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Abstract  
 
 
 
 
This thesis is intended to explore the international relations of emerging nation-building 
in the Somali coast, with particular reference to the un-recognised Republic of 
Somaliland in the north-western Horn of Africa region. This study focuses on the 
international relations of Somaliland’s international quest for recognition, linked to its 
own culturally-rooted internal reconciliatory post-war nation-building efforts. Informed 
by written as well as first-hand research interviews, particular focus is placed in this 
study on the interplay of internal and external forces in shaping a strategy by 
Somaliland’s elites for acquiring international recognition and national self-
determination.   
 
These are placed within the broader regional and international context of attempts to 
resuscitate the Somali state, an endeavour offering a fitting assessment of different 
modalities of African nation-building within the greater Somali environment. In relative 
analytic terms, the competitive international relations of nation-building in Somaliland 
and state reconstitution in southern Somalia informs the underlying hypothesis of this 
thesis: Somaliland’s example as a study in the efficacy of the internally-driven, 
culturally-rooted ‘bottom-up’ approach to post-war nation-building and regional 
stability, and the implications this holds for prioritising reconciliation between 
indigenous traditions and modernity in achieving stability in nation-building. By 
contrast, the internationally-backed ‘top-down’ approach to reconstituting a 
Mogadishu-based Somali state remains elusive. Yet, the international status quo 
regarding the affording of diplomatic recognition to what are normally considered 
secessionist ‘break-away’ regions of internationally recognised states, complicates 
Somaliland’s culturally rooted ‘bottom-up’ modalities. It also challenges the African 
Union (AU) during the ‘good governance’ era of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), a context within which Somaliland fits comfortably as a good 
citizen of the international community. 
 
The international relations of the Somaliland nation-building enterprise is approached 
from a ‘quadrilateral framework’ of interactive elements to the Somaliland experience: 
Reconciliation, Reconstruction, Religion and Recognition. This framework informs the 
four core chapters of the thesis.  
 
 
Key words: Somalia, Somaliland, Horn of Africa, nation-building, reconciliation, 
reconstruction, self-determination, post-conflict stabilisation, geo-politics, Islam. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
 
 
Ama buur ahaw ama buur ku tirso 
 
Either be a mountain or attach yourself to one (Somali proverb) 
 
 
This thesis is intended to explore the international relations of nation-building 
in the Somali coast, with particular reference to the un-recognised Republic of 
Somaliland. Somaliland has been described as “the inspiring story of 
resilience and reconstruction and of a truly African Renaissance which has 
many lessons to teach the rest of Africa, and the international community”.1  
 
In this respect, the material has been organised in six chapters, which aim to 
illuminate key elements of Somaliland’s post-war nation-building and 
international relations, with specific focus on the virtually unknown 
interconnected elements of reconciliation, reconstruction, religion and 
recognition in Somaliland’s quest to sustain its independence and 
development as an important state actor within its region, the greater Horn of 
Africa and within Africa at large. The author plans to narrate this important 
                                                 
1 Cited in Jeremy Brickhill and and Verity Johnson, ‘Rising from the Ashes’, (30 August 
2001). 
http://www.africarenaissance.org/archive/30Aug2001.html; Ken Menkhaus asserts that 
Somaliland has "a level of peace and rule of law that few neighbouring states can match", in 
‘Vicious circles and the security development nexus in Somalia’, Conflict, Security and 
Development, (August 2004a), p. 154. See also Ioan M. Lewis, ‘Lessons from Somaliland: 
Appropriate technology for ‘Peace Processes’, paper presented at the 1st Somaliland 
Societies in Europe Conference, held on 1-2 September at The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, (2005), http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=6034 This point is further 
argued by David Shinn, ‘Somaliland: the little country that could’, Washington: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, (2002). 
 http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/anotes_0211.pdf 
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story, informed by written as well as first-hand research interviews. The author 
sets out the specific theoretical concerns that have informed this thesis and 
relates his analysis to some of the larger issues in the thin body of available 
scholarship on Somaliland. It is an attempt to add to the substantive 
knowledge of Somaliland’s post-war nation-building and international 
relations. 
 
It is hoped that the findings from this research, as reflected in the chapters 
that follow, notably the interplay of external and internal forces in shaping a 
strategy by Somaliland’s elites for acquiring international recognition, will 
contribute constructively to: (a) developing a new sub-field of international 
relations dealing with the “internationalization of domestic transformation”2 
(virtually non-existent in the case of Somaliland), and (b) to an emerging 
regional discourse on the Horn of Africa in South Africa, as South Africa takes 
on the tasks of chairing the African Union’s Ministerial Committee on Post-
Conflict Reconstruction in Sudan and engaging the principle of self-
determination in South Sudan and Somaliland.3 
 
                                                 
2 For a definitive analysis of this interplay of external and internal forces for national self-determination in 
Biafra, see John J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, (1977). Another related perspective on this dimension of international 
relations is the interplay between global economic change and domestic restructuring. The theoretical 
implication of this dimension is that a strict focus on domestic politics at the expense of international 
politics or vice versa highlights only one side of the story. See the pioneering work by Robert O. 
Keohane and Helen V. Milner (eds.), Internationalization and Domestic Politics, Cambridge University 
Press (1996); Robert O. Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World, London: 
Routledge (2002).  
3 Thabo Mbeki, ‘Long live the spirit of John Garang!’, ANC Today.  Online policy voice of South Africa’s 
ruling African National Congress (ANC), Vol. 5, No. 31, (5-11 August 2005) 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2005/at31.htm; ANC Statement, ‘President Nelson Mandela’s 
Peace Efforts in Sudan’, (25 August 1997); Iqbal Jhazbhay, ‘Sudan: Renewed possibilities and hope in 
long walk to peace’, ANC Today, Vol. 5, No. 14, (8-14 April 2005) 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2005/at14.htm; Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Character 
of Sudan: Causes of Conflict and Prospects for Peace’, Strategic Planning Review Workshop, 40-page 
confidential report. Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs, (3-4 October 2004) and Tandeka Lujiza, 
‘Somaliland’s Claim to Sovereign Status’, Office of the Chief State Law Advisor (International Law), 6-
page report, Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs, (April 2003). 
 3
1.1 Exploring the Roots of Somaliland’s Nation-Building 
 
Broadly articulated, the question to be answered is: how did Somaliland 
succeed in reconciling and cohering the clans that currently comprise its 
society? How did this "new solution" emerge, ending war and leading to a 
democratic path?4 How did this process of reconciliation give momentum to 
nation-building in a turbulent and intractable environment, while navigating the 
religious extremism of a militant Islamism, accompanied by what has become 
a reasonably sustained diplomacy for international recognition? As such, this 
treatise will examine the trajectory of Somaliland’s reconciliatory processes, 
reconstruction tracks, religious discourse and international relations from 1991 
through to 2006. On 18 May 1991 Somaliland’s traditional elders and the 
liberation elite unilaterally declared their independence from Somalia. On 18 
May 2006 Somalilanders in many corners of the world celebrated fifteen years 
of Somaliland’s independence and freedom. 
 
This inquiry takes on special urgency in the world that has emerged after the 
September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United States and what this event 
brought in its wake in terms of the trans-national movement of Islamic ideas 
and political currents, terrorism and the quest for international order. The 
challenges posed by this cluster of dynamics as they impinge on Somaliland 
are further compounded by the problematic predicament of Somaliland as an 
unrecognised entity in a continent where the status quo of territorial integrity 
of colonially inherited boundaries is sacrosanct. The two exceptions to the 
                                                 
4 John J. Stremlau, ‘Ending Africa's Wars’, Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2000). 
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latter view are the recent ‘African Union Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland’ 
and the European Union’s support of Somaliland’s recent 2005 parliamentary 
elections.5 
 
The international relations of Somaliand’s bid to overcome this status quo are 
further complicated by rival geo-political agendas between major state actors 
in the Horn of Africa such as Ethiopia, and in Arab North Africa, the Levant 
and the Persian Gulf, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These geo-politics, in 
turn, feed into fundamental conflicts over the modalities of nation-building 
along the Somali coast between proponents of varying federalist formulas and 
those stressing the need for unitary state centralism; between externally 
driven ‘top-down’ interventions to reconstruct and reconstitute a pan-Somali 
state versus internally motivated, culturally-rooted, regionally-based ‘bottom-
up’ bids to reconstruct more territorially limited domains of Somali sovereignty.  
 
To a large extent, the different colonial histories and methodologies of 
dominance have influenced this contemporary contestation in rival attempts at 
Somali state reconstitution and nation-building. Compounding this history, 
contemporary external actors interacting with their Somali interlocutors have 
complicated these contradictory dynamics. In the process, tensions were 
generated, which reached a new level of complexity in light of yet another in a 
                                                 
5 African Union Commission, ‘Resume, AU Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland, (30 April to 4 
May 2005)’, Unpublished 4-page report, Addis Ababa: African Union (2005). This mission was 
led by the AU Deputy Chairperson, Mr. Patrick Mazimhaka.  See also, European 
Commission, ‘International Donors Support the Democratisation Process in Somaliland’, 
Delegation in Kenya – Somalia Operations, (1 September 2005) and European Commission, 
‘Somaliland Parliamentary Elections:  International Members of the Steering Committee 
Commend the Process following Proclamation of the Results’, Delegation in Kenya – Somalia 
Operations (18 October 2005). 
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succession of “rebirths of Somalia” to Somaliland’s south: the 2004 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia.6 However, this process, 
in turn, has been further compounded in its complexity following the June 
2006 ascendancy and displacement of the Supreme Islamic Courts Council 
over warlord rule and rivalry in the south; a development challenging TFG 
legitimacy and the regional and external forces supporting the TFG.  
 
1.2 Hypothesis, Analytical Framework and Research Objectives: The 
Efficacy of African Culturally-Rooted Nation-Building from the ‘Bottom-
Up’  
 
This latest externally-driven ‘top-down’ attempt to reconstitute Somalia as a, 
what is now Islamist challenged-TFG remains far from consolidated. 
Meanwhile, the Somaliland Republic has managed, largely on its own, but 
with increasing African and international interest and support, to pass the 
various electoral stages of the transition in order to acquire international 
recognition. In fact, it could well be that the most recent Islamist and TFG-
related events in the south will further enhance the international recognition 
credibility of Somaliland. 
 
Moreover, this sharp dichotomy between local nation-building success 
seeking international endorsement, on the one hand, and continuing 
                                                 
6 International Crisis Group, ‘Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?’, Africa 
Report No. 95, Nairobi/Brussels, (11 July 2005); and International Crisis Group, ‘Somaliland: 
Democratisation and its Discontents’, Africa Report No. 66, Nairobi/Brussels, (28 July 2003)  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1682&l=1 
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international state rebuilding failure without local legitimacy, on the other, 
inspires the central hypothesis of this study: Somaliland’s example as a study 
in the efficacy of the internally-driven, culturally-rooted ‘bottom-up’ approach 
to post war nation-building and regional stability and the implications this 
approach holds for prioritising reconciliation between indigenous culture and 
traditions and modernity in achieving relative stability in the nation-building 
project. 
 
As a governance model, the culturally-rooted ‘bottom-up’ internally-driven 
phenomenon is more often than not associated with grassroots, participatory 
forms of economic development rather than democratic participation, although 
notions of ‘participatory democracy’ evoke ‘bottom-up’ forms of popular 
governance. But, scholars argue governance from the ground-up is often 
associated with a more technocratic discourse pertaining to debates over the 
efficacy of centralisation versus decentralisation involving different 
administrative tiers of government. Alternatively, the interplay between 
‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ approaches to governance are examined in terms 
of arriving at an optimum division of labour between issues of participation 
that are best addressed at local levels of governance, and problems that can 
only be solved through a trans-national or global consensus, which 
necessarily evokes elite-driven approaches to governance.7 
                                                 
7 The Spring 2003 issue of Perspective, International Development: Global and Local 
Perspectives (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) is indicative of the 
diverse discourses regarding ‘bottom-up’ nation development as “meshing the macro and 
micro” levels of development and governance or decentralisation processes (see ‘Bridging 
Gaps: Decentralization Processes in Latin America,’ by A. Harnisch). Ken Menkhaus opposes 
the idea to rebuild a central nation-state in Somalia, a goal he views as too ambitious for the 
time being. Menkhaus recommends strengthening the groups that are promoting lawfulness 
and a modicum of prosperity. See Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, 
Adelphi Paper 364, Oxford: Oxford University Press, for the International Institute of Strategic 
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As an avowedly political nation-building strategy in the African context, the 
‘top-down’ versus ‘bottom-up’ discourse has, until recently, tended to be 
marginalised by prevailing assumptions of the need for strong centralised 
states wherein decentralisation is viewed suspiciously, along with forms of 
federalism and confederation, which are perceived as threats to territorial 
integrity and state security. But the emergence of regionally-based post-
colonial challenges to incumbent regimes, as in the case of Eritrea’s 
independence from Ethiopia and Sudan being forced to accommodate the 
self-determination of South Sudan in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) of 2005, has begun to force an African rethink on questions of 
federalism, decentralisation, popular participation and ‘top-down’ versus 
culturally rooted ‘bottom-up’ forms of governance. 
 
Somaliland’s experience represents a variation along this theme, having been 
incorporated under a centralised post-colonial regime at the time of 
decolonisation in 1960, only to see that system collapse under the weight of 
                                                                                                                                            
Studies (2004); and  ‘State Collapse in Somalia: second thoughts’, Review of African Political Economy, 
Vol. 39, (2003). See also I.M Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, Nation and State in the Horn of 
Africa, 4th Edition, Oxford: James Currey (2002), notably the chapter on ‘Chaos, International 
Intervention and the North’ pp. 262-310.  See Walter M. Clarke, Jeffrey M. Herbst, Learning from 
Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, Westview Press, (1997). The Clarke-Herbst 
book presents analyses by foreign experts, most of whom were directly involved in U.S. or U.N. 
operations in Somalia in 1993-94. One lesson, say the editors, is that humanitarian interventions in 
collapsed states are too complicated to be conducted as top-down, surgical operations.  See also 
Hussein M. Adam and Richard Ford (eds.), Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in 
the 21st Century, Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press, (1997).This Adam-Ford book is a collection of 40 
papers, over half by Somali authors, addressed to charting a way forward for Somali nation-building. A 
broad consensus emerges in the debates, which is that although international support is vital, rebuilding 
Somalia can only be directed by Somalis because they alone can re-stitch, in a bottom-up way, the 
intricate fabric of their unique culture and society. Another line of thinking which emerges in the literature 
is that past attempts to fix collapsed states in Africa have gone nowhere. A radical rethinking is needed; 
and in the hardest cases, international trusteeships offer the best chance for building states. See 
Stephen Ellis, ‘How to Rebuild Africa’, Foreign Affairs, (September/October 2005). For insights into the 
failed top-down approach in the Somali region of Ethiopia, see Tobias Hagmann, ‘Beyond clannishness 
and colonialism: understanding political disorder in Ethiopia's Somali Region, 1991-2004’, Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4, (2005).  
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repressive centralisation of political power in Mogadishu, which propelled the 
Somalis of the Somaliland coastal region to opt for a reassertion of 
independence. But Somaliland’s uniqueness goes even beyond that, as its 
experience will be shown to have evolved organically out of a different 
regionally based cultural and post-colonial dynamic than was the case in 
Italian Somaliland;8 one in which the reconciliation of tradition and modernity 
played a major role in Somaliland’s ‘bottom-up’ nation-building project. The 
‘bottom-up’ nation-building process is rooted in a post-colonial resistance, 
grounded in the indigenous Somali history and culture of Somaliland, which, it 
is argued, has contributed to an infinitely greater coherence in Somaliland’s 
national identity than has been the case in the south of the country.  
 
It is on the basis of this ‘struggle history’, as well as numerous interviews held 
with key social players as outlined later under the section on method, that the 
refinement of the variables and elements are painstakingly arranged and 
articulated into a viable framework. The problem encountered was in finding a 
unit of analysis appropriate to the study of Somaliland’s post war nation-
building and international relations. To resolve this difficulty, the approach that 
has been taken is that of an interpretive narrative that frames its 
reconciliation-reconstruction-religion-recognition elements into what the 
author calls a 'quadrilateral framework', in their relation to Somaliland’s 
culturally rooted ‘bottom-up’ nation-building formation as a strategy of 
acquiring international recognition.  
                                                 
8 Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism, International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn 
of Africa, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, (1963). Lee V. Cassanelli, The 
Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900, 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, (1982). 
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This approach is suggested partly by the literature reviewed and largely by the 
interviews undertaken in Somaliland. Within this 'quadrilateral framework' as 
the pivotal points, the research objectives of this study are four-fold:  
 
1. To illuminate and interpret the 'quadrilateral framework' mentioned above, 
by examining the points of convergence that have given Somaliland 
political and social cohesion;  
2. To analyse the processes by which the four elements have evolved and 
how they interplay;  
3. To probe into how the international relations of the Horn of Africa, in terms 
of inter-African state actors and extra-African state and non-state 
international influences, have combined to shape this 'quadrilateral 
framework' and how this external realm may affect the future of 
Somaliland’s prospects and those of the entire North-East African sub-
region as they impinge on developments along the Somali peninsula and 
the Red Sea; and 
4. Closely interrelated with this last dimension, to demonstrate how 
Somaliland’s internal dynamics is a critical factor interacting with these 
external influences in shaping the international relations of its recognition 
diplomacy and post-war nation-building. 
 
However, these analytical parameters surrounding Somaliland’s quadrilateral 
processes beg further questions that this study attempts to address. These 
relate to findings from the last four points concerning research objectives that 
 10
may be drawn from formulating a sub-hypothesis pertaining to the possible 
lessons to be learned from the particular interplay of internal and external 
forces in shaping a strategy by Somaliland’s elites for acquiring international 
recognition and national self-determination, and from the Somaliland 
Republic’s emergence within the wider quest for the reconsolidating of a 
‘greater Somalia’ or the Somali peninsula identity. 
 
Inter-clan reconciliation has been at the heart of nation-building in Somaliland, 
to the extent that this process reflects what has come to be recognised as a 
culturally rooted ‘bottom-up’ approach to reconciliatory peace and nation-
building. This study (in the process of answering the question posed earlier of 
“how did Somaliland succeed in reconciling and cohering the clans …“) seeks 
to demonstrate that such an approach may have more to offer in stabilising 
African – and, for that matter, non-African – conflict situations, in terms of 
sustainable peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, than the 
conventional ‘top-down’ approach often imposed by the international politics 
of such conflicts; that, to the extent that Somaliland has and continues to 
develop as a “success story”9 in the efficacy of “locally managed peace” and 
nation-building based on its unique clan politics of reconciliation, it also serves 
as an object lesson for the rest of Africa in what may be the greater benefits of 
integrating or balancing tradition and modernity in governance in arriving at 
                                                 
9 Iqbal Jhazbhay, ‘As a success story, Somaliland is Africa’s Best-Kept Secret’, Umrabulo, 
Vol. 18, (2003), http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pubs/umrabulo/umrabulo18/success.html 
An extended version of this essay can be located under the title: ‘Somaliland: Africa’s Best-
Kept Secret, A Challenge to the International Community?’, African Security Review,  Vol. 12, 
No. 4, (2003).  http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/12No4/EJhazbhay.html   
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optimum formulas for achieving peace and security in Africa.10 State collapse 
and warfare experienced in Somaliland and Somalia have catalysed the 
modernisation process, where foreign patronage was abandoned, emerging 
local political authorities brought into being and free-market capitalism 
embraced, and in Somaliland, a more self-determined path was developed; 
and there is ample evidence of this.11  
 
Here, stress must be placed on 'integrating' and 'balancing' since imbalances 
between tradition and modernity in African governance may serve as 
continuing sources of destabilisation and unrest, as amply demonstrated 
within the southern African sub-region in – like the Somali coast – the mono-
ethnic nation-state monarchies of Lesotho and Swaziland (and, post-election 
1994 in South Africa, what is now KwaZulu-Natal province). Finally, given the 
continuing saga of the Somaliland Republic, the challenge of inter-African, 
North-East African and international politics is to arrive at a realistic 
                                                 
10 For relevant debates on tradition and modernity, see Tobias Hagmann, ‘Review Article, From State 
Collapse to Duty-Free Shop: Somalia’s Path to Modernity’, African Affairs, 104/416, pp. 525-535. Peter 
D. Little, Somalia: Economy Without State, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
(2003). Little talks about social trust as the traditional value that underpins much of the informal Somali 
economy. Little follows the ‘transformationalist’ approach in the debate on the role of kinship in the 
Somali conflict. There is very little empirical work in this text on Somaliland or Puntland. Eva Evers 
Rosander and David Westerlund (eds.), African Islam and Islam in Africa: Encounters between Sufis 
and Islamists, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, (1997). This text probes into the debates of how, 
within Islamic societies, the battle between modernity and tradition is unfolding. Ioan M. Lewis, A 
Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of 
Africa, James Currey Publisher, (1999). Though much of the field work for this text by Ioan Lewis, the 
doyen of Somali studies, was undertaken in the early sixties, it has broadly weathered the test of time 
barring some dated statistics. Lewis' seminal study, which is part of Somali intellectual history over the 
years, reflects a traditional school of scholarship which overlooks everyday sociology of life. Lewis' 
contested approach has insisted on the prime significance of the Somali segmentary clan lineage 
system to explicate politics and statelessness. On the debate regarding the ‘transformationalist’ and 
‘traditionalist’ approach to the Somali conflict, see Abdi Ismail Samatar, ‘Destruction of state and society 
in Somalia; beyond the tribal convention’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, (1992), pp. 625-
41. 
11 Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhaus and Roland Marchal, Human Development Report Somalia 2001, 
United Nations Development Programme, (2001). Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the 
threat of terrorism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2004). Judith Gardner and Judy El Bushra, 
Somalia – The Untold Story, The war through the eyes of Somali women, London: Pluto Press 
Publishing, (2004). Mark Bradbury, ‘Living with Statelessness: the Somali road to development, Conflict, 
Security and Development, Vol. 3, (2003). Roland Marchal, Jamil A. Mubarak, Michel del Bruno and 
D.L. Manzolillo, Globalization and Its Impact on Somalia, UNDP/UNDOS, Nairobi, (2000). 
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accommodation of such on-the-ground culturally ‘bottom-up’ requirements for 
bringing peace, security and stability to such conflict-ridden regions in the 
developing world. Here, the political and policy implications of addressing this 
challenge will be explored.  
 
1.3 Notes on Data, Research Methods and Sources  
 
This study is largely shaped by the author’s career as a lecturer in Islamic 
Studies and as a researcher with an area studies specialisation on the Horn of 
Africa, North Africa and the Middle East.12 Much of the study relies on 
academic literature, primary sources and privileged insider access to select 
official and unofficial sources of information.    
 
In addition, the hypothesis of this study is largely informed by original field 
research where key ideas were discussed, interrogated and internalised. The 
                                                 
12 Iqbal Jhazbhay, ‘South Africa – North Africa Relations: Bridging a Continent’, South African 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 11, Issue 2, Winter/Spring, (2004), pp. 155-168. Iqbal 
Jhazbhay (ed.), ‘Horn of Hope', African Security Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2004), pp. 1-3. Iqbal 
Jhazbhay and Patrick Mazimhaka 'Security, Governance and Development: The Braided 
Strands of Future Prosperity in Africa', in African Security, Commodities and Development, 
London: RUSI Whitehall Report 4-06, (2006), pp. 1-5. Iqbal Jhazbhay, 'South Africa–Middle 
East Relations During the Mandela and Mbeki Presidency: A Test of Sure-Footed Maturity 
and Do-Able Morality?' in Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (ed.), South Africa’s Foreign Policy 1994-
2004: Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future. Johannesburg: South African Institute of 
International Affairs, (2004), pp. 281-296 (second edition reprinted 2006). Iqbal Jhazbhay, 
Stanley Makgohlo and Elizabeth Sidiripoulus 'North Africa: A Review' in Greg Mills (ed.) South 
African Yearbook of International Affairs 2000/01. Johannesburg: South African Institute of 
International Affairs, (2001), pp. 199-218. Iqbal Jhazbhay, 'South African Political Islam: A 
Preliminary Approach towards Tracing the Call of Islam’s Discourse(s) of Struggle', Journal of 
Muslim Minority Affairs, London, Vol. 22, No. 1, (2002), pp. 225-231. Iqbal Jhazbhay, 'The 
Politics of Interpretation: The Call of Islam and Ulama Disciplinary Power in South Africa', 
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2, (2002), pp. 457- 467. Iqbal Jhazbhay, 'An 
Emerging Muslim Identity in the Global Village: The South African Presentation at the 
International Conference on ‘Azmat Al-Hawiyya’', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 20, 
No. 2, (2000), October, pp. 369-372. Charl Le Roux and Iqbal Jhazbhay, 'The Contemporary 
Path of Qibla Thought – a Hermeneutical Reflection', Journal for Islamic Studies (University of 
Cape Town), Vol. 12, (1992), pp. 84-100. Iqbal Jhazbhay, 'A Fatwa from al-Azhar for South 
Africa', Journal for Islamic Studies (University of Cape Town), Vol. 11, (1991), pp. 43-52. 
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primary material and interviews used in this study were collected from mid-
2000 to 2006, during various field research visits.13 Nine field trips were made 
to the Somaliland cities of Hargeisa, Borama, Burao, Gabiley, Berbera and 
Erigavo, as well as to the regional capitals of Addis Ababa and Khartoum. 
Stable and safe political conditions prevailed, which did not limit the author's 
travel to any major town or rural settlement. Some 101 Somali and other 
informants were interviewed in a variety of settings and circumstances. A list 
of persons who provided the most useful administrative records, official 
chronicles and information, anecdotal as well as systematic insights for this 
study, can be found in Appendix A.   
 
Direct face-to-face interviews were viewed as the most effective approach.14 
Interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis to evaluate the credibility of 
information provided. The type of questions was informal and tailored to 
different situations; while some interviews were ad hoc, others were arranged 
timeously. Most interviews were internalised and recorded by hand at leisure. 
Another method used was to attend afternoon and evening informal chat 
groups within the context of Somali oral culture to compare notes, pick up 
clues, rectify errors and correct memories. At these chat groups, some Somali 
kinsmen speak to each other cautiously and accurately and others peddle 
conjecture. Consequently, about one-third of the interviews that were 
                                                 
13 The field-research in and fact-finding visits to Somaliland were undertaken in August 2000, 
April 2001, May 2002, January 2003, April 2003, December 2003, January 2004, September 
2005 and July 2006.  Addis Ababa was visited in August 2000, June 2001, January 2003, 
December 2003, January 2004, September 2005, March 2006, May 2006, and Khartoum in 
January 2004. 
14 Natalie Peutz,   ‘Embarking on an Anthropology of Removal’, Current Anthropology, Vol. 47 
Issue 2, (April 2006), pp. 217-241. This article presents fieldwork conducted in Somaliland 
examining a group of Somalis who were deported from the U.S. and comments on the 
sociology of deportation and the use of face-to-face interviews. 
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undertaken involved two or more persons. Often, there was a search for the 
time honoured Somali traditional principle of seeking consensus (ijma), and at 
times participants disagreed. In this way a clearer picture emerged, filling in 
the gaps where some of the written primary and secondary sources were 
lacking. In addition, telephonic interviews were also used to obtain an update 
on recent developments.  
 
Given the need to answer specific questions and design a viable research 
framework of study, select policy-makers, traditional elders, shaykhs and 
opinion-shapers were interviewed in order to elicit on-the-ground, first-hand 
information on Somaliland and the region for its qualitative value. Individuals 
selected were mature adults who were a critical source for tapping into the 
indigenous knowledge systems unique to the region and who were able to 
unpack Somaliland’s inter-related domestic and international dimensions and 
dynamics. The on-site interviews were arranged personally, as well as by the 
Somaliland Academy of Peace and Development and the African Union 
Commission, which also proved most fruitful in the collation of primary, 
secondary and archival sources.  Meetings at the University of Hargeisa and 
Amoud University, and the monthly reports from the locally-based 
international agencies such as the European Commission and United Nations 
assisted in covering particular issues in Somaliland’s reconciliation and 
reconstruction efforts. There is no professional International Relations 
organisation in Somaliland comparable to the South African Institute of 
International Affairs or the Council for Foreign Relations. Nevertheless, there 
are many local development research organisations and every clan had its 
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recognised experts on domestic and international issues.15 Many of the 
informants were interviewed several times over the course of some years to 
get a better sense of Somaliland’s post-war nation-building and international 
relations. 
 
Interviews and their reliability had to be evaluated against known academic 
criteria and established area studies information. Interviews with unrelated 
people from different areas and backgrounds made it possible to discern and 
confirm the certainty of the information provided.  
 
 Arabic and English, two known languages of Somaliland, were used for 
communication with respondents. The author’s knowledge of Arabic, Arabic 
literature, and Islamic culture and religion, along with the intellectual tools of 
Political Studies and International Relations were put to use in the interviews 
and were also employed to probe more systematically into the analysis of 
information. Each channel was closely examined to verify the exactness of the 
information, and the author's field research was able to reveal any instance of 
fabricated or ‘doctored’ reports. Furthermore, the author's intimate knowledge 
of the Horn of Africa, North Africa, Middle East, and personal contacts with 
individuals and key regional institutions worked to his distinct advantage.  
 
                                                 
15 See also the enabling, international ‘thickening’ character of the Somali digital diaspora on 
the internet as a forum for many local voices to amplify their local and international concerns. 
See this line of argument in Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, ‘Digital diasporas and conflict prevention: 
the case of Somalinet.com’, Review of International Studies, British International Studies 
Association, Vol. 32, (2006), pp. 25-47.  
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Another key method used by the author to engage experts, collate information 
and conceptualise key questions in this study was the regular attendance of 
numerous lectures, seminars and conferences on Somaliland, Somalia and 
the Horn of Africa.16  
 
This study attempts to avoid abstractions that could dilute the evidential value 
of the information gathered. Sources were treated with caution and 
interrogated to satisfy the questions of how, when, where and why and the 
maxim of "who says what to whom for what purpose in what circumstances".  
This was done to ensure that all conclusions were made only after the 
sources were carefully evaluated and to probe into the multiple vested 
interests at work.17 Often, sources were compared with independent reports 
and experts in Somali studies.  
 
Gaps in written literature were overcome by frequent visits and telephonic 
interviews, fax and e-mail communication with reliable sources. Fortunately, 
given that this is a new area of study, many reliable sources supported this 
search for an 'authentic' (al-asil) narrative, as a result of the relationship of 
trust which developed over the period spanning from mid-2000 to 2006, and 
                                                 
16 For example, the ‘9th Somali Studies International Association Conference’ hosted by 
Research Centre on Development and International Relations, Aalborg University, Denmark, 
(3-5 September 2004), ‘First Annual Somaliland Convention’ organised by the Somaliland 
Policy and Reconstruction Institute, Los Angeles, (25-27 June 2005) and ‘Conference of 
Somaliland Communities in Europe and Somaliland’ at The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, London (1-2 September 2005). Also the ‘Roundtable on Somalia’, Washington, US 
Department of State and National Intelligence Council, (13 October 2005) and US Combined 
Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, ‘Mutual Security Conference’, Addis Ababa, (25-25 January 
2006). The author was requested to address all of the above-mentioned fora on an aspect of 
Somaliland. 
17 Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, ‘The Challenges of Doing African Studies’, (26 March 2006). 
http://zeleza.com/blog/index.php?p=37 
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because many Somaliland scholars and practitioners saw the need for such a 
scholarly study. Stringent efforts were made to ensure ethical and intellectual 
impartiality by consulting Somali studies experts18 and corroborating evidence 
from various sources, despite the author's bias that Somaliland has earned 
the right to recognition. Resolving this tension was one of the chief 
methodological challengers of this study. Equally challenging was the 
predicament faced by a surfeit of information from an over-abundance of 
sources and the resulting problem of selection. 
 
Somali names have generally been used in their usual anglicised format 
rather than in the orthography of the Somali script. The author's conclusions 
are approached based on the evidence available at the time of the research.  
 
Much of the scholarly knowledge developed here will be within the "middle-
range theories"; a range of theoretical endeavour that attempts to formulate 
specified generalisations of a limited scope and provide good analysis and 
details that might be used in subsequent studies for theory-building, while 
assisting in foreign policy decision-making. With specific focus on key areas, 
the pitfall of over-generalisation is minimised.19  
 
The idea of the 'quadrilateral framework', which focuses on Somaliland’s 
reconciliation, reconstruction, religious discourse and its search for diplomatic 
                                                 
18 I am thankful to Somali studies experts Prof. Hussein Adam, Mr. John Drysdale, Prof. Ioan 
Lewis and Mr. Matt Bryden for their scholarly advice, practical counsel and response to 
numerous queries. 
19 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences, Cambridge, Mass.: Mit Press, (May 2005) p. 266 and p. 75. This lucid study 
describes the type of theory-building and research objectives used in this study as 
Atheoretical/configurative idiographic. 
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recognition, did not come easily. After reading the available academic and 
related literature and especially after the numerous interviews, field-visits and 
informal probing, the author was able to identify these dimensions as key 
elements of a viable framework and to confirm that the hypothesis is testable 
through the data and interviews. 
 
This study attempts to approach the available evidence and move beyond the 
dominant fissions within Somali studies, which focus on the ideological power 
of state-centric concepts. Almost all discourse on Somalia centres on the 
absence of a functioning central government to explain developments in 
Somalia.20 The author follows Tobias Hagmann’s suggested method that 
reading the available evidence and “empirical examination rather than well-
meant assumptions on the functions and meanings of state institutions is 
necessary when gauging the Somali situation.”21     
 
1.4 A Survey of the Six Chapters 
 
Chapter 1: This chapter will provide a brief background of the study and will 
include a brief statement of the problem, the research hypothesis and 
objectives, an analytical framework, the research methodology and data 
                                                 
20 Among the exceptions are Ali Jimale Ahmed (ed.), The Invention of Somalia, Red Sea 
Press (1995). Menkhaus stresses state-building and peace building are opposite projects in 
the Somali context, notably in the South. The point is enlarged in ‘State Collapse in Somalia: 
second thoughts’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 39, (2003).  
21 Tobias Hagmann, p. 534. See also the contested article by Catherine Besteman, 
‘Representing violence and “othering” Somalia’, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 11, (1996).  For a 
cogent counter-perspective and critique on methods used by Besteman, see I.M Lewis, 
‘Doing violence to ethnography: A response to Catherine Besteman's `Representing Violence 
and “othering” Somalia’, Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 13, Issue 1, (February 1998). 
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collection, a survey of chapters and a consolidated review of existing literature 
for each of the four R’s explicated below. 
 
Chapter 2: 'Reconciliation: Resistance, Collapse, Conflict, Consensus and 
the International Community' will review the rise of the Somali National 
Movement (SNM), the trauma of repression and resistance between northern, 
formerly British Somaliland, and the incumbent regime of Mohammed Siad 
Barre, between 1984 and the collapse of that regime in 1991, along with a 
revisiting of the Hargeisa genocide of 1988.  
 
1991 marks the move toward nation-statehood formation and the unilateral 
declaration of independence interacting with the following interrelated socio-
political dynamics: the reconciliation of Somaliland clans involving indigenous 
reconciliation initiatives; interactions between the majority Isaaq clan and the 
minority clans: ‘Iise, Gadabursi, Dhulbahante and Warsengeli, followed by the 
1991-93 politics of transition involving national reconciliation conferences and 
influences of the international community. 
 
Chapter 3: 'Reconstruction: Rubble to Rebuilding' will capture the momentum 
of the national reconciliation nation-state rebuilding phase as it drives a 
reconstruction process involving the: demobilisation of militias; internal state 
institutional reconstruction focusing on the House of Elders and the House of 
Representatives; the international dimensions of reconstruction involving 
humanitarian aid and developmental assistance; private reconstruction 
initiatives interacting with the development of a monetary exchange process 
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and the participation of the Somaliland diaspora; and the role of women as the 
backbone of the Somaliland economy, and how all of these social 
components to nation-state-building are framed constitutionally in the crafting 
of a multi-party democracy with northern Somali characteristics. However, the 
broader context in which these reconstructive dynamics unfold is conditioned 
by the emergence of militant expressions of political Islam within and outside 
the Somali coast in and around the Red Sea ‘Afrabian’ trans-region and the 
Persian Gulf.  
 
Chapter 4: 'Religion: Somaliland and the Upheaval within Islam' will describe 
and interpret these regional (geo-cultural/geo-Islamic) pressures interacting 
with localised Somaliland expressions of pastoral Sufi Islam and Wahhabi 
‘Gulf Islam’ influences; the rise of political Islam in North-East Africa; the geo-
politics of the war on terror and the global Islamic civil war; Somaliland’s 
Islamic culture of education; and the Somaliland prognosis on Islam and 
stability and how an Islamist ascendancy might affect Somaliland. 
 
The Somaliland international relations and politics of reconciliation, 
reconstruction and religion dovetail into what has become the ultimate 
‘bottom-line’ in the 'quadrilateral framework' nexus of this thesis: the 
achievement of international diplomatic recognition – or, at the very least, a 
workable contingent status that will facilitate the normalisation of Somaliland’s 
international relations.  
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Chapter 5: 'Recognition: Recognising the Unrecognised', will examine 
leadership and the domestic pulse; regional geo-political dynamics interacting 
within the broader international context and how these dynamics play out in 
the quest for de jure recognition and the influence of regional politics; 
Somaliland’s navigating its quasi-juridical sovereignty amid the politics of the 
Arab League and the African Union (AU) which resonate in the arena of 
multilateral institutions, while Somaliland’s relations with Ethiopia and South 
Africa open up possibilities of a departure from isolation.  
 
Chapter 6: The conclusion will summarise the ‘big picture’ emerging from 
reconciliation, reconstruction, religion and recognition while looking at lessons 
learned from the uniqueness of the Somaliland experience; where the 
dynamics of its nation-building process and the interplay of internal and 
external forces may lead to international diplomatic recognition; and the 
stabilisation of the fractious Somali coast. The author will suggest areas for 
future research. 
 
1.5 Literature on Somaliland: Consolidated Survey and Review 
 
Somaliland, as a national-state entity, perhaps because of its newness as a 
state and, in addition to that, one that is unrecognised, has not generated 
much in the way of systematic literature on its politics, history, economy and 
people. Thus, any literature review of Somaliland from both historical and 
contemporary perspectives must start by acknowledging the weakness of the 
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literature base in terms of published volumes as opposed to periodical 
sources. 
 
Two noteworthy exceptions, as far published volumes are concerned are 
worth mentioning here. There is the War-Torn Societies Programme 
International work, Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities (Asmara, 
Red Sea Press, 2005) and Michael Schiswohl's work. These include Status 
and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in 
International Law: The Case of ‘Somaliland’ and The Resurrection of 
Somaliland Against All ‘Odds’: State Collapse, Secession, Non-Recognition 
and Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004).  Rebuilding 
Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities is a collection of four valuable studies on 
the decentralisation of government institutions, media and political 
construction, the livestock economy and the impact of war on the family.   
 
Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto 
Regimes in International Law: The Case of ‘Somaliland’, is a helpful study 
designed to describe a valid legal framework applicable to Somaliland and to 
other non-state entities, and the elaboration of the law governing de facto 
regimes and their human rights obligations. Here, given this latter work’s 
treatment of Somaliland as a worthy study, another work that cites Somaliland 
within the context of an emerging body of thought and literature on state 
collapse and failure is States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in 
Authority and Control by Jeffrey Herbst. Herbst sees Somaliland, within the 
context of what he terms “the new type of state disintegration that parts of 
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Africa is undergoing”, where a nascent state emerges from simply exiting a 
disintegrating state, as opposed to the Eritrea scenario where a state “lacks 
the ability to even contest” a secession. Herbst follows this up by making a 
case for needed policy changes that allow for new states like Somaliland to be 
brought into the international economy, so as to benefit from engagement with 
institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.22 
 
More often than not, Somaliland is referred to and/or dealt with within the 
broader context of Somalia and the greater Somali peninsula. In some cases, 
such treatment obscures more than it illuminates with respect to Somaliland.23 
A good example in this regard is a report that will be cited again, titled Arab 
Donor Policies and Practices on Education in Somalia/land (2004, Oxfam 
Netherlands). In this instance, 'Somalia/land' is more illuminating about 
Somalia in general rather than Somaliland specifically. 
 
Nevertheless, since its unilateral independence in 1991, Somaliland in and of 
itself and within the broader context of turmoil engulfing the greater Somali 
region, has generated a proliferation of online journalistic commentaries and 
periodical articles, academic analyses, opinion and commentary pieces and 
studies associated with the treatment of the larger Somalia conflict and 
political environment. Moreover, there are sources that provide regular 
periodic updates on the Somali coast, such as the International Crisis Group 
                                                 
22 Jeffrey Herbst, State and Power in Africa, Princeton: Princeton University Press, (2000), pp. 
267-8. This section is the concluding chapter that discusses 'The Past and the Future of State 
Power in Africa' with Somaliland being referenced in the sub-section on 'Recognizing New 
Nation States'.  
23 Marc Lacey, ‘The Signs Say Somaliland, but the World Says Somalia’, New York Times, 
Vol. 155, Issue 53601, (6 May 2006), p. A4. 
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(ICG) ‘Africa Reports’ that address the situation in Somaliland. In this regard, 
the reports and periodic research papers that have been produced by Matt 
Bryden (formerly the representative of the War-Torn Societies Programme in 
the Horn of Africa) have been invaluable sources of information for keeping 
abreast of ongoing developments in the Somali region, including 
Somaliland.24  
 
The security situation in the Somali coast and the greater Persian Gulf, Middle 
East and Arabian peninsula, relating to the rise of militant political Islamist 
tendencies interacting with the US global war on terrorism, has inevitably 
brought Somaliland under the international peace and security spotlight.25 
 
Somaliland’s development, therefore, has been intimately caught up in the 
wider geo-political security environment of the Horn of Africa region and the 
greater Middle East. Ken Menkhaus’ August 2004 article in Conflict, Security 
& Development, examining the “Vicious circles and the security development 
nexus in Somalia” is indicative in this regard, including as it does, a look at 
Somaliland’s demobilisation process compared to that in southern Somalia.  
 
Readily available online sources such as AllAfrica.com, awdalnews.com and 
hiiraan.com – the main bilingual English and Somali independent news 
                                                 
24 In addition to the two earlier International Crisis Group reports mentioned, see 
‘Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?’, Africa Report No. 88, (21 December 2004). 
‘Salvaging Somalia’s Chance For Peace’, Africa Briefing No. 11, (9 December 2002). 
‘Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State’, Africa Report No. 45, (23 May 2002). 
25 Economist, ‘Somaliland : Trying to behave like a proper state’, (29 Sep 2005).  
http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=4466050&no_na_tran=1; 
Economist, ‘Somalia, A state of utter failure’, (14 December 2005). 
http://www.economist.com/world/africa/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=5313559 
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service on Africa – are also useful for area specialists and policy-makers on 
the Horn of Africa to consult, with respect to contextual unfolding 
developments in Somaliland as well as the Somali region as a whole. In the 
following paragraphs, the author attempts to highlight some of the more 
salient publications, periodical articles and online sources that have been 
consulted in this thesis. Because of the uneven quality of the literature on 
Somaliland, it was considered more useful to relate the literature review to the 
specific chapters rather than to reflect these sources in a more consolidated 
overview format.  
 
1.5.1 Literature in Chapter 2 – Reconciliation: Collapse, Conflict, 
Consensus and the International Community  
 
Literature cited and drawn upon in this chapter, focusing on the reconciliation 
process associated with the birth of Somaliland, is indicative of the range of 
materials that have emerged over the past few years. There is much material 
that is now accessible online on various websites, which has proven 
invaluable. But it is actually an unpublished 2004 paper by veteran Somali 
specialist John Drysdale, ‘A Study of the Somali Hybrid Insurance System and 
the Consequences of its Rejection by Southern Somalia’s Political 
Leadership’26 that provides valuable background to understanding the 
different colonially-based cultural histories of northern Somalia-cum-
Somaliland and southern Somalia in establishing the foundation for this study; 
the differential impacts of British and Italian colonialism and the role that 
tradition has played in shaping the politics of the two regions. Northern 
                                                 
26 See John Drysdale’s website: http://www.somalilandsurveys.info/Article.htm 
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Somalia’s comparatively more manageable coping with tradition versus 
modernity dynamics, as explored by Drysdale, resonates with similar tradition-
modernity issues in what Mahmood Mamdani conceptualises as the colonially 
inherited “bifurcated” urban-citizen/rural-tribal dichotomy explored in his 
seminal work, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of 
Late Colonialism (1996, Oxford University Press). The kind of discussion that 
emerges from these works, Drysdale’s unpublished piece in particular, 
provides a useful basis for reconstructing the scenario of Somalia’s collapse, 
out of which was generated the struggle for northern Somalia’s independence. 
 
In his 1994 work, Whatever Happened to Somalia? (HAAN Publishing), 
Drysdale provides an informative ‘I was there’ account of the local, regional 
and international politics of Somalia’s disintegration, including the context in 
which Somaliland’s unilateral independence was declared. It profiles many of 
the key Somali and international personalities who formed the cast of political 
actors during the early 1990s period of the United Nations (UN) intervention. 
However, the local political map of this terrain was a product of the resistance 
to the Siad Barre regime.    
 
The background to Somalia’s disintegration and the emergence of a plethora 
of Somali liberation movements is captured in numerous sources that are 
drawn upon in the first chapter. The online ‘OnWar.com’ 
(http://www.onwar.com) analysis of the Ogaden Ethio-Somalia War as 
precursor to Somalia’s collapse is captured in 'Ethiopia Somalia Ogaden War 
1976-1978', accompanied by online country study sources of the US Library 
 27
of Congress’ treatment of ‘Oppression of the Isaaq’ in its Somalia study 
(http://countrystudies.us/somalia/1.htm). An excellent online source for 
understanding the liberation struggle context of the SNM, which spearheaded 
Somaliland’s emergence from the larger conflict, sparked by the repression of 
the Siad Barre dictatorship is Jack L. Davies’ August 27, 1994 Civic Webs 
Virtual Library article on ‘The Liberation Movements of Somalia’ 
(http://www.civicwebs.com). A useful companion source that also extends up 
to the more contemporary post-unilateral independence period is provided by 
Ahmed Yusuf Farah’s April 1999 study of ‘Civil-Military Relations in 
Somaliland and Northeast Somalia’. Farah’s piece expands on the liberation 
movement roots of Somaliland – the focus of Davies – to provide a 
comparative analysis of Somaliland and what is now Puntland, the Somali 
coast’s north-eastern autonomous region which, unlike Somaliland, did not 
opt for independence. 
 
Once Davies and Farah have established the culture of resistance and the 
emergence of liberation movements that ultimately lead to the downfall of 
Barre, the collaboration between Mark Bradbury, Adan Yusuf Abokor and 
Haroon Ahmed Yusuf in their Review of African Political Economy article 
examining ‘Somaliland: Choosing Politics Over Violence’ (No. 97: 455-478, 
2003) provides the point of departure for charting the reconciliatory nation-
building process that unfolds in the build-up to and in the aftermath of 
Somaliland’s independence. By laying out the conflicted nature of 
Somaliland’s early alternation between clan elder-influenced negotiations and 
factional conflict, Bradbury et al. build on Davies and Farah in providing, 
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overall, an organic framework for understanding Somaliland’s evolution over 
the early 1990s, against the backdrop of endemic anarchy in southern 
Somalia. Furthermore, Farah’s comparative focus on Puntland, along with 
Somailand, also provides an understanding of the intersecting points of 
tension between Somaliland and southern Somalia that accompany and 
influence Somaliland’s transition from violence to politics, as outlined by 
Bradbury et al.  
 
From there, several lesser news articles and commentaries capture more 
recent developments growing out of Somaliland’s reconciliatory nation-
building, including its quest for diplomatic recognition interacting with its 
navigation of the international politics of efforts to reconstitute a post-
transitional national government in Mogadishu. Many of these sources are 
readily available on AllAfrica.com and include articles from newspapers of 
Ethiopian and Kenyan origin. Other useful sources are periodically available 
from BBC News and from a Somaliland website, Somaliland.Net. Otherwise, a 
particularly useful overview of Somaliland’s reconciliatory nation-building 
experience is provided in ZEF News (No. 14), 'Somaliland: Building 
Governance Bottom-Up', a piece that succinctly complements some of the 
materials earlier cited, especially Drysdale’s unpublished paper. 
 
1.5.2 Literature in Chapter 3 – Reconstruction: Rubble to Rebuilding 
 
Literature addressing Somaliland’s post-conflict reconstruction interacts very 
closely with the reconciliatory nation-building process, though the emphasis 
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shifts from the politics of reconciliation to the imperatives of socio-economic 
development and the recovery of the economy. Any attempt to explore this 
terrain should start with the consulting of two major though modest 
Somaliland publications: The 1999 report of the Somaliland Centre for Peace 
and Development Self-Portrait (SCPD) titled A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: 
Rebuilding from the Ruins, and the Somaliland Ministry of National Planning 
and Coordination’s 2005 report titled ‘Somaliland Economic Overview’. Of the 
two, Self-Portrait provides a comprehensive survey of the country’s socio-
economic development. Its narrative weaves in substantial references to 
Somailand’s building of political institutions of governance at local and 
regional levels as well as at a national level against a backdrop of having to 
cope with repatriation and the demilitarising disarmament-demobilisation-
rehabilitation-reconstruction (DDRRR) process. Self-Portrait, therefore, 
contextualises Somaliland’s reconstruction and development dimensions of 
reconciliation and nation-building in which its establishment of a Ministry of 
Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reconstruction features.  
 
Apart from reintegrating refugee and exile returnees, the incorporation of 
women and marginalised groups into the new polity and reconstruction 
process is also addressed by the SCPD report. However, a more focused and 
important treatment of the gender dimensions of this process emerges in 
Somalia: The Untold Story: The War Through the Eyes of Somali Women, 
edited by Judith Gardner and Judy El Bushra (CIIR and Pluto Press, 2004). 
Here, the key chapter is the contribution by Zynab Mohamed Hassan and 
Shukri Harirr Ismail et al., titled ‘Women and Peace-Making in Somaliland’, 
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which examines the struggles that Somaliland’s women have had to wage in 
achieving gender equality within a conservative patriarchal Muslim society. 
This edited volume fills a gap often neglected by research with a more 
structural angle. It blends Somali female authorship and daily practice by 
ordinary Somalis with oral testimony. (Here, another important reference 
regarding the role of women in Somaliland is an unpublished report presented 
at the 2nd Post-War Reconstruction Strategies Conference convened by the 
Institute for Practical Research and Training in Hargeisa on 20-25 July 2000, 
titled ‘Assessment of Potential Women Leaders in Somaliland’, by Amina 
Mohamed Warsame. It was presented under the auspices of the Somaliland 
Women’s Research and Action Group.) 
 
This is a narrative that embraces both the politics of reconstruction as well as 
its socio-economic dimension which, within the SCPD report, extends into a 
survey of Somaliland’s economic sectors, centring on its major dependence 
on livestock. A more focused discussion of the reconstruction of this and other 
sectors is the domain of the 2005 Somaliland Economic Survey. What is 
important about Self-Portrait however, beyond the report itself, is its reflection 
of the type of developmental research that has been underway in a 
Somaliland preoccupied with building a diversity of civil society and non-
governmental institutions, as well as structures of governance. 
 
Subsequent to Self-Portrait, the SCPD became the Somaliland Academy for 
Peace and Development (SAPD). As a leading think-tank, it interacts 
extensively with Somaliland’s universities as well as with international 
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organisations, donors and government. As a partner organisation of the War-
torn Societies Programme (WSP), it has undertaken a number of studies 
relevant to Somaliland’s development such as examining ‘The Role of the 
Private Sector in Zones of Conflict: The Experience of the Somaliland 
Academy for Peace and Development’. A 2002 report on ‘Regulating the 
Livestock Economy of Somaliland’ is another such SAPD study. These 
studies are pertinent to the more technocratic focus on Somaliland’s 
economic sectors found in the Ministry of National Planning and 
Coordination’s ‘Somaliland Economic Overview 2005’. The 2005 overview 
surveys the problems faced by the critical livestock sector; what is considered 
a neglected marine economy, education, training and health; the environment 
and transport communications, including port development centring on the 
European Union (EU) supported exploration of developing a rail link with 
Ethiopia, which will benefit the further development of the Berbera port on the 
Gulf of Aden.27      
 
Other important source material on Somaliland’s economic development has 
been generated by the UN through, principally, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), despite the fact that the UN does not 
recognise Somaliland. How it gets around this, as reflected in its Economic 
Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2004-2006 is the reference to 
this being the “Development Plan for Northwest Somalia (Somaliland)”. UNDP 
sources such as this, Somaliland’s first UN-sponsored development plan, 
touch the country’s overall capacity-building challenges both at the level of 
                                                 
27 These valuable four studies on livestock, media, decentralisation and war, now appear in 
the volume: War-Torn Societies Programme International, (2005). 
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governance institutions, as well as in such socio-economic human 
development sectors, such as in the education field and in the economy. 
Capacity challenges inevitably highlight what has become another major 
dimension of Somaliland’s development, which has also been a generator of 
research and studies: the Somaliland diaspora, the remittance economy that 
has emerged from this diaspora’s support for family, relatives and projects in 
Somaliland and how Somalilanders overseas have become actively engaged 
in Somaliland’s development.  
 
Indicative of such research and source materials on this aspect of 
Somaliland’s reconstruction and development are works by Peter Hansen of 
the Danish Institute for Development Studies (DIIS), who published in the 
International Organization on Migration’s (IOM’s) Migration Policy Research 
‘working papers series’, a study on ‘Migrant Remittances as a Development 
Tool: The Case of Somaliland’ (No. 3 – June 2004). The Somaliland diaspora 
also features as an important case study in the African Foundation for 
Development’s (AFFORD’s) May 2000 paper, ‘Globalisation and 
Development: A Diaspora Dimension’.28  
 
Literature on the Somaliland diaspora experience and how it intimately relates 
to Somaliland’s development may, over time, emerge as an important source 
of findings and ‘lessons learned’ for how post-colonial African expatriate 
diasporas, and the remittance economy they generate, can become more 
coherently integrated into country development strategies in Africa; an area 
                                                 
28 See ‘University of Hargeisa, Somaliland Case Study’, pp. 10-12. 
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that is specifically relevant to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development’s 
(NEPAD’s) priority to resource mobilisation, including human resources and 
finding ways of reversing the African brain drain and/or coping with it in ways 
that make it benefit Africa. 
 
1.5.3 Literature in Chapter 4 – Religion: Somaliland and the Upheaval 
within Islam      
 
No examination of Somaliland’s post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction 
process can ignore the religious dimension of the role of Islam and how Islam, 
within the context of its global politicisation, affects Somaliland’s prospects, for 
this dimension interacts with important aspects of the country’s socio-
economic development as it pertains to the education sector. It also interacts 
with the influences on Somaliland emanating from its diaspora, especially 
those Somalilanders who have emigrated to the surrounding countries of the 
Persian Gulf and Arabian peninsula. This, in turn, also implicates the role of 
Arab donors and Islamic charities in various aspects of Somaliland’s social 
and economic development. Here again, education features as a key point of 
departure. 
 
The interest in Islam’s influence in Somaliland also relates to the broader 
security environment, given the emergence of militant political Islam and, 
along with it, the global war on terror in the wake of September 11, 2001. 
Exemplary of this genre is the 2004 study co-authored by Ruth Iyob and 
Edmund Keller on ‘Strategic Security Challenges: The Special Case of the 
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Horn of Africa’. However, arriving at an understanding of contemporary 
security challenges in the Horn of Africa, as they impinge on Somaliland, 
requires grasping the historical perspective on the evolution of Somaliland’s 
national and cultural identity, due to it having interacted intimately with the 
expansion of Arab/Islamic influences in North-East Africa. Here, an invaluable 
source for this thesis has been the 1977 thesis of Ali Abdirhman Hersi, 
University of California (UCLA), titled 'The Arab Factor in Somali History: The 
Origins and the Development of Arab Enterprise and Cultural Influences in the 
Somali Peninsula'. 
 
Hersi’s work is important in as much as it establishes the northern Somalia 
entry-point to many of the historical cultural and religious influences 
emanating from South-West Asia, which have shaped this region of the Horn 
of Africa. It establishes the intimate connectivity between Somali identity and 
the process of Islamisation that has defined the region’s culture. This may 
facilitate an understanding of the contemporary interaction between the 
politics of the Somali region and the current dynamics of political Islam.  
 
Other published works adding to this historical context include, In the Shadow 
of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa, edited by Said S. Samatar 
(1992, Red Sea Press) and Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-
Based Society, by I.M. Lewis (1998, Red Sea Press).  Samatar’s edited works 
include two Somali-specific contributions: 'Shaykh Zayla’i and the Nineteenth-
Century Somali Qadiriya', by G. Martin and 'The Sayyid and Saalihiya Tariqa: 
Reformist, Anticolonial Hero in Somalia', by Abdul S. Bemath. In March 2005, 
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Samatar issued a paper, which is available on the www.wardheernews.com 
website, titled ‘Unhappy Masses and the Challenge of Political Islam in the 
Horn of Africa’, with substantial reference to the evolution of Somali Islam, 
where he contends that the religion may have incubated in its Ethio-
Abyssinian ‘refugium’ prior to its flourishing on Arabian soil.  
 
Meanwhile, in Saints and Somalis, Lewis’ introductory essay to his volume, 
titled ‘Appropriating Mystical Islam to Sacralise the Social Order’, is deemed 
of special importance in terms of its challenging what are termed ‘single 
strand’ theories on the cult of saints espoused by some scholars and non-
scholars. It also sets the stage for the presentation of an intricate and 
integrated picture of Muslim beliefs and practices among Somalis. It provides 
a fitting complement to Hersi’s thesis. 
 
Hersi, Samatar and Lewis, taken together, help to contextualise more recent 
developments concerning the interaction between political Islam and the 
fractious nationalism of Somalis in the contemporary post-9/11 period. 
September 11 has generated a proliferation of works on the upheaval within 
the Islamic world, associated with the rise of terrorism and the emergence of 
jihadist tendencies within militant expressions of ‘Islamism’ or political Islam. 
In short, this upheaval within Islam has been depicted by some as a veritable 
‘global Islamic civil war’ of which the recent work, No God but God: The War 
within Islam, by Reza Aslan (2005), may be indicative. To what extent does 
the Somaliland democratic republican project hinge on the outcome of this 
upheaval? Perhaps the best source for monitoring these broader trends, 
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including occasional references to North and North-East Africa is the daily 
Asia Times Online (www.atimes.com) and regular field interviews. 
 
Preoccupation with such current trends has given rise to works specifically 
focusing on the Horn of Africa, of which Alex de Waal’s edited volume, 
Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (2004, Hurst and Company) is 
exemplary. Particularly germane to this study has been the de Waal volume’s 
essay by Roland Marchal on ‘Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil 
War’. This contribution establishes the political, cultural and security 
environment that informs the different trajectories of the north-western 
Somaliland Republic and southern Somalia based around Mogadishu. This is 
the context within which Somaliland’s political leaders have had to contend in 
terms of perceived threats to their isolated project in democratic governance 
vis-à-vis hostile regional forces such as Egypt and Sudan, which view the 
entire Somali coast, Somaliland included, as part of the Arab/Muslim sphere 
of influence. Somaliland, on the other hand, has aligned itself closely with 
Ethiopia as the dominant power in the Horn of Africa, which also sees itself as 
a bulwark against jihadist terrorism.   
 
An important source for monitoring these dynamics as they impinge on 
Somaliland and the Somali coast as a whole are the periodic ‘Africa Reports’ 
of the International Crisis Group (ICG). As recently as July 11, 2005, ICG 
published ‘Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds’ (Africa 
Report No. 95) and its latest report of 12 December 2005 is ‘Somalia’s 
Islamists’ (Africa Report No. 100). The ICG’s tracking of terrorism and 
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counter-terrorism in the Somali coast has been ongoing, as reflected in an 
extensive published study in the Journal of Conflict Studies (Fall 2003,Vol. 23, 
No. 2) by ICG’s Matt Bryden in July 2003, titled ‘No Quick Fixes: Coming to 
Terms with Terrorism, Islam and Statelessness in Somalia’. The year 2003,  
was, in fact when terrorism emerged as a possible destablisation threat 
against Somaliland, with the killings of a British couple outside Hargeisa. This 
incident and its possible implications received wide media coverage as 
reflected in the November 10, 2003 Business Day article by then columnist 
Francis Kornegay: ‘Sound AU Alarm on Destabilisation of Somaliland’.    
 
Because of this charged geo-political environment associated with the 
challenges of Islamism in the Muslim world, development issues affecting 
Somaliland in such critical sectors as education and remittances have been 
complicated by the rise of militant political Islamist tendencies and their 
impact/influence on Somaliland. The influence of Islamic charities in the 
Somali coast has been comprehensively researched by Andre Le Sage and 
Ken Menkhaus in their paper, ‘The Rise of Islamic Charities in Somalia: An 
Assessment of Impact and Agendas’ presented at the 45th Annual 
International Studies Association Convention on 17-20 March 2004 in 
Montreal. Le Sage and Menkhaus address the global reach of Islamic 
charities and their politicisation before honing in specifically on Somalia.29 
With respect to Somaliland, the earlier cited Oxfam Netherland’s report, 
                                                 
29 Andre Le Sage, ‘Somalia and the War on Terrorism, Political Islamic Movements and US 
Counter-Terrorism Efforts’, Jesus College, Cambridge University, Doctor of  Philosophy 
Degree, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, (June 2004). 
 
 
 38
published in conjunction with the World Association of Muslim Youth, is 
somewhat misleading in its title reference to ‘Somalia/land’ when in fact its 
main focus is on Somalia and there is no real differentiation between Somalia 
and Somaliland, which would have been helpful in gauging the influence that 
such charities exert in Somaliland. 
 
Where charities do have an indelible impact in Somaliland is in the education 
sector, specifically in support of Koranic schools. Because of prevalent 
perceptions of Saudi Arabian-funded Madrassas throughout the Muslim world 
as vehicles for the dissemination of Wahabist fundamentalism and 
Wahabism’s link to the flowering of an anti-Western jihadist culture 
underpinning Islamist terrorism, the Islamic charities-Koranic education nexus 
in Somaliland would inevitably come under scrutiny. Nevertheless, the 
available literature, which is not substantial, does not really focus on this 
religio-political dimension as much as on the adequacy or inadequacy of 
Koranic schools in filling the education gap in Somaliland during its extended 
post-conflict reconstruction. This is the focus of Erasmus U. Morah’s article in 
a 2000 issue of the International Journal of Educational Development titled 
‘Old Institutions, New Opportunities: the Emerging Nature of Koranic Schools 
in Somaliland in the 1990s’. If Somaliland’s Koranic education institutions 
have, at least thus far, avoided becoming vehicles of political proselitisation, 
this may well have something to do with the intimately inter-woven cultural 
integration between Islam and Somali society, which again harks back to I.M. 
Lewis’ Saints and Somalis. This raises the issue of the phenomenon of 
Somali ‘religious men’ or wadaads, which is interrogated by Marleen Renders 
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of Ghent University in an unpublished paper titled ‘Peace and Development in 
Somaliland: The Wadaads and ‘Islamic’ Claims to Popular Legitimacy in an 
Emerging Polity’ (2005). The fact that inter-clan peace has continued to be 
vital for the newer wadaad generation may warrant further inquiry into the role 
of an indigenised Islam as a stabilising factor during a period of upheaval 
within the Muslim world, and within the geo-political/security environment of 
Muslim lands like the Somaliland Republic. Moreover, the continued success 
of the Somaliland state-building enterprise has been intimately interwoven into 
the diplomatic quest for African and international recognition. 
 
1.5.4 Literature in Chapter 5 – Recognition: Recognising the 
Unrecognised 
 
The bottom-line for Somaliland’s elites along the continuum of reconciliation, 
reconstruction and religion, is recognition. Here there are ample non-African 
newspaper commentaries arguing in favour of Somaliland’s recognition as a 
comparative ‘model’ African state, trudging alone in a region of conflict and 
instability, and in need of African and international support to sustain its 
democratic experiment. In fact, while cases such as Somaliland’s are a hard 
sell in African and developing world politics, the country has, nevertheless, 
managed to garner an important degree of political if not official diplomatic 
support from key African state actors such as neighbouring Ethiopia and 
Djibouti, as well as South Africa.  
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Apart from more than a few occasional news articles and commentaries, there 
is a dearth of more substantial literature on Somaliland’s quest for recognition 
and the pros and cons of the issue. However, there are a few important 
source materials that have seen the light of day. Among them, one of the 
most compelling cases for recognition is an official South African Department 
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) legal advisory. In April 2003, the Office of the Chief 
State Adviser (International Law) produced a report, ‘Somaliland’s Claim to 
Sovereign Status’. This report bases its brief on Somaliland’s fleetingly brief 
history as an independent state prior to its merger with former Italian 
Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia. Thus, in legal terms, Somaliland 
did not secede from Somalia but simply reverted back to its original 
independent status in the wake of the disintegration of a Somali state that has 
yet to reconstitute itself as a credible government.  
 
The former US Ambassador to Ethiopia and one-time State Department 
Director on Somalia, David Shinn, has also produced useful material such as 
a 2003 analysis, ‘The Horn of Africa: How Does Somaliland Fit in?’ – a 
Weekly Special Report. Shinn was Ambassador to Ethiopia between 1996-99. 
One newspaper article that generated particularly wide coverage and 
reproduction on a number of websites was ‘Somaliland: The Little Country 
That Could’, by David Shinn. His piece, originally published in Ethiopia’s Addis 
Tribune in its November 29, 2002 edition, was republished in several other 
web publications such as on websites like www.globalpolicy.org. What is 
particularly useful about the State Department ‘weekly special report’ analysis 
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and Ambassador Shinn’s piece, are their examination of Somaliland’s bilateral 
relations with a range of regional and ‘out of area’ actors.  
 
These treatments provide very important geo-political context to the challenge 
which Somaliland faces in achieving diplomatic recognition, and are therefore 
essential sources from that standpoint. Monitoring the periodic reports of the 
African Union on political developments in the Somali coast, with particular 
regard to efforts of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to gain 
traction, are also useful. In a departure from what used to be the norm of 
denial and avoidance, the AU’s reports of  Commissioner Alpha Konare, make 
a point of including Somaliland, and the findings of fact-finding missions from 
the AU that have included Somaliland. Thus, Hargeisa has managed to 
achieve a certain important degree of informal political, if not diplomatic, 
recognition from official Africa. In line with this trend are conferences in which 
research analysts and academics have been brought together to explore a 
range of options on the Somali coast, such as those convened by the Africa 
Institute of South Africa (AISA) in Pretoria in 2004. Here, the debate over 
Somaliland and Somalia, with implications for a wider African discourse, has 
moved beyond the pros and cons of recognising one or the other entity, to 
managing a process of diplomatic and political engagement with both Somali 
entities, with an aim toward the eventual stabilisation and re-integration of the 
region. One such presentation, which will be published along with other 
papers in a forthcoming AISA volume is ‘Somalia/Somaliland Dynamics as a 
Case Study in the International Politics of the Stalemated Recognition of a 
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Collapsed State: Tentative Thoughts on Stabilising the Somali Coast’, by 
Francis Kornegay of Johannesburg’s Centre for Policy Studies. 
 
The foregoing survey of source materials is not intended to be 
comprehensive, but rather illustrative of the information resources, including 
those in the Arabic language, drawn upon in constructing the analysis in this 
thesis. It does not reflect all of the materials consulted, such as various 
newspaper articles, press announcements, reports, communiqués and other 
informal materials and the eight field research trips to the region. They are 
footnoted in the body of the thesis and more often than not reflect particular 
episodes at a point in time within a larger context of unfolding events, in what 
has been a very fluid panorama of political and security developments in the 
Somali coast. At the centre of these developments is the process of 
reconciliatory nation-building, which constitutes the beginning of this narrative 
analysis. In many ways, reconciliation is an ongoing process that runs 
throughout the other dimensions: reconstruction, religion and recognition. And 
all of these dimensions, in one way or another, are overlapping and interactive 
themes in a dialectical process of Somaliland’s nation-building.    
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Chapter 2: 
Reconciliation 
Resistance, Collapse, Conflict, Consensus and 
the International Community   
 
 
 
hadduu oday jiro, uu u ood rogo, abaaroodkana way orgootaa ...  
 
 If an elder looks after it [the herd] and caters to its needs, it could show heat even 
during the dry season … (Somali proverb)30  
  
The national reconciliation process that culminated in the declaration of 
Somaliland independence on 18 May 1991 represents a unique blend of 
‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’ out of the travails of the peoples of the north-west 
Somali coast under the ancien regime of General Mohamed Siad Barre, and 
the war of repression he waged against this region; a trauma that effectively 
undermined his 'Greater Somalia' project in confirming the defeat of these 
aspirations in the earlier Ogaden campaign of 1978. The dynamics of 
Somaliland reconciliation revolve around the complex interplay of 
accommodation between what might be termed the forces of modernity, 
represented in the rise of the SNM, Somali National Movement, as an early 
generation African post-colonial liberation-cum-resistance phenomenon, on 
                                                 
30 This proverb is a tribute to the wisdom of elders. It is one of the lyrics used when the 
Somalilander cow herder entertains his herd while providing water for them. It means if the 
caretaker of such herd is a wise elder, it can show signs of heat or have the desire to mate 
even during the dry season, which is unlikely for cattle during this time, due to lack of water 
and fodder.  
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the one hand, and the indigenous forces of tradition vested in the north-west 
region’s clan leadership on the other.31 
 
As a starting point toward the post-colonial readjustment of political identities 
along the Somali coast in the wake of the 1991 collapse of the Barre 
dictatorship, this traditional/modern interplay represented a departure from 
what, throughout much of Africa, had been an essentially ‘top-down’ transfer 
of power from metropolitan colonial elites to nationalist elites who had 
negotiated such power transfers, more or less in the absence of deeper socio-
cultural mass transformations with pan-ethnolinguistic nationalist content. 
Even in mono-ethnic geo-cultural regions like the Somali coast  – much more 
so in ethnolingusitically diverse regions elsewhere in Africa amalgamated into 
single post-colonial polities – such absences of nationalistic social 
transformations accompanying elite power transfers have, over successive 
post-independence decades, come back to haunt much of the continent in the 
form of nominal nation-states with, by and large, weak national identities; 
situations that, in many instances, have become manifest in post-colonial 
break-downs in governance, with civil war and chronic unrest threatening the 
cohesion of many an African state. The ‘failed’ and ‘collapsed’ state syndrome 
has emerged from many such situations, of which Somalia has become a 
prime example.  
 
                                                 
31 Hussein Adam, 'Somalia: International versus Local Attempts at Peacebuilding', in  
Robert Mathews (ed.), Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press (2003). John Drysdale, Stoics Without Pillows: A Way Forward for 
the Somalilanders, London: HAAN Publishing, (2000).   
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2.1 ‘Xeer Soomaali’ Under British Colonialism: Elders the Midwives of 
Somaliland’s Reconstruction 
 
The Somaliland experience of reconciliation represents a variation on what 
may be an emerging theme of post-colonial correctives of such oversights in 
reformulating national identities; and in the process challenging the inter-
African and broader international relations impinging on such upheavals. 
Here, there is a need to revisit the comparative British and Italian colonial 
legacies along the Somali coast to gain some perspective on the foundations 
for post-conflict reconciliation that have thus far benefited Somaliland. The 
veteran British ‘insider’ on the politics of this region, John Drysdale, has shed 
interesting light on this legacy in observations he made last year on why, from 
the vantage-point of history, Somalia is experiencing such problems in 
reconstituting itself in the south.  
 
In an unpublished paper on 'A Study of the Somali Hybrid Insurance System 
and the Consequences of its Rejection by Southern Somalia’s Political 
Leadership', Drysdale points out that the former British Somaliland 
Protectorate of the north-west has three concurrent legal systems: secular law 
in the English language, Islamic law in the Arabic language, and unwritten 
Somali traditional law. “The latter, under the British administrative system, 
was exercised exclusively by Somali elders who were knowledgeable in 
traditional law. They operated in both town and country in the six districts then 
administered by British District Commissioners. To help the elders in the 
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execution of their court orders, District Commissioners had informal clan 
police available".32 
 
Because traditional law, according to Drysdale,  
 
… was not written, and is still not written, only those elders who had inherited 
an encyclopaedic knowledge of the time-honoured principles and practices of 
the traditional law’s tariff systems for the awards of collective compensation to 
the aggrieved … case histories, the art of peace-making, consensus decision-
making, the avoidance of political power in the hands of one person, the 
liberty of the individual for humanity’s sake – no incarceration or capital 
punishment since you cannot deprive a family of its desperately needed 
labour – were qualified as consultants to advise elders in court (the shade of 
a thorn tree). It was, and still is, a largely unknown subject to the outside 
world. However ancient traditional law may be, Somalis are comfortable with 
its judgements to this day, whether disputes coming before the elders are 
peacemaking in character, or the result of injuries sustained in a road 
accident, or compensation for injuries inflicted on a person’s pride or 
wellbeing.  
 
Tariffs associated with this system are at the core of Somali justice in terms of 
applying preventive measures against outbreaks of serious conflict. 
 
                                                 
32 See Drysdale, http://www.somalilandsurveys.info/Article.htm; and the Report of the 
Somaliland Protectorate Constitutional Conference, held in London, Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, (May 1960), italics added. 
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Intimately interwoven with this ‘indigenous knowledge system’ of traditional 
law vested in clan elders is a guarantee for every Somali of collective support 
from one’s Tol. A ‘Tol,’ according to Drysdale, is “a self-contained group of 
genealogical lineage with its chosen elders who run the organisation.” These 
exist in the thousands as institutions that protect the interest of their 
respective memberships. Drysdale continues: 
 
The almost daily voluntary work of elders of the ‘Tol’ is both physically and 
intellectually demanding and usually independent of government. No free 
lunches or four wheels come their way, but governments which have no love 
of them, frequently use or misuse their energy and talents in the interest of 
good or bad governance. Their re-emergence into the open society of 
Somaliland in 1991 from the darkness of their two decades of underground 
work was fostered three years earlier by the Somali National Movement. The 
Movement consisted of freedom fighters based in Ethiopia in the 1980s to 
oust Siyad Barre’s formidable and wicked military garrisons in Somaliland … 
The Movement had a problem of recruitment. Reluctantly they called on the 
elders in Somaliland to persuade surreptitiously their ‘Tol’ followers to join the 
Movement. They were successful. The Movement’s commanders, impressed 
by the elders’ aplomb, brought them in as advisers, giving them equal status 
(italics added). When the Movement ran the garrisons into the sea and 
formed a government in 1991, the elders were given a place of honour, 
resuming their open-handed work, with almost ordained honesty, as before. 
 
This reflection on how ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ came together out of the 
existential circumstances of historical contingency in Somaliland’s resistance 
to Siad Barre’s Mogadishu regime is instructive for what it conveys about the 
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extent to which these two realms of Islamic-cultural reality have been 
alienated from each other in post-colonial African polities. Moreover, in 
Somaliland’s case, they were not necessarily pre-ordained to make common 
cause against the southern tyranny, but for the armed struggle that was 
imposed upon the people of the north-west region and the need for the exiled 
SNM to firmly root itself among the people of the region, in order to wage a 
successful military resistance. In this way, the region’s clan elders became the 
midwives of Somaliland’s rebirth. 
 
Whether or not Britain’s colonial propensity for indirect rule, through traditional 
leadership structures was crucial to the continued existence of the system of 
traditional decision-making described by Drysdale, is not clear. What Drysdale 
does stress, in contrast to the situation in the Somaliland north-west is the 
period of the mid-1950s when Somalia, in the south, was still under the 
administration of the Italian government at the “behest of the United Nations 
Trusteeship Council”. Referring to the Somali Youth League (SYL) leader, 
Abdillahi Issa, Drysdale observes that he 
 
… had several things in common with the Italian administration. One issue in 
particular was their mutual abhorrence of ‘tribalism.’ The Italians ignored 
elders before Abdillahi became prime minister. They felt that Somalis could 
only modernise if their urban societies could develop bourgeois habits, learn 
the Italian language and culture, and be Italian in all their beautiful cultural 
habits including a propensity towards malfeasance. As part of this process the 
condemnation by the Somali Youth League of ‘tribalism’ was grist for the 
Italian mill. ‘Tribalism,’ in the Somali political notion at the time, was an 
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embedded culture drawing upon virtually every Somali’s allegiance 
competitively with the modern concept (to Somalis then) of political parties 
which were deemed to be more like the United States understanding of a ‘civil 
society’. 
 
According to Drysdale, during the first republic (on the dawn of independence 
from colonialism): 
 
Abdillahi Issa, as prime minister, forbade the use of lineage names, with which 
Somalis heretofore identified themselves, and officially discarded the Somali 
traditional system known for centuries as Xeer Soomaali. The same policy 
persisted during the first nine years of the Somali Republic (1960-69) – the union 
between Somalia and Somaliland – which was not a very successful experiment in 
democracy. This was followed by Siyad Barre’s ‘burial’ of ‘tribalism’ for twenty-two 
years which was a farce since he used the members of his own clan affiliations in 
the security services to intimidate the rest of the country. 
 
The rebirth of ‘tribalism’ out of a compact based on mutual need between the 
north-west’s (Somaliland) clan elders and the SNM’s exiled leadership would 
eventually set the stage for the experiment in reconciliatory nation-building 
based on a marriage – initially of convenience – between tradition and 
modernity, which has resulted in the Somaliland of today. However, this was 
not a smooth process without its own internal contradictions and conflicts. But 
the Somaliland national experience, as it unfolded, would confirm the elders 
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as arbiters in resolving the region’s conflicts along the way.33 In effect, 
‘tribalism’ as tradition became the midwife of modernity in Somaliland’s 
rebirth. To arrive where it is today, it is necessary to revisit Somaliland’s first 
brief taste of independence in the early 1960s. Somaliland, as the former 
British protectorate, would go through the ‘false start’ of Somali republican 
union with former Italian Somaliland from 1960-69, followed by the nadir of the 
era of the Barre dictatorship, which eventually rekindled the north-west 
region’s nationalist impulses as a result of the repression and near genocide 
that it had to endure. 
 
2.2 The SNM: Northern Resistance Takes Shape 
 
The SNM came into being in response to the repression of the Siad Barre 
dictatorship.34 As a regionally-based post-colonial resistance movement, it 
represented the northern 'clan-family' of the Isaaqs, centred on the three 
major urban centres of Hargeisa, the second largest city along the Somali 
coast, Burco and the strategic port city of Berbera. Other non-Isaaq clans and 
sub-clans represented in the SNM’s founding included the Dir clans from the 
south in former Italian Somalia, individual members of the Gadabursi clan 
groups, and the Warsangeli and Dhulbahante clans. According to Jack L. 
Davies, in his 'The Liberation Movements of Somalia', it was founded "more or 
less simultaneously by different groups of individuals in Saudi Arabia, 
                                                 
33 Ken Menkhaus, 'Traditional Conflict management in Contemporary Somalia', in I. William 
Zartman (ed.), Traditional Cures for modern Conflicts: African Conflict 'Medicine', Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, (2000). 
34 Africa Watch Report, A Government at War with its Own People. Somalia, Testimonies 
about the killing and the Conflict in the North, London: Africa Watch, (1990). 
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Mogadishu and London,” meeting in London on April 6, 1981.35 Some of the 
members of the founding committee in London were: Ahmed Mohamed 
Gulaid (Jimaleh), the group’s President, who became SNM Chairman; Hassan 
Adan Wadadeed, Vice-President; Ahmed Ismael; and Mohamed Hashi Elmi. 
The London group that hosted the founding of the SNM has been described 
as having been “secular and nationalist in its political outlook”, while the 
Saudi-based members were defined as “religious and quite ardent in their 
support of the Isaq”. Furthermore, “it seems that the religious element in the 
organization was most influential during the formative years, but started to 
wane in importance with the shift of the SNM from London to its base in 
eastern Ethiopia in 1983 and the subsequent intensification of its ten-year-
long guerrilla war against Siad Barre’s forces.” The SNM, as well as the first 
President of Somaliland, Mohammed Egal, had to contend with strong internal 
religious sentiments. A case in point is the inscription of the Islamic religious 
formula on the new flag of Somaliland. This challenge of balancing religion 
and modernity in Somaliland continues.36   
 
The SNM had been born of a sentiment of marginalisation – a feeling among 
the Isaaq and allied clans and sub-clans that the Mogadishu dictatorship 
under Siad Barre had neglected its clan and region. Southern dominance in 
the Republic of Somalia had triggered sporadic Isaaq unrest throughout the 
post-independence period. For example, in 1961, Somaliland’s military 
                                                 
35 Jack L. Davies, 'The Liberation Movements of Somalia', Civic Webs Virtual Library, (27 
August 1994). 
http://www.civicwebs.com/cwvlib/africa/somalia/1994/lib_movments/lib_movements.htm 
36 Bashir Goth, 'Editorial – Taking the new opposition dominated parliament to task', 
Awdalnews, (9 December 2005).  http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=6603 
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officers, led by Hassan Kayd, attempted to reclaim Somaliland's 
independence. Yet, in spite of this periodic unrest, the marginalisation and the 
savage military repression that ensued in the late 1980s, the SNM’s initial 
raison d’être was not to secede from the Somali union, but to overthrow the 
Siad Barre dictatorship. As an inter-clan expression of pan-Somali 
nationalism, the driving force was a “unified desire to oppose the oppressive 
socialist dictatorship of General Barre, rather than to support any particular 
clans, such as the Isaaq clans that provided the largest fraction of its 
membership. Therefore, it collected intellectuals with a wide variety of political 
views who shared this common goal.” Short of secession, there was, 
according to Davies, a longer-term SNM desire, not only to stop the 
oppression of the central government in Mogadishu, but “to decentralize much 
of the power of that government.” However, “the short-term motivation of 
stopping the growing genocide of the Isaq group of clans by General Barre 
focused the goals of the SNM on a narrower clan basis.”37 
 
The increasingly repressive nature of the Barre regime reflected a confluence 
of pressures stemming from General Barre’s failed ‘Greater Somalia’ 
irredentist project. The aim was to detach from Ethiopia its Ogaden Somali 
region. This was initially undertaken by Mogadishu’s backing of the Western 
Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and the so-called ‘Somali Abo’ insurgent 
forces at a time when the Mengistu regime was also contending with the 
Tigre-Eritrean insurgencies throughout the Abyssinian highlands and the Red 
Sea coast. Having over-committed his regime to the liberation of the Ogadeni 
                                                 
37 Davies, (27 August 1994).  
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(to the extent of integrating them into his regime), Siad Barre’s military defeat 
by the Cuban forces, which intervened in the Ethio-Somali battle for the 
Ogaden in 1977-78, eventually undermined the rationale and cohesion of his 
rule. The Somali armed forces (known as the Somali National Army (SNA)) 
never recovered from the Ogaden defeat. (At one of the war’s turning point 
engagements, the battle of Jijiga, the SNA lost more than half of its attacking 
force of three tank battalions, each consisting of more than thirty tanks! Years 
later, after the outbreak of the SNM-led northern resistance, Ogadeni troops in 
the national army defected en masse, contributing to the formation of the 
Somali Patriotic Movement in a process of proliferating southern anti-regime 
formations.) 
 
Siad Barre had misplayed his hand amid the changing geo-political balance of 
forces in the Horn of Africa as a result of Soviet-Cuban adventurism. In fact, 
the nominally ‘scientific socialist’ regimes in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu 
were an object lesson in how more mundane agendas of narrowly 
nationalistic realpolitik had more to do with animating the domestic and 
foreign policy agendas of such African governments than a commitment to 
ideology.  
 
Having already become political and military mentors of Siad Barre’s ‘scientific 
socialist’ regime in Somalia, the Soviet Union and Cuba had been in the 
process of extending their influence to the increasingly ‘scientific socialist’ 
military regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia. How fitting it seemed 
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then, for both ‘scientific socialist’ Ethiopia and Somalia to join hands in 
‘socialist solidarity’, by forming a socialist federation of the Horn of Africa. The 
only problem was that before this could happen, Siad Barre needed to 
consummate his irredentist project by liberating the Ogaden. Failing this, the 
Soviet-Cuban intervention on ‘scientific socialist’ Ethiopia’s behalf ushered in 
a changed balance of power in the Horn of Africa, as a weakened Somalia 
became a client of the US and tacitly aligned with other reactionary forces on 
the continent. Thus, in the bombing campaigns that Siad Barre unleashed on 
Hargeisa, Rhodesian and South African mercenary pilots are reported to have 
been employed by the Somali air force.38 
 
It is in the wake of the Ogaden defeat that endemic inter-clan and sub-clan 
instability gained momentum in formerly ‘scientific socialist’ Somalia. The 
emergence of an Isaaq-led resistance, with its regional inter-clan as well as 
clan character, unfolded within this wider context of Somali unrest and 
resistance against an increasingly defensive Mogadishu dictatorship. SNM 
resistance was part of a broader insurgency to unseat the Barre regime. The 
SNM’s military campaign, launched in 1988, resulted in the capture of Burco 
on 27 May, and the capture of a substantial part of Hargeisa on 31 May 1988.  
                                                 
38 Civic Web, 'Letter from Minister of Finance Authorizing Pay for Mercenary Pilots', (13 
November 1990). 
http://www.civicwebs.com/cwvlib/africa/somalia/1990/authorization_for_mercenary_pilots.htm 
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The savagery of government retaliation forced some 300,000 Somalilanders 
to flee to Ethiopia, further fuelling the insurgency. Five thousand Isaaqs were 
killed between May, when the SNM captured Burco, and December 1988. 
This chapter in the SNM’s struggle will be revisited later for what it reveals 
about the larger geo-political context of repressive regime survival in both 
Ethiopia and Somalia, as both regimes sought quid pro quos to deal with their 
respective challenges in which anti-regime liberation movements played proxy 
roles. But first, the SNM challenge needs to be placed within a broader Somali 
resistance framework to better understand its uniqueness compared to other 
Somali movements, and how this uniqueness relates to the reconciliatory 
nation-building process that has been underway over the past several years in 
Somaliland. 
 
2.3 Somalia’s ‘Liberation’ Proliferation 
 
In terms of an historical and contemporary perspective on the politics of 
conflict and accommodation along the Somali coast, Davies39 offers a 
typology of ‘Somali liberation movements’ that may be instructive to locating 
the SNM insurgency and its legacy. He differentiates between ‘genuine’ 
liberation movements and ‘new’ liberation movements; the latter mainly 
reflecting the fission and fusion of political formations during the post-Barre 
period. Here, however, Davies offers an insightful commentary on the 
international politics of Somali liberation and 'reconciliation' that harks back to 
                                                 
39 Davies, (27 August 1994). 
  
 56
the ‘top-down’ versus ‘bottom-up’ dynamics that have distinguished 
Somaliland’s state-building from statehood failure in the south: 
 
Any two Somalis can get together and form a new ‘liberation movement’ that 
claims to represent any group of people they want to claim. International 
‘reconciliation conferences’ that give one vote to each faction admitted, use almost 
non-existent ‘liberation movements’ in order to deliberately distort voting rights at 
these conferences. This practice began at the two Djibouti Conferences in the 
Summer of 1991, More recently, the US State Department and the United Nations 
in particular have been using this technique to inflate the importance of minor 
liberation groups that support their own stated goals, in order to weaken the 
influence of genuine liberation movements that oppose some of their views, 
particularly concerning recognition of the Republic of Somaliland. Therefore, 
Somalis are beginning to argue that only ‘genuine’ liberation movements who 
fought against the dictatorship prior to January 1991 should be admitted as real 
factions to such ‘reconciliation conferences’.40 
 
Besides the SNM, Davies classifies the following as being or having been 
“genuine” Somali liberation movements:41 
 
 The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) which at times has 
been the Somali Salvation Front (SSF); 
 The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and the two factions that it split 
into: SPM Ogadeni and SPM Harti; 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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 The United Somali Congress (USC) and the two factions that it split 
into: USC ‘Aidid’ and USC Mahdi; 
 The Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and the two factions that it 
split into: SDM pro ‘Aidid’ and SDM pro Mahdi. 
 
Without enumerating the ‘new’ movements of dubious credibility, the SNM 
insurgency in the north complemented the emergence of the SSDF/SSF and 
USC, which eventually forced Siad Barre to flee Mogadishu in 1991. Here, 
some analysis of this larger resistance context is in order as a means of 
gaining more insight into SNM’s comparative advantage vis-à-vis these other 
movements, as well as to reference the dynamics that have a bearing on 
current developments between the Somaliland Republic and the latest – 
2004/05 – peace conference rendition of a reconstituted Mogadishu 
government: the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 
 
The SSDF/SSF was an older Ethiopian-backed movement formed in 1979, 
headquartered in Addis Ababa with funding and military aid provided by Libya. 
As the SSDF/SSF sought to broaden its predominantly Majerteen clan group 
base, its founding leaders, in reaction to what they perceived as a threat to 
their leadership, worked a deal with the Ethiopian and Libyan governments 
which transformed the movement into as much a proxy of Ethiopia against 
Somalia as an authentic liberation movement. In this transformation, Colonel 
Mengistu arrested one of the main key SSDF/SSF leaders, Colonel Abdullahi 
Yusuf Ahmed and several of his key aides. They languished in jail until the 
overthrow of the Mengistu regime. Upon their release, Yusuf, currently 
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President of the new Somali TFG and formerly leader of the autonomous 
region of Puntland, reclaimed SSDF/SSF leadership. 
 
Closely intertwined with what has been ongoing contemporary border 
tensions between Somaliland and Puntland over the Sool and Sanaag 
regions, Davies recounts that “there were jealousies between the SSDF and 
the SNM, whereby the SSDF tried to force the SNM to join it and the SNM 
refused. Ultimately, Colonel Mengistu dropped the SSDF and sided with the 
SNM” although the “SNM was never as cooperative as the SSDF … refusing 
to take orders from the Ethiopian Dictatorship and refusing to accept the 
‘Green Book’ of Colonel Qaddafi as the pre-requisite for receiving financial 
and military aid from him”.42  
 
The SNM’s uniqueness compared to the other movements, according to 
Davies, lay in the fact that, apart from having a preponderant clan-base in the 
Isaaqs, it did not try to expand further to include members from even more 
clans and groups of clans, although it had an ideological thrust that attracted 
individuals from other clans. “In sharp contrast to other liberation movements 
at that time, the SNM did make a serious effort to use internal democratic 
procedures to develop political goals based upon an internal consensus – and 
to publish them.”43 Davies cites a typical published statement from 1981: “We 
propose a new political system built on Somali cultural values of co-operation 
rather than coercion; a system which elevates the Somali concept of ‘Xeer’ or 
                                                 
42 Ibid., (italics added). 
43 Ibid. 
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inter-family social contract in which no man exercised political power over 
another except according to established law and custom, to the national 
level”.44  
 
A different take on the SNM’s social base in the north-west is provided by 
Ahmed Yusuf Farah (1999) in a contribution he made to a Project 
Ploughshares inquiry into ‘Civil-Military Relations in Somaliland and Northeast 
Somalia’.45 In a presentation entitled ‘Political Actors in Somalia’s Emerging 
De Facto Entities: Civil Military Relations in Somaliland and Northeast 
Somalia’, Farah contends that, in fact, Somaliland is “socially and politically 
more complex than Northeast Somalia” – referring to Puntland – that 
Somaliland supports a “population of mixed (and rival) clan origin belonging to 
three large clan families (Dir, Isaq and Harti/Darood).”  This more pluralistic 
perspective on Somaliland may account for the Isaaq/non-Isaaq clan 
strategies that the SNM has pursued in its approach to interacting with 
traditional authorities in the region. But it may also account for the 
movement’s motivation in producing a clearly articulated pan-Somali ‘national 
democratic’ ideology on which Davies further elaborates. Instructive, in this 
regard, are the following, taken from the eleven guidelines published by the 
SNM that stipulated: 
 
                                                 
44 Ibid., (italics added). 
45 Ahmed Farah, ‘Political Actors in Somalia's Emerging De Facto Entities: Civil Military 
Relations in Somaliland and Northeast Somalia’, Project Ploughshares, presented at the 
Conference on Civil-Military Relations, Nairobi, (April 1999). 
http://www.somaliawatch.org/archivefeb01/010414202.htm.  
See also Farah and Lewis, (1997), pp. 317-325.   
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• “The structure of the central and regional government will be as simple as 
possible. They will be designed to reduce hierarchy and bureaucracy to a 
minimum and enable the average man and woman to understand and 
relate to regional and national governments; 
• It will integrate effectively traditional Somali egalitarianism and the 
requirement of good central government; 
• It will maximise the effectiveness of the representative and democratic 
process at all levels; and 
• The freedom of the press in accordance with the constitution and the 
laws of the country will be guaranteed by law.”46 
 
2.4 SNM’s Comparative Advantage in an Escalating Struggle  
 
Building on a cohesive clan base, combined with an essentially pan-Somali 
democratic ethos, the SNM strategy, according to Davies, was to assist other 
clan and regional groups to embark on their own resistance against the Barre 
dictatorship. He went on to say that “it assisted the Hawiyes in forming their 
USC and the Ogadenis in forming their SPM as sister liberation movements in 
the fight to oust the socialist dictatorship of General Barre in the war-of-
liberation.”47 Nevertheless, the SNM succeeded in attracting non-Isaaqs, 
though Siad Barre also did well in trying to undermine this attraction. “General 
Barre was extremely irritated by the growing number of Hawiyes joining the 
SNM and the fact that the Vice Chairman was a Hawiye. He succeeded in 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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creating a conflict between the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SNM, 
which led to the resignation of Vice Chairman, Ali Mohamed Ossoble 
('Wardhigley'). Other foreign countries appear to have co-operated with 
General Barre in developing the theory that since the SSDF had stopped its 
armed resistance to General Barre, only the SNM was left. If the SNM could 
be induced to give up its armed struggle, there would be no further conflict 
and opposition to General Barre. Despite the various bribes offered, the SNM 
refused to end its war-of-liberation. Many other leading Hawiye members of 
the SNM also left the SNM in 1987 as a result of this episode.  
 
This attempted ‘divide-and-conquer’ ploy on Barre’s part forms a crucial 
backdrop to the escalation of the SNM insurgency within the north during 
1988 and the regime’s savage retaliation. This escalation is directly linked to 
mutual sell-outs of liberation proxies by Mengistu and Barre in the interests of 
their respective regime survivals.  
 
In April 1988, Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia struck a peace deal with General 
Barre, to their mutual convenience, whereby each agreed to stop supporting 
the liberation movements based in their countries and launching raids in the 
other country. The basic idea was to force the SNM to withdraw from the 
border, deeper into Ethiopia, from where they would not be able to launch any 
more raids across the border. However, with the ‘rug pulled out from under 
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their feet’, the SNM went in the other direction and moved its militias to within 
Somalia”.48  
 
The rest is history in the escalation of Somalia’s civil war, to the point of the 
Barre regime’s eventual collapse in 1991.  
 
The fact that the SNM was able to make the transition from external cross-
border raids to full-fledged internal insurgency is a commentary on the 
accommodation that its ‘modern’ nationalist leadership had arrived with the 
traditional authority of the region’s clan elders in the spirit of ‘Xeer Soomaali’. 
Nevertheless, the SNM had its own internal contradictions which, according to 
Ahmed Yusuf Farah and Ioan M. Lewis,49 would come back to haunt 
Somaliland in the post-independence declaration period. During the armed 
struggle phase, the SNM managed to suppress, according to Farah and 
Lewis, long-held civilian-military leadership rivalries that eventually erupted 
after the overthrow of Barre and during the early phase of state formation. To 
some extent, this appears rooted in the movement’s clan dynamics. The 
military leadership of the SNM had, during the struggle period, been “eager to 
transform the organization into a professional and efficient military and 
political body; but efforts to do so were frustrated by the clan character of the 
SNM.” Yet, as Farah and Lewis also acknowledge:  
 
                                                 
48 Ibid., (italics added). 
49 Farah and Lewis, (1997). 
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The vital dependence of the SNM on Isaq clansmen made it responsive to the 
wishes of the wider population, particularly traditional leaders who administer 
the affairs of local clans. Along with the majority of the public, traditional 
leaders supported the civilian leaders in the power struggle within the SNM – 
an inclination that seems to have endured in the post-military period.50 
  
This tilt toward civilian ascendancy, based on the SNM’s popular base, was 
the key to its survival during the nadir of the Barre regime’s savage reprisals. 
Tellingly, Farah, in underlining the breadth of SNM dependency on its social 
base, points out that  
 
the struggle of the SNM depended on support from different sectors of the 
Isaq population, including the Isaq diaspora, refugees in camps in eastern 
Ethiopia, and Isaq nomads. It received relatively little external military and 
financial assistance as both interested governments in Ethiopia and Somalia 
worked to subvert its objectives.51  
 
Thus, civilian elite ascendancy, for the SNM, was critical to its survivalist self-
reliance and self-sufficiency during the armed struggle. But this proved to be 
at the cost of deferring the resolution of civil-military leadership tensions within 
the SNM. When they violently resurfaced during the early phase of 
Somaliland’s state formation in 1991, they would operate to further entrench 
the traditional leadership of clan elders as the society’s leading agents in 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., italics added. 
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conflict prevention, management and resolution. In a very real sense, the clan 
elders have served as Somaliland’s guarantors of peace and security; the 
nation’s ultimate fall-back as an ‘insurance policy’ against a descent into 
anarchy. The clan elders became the SNM’s main fall-back during the 
ensuing state-building phase of democratic post-conflict stabilisation. 
 
2.5 Enter the Clan Elders: Post-Conflict Stabilisation 
 
From the late 1980s until the Barre regime’s collapse, the SNM apparently did 
most of the fighting in the resistance war. It seems that only toward the end, in 
the last one to one-and-a-half years, did it receive substantial assistance from 
the USC and the SPM. Once this armed struggle phase ended, the initiative 
within Somaliland shifted to the clan elders as the SNM handed over to them 
to navigate what would become a complicated and delicate process of post-
conflict reconciliation and political consolidation of a brutalised society that 
had been under prolonged siege. The backdrop to the unfolding of this clan 
elders-led national reconciliation phase in the north-west is the state collapse 
in Mogadishu, which followed on the heels of the regime collapse of the 
General Barre’s government. It was the USC, a powerful force in Mogadishu, 
that seized control of the capital only to have the situation deteriorate into a 
round of factional fragmentation and in-fighting that ushered in what became 
an era of stateless warlordism in former Italian Somalia.      
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The shift of the initiative from the SNM, as the politico-military vanguard of the 
struggle against Barre to the more popular based leadership of the clan 
elders, was underlined by the manner in which Somaliland moved from 
insurgency toward the outright declaration of independence. Immediately after 
General Barre’s defeat in January 1991, followed by a February peace 
conference in Berbera that proclaimed a formal cease-fire, the SNM called a 
March meeting of the elders of all non-Isaaq clans “to reconcile any potential 
differences between them and the Isaq clans – as agreed upon by all 
liberation movements before the end of the war-of-liberation.”52  
 
The Berbera peace conference had established the SNM’s policy of peaceful 
co-existence among the clans of Somaliland. The post-Berbera non-Isaaq 
meeting was followed up by an April meeting with the Isaaq clan elders in 
Hargeisa, setting the stage for an end-of-April SNM Congress, together with 
representatives of all clans, Isaaq and non-Isaaq alike. This became the 
Guurti Congress of the Elders. The elders and other democratically-selected 
representatives forced the SNM, against its will, to announce the creation of 
the independent Republic of Somaliland on May 18, 1991. “After a one-day 
pause, the SNM leadership bowed to public pressure and declared 
Somaliland’s independence.” 53 This declaration was accompanied by the 
establishment of an SNM-led interim government. Its administration was 
based on the SNM’s organisational structure, with its Chairman, Abdulrahman 
Ali ‘Tuur’ appointed as the country’s first executive President. The SNM 
central committee functioned as the government’s first parliament.  
                                                 
52 Davies, (27 August 1994). 
53 Ibid.; and Bryden, (2004), p. 24.  
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Reflecting the accent on reconciliation, the interim administration was tasked 
with accommodating non-Isaaq communities by enlisting their participation in 
the new regime. It also had to start the process of constitutional development 
and preparing Somaliland for an elected government. However, the new 
interim regime was acutely vulnerable to the consequences of the devastation 
that the war had left in its wake, not to mention long-deferred civil-military 
leadership tensions in the SNM. “Bereft of a revenue base with which to 
rebuild an administration, a decimated infrastructure, and with a large number 
of people displaced from the south or in refugee camps, the government had 
little capacity to deal with the growing number of freelance militia who were 
making a living through robbery and extortion.”54 Then, there was a 
particularly critical political deficit that needed tending to.  
 
While the Burco conference restored relations between the Isaaq and other 
northern clans, “it failed to heal the schisms within the SNM and among the 
Isaaq that had developed during the war.”55 Wartime rivalries within the SNM, 
which carried over into peacetime, resulted in the outbreak of fighting in 
Burco. In March 1992, fighting erupted in Berbera when the interim 
government sought to establish control over the port and its revenue. 
Pacifying this situation deepened the role of the clan elders in stabilising the 
country. The Berbera confrontation threatened to push Somaliland into a state 
                                                 
54 Mark Bradbury et al., (2003), p. 459. 
55 Mark Bradbury, ‘Somaliland Country Report’, London: CIIR, (1997). 
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of protracted civil war. This would have replicated the southern deconstruction 
of former Italian Somalia in the former British colony. 
 
2.6 Sheikh and Borama Conferences: Toward a Traditional-Modern 
Compact 
 
Somaliland’s elders stepped in to re-establish peace through the convening of 
two major clan conferences in the towns of Sheikh and Borama. According to 
Mark Bradbury et al.,  
 
… the Sheikh conference was significant for several reasons. First, resolving 
the conflict over Berbera port and confirming its status as a public asset, 
ensured that future Somaliland governments had a source of revenue with 
which to build an administration. Second, the conference established a 
framework for the participation of clan elders in Somaliland’s post-war system 
of governance by creating a council of elders – the guurti. In Somali pastoral 
society, a guurti is traditionally the highest political council comprising titled 
and non-titled clan leaders. At Sheikh the guurti of Somaliland’s different 
clans were constituted as a national guurti and given responsibility for 
controlling the clan militia, preventing acts of aggression against other 
communities, and for defending Somaliland.56  
 
                                                 
56 Bradbury et al., (2003), p. 460; Farah and Lewis, (1997), pp. 84-87.  
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This framework for internal security, which was consolidated in the 
subsequent Borama conference, was important for what Bron has described 
as a “society-rooted process towards state formation.”57  
 
Third, the intra-Isaaq nature of the Berbera conflict required the mediation of 
non-Isaaq elders, in this instance, the Gadabuursi guurti. Their participation at 
Sheikh indicated that the influence of the SNM was declining and that if it was 
to be sustained, Somaliland needed the buy-in of non-Isaaqs.  
 
The defining event in Somaliland’s post-conflict politics was the shir beeleed 
in Borama, which lasted for five months between January and May 1993. 
Here, “an electoral college of elders who made up the national guurti, oversaw 
the peaceful transfer of power from the SNM government of Abdulrahman 
‘Tuur’ to a civilian government headed by Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, who 
had been Somalia’s last civilian Prime Minister before the 1969 military coup.” 
The Borama process produced an interim Peace Charter and Transitional 
National Charter. The Peace Charter re-established the basis for law and 
order by setting out a code of conduct (or xeer, unwritten contracts, laws, 
agreements or social codes between clans) for the people of Somaliland in 
accordance with their traditions and the principles of Islam. The National 
Charter defined the political and institutional structures of government for a 
transitional three year period, until a constitution could be adopted.”58 
 
                                                 
57 Brons, (2002), p. 250. 
58 Bradbury et al., (2003), p. 460.  
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Bradbury et al. contend that, “In the post-war context, the Borama conference 
was important for the way in which issues of representation and power-
sharing were dealt with, by institutionalising clans and their leadership into the 
system of governance. The National Charter established what has become 
referred to as a beel (clan or community) system of government”.59 Described 
as a “dynamic hybrid of Western form and traditional substance”,60 this 
consisted of an Executive (Golaha Xukuumadda) with a President, Vice-
President and Council of Ministers, a Legislature, comprising a bicameral 
parliament with an Upper House of Elders (Golaha Guurtida) and House of 
Representatives (Golaha Wakiillada) and an independent Judiciary. “The 
Charter also established state offices such as an Auditor General, as well as 
regional governors and mayors. The role of elders was formally recognised by 
giving them responsibility for selecting a president, for ensuring state security 
by managing internal conflicts and demobilising the militia, and by 
incorporating the guurti into the Upper House of the new legislature. The 
purpose of this was to act as a check on the executive and the 
representatives.”61  
 
The beel system of government established at Borama recognises kinship as 
the ‘organising principle’ of Somali society. In essence, government became a 
power-sharing coalition of Somaliland’s main clans, integrating tradition and 
modernity in one holistic governance framework; a framework for fostering 
“popular participation” in governance or participatory governance, which might 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
60 Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development (SCPD), (1999), p. 22.  
61  Bradbury et al., (2003), p. 460. 
 70
best define the essence of ‘democracy’ without the encumbrance of a 
‘Western’ connotation. Presidential appointments to the executive were made 
to ensure a clan balance. In the Upper and Lower houses of parliament, seats 
were proportionally allocated to clans according to a formula that allotted 
seats in this legislative body. However, the patrilineal clan system meant that 
women were excluded from representative politics, because it was ambiguous 
whether a woman would represent her husband’s clan or that of her father. 
 
Bradbury et al. point out that “the inclusion of traditional leadership in the state 
apparatus has its antecedents in British colonial rule, when clan elders were 
incorporated into the administration as salaried chiefs in order to extend 
control over the rural areas.” Again, reiterating Drysdale, they go on to point 
out that under “post-independence nationalist governments, who viewed the 
‘problem of tribalism’ as an impediment to unity and modernisation, the 
traditional leadership became marginalised from politics”, whereas the SNM 
“challenged this by incorporating a guurti of Isaaq elders into its organisation 
structure.”62 The purpose was two-fold: “to mobilise support for the struggle 
and to lay the basis for a more participatory form of democracy in the post-
Barre era. Indeed, the National Charter reflected much of what was proposed 
in the SNM’s constitution for a post-Barre government” for Somalia proper. 
The government would be built on  
 
Somali cultural values, the elevation of xeer to the national level, the 
incorporation of elders in a two-chamber legislature, and combining traditional 
                                                 
62 Lewis, (1998), p. 167.  
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Somali egalitarianism with the requirements of good central government. The 
beel system of government established at Borama was intended to be in 
place for only three years. It lasted a decade.63 
 
2.7 Reconciliation, A Divergent Perspective: Somaliland and Puntland 
 
The magnitude of Somaliland’s achievements in constructing what Ahmed 
Yusuf Farah has referred to as a “culture of locally based reconciliation 
processes” may be better appreciated from his critical assessment of 
strengths and weaknesses of Somaliland and Puntland as divergent 
examples of “two relatively stable de facto political entities in northern 
Somalia”, responding to the larger post-Barre upheavals along the Somali 
coast.64 This comparison is not just academic, given the fact that Somaliland 
and Puntland, as neighbours, have long been at logger-heads over the future 
political reorganisation of the Somali coast; a predicament that has been 
taken to another level now that Puntland’s former leader, Abdullahi Yusuf 
Ahmed, has become the Ethiopian-backed interim president of the latest 
attempt at reconstituting southern Somalia – the TFG – which emerged from 
the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) sponsored Nairobi 
reconciliation peace talks. Comparing and contrasting Puntland’s and 
Somaliland’s reconciliation strategies may also be instructive for revealing 
how both, taken together, point toward some major shifts that may be 
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64 Farah and Lewis, (1999), p. 4. 
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underway in contemporary African thinking about governance and the 
reconstitution of the African state in the new age of the AU. 
 
Within the contested terrain of how the Somali coast region of the Horn of 
Africa is to be reconstituted, Somaliland, Puntland65 and southern Somalia 
may be approached conceptually as a continuum of alternative futures:  
 
• The reconstitution of Somalia as a centralised state along the lines of the 
first post-independence republic; 
• The reconstitution of Somalia as a federal state comprising autonomous 
regions as reflected in the Puntland initiative; 
• The reconstitution of Somalia as a region comprising independent 
sovereign states as reflected in the emergence of an independent 
Somaliland Republic. 
 
The centralised state option that would, in effect, take the region back to the 
status quo ante, prior to the overthrow of the Barre dictatorship, has been 
rejected. Yet, there remains no consensus between the federalist and 
sovereign independence options. Indeed they are in confrontation, as 
reflected in the outbreak of border hostilities that occurred soon after Ahmed’s 
selection as the TFG’s new interim leader – SNM-SSDF rivalry by other 
means? As such, the confrontation between Somaliland and Puntland/TFG 
                                                 
65 WSP Somali Programme, Rebuilding Somalia: Issues and Possibilities for Puntland,  
London: HAAN Publishing, (2001), p. 53. 
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challenges the sustainability of Somaliland in two respects in terms of the 
following questions: 
 
1. Is Somaliland’s '’culture of locally based reconciliation processes’ 
sustainable within a regional environment where it is in confrontation with 
the rest of the Somali region? 
2. To what extent are Somaliland’s gains in national reconciliation 
increasingly contingent on a broader reconciliatory process gaining hold 
within the Somali region as a whole? 
 
It is against this backdrop that the strengths and weaknesses of Somaliland’s 
national reconciliation can be assessed in gaining an understanding of its 
achievements, in comparison with its Puntland neighbour. Farah has 
distinguished Somaliland and Puntland in the following terms: 
 
Culturally, Woqooyi Bari Soomaalia (north-east Somalia) is clearly defined by clan 
exclusiveness and the traditional territorial control of the large Majerteen clan and 
allied Darood groups (Leylkase, Awrtable and others). In this sense, north-east 
Somalia differs from Somaliland, as it constitutes a more socially cohesive political 
entity. Somaliland, on the other hand, supports a population of mixed (and rival) 
clan origin belonging to three large clan families (Dir, Isaq and Harti/Darood). This 
makes Somaliland socially and politically more complex than north-east Somalia 
… While Somaliland’s experience in peacekeeping and governance had been 
relatively violent (yet constructive), north-east Somalia has witnessed domestic 
stability at the cost of political stagnation … traditional leaders in both Somaliland 
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and north-east Somalia emerged as paramount political actors in the post-military 
period. In Somaliland, the guurti have been politicized since 1993 when they were 
institutionalized as one of the two chambers of parliament in the new 
administration formed in Borama. The Interim Charter of Puntland, however, failed 
to legislate a similar status for the Isimo who themselves have played a similar 
role in north-east Somalia, securing internal stability and driving the grassroots 
political process that culminated in the Garowe conference.66 
 
In Farah’s estimation, Somaliland has presented a much higher risk 
proposition than Puntland, though the Somaliland experiment has progressed 
much further. Given the reasons he cites, this may be instructive for the future 
of both Somaliland’s nation-building future and the prospects of the TFG. Both 
Puntland and Somaliland, relative to the rest of the Somali region, have 
benefited from the reconciliatory role of the clan elders. In Puntland’s case, 
however, as Farah points out, prolonged competition for the chairmanship of 
the SSDF by “two prominent Majerteen political leaders, Col. Abdillahi Yusuuf 
(ex-military officer and now first president of Puntland State) and his arch-rival 
Gen. Mohamed Abshir Musa (ex-police commissioner and vigorously 
opposed to Yusuuf) paralyzed the SSDF since 1994.”67 This essentially 
military – as opposed to civilian – leadership rivalry prevented the SSDF 
leadership and the Isimo – ‘titled clan and sub-clan heads and lineage 
leaders’ – from achieving any progress in the area of political rebuilding. 
Indeed, according to Farah, “the process of building basic institutions of 
                                                 
66 Farah and Lewis, (1999), p. 4. 
67 Ibid., p. 3. 
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governance remained frozen in a kind of permanent and uncertain transition 
prior to the declaration of statehood by Puntland in July 1998.”68 
 
Undoubtedly, in the case of Somaliland and the SNM, the relatively more 
clearly defined and coherent articulation of a political programme by a civilian 
nationalist elite, with a more organic connectivity to its social base, benefited 
the political rebuilding process, which has since steadily advanced. Hence, 
Farah would venture: “The relatively more constructive experience of 
Somaliland in governance in the post-military period and its multi-ethnic 
composition makes it an interesting case to watch in the process of rebuilding 
wider political structures from a patchwork of clan-fiefdoms.” Yet, to 
Puntland’s credit, “unlike in the SNM, competition for control of the 
organization and local administration did not degenerate into” what he 
described as “the devastating internal power struggle witnessed in Somaliland 
in the transitional period.”69 Here, unlike in many renditions of the Somaliland 
experience, Farah delves at some depth in unpacking its contradictions, 
rooted in the history of the SNM. 
 
Old divisions within the military and civilian wings of the SNM resurfaced 
more intensely in the post-military period, in the absence of a common foe. 
Opposition to Tuur’s administration coalesced around the alan cas faction of 
the SNM, which accused the government of having a civilian bias and 
deliberately under-representing the military wing. Dominated by the military 
elite of the SNM (who were either dissatisfied with their status in Tuur’s 
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administration or were aspiring for high office in the new administration), the 
opposition also included civilian politicians with a vested interest in ending 
Tuur’s administration.70 
 
Against this backdrop, Tuur’s attempt to expand the interim government’s 
authority outside Hargeisa – as successive Modagishu regimes have failed to 
do in the south – by establishing a national army from the clan-based SNM 
militia only exacerbated matters by helping to trigger inter-clan warfare. In 
March 1993, the administration organised a multi-clan force in order to 
establish control over the vital port of Berbera, which brought Somaliland to 
the brink of civil war. This prospect motivated the clan intervention, which set 
off the series of successful reconciliation conferences that have managed to 
stabilise Somaliland ever since.71 
 
Writing in 1999, Farah was hoping that a “peaceful and constitutional 
transition” would spare Puntland a similar internal conflict. Unfortunately this 
hope did not come to the fore. Veering from the path of constitutionalism, 
Abdullahi Yusuf, instead pursued the route of strongman, warlord rule over 
Puntland while vying for ultimate leadership of a successor to the failed 
Transitional National Government (TNG) in Somalia, and, at the same time, 
stoking border tensions with Somaliland. In following this route, Puntland’s 
experience has exposed the limits of clan power in deterring warlord political 
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ambitions. In 2001, the region’s clan elders had elected Jama Ali Jama as the 
new head of Puntland. This was immediately rejected by Colonel Yusuf, who 
alleged the vote was “futile and illegal,” thus triggering a war against Jama’s 
forces, which ended in May 2002 with the defeat of the latter’s forces at 
Qardo.72  
 
Somalilanders, meanwhile, saw Yusuf’s strongman rule in Puntland as merely 
a stepping stone for his real objective of ultimately heading up a successor to 
the failed TNG in Mogadishu which, with Ethiopia’s support – Ethiopia, also 
widely seen as pro-Somaliland – he ultimately achieved. In commenting on 
his stewardship in Puntland and candidacy for heading up the new TFG, 
SomalilandNet, on 17 September 2004, commented that:  
 
… he has shown to the IGAD states and Somalis alike that no other person 
other than him would govern Puntland. With the exception of Mohamed Abdi 
Hashi, Vice president of Puntland who regularly disagreed with and publicly 
challenged him, Abdullahi Yusuf has often gotten his way and treated 
Puntland as his fiefdom. For example, he has been taking almost $250,000 
monthly for the last 22 months from the region for his campaign use in 
Nairobi. This was done over the objection of the vice president and the House 
of Representatives who would have liked to give more priority to the 
worsening drought conditions in the Sool, Sanaag and Buuhoodle regions.73 
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2.8 Somaliland’s Contested Consolidation: From Reconciliation to 
Constitutionalism 
 
While constitutionalism did not take root in Puntland’s experiment in regional 
autonomy, the clan reconciliation process in Somaliland took that trajectory 
after the post-Berbera conflict series of reconciliation conferences, though this 
did not end the violence. Nevertheless, the aim, unlike in Puntland, whose 
leader hitched its fate to the broader reconstitution of the southern-based 
Somali republic, was to consolidate the independence of the north-west 
Somali coast. Putting in place the constitutional underpinnings of this process; 
one which confirmed civilian ascendancy over the military elites, has been 
examined in considerable detail by Bradbury et al.,74 starting with their review 
of the administration of Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal – the old Somali 
republic’s last civil Prime Minister before the 1969 Barre coup. The transfer 
from the SNM interim administration of Abdulrahman ‘Tuur’ to Egal was 
effected peacefully within the implementation framework of the Borama 
process.  
 
Egal is, in effect, the ‘founding father’ of the Somaliland Republic. But his 
tenure would undergo a ‘baptism by fire’ that would test, yet again, the 
sustainability of reconciliation in Somaliland. Over the first 18 months of his 
new post-Borama administration, the Republic’s foundations were secured; 
the institutions of government were established, the militia was demobilised, a 
revenue system was created (where the outcome of the battle over the 
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Berbera port had been critical) and a secure environment for economic 
recovery was provided. Constitutional progress, however, was initially slow, 
as contested issues from the Borama conference still remained.  
 
According to Bradbury et al., as Egal’s government “sought to extend its 
administrative control dissatisfaction grew among certain Isaaq clans with the 
formula for sharing political power adopted at the Borama conference. This, 
combined with political opportunism by certain politicians, pushed Somaliland 
into civil war.”75 This conflict underlined the fragility of the reconciliation 
process and Somaliland’s independence, when a section of the opposition to 
the Egal administration declared its support for a federal Somalia. The war 
lasted from November 1994 to October 1996, displacing over 180,000 people 
and causing severe damage to Burco and Hargeisa – areas that were still 
trying to recover from the devastation of the war of resistance against the 
Barre dictatorship. A second national reconciliation conferencing process (or 
Shir Qarameed), held in Hargeisa between October 1996 and February 1997, 
ended the civil war and, in the process, accelerated Somaliland’s 
constitutional development. Egal’s political leadership survived the war, due to 
the fact that an electoral college of elders extended his tenure in office by 
another four years. The group also increased opposition and minority seats in 
the house of parliament, while an interim constitution was adopted, which 
superseded the Borama charters and provided the basis for a multi-party 
system of government. 
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The Hargeisa conference was financed and managed with little foreign 
support.76 However, it was largely financed by government, thereby 
strengthening the reality of a central government in Hargeisa, which was 
constantly eluding the warring factions in southern former Italian Somalia. 
Twice the number of voting delegates were present at the conference than at 
Borama, with a number of women permitted to observe the proceedings. The 
fact that there was no change in governmental leadership meant that the civil 
war had failed to disrupt the country’s governance, thereby providing for 
continuity in Somaliland’s continuing transition. Since this last reconciliatory 
conferencing process in 1997, Somaliland has experienced a period of 
uninterrupted security. Security, in turn, has facilitated the country’s continuing 
constitutional, political and socio-economic development.  
 
Here, it is instructive to quote at some length Bradbury et al., who explain 
how, within the dynamics of conflict and accommodation, Somaliland’s 
reconciliatory capacities, time and again, prevailed over the centrifugal 
tendencies that have been the feature of politics in southern Somalia.77 
Drawing on an observation by political economist William Reno,78 who pointed 
out that Somaliland illustrates how changes in the global economy do not 
inevitably produce predatory war economies and the end of political order, 
Bradbury et al. suggest several explanations why Somaliland has not followed 
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the path of the south into protracted civil war: “The political system adopted at 
Borama which integrated traditional authorities in the state administration 
guarded against the re-emergence of authoritarian rule.”79  
 
It has been argued that due to the particular experience of British colonialism 
these are more entrenched and stronger in the pastoralist communities in the 
north compared to southern Somalia.80 The Sheikh and Borama conferences 
were only two of 33 clan peace conferences that took place in Somaliland 
between February 1991 and 1996.81  
 
This explanation, however, overlooks the influence of other factors. These include 
the different political experience of northwest Somalia within the Somali Republic, 
the legacy of democratic practices within the SNM, the relatively good relations 
between the northern clans, a different resource base than the south, and the lack 
of international intervention in Somaliland in the early 1990s, which in the south 
had served to strengthen the power of the warlords. The experience of the war in 
the north was also very different from the south. It was fought mostly within Isaaq 
territory and the SNM, while some elders worked to maintain social and economic 
relations between the clans and neutralise the potential for violence. The war 
served to create a political community among the Isaaq which was reinforced by 
the experience of self-organisation in the refugee camps in Ethiopia … The 
creation of Somaliland also reflected a broad consensus on the need for some 
form of government to manage internal conflict and external relations. This 
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consensus is apparent from the financial support given to peace conferences by 
communities and business people. The SNM’s stated vision of a government 
which integrated traditional authorities in the state administration … established a 
political system that guarded against the re-emergence of authoritarian rule.82 
 
There is more to this explanatory reflection by Bradbury et al. that will be 
revisited in the next chapter on reconstruction. After all, what is described 
here – which reinforces earlier insights provided in this chapter by Drysdale 
on the region’s progressive ‘clanism’ – is the unfolding of a uniquely self-
reliant and self-contained path toward political and economic development; 
one that is the essence of ‘popular sovereignty’ as opposed to the more 
prevalent ‘national sovereignty’ that tends to euphemistically provide 
protection for ruling elites against local and international accountability. 
Somaliland’s constitutional phase of reconciliatory nation-building, the stage it 
is currently experiencing, which formally culminated in successful 
parliamentary elections in September 2005, was intended to further entrench 
and institutionalise the emerging political culture described by Bradbury et al. 
and many others.  
 
2.9 Post-Conflict Constitutional Development  
 
In the aftermath of the civil war, the interim constitution adopted at the 
Hargeisa conference, enshrined principles intended to enhance the 
development of stable civil-military relations. According to Ahmed Yusuf 
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Farah, a possible solution was to introduce a constitution that clearly defined 
the “institutional functions and mandates of security and civilian institutions, 
while at the same time adopting democratic rules governing access by the 
elite to high public office regardless of professional bias.”83 Farah then cites 
the following articles that were introduced to regulate the distribution of power 
and authority between the civilian and military elites:84 
 
Article 38: Freedom of Association 
It is forbidden [for] any organisation with aims and objectives that are deemed 
detrimental to the wider interest of society, including covert and underground 
organisations, armed and with military structure, or any other organisation 
that violates the constitution regardless of its form.  
 
Article 61: Joint Sessions of the Two Chambers of the Parliament 
The two chambers of the parliament (council of elders and elected 
legislature), will hold joint sessions to deliberate on the following issues: 
 
x. The decision and the declaration of war when the Republic of Somaliland is 
faced with a state of war. 
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Article 77: The Power and Obligation of the Council of Representatives 
The decision by the executive to introduce emergency rule throughout the 
country or parts of the country should seek the approval of the two chambers 
of parliament. 
 
Article 115: The Powers of the President 
3. Nomination and change of high public officials of the government after 
consultation with the responsible Minister, and having considered the 
constitution and by-laws. 
 
Article 148: Commanders of the Armed Forces and their Deputies 
1. The armed force is responsible to defend and secure the integrity and 
independence of the country from external aggression, in addition, it will 
act in response to necessary emergency as circumstances demand, in 
accordance with the constitution. 
2. The armed force must always abide by and ensure the execution of the 
constitution and by laws of the country. 
3. The formation of the National Army is an internal matter limited to the 
different parts of the country. 
4. The individual nominated to be the Minister of Defence must be a citizen 
and a civilian. 
5. A by-law defining the structure of the National Army will be formulated. 
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Article 149: Police Force and Prison Corps 
The police force is responsible for domestic security and stability and 
ensuring the execution of the constitution and laws of the country, their 
structure and functions will be defined in a by-law. 
 
The prison corps are responsible for keeping and rehabilitation of the 
prisoners, their structure and functions will be defined in a by-law. 
 
In addition to institutionalising the regulation of civil-military relations within a 
constitutional framework, the interim constitution set out a schedule for the 
legalisation of political parties and the holding of democratic elections. It 
would take four years, however, before a referendum was held on the new 
constitution. According to Bradbury et al., “Egal linked the transition to multi-
party democracy with Somaliland’s desire to gain international recognition, 
arguing that the international community would not recognise Somaliland’s 
independent status unless it adopted such a system.” Here, they point out that 
“a major impetus for implementing the constitution was the formation of 
Puntland in 1998 and the TNG in 2000,” stressing that “Puntland, which 
claims authority in areas of eastern Somaliland, and the TNG, which claims 
sovereignty throughout Somalia, directly challenged the legitimacy of 
Somaliland.”85 Somaliland’s constitutional consolidation, therefore, was 
intimately intertwined with its regional security interests within the broader 
fluid context of the reconstitution of the state along the Somali coast. 
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As Bradbury et al. state,86 with Article 2 of the constitution affirming 
Somaliland’s independent status, the constitutional referendum of 31 May 
2001 was effectively a vote on the status of Somaliland vis-à-vis the rest of 
the Somali region. This constitutional confirmation of Somaliland’s status set 
the stage for the institutionalisation of the country’s multi-party political 
system, in a phase that would now extend the constitutionalisation of 
reconciliatory nation-building toward a consolidation of democracy. The 
Somaliland parliament legalised the formation of political organisations on 6 
August 2001, and scheduled presidential elections for February 2002. 
President Egal followed up this legalisation of political organisations by 
announcing the formation of Somaliland’s first such organisation – the 
Democratic United Peoples’ Movement (UDUB). With a further six 
organisations registering by the end of September 2001, the politics of 
Somaliland began making the transition beyond the ‘liberation movement’ era 
of the SNM and its turbulent aftermath, toward a more normalised phase of 
civilian democratic governance. Bradbury et al. describe this as a transition 
“from community politics to multi-party politics.” As this transition unfolded, the 
power-sharing system of governance established during the Borama process 
has proven critical to the process of reconciliation and recovery in Somaliland, 
succeeding where numerous efforts in Mogadishu have, to date, failed. 
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2.10 Somaliland’s Electoral Transition 
 
The new constitutional system introduced the principle of universal suffrage, 
thereby extending to women the right to vote. Within the context of the 
electoral system, under the new constitution, the installation of the different 
tiers of government has been a ‘bottom-up’ process, starting with local district 
elections. These involved electing 379 councillors to 23 district and municipal 
councils in Somaliland’s six regions. According to Bradbury et al., “the reason 
for starting with a district election was to determine which three parties would 
contest the presidential and parliamentary elections.” Besides the UDUB, 
President Egal’s party, “the local elections were contested by six 
organisations: ASAD, HORMOOD, Kulmiye, SAHAN, UCID … who were able 
to demonstrate adequate support in six regions.”87 
 
In December 2001, an Nationa Electoral Commission was established to 
oversee elections. A number of problems became apparent: 
 
• Electoral commissioners lacked experience in managing elections; 
• The political organisations had no experience in contesting elections or 
resources for mounting one; 
• No consideration was given to selecting women candidates; 
• There had been no voter education; 
• Somaliland’s media lacked experience in elections coverage; 
                                                 
87 Ibid., p. 265. 
 88
• There was a mutual lack of trust between political organisations, and 
between them and the electoral commission; 
• The participation of the Sool and eastern Sanaag regions was 
controversial due to local ambivalence in those regions toward 
Somaliland (and, undoubtedly, their being contested terrain with 
Puntland); and 
• The lack of a census and an electoral register proved problematic. 
 
Civil society organisations played an important role in addressing some of 
these problems. Such involvement helped generate an environment of 
popular participation that, with outside technical assistance and expertise, as 
well as funding for training from such quarters as the European Commission 
and the US-based International Republican Institute (IRI), helped to carry 
Somaliland through an important learning curve.  
 
By the time voting in local elections were underway in 2002, President Egal 
had passed away in South Africa, and was succeeded by his minority clan 
Vice-Presidential successor, Daahir Rayale Kahin of the Gadabuursi clan. 
Voting in the district elections occurred on 15 December 2002, at 726 out of 
800 polling stations. Because of security considerations, they did not take 
place in Sool, eastern Sanaag and parts of the Buudhoodle district in 
Togdheer region. A total of 440,067 valid votes were counted and 332 District 
Councillors were elected. Kaahin’s party, the UDUB, was the clear winner, 
followed by a cluster of close competition between UCID (30,676 votes), 
Kulmiye (29,923 votes) and HORMOOD (29,104 votes). Because of the 
 89
problems experienced with the district elections, making additional electoral 
legislation necessary, the presidential and parliamentary election time-tables 
were delayed. The presidential election took place in April 2003.  
 
Civil Society organisations again provided training for polling station staff, 
domestic observers and party representatives, while the Integrity Watch 
Committee worked with the parties to recommit themselves to the Code of 
Conduct.88 
 
Efforts were made by the Somaliland National Electoral Commission (NEC) to 
ensure that democratic practices were followed by all parties. Yet the NEC 
had few powers to control the parties’ campaigns. Kulmiye outspent the 
governing UDUB party of the president, raising money from the Somaliland 
business community and the diaspora. Kaahin, however, was elected in a poll 
that generally received favourable reviews from international and domestic 
observers, though various irregularities were noted. As a result, the closeness 
of the contest “presented a harsh test for Somaliland’s aspiring democracy”,89 
as the UDUB outpolled Kulmiye by a mere 80 votes. What is more, according 
to Bradbury et al., UDUB supporters as well as the supporters of Kulmiye had 
expected the latter to emerge victorious. The outcome triggered small protests 
in Burco and Gabiley, which are Kulmiye strongholds. However, in spite of 
fears that there might be outbreaks of violence, such destablisation failed to 
materialise. This was the result of government’s emergency precautions and 
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the Kulmiye leadership’s decision not to contest the outcome, though it did 
present evidence of mathematical miscalculations by the NEC. 
 
In the end, in accordance with the Electoral Law, the Supreme Court delivered 
the final verdict in favour of the ruling UDUB, increasing its victory margin to 
214 votes after submissions by all parties and the NEC; an outcome that was 
immediately contested by Kulmiye, in the process, raising questions about the 
court’s competence as well as highlighting Somaliland’s weak judicial system. 
This is a point of increasing concern by Somalilanders who, in fact, question 
the Supreme Court’s independence from the Executive. Bradbury et al. drew 
the following implications from the April 2003 presidential elections and their 
district election antecedents:90   
 
• In spite of the contested nature of the electoral outcome, there was no 
‘political entrepreneurial’ constituency for violent or even massive non-
violent opposition amid timely civil society interventions (such as the 
Integrity Watch Committee)  to mediate and advise parties on settling 
matters peacefully; 
• The regional distribution of votes illustrated a demographic and socio-
political division between western and eastern Somaliland related to “the 
non-participation of eastern Sanaag and Sool regions,” which accounted 
for significantly lower voter participation in the east – an area contested 
with Puntland; 
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• To some extent, this east-west differentiation reflected partisan divisions 
between more western support for UDUB and more eastern support for 
Kulmiye; 
• Much of Somaliland’s population (or at least politically active population) is 
concentrated in the west as reflected in the Woqooyi Galbeed (Hargeisa 
region), Awdal and Saxil, areas accounting for over 60% of voting in both 
district and presidential elections; 
• The fact that 40% of all voting centred in the Hargeisa region “dramatically 
illustrates the urban drift towards Hargeisa and its growing dominance as 
the capital”;  
• Elections in Somaliland, based on these perceived patterns, are largely an 
urban event as there was “limited campaigning and voting taking place in 
rural areas”; 
• Successive Somaliland governments will face a major challenge in 
preventing eastern, primarily rural and nomadic marginalisation and 
feelings of alienation from the rest of the country, especially within the 
context of ongoing contestation between Somaliland and efforts to 
reconstitute a Mogadishu-based Somalia; 
• The elections – district and presidential – have facilitated an electoral 
transition from an electoral college of elders to individual voters though the 
introduction of multi-party competition has not seemed to adequately solve 
problems of representation; 
• At local levels, people appear to vote along clan lines irrespective of a shift 
from an electoral college of clan elders to individual voters; 
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• Given the continuing clan influence on voting preferences and the 
majoritarian voting system, “minorities have no representation on any of 
the new councils”; 
• Given the fact that the UDUB has a majority in 11 out of 15 district councils 
and shares an equal number of seats with Kulmiye in two such councils, 
with the majority of mayors also being UDUB, “the district and presidential 
elections have therefore given UDUB sweeping authority over 
Somaliland’s political institutions”; 
• The extent of UDUB dominance is important because “the elections … 
drew attention to the issues of the decentralisation of government and 
political power” which, given the disastrous experience of centralised 
authoritarian rule from Mogadishu, influenced the 1993 Borama Charters 
and the subsequent constitution in the direction of institutionalising a 
decentralised system of government “as a way of preventing a return to 
authoritarian rule and strengthening popular participation in government,” 
thus:  
 
… the election of district and municipal councils that are accountable to the local 
electorate holds great potential for creating a form of government that is 
responsive to local needs and one that will prevent the recentralisation of political 
power.91 
 
This last implication drawn from the district and presidential electoral 
experience has broader regional significance within the larger Somali coast 
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context. Decentralisation within Somaliland and the existence of an 
autonomous Puntland, linked to the federalist outcome of the Nairobi talks, 
resulting in the current TFG, indicate an overall direction in post-Barre Somali 
political culture toward a decentralised reconstitution of the state within the 
greater Somali region. Whatever the outcome in the contestation between 
Somaliland and the rest of the Somali region, a future centralisation of power 
along the Somali coast is highly unlikely. This fact will dictate the terms of a 
future reconciliatory dynamic within the region if such a process emerges. 
Here, to bring the problems and prospects of Somaliland’s reconciliation 
experience up to date, it may be useful to speculate on these broader 
reconciliation prospects vis-à-vis Somaliland and the rest of the Somali 
region. 
 
2.11 Reconciliation: A Lutta Continua92   
 
The effective ascendancy of decentralised state-building in Somaliland and 
the greater Somali region grew organically from the political, territorial and 
military fragmentation that has been so much a feature of the destabilisation 
of the region, in the wake of the collapse of the Barre regime. The fracturing of 
Somali society emerged dialectically in over-reaction to the hyper-
centralisation of power during the Barre period coupled with, in Somaliland’s 
case, the marginalisation and ultimate alienation of an entire region and its 
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peoples. Reversing fragmentation appears to have led naturally to a 
decentralising ‘equilibrium’, which has given impetus to another ascendant 
trend: the re-assertion of the very ‘clanism’ depicted derisively by some 
‘modernisers’ but which, in fact, has played a pivotal stabilising role, as 
expressed in the interventions of clan elders as the arbiters of conflict and 
accommodation.   
 
In the case of Somaliland, clan leadership ascendancy was facilitated by the 
modernising nationalism of the SNM which, ideologically, sought to bridge the 
cultural gap between tradition and modernity and which, from the standpoint 
of self-reliant pragmatic survival, depended on the clan elders as pillars of 
support in mobilising the social base for insurgency and post-conflict 
governance. Because of external isolation, Somalilanders have had, as 
Bradbury et al. put it, “certain freedom to craft an indigenous model of modern 
African government that fuses indigenous forms of social and political 
organisation within a democratic framework.” Herein may reside one path 
toward transcending the African post-colonial predicament of “the bifurcated 
state”, as interrogated by Mahmood Mamdani.93  
 
Organised differently in rural areas from urban areas, the governing 
inheritance bequeathed by colonialism was a state that, according to 
Mamdani, “was Janus-faced, bifurcated. It contained a duality: two forms of 
power under a single hegemonic authority”, which counter-poised the 
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modernising “civil power” of rights and freedom to the “customary power” of 
custom and tradition, each signifying “one face of the same bifurcated state.”94 
 
Clan leadership, as the arbiter of national reconciliation in Somaliland, 
appears to have assisted the north-western brand of Somali nationalism in 
overcoming this bifurcating legacy. And so has this same social stratum of 
leadership emerged as a key actor in the ongoing efforts to revive a 
semblance of government in former Italian Somalia, where ‘clanism’ was once 
anathema. Only here, unlike in Somaliland (or at least to the same degree), 
inter-clan dynamics were to become complicated by the militarised 
balkanisation of a factionising southern Somalia; a process that gave rise to 
that region’s ‘warlord’ phenomenon, and the parasitic political economy and 
culture it has spawned. While the logic of decentralisation ultimately prevailed 
over external pressures for a ‘unified’ – read, unitary centralised – Somalia, 
the jury remains out on whether or not the TFG, led by Somaliland’s nemesis, 
Abdullahi Yusuf, can replicate the reconciliatory dynamic that has 
characterised the north-west in the south, much less reconcile with the reality 
of an independent Somaliland. Somaliland itself is still undergoing its own 
process of consolidating reconciliation into sustainable statehood. 
 
Provided that the IGAD states, the AU and key state actors like South Africa 
and neighbouring Ethiopia, are able to prevent hostilities between Somaliland 
and Somalia, the latter’s five-year transitional phase that its TFG must 
navigate, could provide ample space for Hargeisa and Mogadishu to work on 
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their respective nation-building/re-building projects and, perhaps, converge 
toward a workable accommodation. Throughout the Mbagathi talks, which 
gave rise to the TFG, Somaliland was vigilant on the question of those talks 
not presuming to incorporate its region into the scope of the settlement being 
sought. However, as recently as President Kahin’s trip to South Africa in late 
January 2005, his Foreign Minister Edna Adan Ismail made it clear that 
Hargeisa sought good relations with Mogadishu:  
 
… Let the other side (Somali Republic) set in motion a credible government, 
accountable to its people and we will think of having a relation like we have 
with other neighbours … Let them salvage the country and the people from 
destruction and nightmare. It is only then we can talk of relations and issue of 
mutual interest.95  
 
In the process, she downplayed border tensions between Somaliland and 
Puntland, while indicating that whatever happened in the Republic of Somalia, 
it had to address the interests of Somaliland.96 97 
 
There are a number of issues to which the new TFG and its parliament must 
tend, which have a bearing on establishing the preconditions for a wider 
regional reconciliation. Over the next five years, Somalia must conduct a 
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national census, draft a new constitution and have that constitution approved 
by an internationally supervised national referendum. This process, in turn, 
would establish the playing-field for national elections. With the current 
process of dialogue amongst Somalia’s new MPs in Jowhar and Mogadishu in 
progress, and the eventual return of their president and his cabinet (some of 
whom, at the time of writing had already returned) to Mogadishu, the security 
situation within Mogadishu and environs has been a major preoccupation of 
all interested parties in getting the new Mogadishu government’s mandate 
underway. The region is still at the mercy of factional warlord-strongmen and 
their ‘technicals’, and several murders of TFG security personnel and officials 
are indicative of what could be an uphill struggle for the TFG to prevent itself 
from going the way of the former Djibouti-backed TNG.  
 
Although clan leadership has figured importantly in the Mbagathi process, its 
role has not produced an inter-clan security consensus – that would 
necessitate warlord buy-in – which would guarantee the safety and security of 
the incoming government. As critical as this should be to the integrity and 
legitimacy of the TFG, that part of the Mbagathi settlement calling for an 
African peacekeeping presence in Mogadishu, has proven controversial. 
President Yusuf’s appeal for a 20,000-strong AU peacekeeping force – 
seemingly without Transitional Federal Parliamentary approval – has 
apparently been seen by elements in Mogadishu as a ploy by him to impose 
his authority through the multilateral instrumentality of a ‘foreign’ force. Thus, 
“a number of Somali leaders, including several key Islamists, have since 
flagged their opposition to the plan, reportedly sending the price of weapons 
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and ammunition in Mogadishu skyrocketing and a reported flood of new stock 
entering the city’s arms markets”.98 Though initially supported by IGAD 
members Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, Yusuf’s request was subsequently 
deflected by both the AU and the UN Security Council as a means of avoiding 
“a repeat of the disastrous ‘Black Hawk Down’ episode of 1993”. Instead, the 
AU is reported to be continuing plans for the introduction of a modest peace 
support mission, possibly accompanied by a small “protection force.”99 Even 
these limited deployments, however, would require prior approval, which may 
hinge on the TFG managing to obtain credible militia approval by the new 
parliament, along with a measurable cease-fire arrangement put in place – 
both disarmament and disbanding which, again, would seem to require on-
the-ground agreement/acquiescence from clan-cum-warlord leaders.  
 
The AU peace support mission that is contemplated would, among other 
things, be charged with training the new Somali security forces. So far, only 
Uganda and Sudan has pledged troops – 1,700 – in the hope that other 
member states, “especially frontline states Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti,  
follow suit,” though there is opposition to Ethiopian involvement in such a 
force. One Somali intellectual ventured an opinion that “African forces should 
come here … they are welcome … but not Ethiopians,” reflecting also a 
suspicion that Abdullahi Yusuf, as President, is a puppet of Addis Ababa. 
Meanwhile, with the inclusion in the cabinet of four factional leaders, who 
were left out of the initial line-up, “sources close to the transitional government 
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believe that the main task of the government now is to disarm the militias 
through persuasion.”100 Priority though this may be, whether it is a realistic 
prospect, could be judged by a Nairobi-based mid-January report from a 
Maxamed Xaaji Ingirilis, stating that “lately, fierce fighting has flared up across 
the country. Inter-clan war backed by the fiendish business community of both 
sides is currently going on in the central regions of Hobyo and Gelinsor”101 
(italics added). More reassuring may be the reception received by 50 Somali 
MPs, including the Speaker of Parliament and the Minister of National 
Security, when they entered Mogadishu from Kenya on the 6th of February. 
They were met by a crowd of 5,000 people as they entered a stadium in 
Mogadishu.       
 
Assuming that the security situation pans out sufficiently to allow the interim 
government to settle down, another crucial hurdle is the establishment of a 
Federal Commission, as stipulated in the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC). 
This Commission would be mandated to set in train “the elaboration of a 
federal framework for the state – with or without the inclusion of Somaliland”, 
as a precondition to laying the ground for free and fair elections.102 Donors, at 
least initially, would be expected to support these “regional federal states of 
Somalia”, which introduces another dimension with implications for 
Somaliland advancing its cause in the international community: “the jostling by 
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frontline states for strategic positions in readiness for the reconstruction 
programme”, which will introduce major donor resources and possible 
investments into the region.103  
 
This prospect, in fact, has been cited as a major impetus behind Kenya’s 
pressure on the TFG to relocate back to Somalia. Sections of Kenyan 
President Mwai Kibaki’s cabinet have been pushing for a quick relocation of 
the TFG and Parliament back to Somalia, “lest Kenya lose out on the 
reconstruction programme to other stakeholders who have been positioning 
themselves to clinch major project deals”.104 Kenyans view their country as 
the natural gateway for Somalia’s reconstruction in terms of proximity, human 
resources and facilities which, undoubtedly, may also reinforce the gateway 
role that Kenya is positioned to play in another post-conflict reconstruction 
challenge: southern Sudan, in the wake of its hosting of the recently-
culminated Naivasha peace process. Otherwise, with respect to Somalia, 
some Kenyans see their reconstruction gateway role threatened by others, 
notably Ethiopia, the latter which has been hoping for a peaceful and stable 
Somalia as a means of expanding its access to the sea. 
The building up of momentum toward a political economy of post-conflict 
reconstruction for the TFG is likely to escalate pressures for the TFG’s 
diplomatic recognition which, in turn, will complicate Hargeisa’s campaign to 
gain sufficient international recognition to break out of its current isolation. The 
international politics of Somaliland’s quest for recognition is the subject of the 
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concluding chapter, and will thus not be elaborated on here. However, there 
may be a dialectical relationship between Somaliland’s internal and external 
reconciliation prospects and its competition for recognition vis-à-vis yet 
another – the 14th – transitional government in Somalia. The politico-economic 
dimensions to Somalia’s reconstruction, in terms of external aid and 
supporting investment, which will benefit IGAD member states, could prove 
irresistible in undercutting the politically constructive diplomatic role they might 
play in calibrating a managed process of conditional recognition of the TFG, 
accompanied by a serious consideration of recognition options that might also 
benefit Somaliland and, in the process, move the politics of reconciliation in 
both countries toward an eventual convergence that could conceivably lead to 
a wider reconciliation process in the Somali coast region. 
 
2.12 Somaliland, Reconciliation and the New Logic of Continental 
Union 
 
The prospects for a convergence in reconciliation between Somaliland and 
Somalia is not a purely academic exercise when viewed in the broader 
context of the trajectory of the politics of the AU. Unlike its predecessor, the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), the AU’s vision departs significantly from 
the constraints of non-interference, the inviolability of ‘national sovereignty’ 
and, ultimately, the dictum of territorial integrity. The AU Commission under 
Prof Alpha Konare and his deputy have made efforts to change the political 
and institutional culture of the AU significantly and to convince member states 
 102
to follow. Most member states have been slow in enracing the new AU ethos. 
Otherwise, Somaliland might have already become an officially recognised 
member of the AU. But the conceptual framework of the AU, its fledgling 
organs and its vision of promoting a regional integration process that moves 
the continent toward a confederation of sub-regional federations, radically 
changes the terms of reference pertaining to the age-old debates about the 
sanctity of territorial integrity and the options for self-determination, including 
secession. Based on the AU’s commitment to continental federation and its 
Constitutive Act of Union, what is emerging in the transition from the OAU is a 
continental proto-government; a conception that, theoretically, at least, 
creates a situation wherein the territorial integrity of any member nation-state 
of the AU is ultimately superseded by the territorial integrity of the continent 
itself. Though political thinking in Africa has not fully assimilated this new 
paradigm, it is one that should facilitate a new flexibility and creativity in 
addressing regional tensions within and between countries that are part of the 
unresolved legacies of colonialism.             
 
No sub-region of the continent has been as ill-served by the OAU’s inflexibility 
on issues of territorial integrity and self-determination as the Horn of Africa. 
Here, for example, Eritrea’s independence had to be resolved militarily, 
because the OAU’s strictures combined with ingrained antipathies – rooted in 
post-colonial fears of divisive external ‘divide-and-rule’ threats to ‘national 
unity’ (and territorial integrity) – made it impossible for the Organization to 
accommodate the Eritrean liberation movement and its people’s aspirations 
for self-determination. A politico-diplomatic conflict prevention-management-
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resolution option did not exist until the ‘facts on the ground’ dictated ultimate 
OAU recognition of Eritrean sovereignty. In large measure, the AU has 
already seen an advance over this inflexibility in the case of the Sudan, where 
the Naivasha interim settlement allowed for a self-determination option 
exercised through a referendum after six years of south Sudan autonomy. 
This amounts to the first time in Africa’s post-colonial history that the right of 
secession has been politically and diplomatically accommodated in a political 
settlement to a conflict. However, interestingly, in southern Sudan’s case – 
with implications for Somaliland – this AU and internationally recognised self-
determination/secession option is likely to be wrapped in a broader geo-
political dynamic that will forestall and/or contain the fragmenting logic of this 
option that has been afforded to the southern Sudanese. 
 
By the time south Sudan’s six year interim period culminates in a referendum 
on self-determination, there is likely to be in existence an East African 
federation, which would come into being in 2010 – in a mere four years’ time; 
the self-life allotted for Somalia’s TFG. The logic of south Sudan’s self-
determination could likely lead it out of a federation with ‘New Sudan’ and into 
one with the East African Community (EAC); and an expanding one at that, as 
Burundi, Rwanda and possibly even the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
may join the greater East Africa. Alternatively, a ‘New Sudan’ in its entirety, 
south Sudan included, could link to the prospective East African federation – 
all within the framework of the new AU logic of continental federation-building. 
Moreover, Sudan’s possible post-conflict integration into an expanding East 
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African federation, automatically places the Horn of Africa, including the 
Somali coast, into this eventual new emerging geo-political reality. 
 
In short, Somaliland is by no means a ‘finished product’ within the larger 
context of reconciliation along the Somali coast. Should a convergence in the 
politics of reconciliation in Somaliland and southern Somalia progress toward 
an eventual co-equal political arrangement between the two, the logic of such 
an evolution would dovetail with the larger logic of federation-building in 
greater East Africa and the continent as a whole. The year 2010 is not far off. 
With that in mind and the fact that 2010 is also the year in which Somalia’s 
federal transition would culminate in a reconstituted republic, there should be 
ample room for the AU and key members of its PSC, such as South Africa 
and Ethiopia, to work with Somaliland and Somalia in nurturing a 
reconciliation process that informs new approaches to the question of 
diplomatic recognition; that expands their and the AU’s options within the 
larger unfolding geo-political context of a greater East Africa, and that possibly 
revisits the aspirations of pan-Somali reconciliation within a broader pan-
African framework, as opposed to the old OAU nation-state constraints. By 
implication, these constraints meant that pan-Somali nationalism could be 
nothing more than the destabilising irridentist force that it, in fact, turned out to 
be. Somaliland’s reconciliation process, which has been an ‘example’105 for 
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the rest of the Somali coast could, if reconciliation takes hold in the south, 
return the region to a pan-Somali future, intimately intertwined with the larger 
unfolding pan-African future of greater East Africa.          
 
Map of UN Offices in Somaliland and Somalia 
 
        Source: OCHA Somalia, Nairobi. 
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Chapter 3: Reconstruction 
Rubble to Rebuilding  
 
 
 
Rag waa kii kufa ee haddana kaca ... 
 
A man is he who stumbles and then pulls himself up … (Somali proverb) 
 
There is no neat distinction or cut-off point between reconciliation and 
reconstruction, though reconciliation is first and foremost a political process. 
Reconciliation lays the political foundation for the post-conflict reconstruction 
of an embattled polity. In the process, it mutates into a multi-faceted phase of 
reconstruction; reconstruction constituting a more elaborate radiation of 
reconciliation into institutional and socio-economic dimensions of societal 
rebuilding and, in the case of a new nation-state, nation-building.  
 
Reconstruction, in essence, is reconciliation by other means; reconciliation ‘in 
depth’ or, if you will, ‘deep reconciliation’, with the political process of 
reconciliation continuing apace and dialectically interacting with institution 
building and socio-economic development.106 This can be graphically seen in 
the case of Somaliland, which, at the time of writing, was entering what could 
be the last phase of its reconciliatory process of political transition from a 
largely clan-based representational enterprise, to a fully-fledged parliamentary 
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system of governance. This continued unfolding of the politics of reconciliation 
remains a hotly contested terrain that is open-ended, even as Somaliland’s 
post-conflict reconstruction and recovery has long been underway and has 
continued to gain momentum. As such, reconciliation and reconstruction in 
Somaliland can be viewed as mutually reinforcing imperatives.107  
 
As an internationally unrecognised state that has had to compete with 
successive attempts by the international community to underwrite the 
reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery of Somalia in the south, 
Somaliland’s recovery has necessarily evolved along a self-reliant path as “an 
example of the importance of the bottom-up approach to building societies 
from local communities upwards, gradually widening the arena of political 
agreement and political consensus”.108 Hargeisa, and its communities, have 
had to pursue a political and developmental path that has made a virtue of 
necessity for self-reliance, based on the political realities of international 
isolation. Within these parameters, post-conflict reconstruction has been 
embedded in the actual protracted process of reconciliation itself. This 
process required instituting the demilitarising of the country amid the 
construction of a national army and police force as the guarantors of peace 
and security. 
 
                                                 
107 See recommendations of The Institute for Practical Research and Training, ‘The First 
Conference on Reconstruction Strategies and Challenges Beyond Rehabilitation’, Hargeisa, 
(20-24 October 1998). http://www.iprt.org/FirstConfOnReconstruction.htm 
108 Lewis, (1-2 September 2005). 
http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=6034 See Abdulqadir Jirde, 'Memorandum on 
Somaliland', Speech delivered by Abdulqadir Jirde, on behalf of the two houses of the 
Somaliland parliament, on the occasion of the visit of the African Union to Hargeisa, 
Somaliland, (3 May 2005). http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=5330 
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Therefore, this chapter will commence with reviewing the demilitarisation of 
Somaliland’s polity and society – a process that has been intimately 
intertwined with the political transition which, in terms of reconstruction, has 
made mandatory the institutionalisation of government and its 
democratisation. This politico-demilitarisation process has, in turn, been 
intimately tied in with a securing an enabling environment, in which the 
fledgling Somaliland government could generate its own revenues.109 This 
was a particularly critical imperative in the light of its having to pursue a self-
reliant path of development; one that necessarily ruled out external assistance 
due to the country’s popularly chosen political route of independence, and the 
realities this carried with it of being diplomatically unrecognised and, as a 
result, internationally isolated. “It was achieved without any external 
demobilisation or security sector reform assistance whatsoever".110 
 
The ongoing process of political reconstruction sets the stage for a more 
detailed look at Somaliland’s economic reconstruction. This involves 
surveying the country’s social economy in historical and contemporary 
perspective. Here, ‘social factors of reconstruction’ are examined for 
determining their developmental reconstructive role: how they contribute to 
levels of participation in development, in terms of the role played by 
Somaliland’s civic leadership; the extent of women’s participation and the 
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gender dimensions of development; the role of NGOs and civil society as well 
as the status of the rural areas and their development for overcoming the 
proverbial African predicament of ‘bifurcation’, as conceptualised by 
Mamdani.111 This interplay of social forces, in turn, ties in with social service 
delivery. This crucial area is augmented by what has been a very active 
diaspora. The Somaliland overseas community has played a major role in 
Somaliland’s development and sustainability, therefore warranting more than 
a passing focus as a critical social factor in its reconstruction. It is a 
constituency that also brings with it its own political significance in terms of an 
ongoing assessment of Somaliland’s internal balance of political forces.  
 
How these actors have interacted with one another in meeting the challenges 
of post-conflict recovery lays the framework for examining other factors of 
reconstruction in Somaliland’s ongoing attempt to rebuild its economy. In what 
is a largely agricultural and pastoral society, this panorama includes different 
sectoral factors of reconstruction: pastoral production, trade and services, 
fisheries, frankincense and salt, as well as such critical sub-sectors as finance 
and infrastructure. How these are managed brings into focus the issue of 
‘economic and corporate governance’, which is discussed in terms of the 
following dimensions: reconstruction without aid; the growing international 
presence within Somaliland, despite its being internationally unrecognised; 
external trade and investment within an emerging geo-economic and political 
context, conditioned by the growing importance of hydro-carbon resources; 
and finally, how Somaliland’s self-reliant reconstruction prospects relate to the 
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bigger changing picture of international commitments to Somalia’s 
reconstruction and the African Union’s focus on sub-regional economic co-
operation and integration.112 
 
3.1 Political Governance: Reconciliation as Political 
Reconstruction 
 
3.1.1 The Security Preconditioning of Political Reconstruction 
 
The fact that Somaliland has a Ministry of Rehabilitation, Reintegration and 
Reconstruction (MRRR) serves as a fitting point of departure for exploring the 
country’s post-conflict recovery. This process is one that emanates from its 
disarmament – demobilisation – rehabilitation – reintegration – reconstruction 
(DDRRR) experience, which was crucial to establishing a foundation of 
stability and a secure environment for reconstructive development to gain 
momentum. Somaliland, after all, had to go through two periods of conflict and 
instability before its politics of reconciliation produced the current period of 
sustained stability in governance. Otherwise, up until early 1996, Somaliland 
was as much a battleground as was the stateless south.  
 
There was the crucial 1992 confrontation between the fledgling central 
authority in Hargeisa and the militia in control of the vitally strategic port of 
Berbera – a confrontation that had to be resolved in the government’s favour, 
if the diplomatically unrecognised Republic was to secure a major source of 
                                                 
112 Centre for Conflict Resolution, 'The AU/NEPAD and Africa's Evolving Governance and 
Security Architecture', University of Cape Town, (December 2004).  
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revenue from international trade and transport via the Gulf of Aden and the 
Indian Ocean. Once government had extended its control to this vital sector, 
what continued was a much longer, drawn out and destructive post-Borama 
conference civil war during the initial tenure of the Egal administration, which 
lasted from 1994 to 1996.  
 
Thus, the difficulties of 1992-96 belie the current perception of Somaliland as 
an oasis of stability in an otherwise chaotic Somali regional environment. At 
least, compared with the south, throughout this period Somaliland possessed 
a central government, embattled though it was. But the post-unilateral 
declaration of independence violence underlined the tenuousness of this 
distinction. Overall, these conflicts, on top of the previous periods of violence 
emanating from the Barre repression, had turned Somaliland into a nation of 
internally and externally displaced persons. Somaliland’s demilitarising 
DDRRR process, therefore, had to cope with a larger process of reintegrating 
refugees. As the Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development (SCPD) 
report of 1999 – 'A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins' – 
graphically points out, “Somaliland, for all practical purposes, is a land of 
returnees”, where virtually every Somalilander has been displaced at one time 
or another over the past decade up to that point. The MRRR reported that 
682,000 people were involved in the massive exodus to Ethiopia that followed 
the escalation of the war in 1988 and a “similar, although undetermined 
number, are believed to have become internally displaced during the same 
period” with a much smaller number taking up refuge in Djibouti.113 During the 
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1992 strife, associated with the conflict over the Berbera port, a large portion 
of the population of Burco and almost the entire population of Berbera were 
displaced. During the second round of fighting during the Somaliland civil war 
of 1994-1996, over 150,000 people were displaced from Hargeisa and Burco, 
approximately 90,000 of whom crossed the border to Ethiopia.114 
 
In 1999, when the SCPD report was written, nearly 200,000 people were still 
registered in refugee camps in Ethiopia and Djibouti, awaiting repatriation. For 
the most part, repatriation and reintegration was accomplished without 
significant external assistance. Members of Somaliland’s diaspora figured 
significantly in this process, through their efforts to help family members re-
establish their homes and businesses by contributing a portion of their 
earnings. Ethiopia’s closure of refugee camps, catering to displaced 
Somalilanders in 2001, was seen as a fitting testimony to the new Republic’s 
hard-won peace and security, evidenced by the momentum that repatriation 
and reintegration had on reconstruction. It is within this context that the 
DDRRR of former combatants in Somaliland’s conflicts took place; a process 
which, according to the late South African peace and security specialist, 
Rocky Williams, was one of Africa’s most successful, alongside South 
Africa’s.115 
Along with returnees, government assigned top priority to veteran guerrilla 
fighters, ex-militia and former government soldiers. One must bear in mind 
that the Somaliland DDRRR unfolded against a backdrop of division and in-
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fighting between the country’s former SNM military and civilian political 
factions – dynamics at least in part attributable to Somaliland’s instability 
during the much of the first half of the 1990s. According to the SCDP report, 
the demilitarisation and demobilisation process passed through several 
phases. The first step, after reconciliation, was to distinguish between regular 
(and therefore authorised) and irregular (or ‘non-statutory’ in South African 
parlance) security forces. “This was achieved through the formation of a 
national army, which absorbed many members of the wartime militia units,” 
along with the establishment of a civilian police force achieving a similar 
purpose.116  
 
The central police training school in Mandheera has emerged as a key 
institution in the reconstruction of Somaliland’s police force.117 However, it has 
suffered from resource shortages, compounded by the challenge confronting 
instructors of transforming former militia members – many illiterate and initially 
exhibiting little respect for discipline and authority – into reliable guardians of 
law and order.   
 
The disarmament dimension of this process was crucial in so far as 
separating militia and their armaments from the direct control of their clans, 
which enabled government to minimise the likelihood and consequences of 
further inter-communal violence, though some heavy weapons did remain 
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cantoned in their clan areas. In exchange, each clan was given an allotment 
of recruits in the national army, which provided them with a profession and a 
steady income. The process, however, has been costly, with the SCPD report 
pointing out that government was maintaining approximately 18,000 members 
of its security forces on its payroll, “nearly three times as many as it requires, 
at a cost of 70% of the national budget”. Government’s security rationale: 
“better to keep the militia busy in camps, away from the cities and roads, than 
to return to the days of banditry and insecurity before the national army.”118  
 
Demobilisation, meanwhile, has not constituted a formal programme as much 
as a spontaneous and voluntary process. The fact that training camp numbers 
were being reported by military officers to be declining as some recruits quit 
voluntarily, meant that there was an attrition of quiet integration into civilian 
life. There are opportunities for demobilised soldiers to acquire civilian-
relevant skills through the Sooyaal or veterans association.119 Under their 
auspices, a Vocational Training Centre (VTC) was established in Hargeisa in 
1994. It has offered a variety of courses to ex-combatants, war-widows and 
returnees from the refugee camps. On a critical evaluative note, the SCPD 
report had this to say: 
 
The fact that the government payroll has not decreased in line with the 
shrinking population of the training camps has been a subject of some 
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controversy. It is widely believed that various interest groups within 
government, military, clan and commercial circles seek to benefit from the 
lucrative contracts involved in maintaining the army, and therefore work to 
undermine the transparency of the system…Disarmament and demobilisation 
has worked best in areas where confidence in peace and security is high. In 
the less settled eastern regions, much remains to be done. As long as the risk 
of conflict lingers, however remote, then communities are unlikely to 
surrender their militia and their arms.120 
 
3.1.2 Contradictions in Centralising Security and Decentralising 
Governance 
 
On this critical note, the issue of governance looms as a continuing variable in 
determining the viability of the reconstruction process. This process has been 
intimately tied in with the imperatives of demilitarising Somaliland’s society as 
the key to establishing the peace and security foundations for development.121 
The politics of demilitarisation, as reflected in the DDRRR process, has 
essentially aimed at aggregating the disparate and decentralised bases of 
coercive capability into a consolidated and centralised coercive power for the 
functioning of the new state. This would help counteract the emergence of the 
warlord tendencies of southern Somalia which also have their clan links. The 
consolidation of the coercive powers of the state, through the building of a 
national army and a civilian police force, has gone hand-in-hand with the 
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institutionalisation of other arms of government and their democratisation. 
This is an ongoing process unfolding through the evolution of the electoral 
and judicial systems and the representational institutions – the latter being a 
process that has yet to run its course, and one that has become highly 
contentious. 
 
Stabilising the security environment has naturally reinforced the basic 
tendencies toward state centralisation, as the national government has had to 
aggregate unto itself the monopoly of coercive power that defines ‘state 
power’:  
 
One universal expectation of the central government is that it should provide 
security throughout Somaliland – albeit in a benign, unthreatening way. 
Somalilanders everywhere recognize the importance of peace and security as 
a precondition to economic and social development.122 
 
Otherwise, these centralising tendencies associated with security have been 
offset by governing tendencies toward decentralisation, though the SCPD 
report pointedly cautions that the “theoretical debate over decentralization” 
has been gradually pre-empted by the “facts on the ground”, as central 
government and local administrations have expanded their writ and 
elaborated their structures in what has been described as “haphazard and 
sometimes contradictory ways.”123  
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Thus, while decentralisation has become a preferred governing framework in 
reaction to the Somali coast’s past experience of centralised misrule from 
Mogadishu, demands have been placed on the central government in 
Somaliland that reflect pressures for it not to neglect the regions and districts. 
This is reflected in criticism that Hargeisa has been “too slow to establish 
administration in the regions and districts,” contradictions that are seen as 
epitomising “the legacies of past governance practices: a deep distrust of 
central government on the one hand, elevated demands of it on the other.”124  
 
These, in essence, apart from the centralising imperatives of security, reflect 
the centralising implications of a developmental state, which is under pressure 
for ‘delivery’ in reconstructing the socio-economic foundations of a fractured 
society. Security, being a function of governance, has inevitably reflected 
some of the pressure emanating from competing interests in Somaliland’s 
DDRRR process, as indicated in the SCPD report.125  
 
3.2 Political Reconstruction Continued: Parliamentary Elections in the 
Balance 
 
The SCPD report’s critique, which alludes to the politics of diverse groups with 
a vested interest in maintaining a bloated government payroll linked to the 
DDRRR process, may be indicative of a larger phenomenon of contestation 
over the political terms of governance in Somaliland. As such, its political 
reconstruction as a fledgling state would have to be considered as remaining 
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quite fragile. The stability of political reconstruction may be largely contingent 
on the capacity of the Somaliland government to remain the preponderant 
coercive force in society while retaining a loyal security establishment – 
military and police – and sufficient popular legitimacy from a population that, 
however exercised over contentious political issues, would not wish for a 
return to the violence and civil strife that has characterised the anarchic state 
of the south. Nevertheless, each phase of this process appears fraught with 
uncertainty, as was the case with the parliamentary elections. These 
constitute the last step in Somaliland’s transition from a clan-based 
representational to a conventional parliamentary representational system. 
 
Pending a decision on whether or not to delay the parliamentary elections 
planned for March 2005, renewed questions and doubts about sustainable 
political stability in Somaliland were raised. These concerns may have been 
prompted by the closeness of the contestation between the ruling UDUB 
government and the leading opposition Kulmiye; a competitiveness that 
placed noticeable strains on the legitimacy of the governing system in the 
wake of the presidential election of 2003. In February 2005, the Chairman of 
Kulmiye, Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo, called on the people of Somaliland to 
demonstrate peacefully if elections were not held by the end of March. This 
came after the interim parliament, under its UDUB majority, passed an 
electoral law calling for a census and a full registration process as 
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preconditions for the end-of-March elections, articles that were seen as 
unrealistic and unworkable within the targeted time frame for the elections.126 
 
Voicing suspicions that the parliamentary elections, therefore, might be 
postponed amid an extension of the term of the house of representatives, on 
the basis of such articles of the election law not being implementable, Silanyo 
elaborated further on concerns about the electoral system that might militate 
against a free and fair election: the alleged usage of public funds by the 
government, the public media, an increase in the number of members of the 
National Electoral Commission (NEC) that had not been requested, and also 
that Kulmiye had no part in nominating new NEC members. 
 
Given the importance attached to Somaliland culminating its democratisation 
process as integral to its political reconstruction, the possibility which arose at 
the beginning of 2005, that this accomplishment might go unfulfilled as a 
result of a delay in the parliamentary elections, began eliciting critical 
comment.  
 
Steve Kibble and Adan Abokor,127 note that fulfilment of Somaliland’s 
democratisation is so intimately tied in with its gaining de jure international 
recognition, amid comparison with the chaos in the south, and what appear to 
be increasingly uphill efforts to kick-start the TFG, emerging from the 
Mbagathi process. They consequently express their fear that “if there is not an 
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election the one stable part of ‘greater Somalia’ will relapse from the 
democratic path, thereby rendering useless the internal and international 
goodwill, investment and work that has been undertaken so far.” Kulmiye and 
other opposition parties allege that parliamentarians, especially those allied to 
the ruling UDUB, are more committed to retaining their seats in the interim 
parliament than furthering the democratisation process as a result of the 
census and registration preconditions; and this amid the correct prediction, 
according to Kibble and Abokor, that “many Somalilanders also expect UDUB 
to lose to Kulmiye.” 
 
Kulmiye, in their assessment, appears to have strong support from women 
and the youth, as well as from the ex-combatant veterans of the SNM, 
together with a strong base in the Somaliland diaspora. This latter dimension, 
in fact, has reportedly prompted the UDUB to counter charges of its reliance 
of the advantages of incumbency with the greater diaspora remittances going 
to Kulmiye. Kibble and Abokor perceive a possibility that, given President 
Riyale’s commitment to the electoral process and hope for donor support, a 
lack of substantial funding for the parliamentary elections might, in itself, 
contribute to a questionable outcome which could “at least demand a great 
deal of consensus,” by inference, adding additional strain to the legitimacy of 
the political reconstruction process. “The worry is that without support the 
cash-strapped government will not be able to run an election that can be 
shown to be free and fair and therefore that instability will result …” Given the 
fact that Somaliland’s self-reliance has generated an attraction among 
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donors,128 in spite of its lacking de jure international diplomatic recognition, 
Kibble and Abokor express a concern that sustaining such external support, in 
the absence of credible parliamentary elections, could be further complicated 
by these very same donors re-engaging in funding the reconstitution and 
reconstruction of southern Somalia. 
 
The fulfilment of Somaliland’s political reconstruction at the national level, 
therefore, is intimately tied in with the international politics of Hargeisa’s quest 
for recognition and external assistance within the fluid context of the 
international relations of reconstructing a new regime in Mogadishu. 
Meanwhile, this political reconstruction process within Somaliland has been 
seen to be uneven at the local level. Given the geo-politics of the greater 
Somali region, this carries implications for Somaliland’s stability. In the 
western regions of Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed and Saaxil, government 
administration was well established by the end of the 1990s. In the eastern 
areas that border Puntland, government authority had been slower to take 
root.129 Notably, "where local government has gained ground, progress 
appears to be more a function of community leadership and initiative than of 
central government support”,130 an observation which may make Somaliland 
an excellent barometer on the extent to which popular participation in 
development, as espoused in the 1990 Arusha African Charter on Popular 
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preference to use Bossasso port in Puntland than the port at Berbera.  
130 SCPD, (1999), p. 39. 
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Participation in Development and Transformation,131 can advance the good 
governance objectives of NEPAD. As such, however, this may have to factor 
in an inevitable ‘dynamic tension’ between local government and participatory 
development and central government. Thus, the SCPD report132 cites the fact 
that while local leaders in both Gabiley and Boorame were proud of the 
achievements they have made in establishing their own local administrations 
and revived taxation systems, their relationship with Hargeisa was awkward, 
especially when local government may be expected to foot the bill of visiting 
officials and ministers. 
 
The Burco municipality’s revival of local government has been cited as a 
particularly note-worthy achievement.133 After it was almost totally destroyed 
in the civil war in 1996, it had re-established its administration by July 1997. 
By the end of the 1990s, all local departments were functioning, except for an 
office of census and statistics. An impressive range of rehabilitation initiatives 
have also been undertaken – such as rebuilding the regional hospital, 
repairing and furnishing several schools and developing a new 1,200-stall 
market, intended to become the largest in Somaliland – relying mainly on 
locally raised funds and community contributions. Self-help initiatives have 
also been cited for spurring development in smaller communities, though, on 
the other side of the local reconstruction ledger, the involvement of extended 
families and clans in lobbying for civil service appointments and entitlements 
                                                 
131 See http://www.sarpn.org.za/NEPAD/april2002/dev_bank/page5.php  
132 SCPD, (1999), p. 39.  
133 See also Borama Local Council, 'The Statistical Abstract of Borama Municipality', 
Economic and Project Management Committee, (December 2003). 
http://www.so.undp.org/pdf/Borama%20MSA%202003.pdf 
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are judged to have retarded effective governance. In fact, it may well be that 
as essential as the clan system has been as a partner in Somaliland’s 
development, from its pre-independence struggle phase to the present, the 
viability of the state in reconstruction will hinge on the extent to which a more 
modernising and rationalising of governance occurs. The same strengths of 
the clan system, as a generator of participation, can also work against good 
governance to the extent that clan and kinship networks promote and sustain 
conflicts of interests underpinning corruption – a major challenge facing 
government at all levels in Somaliland. 
 
Nevertheless, it is worth recounting the extent to which popular participation 
has become a major preoccupation in the country’s fledgling political culture. 
In reflecting how Somaliland’s governance has evolved, the SCPD report  
noted that the early transition from SNM rule to more broadly-based civilian 
administrations had “already gone some way towards the realization of 
participatory government.” It proceeded by saying that: 
 
The importance of broadly consultative fora at which decisions are reached 
through consensus is one notable feature; the growing confidence and 
seriousness with which Parliament approaches its responsibilities is 
another.134  
 
Still, to the extent that popular participation tended to remain linked to the 
traditional beel system, there are limits to how such a framework could cope 
with the demands of modern governance. The inevitable bureaucratisation of 
                                                 
134 SCPD, (1999), p. 36.  
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governmental management and administration, along with the technocratic 
nature of problems in any number of sectors in demand of solutions, ensures 
that such a system, on its own, is unlikely to cope, though the report cites 
such observations as “people need to be consulted, educated and their 
awareness raised, about government and its activities”, as indicative of how 
the culture of consultation that has emerged in Somaliland’s various phases of 
development can be brought to bear in enhancing participation. Rural 
participation and women’s participation are special challenges. Here, a very 
basic and fundamental challenge is posed: 
 
The rural population – particularly the nomads – has long been estranged 
from the political process. Improving the pastoral population’s participation in 
governance poses a formidable challenge, raising the question of what form 
of government is best suited to Somaliland’s rural majority. Many are 
concerned that the shift to a party system might alienate pastoralists even 
further. According to one Hargeysa intellectual: There is no government 
outside Hargeysa, and unless the rural man participates in and benefits from 
government, we cannot talk about [political] parties.135 
 
3.3 From Clan Limits to Political Reconstruction: Rural and Gender 
Dimensions 
 
The challenge of rural participation in governance is compounded by local 
representational issues, where there are tendencies for clans to want their 
own districts, thereby generating pressure from below for a proliferation of 
                                                 
135 SCPD, (1999), p. 36, (italics added). 
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administrative units which may have nothing to do with effective local 
governance and decentralisation. Women, on the other hand, have 
traditionally enjoyed no formal role in the clan-based political process, though 
this is slowly changing as a result of the democratic transition.136 Despite such 
exclusion, women have played an active role in mobilising for both peace and 
war.137 Some took on the role of combatants against the Barre regime. Others 
raised funds to sustain the war effort and nursed the wounded. Here again, it 
is expected that Somaliland’s political transition from a clan-based to a more 
modern multi-party parliamentary system will effect the necessary changes to 
enhance women’s participation. The constitution, for example, affirms the 
rights of women to vote and hold public office, while women’s NGOs have 
emerged as important actors in Somaliland’s burgeoning civil society.138  
 
With respect to the provisional constitution and women’s right to vote, Somali 
human rights activist, Rakiya Omaar, implies that the underlying clan 
foundations of Somaliland’s transition may be emerging as double-edged 
sword producing “an ineffectual government.”139 This she sees as reflective of 
the fact that “sadly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the political landscape of 
Somaliland today resembles the multiparty politics of the early 1960s” where 
                                                 
136 Amina Mohamoud Warsame, Queens Without Crowns: Somaliland women’s changing 
roles and peace building, Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute, (2002). 
137 Judith Gardner and Judy El Bushra (eds.), Somalia: The Untold Story. The War Through 
the Eyes of Somali Women, London: Pluto Press and the Catholic Institute for International 
Relations (2004); Debra M. Timmons, The Sixth Clan – Women Organize for Peace in 
Somalia: A Review of Literature, University for Peace, Africa Programme, Geneva, (2004). 
http://www.africa.upeace.org/documents/somalia_the_sixth_clan.pdf 
138 Nagaad Umbrella Organisation, 'Overcoming Cultural Barriers: Promoting Gender Equality 
and Equity', Annual Report, Hargeisa, Somaliland, (2004).  
http://www.somali-civilsociety.org/partners/partner_nagaad.php 
139 Rakiah Omaar, ‘Peace-Building and Democracy: The Lessons of Somalia and 
Somaliland’, in Global Challanges and Africa, Report of the 2004 Tswalu Dialogue, Whitehall 
Paper 62, London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 
(2004), pp 83-92. See page 91, specifically.  
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Hargeisa is “intent upon claiming the meagre resources of the country to fund 
its own political interests” – amplifying opposition claims that emerged early in 
2005 regarding the prospect that parliamentary elections would be delayed or 
postponed. In her opinion, the clan system – as opposed to the promised 
multi-party system that is trying to emerge – which excludes decision-making 
and leadership roles for women “no longer offers a very real mechanism for 
accountability” in the political reconstruction of the country. Omaar contends 
that “the elders should have withdrawn from active political service once they 
had delivered peace” that, unfortunately, “their extraordinary success in the 
early 1990s proved too strong a temptation” whereupon they “transformed 
their role from community representatives and peace-makers to power-
brokers.” The successful recent intervention of the House of Elders in calming 
the political “scuffles”140 as a result of the stalemate between the ruling UDUB 
party and the opposition, suggests that the Elders have a select role as 
Somaliland’s “custodians of the peace and harmony.”141 With this ‘bifurcated’ 
impasse, Mamdani proposes “that the way forward lies in sublating both, 
through a double move that simultaneously critiques and affirms”.142  
 
Omaar’s sentiments, while contentious, are echoed in Somalia: The Untold 
Story: The War Through the Eyes of Somali Women. In the section on 'Post-
War Recovery and Political Participation' that addresses 'Women’s 
Participation in the Governance of Somaliland', which draws on papers 
prepared by Shukri Hariir and Zeynab M. Hassan, and interviews with Noreen 
                                                 
140 Irin News, ‘SOMALIA: Scuffles mar opening of Somaliland parliament’, (1 Dec 2005).  
141 Bashir Goth, ‘Somaliland's wisdom again frustrates doomsayers’, Editorial, Awdalnews, (6 
December 2005). 
142 Mamdani, (1996), p. 3.  
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Michael Mariano, a member of the Women’s Political Forum of Somaliland 
ventures that:  
 
Women have no chance of competing with men while clan remains the main 
basis for political life in Somaliland. Male candidates are supported by their 
clans but women are not. 
  
In the absence of a fully-fledged multi-party parliamentary system, women’s 
participation is largely dependent on the political calculations of male 
politicians. That the current incumbent, President Rayaale, saw fit to name 
women as ministers of family and social welfare and foreign affairs is 
indicative of the president’s awareness that in today’s world, the politics of 
gender must be factored into Somaliland’s interactions with the international 
community. Thus, Foreign Minister Edna Adan Ismail, as the most senior 
ministerial position held by a woman in the Horn of Africa, has been an asset 
in the country’s diplomacy. However, pending a full transition to multi-party 
democracy, it is the NGO sector where women’s participation has had its 
greatest impact. The extent of women’s participation at this level is 
extensively elaborated on in Somalia: The Untold Story: The War Through the 
Eyes of Somali Women.143 By the beginning of the 1990s, the leading 
women’s organisations operating in Hargeisa were the Somaliland Women’s 
Development Association (SOWDA) and the Somaliland Women’s 
Organisation (SOLWO). Both organisations played a leading role in lobbying 
                                                 
143 See also ‘Draft report: Workshop on the Status of the Implementation of the Beijing 
Declaration and the Platform for Action in Somaliland’, Hargeisa, 19-20 October 1999; Annex 
I in Halima Aman and Shamis Hussein, Women at the Crossroads, Somali Women’s 
Progress in Implementing the Beijing Platform for Action, (November 1999).   
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the interim Tuur administration for the establishment of a police force and a 
judiciary system. SOWDA promised that women would contribute to a police 
programme, and did so by donating 500 police uniforms, bedding and utensils 
to different police stations.  
 
Later, organisations such as the Women’s Advocacy and Progressive 
Organisation (WAPO) – which became the Women’s Advocacy and 
Development Association (WADA) – and Dulmar began moving away from a 
purely social welfare reconstruction role toward the open advocacy of 
women’s rights. After the beginning of the new millennium in 2000, 
Somaliland women were moving toward seeking a greater political voice 
through the formation of the Women’s Political Forum (WPF), which decided 
to create its own political party, Qoys (Family) to represent women’s 
concerns. Importantly, a recent World Bank (WB) study found that women 
constitute 70% of breadwinners in Somaliland’s households.144 The challenge 
remains for this critical role to be appropriately represented in the political 
sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
144 World Bank, 'Somalia. Socio-Economic Survey 2004'. Report no 2, Somalia Watching 
Brief. Washington: UNDP, Somalia and World Bank, (2003). See also Irin News, ‘SOMALIA: 
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the world’s first women’s mosque in the world, see Abdi Ismail Samatar, ‘Social 
Transformation and Islamic Reinterpretation in Northern Somalia: The Women’s Mosque in 
Gabiley’ in Geographies of Muslim Women. Gender, Religion, and Space, Ghazi-Waud Falah 
and Caroline Nagel (eds.), New York and London: The Guilford Press, (2005). 
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3.4   Economic (and Corporate) Governance: The Parameters of 
Economic Reconstruction 
 
3.4.1  Somaliland’s Social Economy of Reconstruction: Geo-Cultural 
Contours 
 
Between the conundrums of rural development and women’s participation in 
the political reconstruction calculus, the cultural contours of what might be 
depicted as Somaliland’s ‘social economy’ emerge as the backdrop to its 
economic reconstruction. Here, the SCPD report145 makes reference to the 
optimism that has been attached to Somaliland’s prospects as an inheritance 
from what was “the relative prosperity it enjoyed in the decade prior to 
independence” – referring to its immediate post-colonial independence and 
amalgamation with the south. “During the 1950s, the Arabian oil boom 
generated an unprecedented demand for Somali livestock. The central towns 
of Hargeysa, Berbera, and Burco became the hubs of that trade, forming a 
triangle that would eventually become the core of economic development in 
the region.” The report further states:146  
 
During the same period, in the Hawd region, the colonial authorities…built a 
chain of earth dams along the Ethiopian border to collect run-off water. These 
man-made depressions prolonged the period nomads could graze their 
livestock in the Hawd, and thus changed the face of the land forever. 
Permanent settlements began to appear, raising surplus livestock for export 
                                                 
145 SCPD, (1999), p. 39.  
146 Ibid., p. 12. 
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to Arabia through the markets of Somaliland’s central economic hub. In the 
years following independence, this zone became increasingly specialized in 
the commercial production of livestock and related export services. The 
relative dominance of this central triangle, and its relationship with the 
Arabian livestock markets, has changed very little up to the present day. 
 
This narrative provides a fitting backdrop for the current geo-political-
economic context and gaining an understanding of the current political 
predicament confronting Somaliland’s economic reconstruction; an 
environment that the country’s unilateral declaration of independence 
transformed into a hostile neighbourhood. Geo-politically, a Somaliland 
independent of the rest of the Somali coast has come to be seen by the Arab 
governments bordering the Red Sea as a challenge to an inter-regional status 
quo which balances the Afro-Arab, Christian-Muslim power equation on the 
Horn of Africa side of this ‘Afrabian’ corridor. Hence, the 1998-1999 Arab 
regional boycott of the North-East African livestock economy was not 
unrelated to Arab hostility to Somaliland’s independence bid. This complicated 
the country’s economic reconstruction struggle, in what Rakiah Omaar has 
defined as a “context of international neglect.”147  
 
Tellingly, however, with implications for Somaliland’s current predicament vis-
à-vis the rest of the Somali coast, and Puntland especially, the SCPD report 
points out that “eastern Somaliland (composed essentially of present day Sool 
and Sanaag regions) was affected relatively little by the livestock export 
                                                 
147 Rakiah Omaar, 'Peace-Building and Democracy: The Lessons of Somalia and Somaliland', 
in 'Global Challenges and Africa, Report of the 2004 Tswalu Dialogue', Whitehall Paper 62, p. 
2, London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, (2004). 
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boom” before and after Somalia’s post-colonial independence at the end of 
the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s. Within a political reconstruction context 
relevant to economic recovery, this history puts into perspective the challenge 
of rural participation confronting Somaliland’s nation-building project: 
 
Nomadic pastoralism has historically been the predominant social and 
economic mode in eastern Somaliland, but the area has nevertheless evolved 
somewhat separately of the central economic zone between Hargeysa, 
Berbera and Burco. Sanaag region has long maintained independent, 
sometimes clandestine, trade ties with the Arabian countries, especially 
Yemen. Export of livestock and frankincense in exchange for consumer 
goods from the Arabian side evolved into a strong commercial and cultural 
relationship of central importance to Sanaag’s social and economic life. 
Further south, the inhabitants of Sool region long ago developed a niche as 
an economic and social gateway between Somaliland and Somalia – a role 
the region still plays.”148 
 
While less marginalised than the east, western Somaliland, comprising the 
Awdal and western Woqooyi Galbeed regions, is also depicted as having 
experienced a slightly separate development” from the Hargeisa-Berbera-
Burco central economic zone. Around the turn of the 20th century,  
 
inhabitants of the area began to borrow ox-plough farming techniques from 
the neighbouring Oromo groups (in Ethiopia) and have since developed an 
agropastoral mode of production in which cattle raised in sedentary 
agricultural villages have replaced camels as the principal stock. The region 
                                                 
148 SCPD, (1999), pp. 12-13.  
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has since become increasingly specialised in the production of cereal crops – 
chiefly sorghum and maize – which are traded throughout Somaliland. More 
recently, cereal production has been supplemented by fruits and vegetables 
grown on small scale irrigation farms for domestic consumption (italics 
added).149  
 
Of particular importance here, relative to eastern Somaliland’s gravitation 
toward a more Arabian geo-cultural and economic sphere of influence, is the 
extent to which western Somaliland’s social economy integrates it regionally 
into an Ethiopian Ogaden geo-cultural/economic sphere-of-influence. Thus: 
 
 The sedentary agricultural mode of production in the west created a 
concentration of settlements unmatched elsewhere in Somaliland, including 
Gabiley, Tog Wajaale, Dila and Boorame. Furthermore, this zone came to 
serve increasingly as a transhipment point in the trade linking Djibouti, Jigjiga 
and Dire Dawa to the major population centres of Somaliland. Despite the 
region’s ‘separate development,’ western Somaliland’s relative prosperity, the 
metropolitan influences from neighbouring towns, and the settled nature of the 
population have encouraged its gradual integration within Somaliland’s 
broader economic and political context.150 
 
 This relative stability of western Somaliland’s sedentary social economy vis-
à-vis the central economic zone compared to the more marginal pastoral-
nomadic linkages of eastern Somaliland to the Hargeisa-Berbera-Burco 
‘triangle’ revisits the relative success of local government, as cited by the 
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SCPD report; the fact that, “in the western regions of Awdal, Woqooyi 
Galbeed and Saaxil, government administration is well established, whereas 
in the east, government authority has been slower to take root.”151 These 
dichotomies within Somaliland may prove crucial for future reference in a 
broader stabilisation of the Somali Peninsula inclusive of both Somaliland and 
Somalia as the challenge of governance in the Somaliland east may be 
amplified more broadly in the governance challenges of political 
reconstruction in and around Mogadishu and its hinterland. As the SCPD 
report (1999) makes clear, by the end of the 90s, Somaliland’s social 
economy had become configured around an essentially west-central axis 
dominated by the central economic zone:  
 
 The growing importance of central Somaliland over the past century has been 
matched by the gradual decline of the coastal areas. The importance of 
ancient settlements like Seylac, Bullaxaar, Xiis, Maydh, Laas Qoray and 
Ceelaayo was diminished when the British colonial authorities shifted their 
administrative centres from the uncomfortable coastal climate to the cooler 
Oogo zone, and was further eclipsed by the development of major ports at 
Berbera and Djibouti. Among the coastal towns, only Berbera, by virtue of its 
port facilities and its key role in the central ‘triangle’ export trade, has gained 
in size and importance.152 
 
The current use of the Berbera port by Ethiopia for its critical imports within 
the context of regional tensions, and the EU plans to facilitate regional 
                                                 
151 Ibid., p. 39.  
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infrastructure by developing a Berbera-Addis Ababa corridor, which augurs 
well for Somaliland’s economic development prospects.153  
 
3.5 Somaliland’s Sectoral Factors of Reconstruction 
 
The foregoing survey of the geo-cultural contours of Somaliland’s social 
economy – between a declining pastoralist eastern region that has been 
traditionally influenced by Arabian/Red Sea inter-regionalism and an 
economically more vibrant sedentary agricultural economy in the west, linked 
to the Djibouti-Ethiopian Ogaden axis – contextualises the challenges of 
economic reconstruction. These efforts are confronted by what might be 
termed Somaliland’s ‘sectoral factors of reconstruction’ in terms of the 
country’s productive sectors (its livestock economy and agricultural sector, the 
coastal marine economy, comprising employment and entrepreneurial 
activities in fisheries); the social sectors of water and sanitation, and the 
‘HEW’ cluster of health-education-welfare and the environment, as well as a 
revisiting of security and the post-September 11, 2001 preoccupation with 
anti-terrorism; the infrastructural sectors of transport communications via 
roads (surface transportation), civil aviation and sea transport revolving 
around the strategic Berbera port; the fuel and energy sectors which are 
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attracting foreign direct investment; communications inclusive of telecoms154 
and national broadcasting; and programme funding efforts involving 
assessments and project cost estimates. Economic reconstruction in these 
sectors is also accompanied and/or complicated by drought, which has had a 
particularly severe impact in eastern Somaliland.155 
 
A major precondition for the economic and corporate governance dimensions 
of reconstruction in Somaliland revolves around human resource capacity. 
This is perhaps the most central preoccupation of government in reversing the 
legacies of war-induced economic and social decline. As Somaliland’s 
Ministry of National Planning and Coordination makes clear in its 2005 report 
on the 'Somaliland Economic Overview',156 the country, as a result of “the civil 
war and severe loss of all its professionals at all levels through brain drain,” 
has had to cope with a system is very weak as far as personnel is concerned. 
The personnel are characterised by low levels of education, inadequate 
professional skills and lack of work experience “contributing to poor delivery of 
the Government services to the public.”157 There are technical and institutional 
shortfalls at almost all levels of government. To rebuild its civil service 
capacity, Somaliland’s government has embarked on a “bold step of carrying 
out the most feared Civil Service Reforms,”158 aimed at addressing major 
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impediments in the civil service and at stimulating private sector economic 
growth.  
 
Economic and corporate governance, within this context, will mean 
confronting the following reconstruction challenges outlined in the report:159 
 
• Most ministries lack the capacity to articulate clear national development 
visions, strategies, objectives and policy directions for public institutions. 
• Almost all ministries lack the capacity to set long-term national 
development plans as guides to their overall functions and operations. 
• The capacity to design and implement concrete action plans and systems 
that can ensure good governance, efficiency and accountability in the 
public sector is inadequate. 
• Periodically monitor and evaluate outputs and expected results are limited. 
• Foster mutual co-operation and collaboration among public and private 
institutions for wider economic development are almost non-existent. 
 
3.6 Capacity-Building Support: A Brief Survey 
 
In trying to address these challenges, Somaliland’s government has been 
engaging the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In spite of 
Somaliland’s lack of international recognition, the fact that it has in place a 
functioning government helps to facilitate the UN’s developmental objectives 
in the Somali coast (see the UN Offices in Somalia/Somaliland map). Thus, in 
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seeking to fulfil its objectives of enhancing the delivery of basic services in 
public institutions through training, institutional capacity-building and public 
sector reform, the UNDP has engaged Hargeisa in the establishment of an 
Institute of Public Administration (IPA) and its curriculum development. Under 
the rubric of 'Northwest Somalia', it has prepared and finalised Somaliland’s 
first ‘Development Plan for Northwest Somalia (Somaliland)’ in what has been 
termed the 'Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2004-
2006'.160  
  
As part of a broader objective of strengthening the governance capacity 
preconditions for development, the UNDP has supported the development 
and strengthening of Somaliland’s legislative bodies (specifically the 
Guurti/Upper House of Somaliland) and, notably, in terms of economic 
development, supported a needs assessment conducted by the Ministry of 
National Planning and Coordination, for the purpose of strengthening its 
strategic economic planning capacity. Related assistance has gone to 
supporting registration and ground-breaking cadastre establishment in 
Somaliland under its Ministry of Agriculture,161 and toward training courses in 
Law and Business Administration for civil servants, with the aim of skills re-
qualification at the University of Hargeisa.162 Accomplishments cited by the 
UNDP have been the finalising of the Cadastral Survey in Gabiley in 
Somaliland, and the extension of this survey to Borama as a means of 
facilitating title ownership to the area’s farmers (thereby reducing conflict over 
land), the conducting of a training and study tour of Somaliland women 
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leaders to Uganda, and of traditional elders to South Africa. In the urban 
sector, the UNDP has supported a Land Management Information System 
survey for the capital, Hargeisa; development of the first ever Hargeisa City 
Charter and its translation into Somali; and rehabilitation work of the 
Hargeisa/Borama/Hudur municipal buildings. On the distance education front, 
the UNDP has made use of resources from the African Virtual University 
(AVU) and other online sources to establish satellite technology at the 
Universities of Hargeisa and Amoud163 and has helped them create local area 
networks, and in the process, allowed them to network their computers at the 
learning centre. 
 
In all this, the capacity-building reconstruction challenges have been many. In 
public administration, the challenge has been to overcome obsolete 
managerial, technical and administrative cadres, which have suffered from the 
disruption of academic institutions, emigration of skilled human resources, 
and overstaffing of institutions, resulting in high recurrent costs and low 
productivity amid a climate of high social tension and insecure employment 
conditions. In the area of governance, the challenge has been hostility and 
resistance to the discussion of women’s issues in the political arena. The 
urban sector, meanwhile, has been challenged by the return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons to areas such as Hargeisa, which has placed the 
limited resources of the local authorities under immense pressure. This is 
compounded by returnees’ unwillingness to move and the inadequate 
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capacity and resources of the local authorities, thus making urban planning 
difficult. 
 
3.7 Overcoming the Livestock Achilles’ Heel 
 
This brief highlighting of capacity problems illuminated by the UNDP 
assistance to Somaliland, within the context of the UN’s assistance in the 
Somali region, is illustrative of the overall challenges confronting the sectoral 
factors of reconstruction. Post-conflict reconstruction, after all, is a particularly 
sensitive sphere of political and economic governance contingent on capacity. 
Equally critical, is the extent to which Hargeisa is able to manage 
Somaliland’s regional economic interdependencies within the Red Sea/Somali 
Peninsula/Gulf of Aden geo-economic zone. Here, the vagaries of the 
livestock economy has proven to be particularly challenging during 
Somaliland’s first independence decade, given Arab opposition to its unilateral 
declaration of independence in 1991.  
 
As a draft report from 2002 by Somaliland’s Academy for Peace and 
Development on 'Regulating the Livestock Economy of Somaliland' points out, 
“pastoralism, in one form or another, is the primary production system in 
Somaliland” wherein the livestock economy has played a central role as a 
revenue generator. “Taxation on livestock exports is the main source of 
government revenue and of funding for the re-establishment of government 
institutions.” As the SCPD report164 emphasises, livestock exports are the 
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Achilles’ Heel of Somaliland’s economy in the absence of diversification, 
although it is the “leading exporter of livestock among eastern African states 
and among the world’s leaders in live animal trade.165  
 
In February 1998, the government of Saudi Arabia imposed a livestock ban on 
all animals originating from Horn of Africa countries and Yemen due to an 
outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in north-eastern Kenya and southern Somalia. 
The blanket import ban was seen as having especially serious consequences 
for Somaliland and the Ogaden 'Ethiopian Somali National Regional State', 
both being areas where local economies depended heavily on the export of 
livestock. At the time of the ban, Somaliland was seen as likely to suffer the 
most, since normally 80% of hard currency earnings, as well as the bulk of the 
government’s tax revenue, are derived from livestock exports. Furthermore, 
the Saudi ban came at a time when the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) was implementing a regional refugee repatriation 
programme which, it was feared, could be undermined by the boycott.       
 
The 1998-1999 ban had a dramatic impact in terms of its ‘collateral damage’ 
beyond the livestock sector itself. “Somaliland national income suffered a 
sudden drop of as much as 40% …The ban affected all sectors of Somaliland 
society including urban dwellers, many of whom previously believed that only 
                                                 
165 This report has been published as, War-Torn Societies Programme International, (2005), 
pp.189-268. Peter D. Little, Somalia: Economy Without State, Great Britain: The International 
African Institute, in association with James Currey, Indiana University Press and Btec Books, 
Hargeisa, (2003), p. 132. 
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nomads depended on livestock. Even beyond the central ‘triangle’ of 
Somaliland’s livestock trade, economic activity slowed to a crawl.”166  
 
Immediate relief was experienced in mid-1999 when the ban was lifted. But 
then, less than three years later, another ban was imposed by Saudi Arabia, 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen, only to be partially lifted by the 
UAE in June 2001. At the time of the 2005 'Somaliland Economic Overview’s' 
release, the ban was at least partially in force, as made apparent in the 
report’s discussion of “sector modernisation” of the livestock economy; the 
fact that as “the ban of Somaliland’s livestock export had been triggered by 
Rift Valley disease outbreak, modern laboratory establishment would prevent 
livestock exposure to such disease and control any new epidemic …”.167 
 
The Academy for Peace and Development report, drafted in 2002, tabled 
several recommendations, one set addressing the role that could be played 
by international donor agencies, which serves to highlight Somaliland’s 
precarious predicament, given its lack of even partial or preliminary 
international recognition. Thus, at the top of the list of actions “required from 
international aid agencies” was “providing diplomatic support for lifting the 
livestock ban”. Otherwise, it was noted that “despite the central role that 
livestock trade plays in the reconstruction and well-being of the people of 
Somaliland, the contribution of donor agencies to the promotion of livestock 
trade has been virtually zero”, although “the engagement of the aid agencies 
                                                 
166 SCPD, (1999), p. 48. 
167 Ibid., p. 13. 
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in the sector would contribute to the county’s development, and the nation’s 
food security and socio-economic wealth”.168  
 
Diversification, according to the Academy report,169 should take two forms in 
terms of developing new non-pastoral economic resources and sectors such 
as those cited in the SCPD report – such as coal mining, oil exploration, 
cement production, tourism, an economic free zone, financial services and 
internet commerce – along with the diversification of pastoral products and 
markets. Within the context of such a strategy, government should give 
priority to: 
 
• Provision of basic human services and essential infrastructure to 
encourage movement to coastal areas; 
• Provision of support for the voluntary migration of pastoralists to coastal 
areas, and assistance for those who seek to engage in fishing; 
• Diversification of the livestock trade, which will demand greater domestic 
processing and an aggressive international marketing strategy. To achieve 
this will require leadership of the government collaborating with the 
chamber of commerce; 
• Encouragement of the development of a domestic processing plant for 
chilled meat and hides for export, by offering credits, tax breaks and free 
land for construction; 
• Periodic inspections by government inspectors and international experts of 
the Somalia/Somaliland chilled meat processing infrastructure and 
                                                 
168 SCPD, (2002), pp. 81-82. 
169 Ibid., p. 85. 
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procedures and the submission of the report to the relevant authorities in 
the exporting countries; 
• Technical support to the private sector in facilitating chilled meat so that 
international standards are met; 
• Provision of an environment that encourages foreign investment in this 
sector and that safeguards this investment.170 
 
These recommendations amplify one of the observations made by the SCPD 
report concerning rationalisation and diversification, with regard to alleviating 
rangeland pressures. Exploiting other economic options would be “unlikely to 
yield much revenue unless they are linked to greater domestic processing 
capacity, and aggressive international marketing strategies.”171 
 
Diversification into a broader agricultural complement to livestock would, 
among other things, mean reversing the severe erosion of arable land, which 
is compounded by periodic droughts. According to the ‘2005 Economic 
Overview Report’, arable land in the country is roughly estimated at 150,000 
hectares, approximately 60% of which has been subjected to severe erosion. 
This means that an integrated ecosystems-based economic recovery strategy 
would have to be at the foundation of further agro-pastoralist development. 
“For natural erosions, agriculture restoration projects are envisaged by the 
government who is conscientious that it would not be feasible without foreign 
investments or substantial international community assistance.”172 One 
                                                 
170 SCPD, (2002), p. 80. 
171 Ibid., p. 85. 
172 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, ‘Somaliland Economic 
Overview’, Hargeisa, (2005), p.13.  
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productive sector contemplated by the report for revival is date production. 
Before the civil war, there were many date plantation projects. These were 
among the economic casualties of war. Date plantations had been envisioned 
as a key to raising the social and economic standards of people living in the 
coastal areas. The report recommends an urgent rejuvenation programme 
that would require the development of thousands of hectares, which, in turn, 
would necessitate importation of hundreds of thousands of shoots. “For the 
up-keep of deteriorated existing palms and planting on new lots, it is desirable 
to acquire initial investment for the purchase of more pumps and digging earth 
wells. The groves to be rehabilitated will start fruiting from 2008 onward and 
assuming that 70% of the palms will be rejuvenated, annual production will 
probably be thousands of tons.”173 
 
3.8 The Neglected Marine Economy 
 
Developing the marine economy is recognised as a major alternative to 
dependence on agro-pastoralism, as the coastline, stretching for over 850km 
along the southern shores of the Gulf of Aden, is seen as having great fishing 
potential that could generate employment and income for many people, 
enlarge and enhance the nutritional intake of consumers and increase 
Somaliland’s foreign exchange earnings through exports to international 
markets. At the time the ‘2005 Economic Overview Report’ was published, the 
challenges facing the development of this sector as an alternative to agro-
pastoralism, were: 
                                                 
173 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, (2005), p.13. 
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• The number of communities that depend on fishing was very small and 
poor; 
• The demand for fish in Somaliland is very low as seafood is not popular; 
• The seafood export market is non-existent due to lack of proper 
infrastructure and information; 
• There is a shortage of qualified manpower in the sector; 
• Marine resources have not been properly studied and estimated, yet;174 
• Those very resources are already prey to unscrupulous poachers and 
polluters.175 
 
Clearly, fisheries would appear to be more of an export market resource than 
one for internal consumption. Measures are being contemplated – or 
implemented – in licensing and registration, the provisioning of fishing gear 
and processing equipment, marine resources conservation, and in the realm 
of laws and regulations. To develop this market, the ‘Economic Overview 
Report’ indicated that the Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Development 
would have to undertake an extensive fisheries and marine resources 
research and survey programme.176 
 
                                                 
174 Some studies undertaken include: Michael H Schleyer, ‘Biodiversity Assessment of the 
Northern Somali Coast East of Berbera’, IUCN and Oceanographic Research Institute, 
Durban, South Africa, (March 1999)  
http://www.iprt.org/SOMALIILAND%20BIODIVERSITY%20BERBERA.pdf 
and Ahmed H. O. Gulaid, ‘Omane’ ‘Feasibility Report on the Fisheries Sector in Somaliland: 
Current status, opportunities and constraints’, Kenya: UNDP, Somalia, (2004). 
http://mirror.undp.org/somalia/pressreleases/fisheries%20cover.pdf 
175 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, (2005), pp. 14-16. 
176 Ibid., p. 16. 
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In the ‘HEW’ social sectors of health, education and welfare, the war and 
conflict situations have reinforced the top priority of addressing Somaliland’s 
water and sanitation problems. Since there are no rivers in Somaliland, the 
harvesting of run-off water in surface reservoirs and tapping the subterranean 
aquifer are the country’s only two key water sources. Growing urbanisation, 
as well as rural welfare during the current ongoing reconstruction period, 
underline the importance of development in this sector. In fact, overcoming 
this problem is basic to rural development. Here, “immediate priorities” based 
on the 2005 Somaliland Economic Overview are:  
 
• Rehabilitation of surface water sources, especially that of the Hawd public 
water reservoirs; 
• Rehabilitation of existing bore-wells; 
• Creation of permanent dry season water sources (bore-wells) to Hawd 
pastoral zones, to the hot western coastal plains and to the eastern Sool 
plains; 
• Enhancement of drought preparedness capability at both the regional and 
national levels to supplement existing private operational capacities (an 
area of development that, in fact, makes regional co-operation with 
neighbouring countries imperative); and 
• Improvement of rural and village sanitation facilities.177 
 
With regard to urban water systems, providing this resource to new returnees 
and internally displaced person (IDP) settlements and other outlying 
                                                 
177 Ibid., p. 25. 
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communities highlights the need for several medium-term undertakings, such 
as the construction of subterranean dams, weirs and bunds to conserve 
underground water levels; the compilation and updating of available 
hydrological data; and the establishment of a water data/information centre 
within the Ministry of Water and Mineral Resources, in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Pastoral Development and Environment. 
 
3.9 Education: Somaliland’s Reconstruction Generator 
 
Given Somaliland’s human resource deficits and capacity-building challenges, 
the education (and training) sector is an emergency priority. Here, 
reconstruction has to be seen within the broader context of how Somaliland is 
drawing upon the participation and resources of its far-flung diaspora, as well 
as on efforts aimed directly at reviving the qualitative and physical 
infrastructural aspects of the country’s education system. This was all diluted 
and ultimately destroyed during the era of military rule from Mogadishu and as 
a result of the subsequent wars.  
 
The development of the education sector has been a critical 'social 
reconciliation bridge' for Somalilanders abroad.178 For example, the setting of 
Somaliland’s first Amoud University cohered Somalilanders abroad across 
clan divides, in cities such as Abu Dhabi, and inspired many other university 
initiatives on the Somali coast. Today, Amoud University is seen as a key 
symbol of Somaliland's resilience. Often the University’s survival track record 
                                                 
178 Amoud Foundation is one of the initiatives of the diaspora to support education and 
humanitarian development in Somaliland. http://www.amoudfoundation.com/ 
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is seen as an example of Somaliland's stability and self-reliance. Clearly, this 
tertiary institution has played a pivotal role in the consolidation of Somaliland’s 
reconciliation agenda and its emerging identity. Amoud University was 
transformed from Amoud High School seven years ago and has been 
successful in drawing on its symbolic capital as the first Somaliland 
Protectorate secondary boarding school and the alma mater of generations of 
Somaliland’s educated class, including leaders such as the current 
Chairperson of the Kulmiye Party, Mr Ahmed Silanyo.179 
 
On the schooling front, since 1991 when there was an enrolment of 10,000 
students in 47 primary schools organised through community initiatives, the 
combined public and private primary school enrolment had jumped to 96,201 
in 354 functioning schools by 2000/2003. There are currently 15 functioning 
secondary schools serving a population of 4,380 students. The total number 
of teachers, both public and private is 2,346. Here, international engagement, 
despite diplomatic non-recognition, has played an important role. With such 
help, Somaliland succeeded in operating functioning schools with 2,386 
rehabilitated classrooms. Meanwhile, according to the Somaliland Economic 
Overview, “a long process of primary school curriculum reform has borne fruit, 
with the first consignment of new textbooks already in use.” Now, as a 
complement to this, attempts are underway “to develop a multi-purpose non-
                                                 
179 A known academic and contentious critic of Somaliland’s political project for independence 
has reflected on how Amoud University has succeeded in serving common rather than 
sectarian interests. See Abdi Ismail Samatar, ‘Somali Reconstruction and Local Initiative: 
Amoud University’, World Development, Vol. 29, Issue 4, (April 2001), and Mohamed a Nur-
Awaleh and Dorothy Mtegha, ‘Shared Governance and Leadership in African Universities: 
Experiences from Mzuzu University, Malawi and Amoud University, Somaliland’,  
Africa Development, Vol. XXX, Nos. 1 and 2, Codesria, (2005). 
http://www.codesria.org/Links/Publications/ad1_05/awaleh_Mtegha.pdf 
See also Andrea Useem, ‘In a Breakaway Region of War-Torn Somalia, a New University 
Takes Root’, Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. 45, No. 19, (15 January 1999).  
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formal education curriculum.”180 What is more, overall, the educational revival 
process is attempting to mainstream gender issues by integrating such issues 
into educational resource materials and programmes. Such gender 
mainstreaming in education is reinforced by what is also becoming an 
emerging focus on the education of girls – an area highlighted as among the 
sector's “immediate priorities”, along with the more medium-term priority of 
rehabilitating rural education.181  
 
Although Somaliland’s educational system achieved early success in 
disseminating rural education well into the 1970s, the current education 
revival is seen as being overly biased toward urban areas. Within this context, 
there are “serious regional disparities of access to educational 
opportunities”182 with Ministry of Education official statistics showing that most 
of the country’s schools are now concentrated in the Galbeed region, which 
accounts for 47.1% of total student enrolment in Somaliland; the other 52.9% 
is divided up among Awdal (14.4%), Sahil (7.9%), Togdheer (9.7%) and Sool 
and Sanaag with 10.6% each. This urban bias is reinforced by the fact that 
most teachers are concentrated in towns as a result of these being venues 
where other income-generating opportunities can be accessed. In the medium 
term, priorities focused on reviving education in the rural areas include: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
180 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, (2005), p. 26. 
181 Ibid., (2005), pp. 26-27. 
182 Ibid. 
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• Supplementary sources of income for rural teachers; 
• Expanding primary schools into rural communities and urban settlements 
that are currently not being served; 
• Establishment of regional level technical institutes; 
• Support studies on the sustainability of the present cost-sharing system 
for financing public education and that of private education and 
potentialities for improved payment of teachers, improving educational 
access for the pastoral population, feasibility of expanding non-formal 
education and the instilling of moral values in education.183 
 
Overall, the key to education’s revival is overcoming the teacher bottleneck. 
“There has not been a supply of new teachers for more than a decade now, 
and older generation teachers are leaving the profession because of age or 
because of change of occupation.”184 Recently, a teachers’ training college 
was opened in Hargeisa, while Amoud University is producing a limited 
number of secondary school teachers, which is expected to increase. The 
capacity of such institutions to produce a new generation of primary and 
secondary teachers for public and private schools, highlights the role that 
tertiary education institutions are playing in Somaliland’s reconstruction and 
educational revival.185 
 
With the opening of Burco University in August 2004, Somaliland now has 
four institutions of higher learning, namely, Burco, Amoud University, 
                                                 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid., p. 46. 
185 Afrol News, (20 August 2004). 
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Hargeisa University, which graduated its first-ever students in 2004, and 
Berbera University. As Afrol News reported, “this exceptional density of 
educational centres has been made possible by bold government policies and 
the financial support of many Somalilander exiles,” 186 referring to the impact 
of the diaspora communities overseas, which contain many individuals who 
not only make financial contributions but travel back and forth to Somaliland in 
a variety of support capacities related to institution and capacity-building. 
From the standpoint of attracting external assistance – despite Somaliland not 
being recognised – Burco University’s founding represents one route to this 
goal by emphasising the school’s German roots as a means of attracting this 
nation’s support. According to Afrol News, Burco University “takes up the 
heritance from a technical institute that was constructed with German state 
aid but left in ruins by earlier hostilities. Consequently, the town’s new 
university plans to specialise on engineering and technical studies.” In the 
process, it is hoped that, as a matter of continuity, German funding can be 
attracted to support the institution. Former graduates of the old Technical 
Institute of Burco have been among the many contributors to its revival as 
Burco University, a reflection of how “the Somaliland Diaspora has played an 
important part in financing the country’s four universities” as well as in raising 
funds to reconstruct Burco.187 
 
The density of Somaliland’s tertiary education sector, given the small size of 
the country, reflects a broader renaissance of an institutionalised civil society 
as another source of reconstructive capacity-building. In addition to the 
                                                 
186 Ibid. 
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women’s NGOs mentioned above, institutions like the SAPD interact with the 
universities, international organisations and government in augmenting the 
kind of research and analysis into Somaliland’s manifold developmental 
challenges, which is hoped will sustain reconstruction momentum. The SAPD, 
formerly the Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development has, for example, 
worked closely with the War-Torn Societies Project (WSP) in profiling 
Somaliland’s reconstruction and developmental needs. Prior to its 1999 
report, SAPD, in its SCPD incarnation, had identified four strategic areas 
(Entry Points) in Somaliland society for prioritising the rebuilding process: 
 
• Regulating the pastoral economy; 
• Consolidating government institutions at central and local levels, including 
decentralisation; 
• The role of the media and oral culture in rebuilding; 
• The legacy of war on the family, culture and values.188 
 
Through the kind of participatory research that such institutions undertake, in 
this case enlisting the involvement of a private sector (by and large livestock 
traders), linkages have been forged between Somaliland’s indigenous 
‘knowledge sector’ and the larger society. This larger society, in terms of the 
private sector, also includes an organised business community in the form of 
the Somaliland Chamber of Commerce which, with the assistance of the 
UNDP, has published its own directory providing a comprehensive list of 
products and services, as well as public and private institutions. This civil 
                                                 
188 SCPD, (1999), pp. 8-9. 
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society complement, inclusive of the universities, makes Somaliland 
potentially the hub of reconstruction throughout the greater Somali region as a 
whole.189 
 
In the health sector, the priority areas of intervention pertain to the need for 
constructing a comprehensive health care system, which does not exist due to 
the lack of resources.190 The lack of medical supplies and equipment, as well 
as the need for training, is seen as vital in expanding health delivery services 
which, at present, must also cope with the HIV/AIDS/STD pandemic cluster of 
health threats.191 Again, like the education system, the health care delivery 
system is seen as heavily biased toward Somaliland’s urban areas. 
Developing the health infrastructure interacts intimately with the development 
of urban and rural water and sanitation systems which, in turn, tie in closely 
with increasing environmental concerns. Environmental concerns have 
become more manifest with recurring droughts affecting Somaliland and the 
Horn of Africa as a whole, exacerbated by coal production, resultant 
deforestation, population growth and expansion.192 Here, the salient issues of 
great concern to Somaliland have been summarised by the ‘2005 Economic 
Overview’ as: 
                                                 
189 An encouraging indicator is the range of regional meetings convened in Hargeisa. See for 
example, Amnesty International’s regional Horn of Africa meeting: Amnesty International, 
‘Human rights in Somaliland: Awareness and action. A report of a workshop held in Hargeisa, 
Somaliland’ (17 - 19 October 1998) http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR520011999 
190 Ministry of Health and Labour, ‘Annual Health Report 2002’, Hargeisa (2003) and Ministry 
of National Planning and Co-ordination, ‘Strategy for Economic Recovery and Poverty 
Reduction Plan 2003-2005’, Hargeisa (2003). 
191 UNICEF, ‘Efforts to Prevent HIV-AIDS in “Somaliland”’, (December 1999). 
192 The increased demand for coal has led to deforestation in Somaliland. Ecological 
degradation is the key theme of research to sustain Somaliland’s pastoral economic base. 
See Mohamed Jama, ‘The Political Ecology of Colonial Somaliland’, Africa, Vol. 74, No. 4, 
(2004) and Martin Herzog, ‘Forestry and Woodland Management in Somaliland: Problems, 
Background, Development Potentials’ HEWW, (n.d.). 
http://www.brainworker.ch/reports/Somaliland/Somaliland%20recommendations.htm 
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• Environment information and research; 
• Environmental impact assessment of policies, programmes and project 
components;  
• Environmental education; 
• Sustainable management of the environment and natural resources; 
• Environmentally sound management of pollution; 
• Improvement of living and working environments; and 
• Providing a national framework for integrating conservation and 
development.193 
 
Again, this is an area that demands major capacity-building in human 
resources development to deal with interrelated health, sanitation and 
environmental issues in a challenging ecosystem.194 
 
3.10 Transport Communications and Tapping the External Realm 
 
There is a broad cluster of sectoral factors of reconstruction that link 
Somaliland’s fate to the outside world; factors of regional and global economic 
interdependence that impinge on the country’s continuing reconstruction and 
recovery prospects. These have to do with transport communications within 
Somaliland, which are interlinked with the rest of the Horn of Africa/Red 
                                                 
193 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, (2005), pp. 32-33. 
194 Somaliland’s current Foreign Minister Edna Adan Ismail has been a consistent champion 
for better health services. See her inspiring story of building Somaliland’s only maternity 
hospital, the Edna Adan Maternity Hospital: http://ednahospital.netfirms.com/ 
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Sea/Gulf of Aden geo-political-economic region; Somaliland’s access to 
foreign donor assistance, private investment and international expertise, 
which brings into greater focus the role of the Somaliland diaspora; and the 
interaction of Somaliland’s self-reliant development path with the imperative 
sub-regional economic co-operation and integration within the framework of 
an overlapping array of regional economic communities (RECs) within the AU. 
 
Despite Hargeisa’s unrelenting bid for internationally recognised 
independence, the transport communication interdependencies that tie its 
economy to the rest of greater North-East Africa and the Red Sea/Gulf of 
Aden region are critical to its continuing post-conflict recovery.  
 
Moreover, Somaliland has a regional comparative advantage in its strategic 
Berbera port on the Gulf that, potentially, could make it the gateway to the 
entire IGAD195 community of nations that are among Somaliland’s neighbours. 
Because of Berbera’s berthing capacity, coupled with a landing strip that is 
one of the second longest on the entire continent, Berbera’s port development 
and rehabilitation could benefit a range of regional and external transport 
communications requirements, from peacekeeping to humanitarian aid and 
disaster relief deliveries, to a range of commercial export and import 
trafficking of goods to and from the region.196  
 
                                                 
195 Current members of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, IGAD, are Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. http://www.igad.org/ 
196 Peter D Little, pp. 38, 116 and 131. The port of Bossaso in Puntland is used primarily by 
Somalilanders in the Eastern region of Somaliland and constitutes competition for the port of 
Berbera.  
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However, Berbera must be seen within a wider matrix of transport 
communication rehabilitation requirements identified in the ‘2005 Economic 
Overview'. Rehabilitating surface transportation along with aviation and 
maritime-port capacity constitutes a major dimension of recovery, as much of 
this vital infrastructure was either destroyed or degraded during Somaliland’s 
conflicts, dating back to the days of military retribution by the Barre regime, or 
was left to perdition due to neglect and disrepair as a result of successive 
deployments, military build-ups, build-downs and redeployments by the former 
Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War, when Berbera’s strategic value 
was a major geo-political prize. Within this context, rehabilitating surface 
transport has been a basic priority in re-establishing internal and external 
economic linkages. The ‘Economic Overview’ cites, in this regard, the role of 
the Somaliland Road Authority (SRA)197 in co-ordinating and seeking external 
financing, as well as engaging the private sector in the maintenance and  
provision of services. These include: hiring professional and technical 
expertise to assist the SRA in developing maintenance plans, programmes, 
schedules and budgets, as well as providing site supervision services; 
delegation of maintenance responsibilities to other agencies such as local 
authorities; and outsourcing physical works to commercial contractors, 
communities and individuals. 
 
                                                 
197 See the work of the EU funded Berger Group, which helped the Somaliland Road 
Authority, 
http://www.louisberger.com/berger/world/2003q4/sah.html. The Somaliland Road Authority 
has also commissioned land mines clearance projects, 
http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/somaliland.html 
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Somaliland’s road network is estimated to comprise around 2,200km of paved 
road, including the road link to Erigabo and the unpaved roads to Ethiopia via 
Hargeisa. The maintenance cost of priority roads has been estimated in the 
neighbourhood of US$5.3 million. Particularly high priority is attached to the 
maintenance of the unpaved road from Burco to Erigabo and the cross-border 
road network linking Wajale, Inu-Guha and Allay Baday. These two roads total 
500kms. The government is committed to raising about 35% of the capital 
needed for the Burco-Erigabo axis, with the remaining 75% being sought from 
international donors. Meanwhile, regional, district and village communities are 
being encouraged to formulate their own road rehabilitation projects for 
integrating into the larger surface transport communications matrix. 
 
Hargeisa has, with the support of the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO), prepared feasibility studies for upgrading the airports of Hargeisa, 
Berbera and Burco. Such upgrading would come at an estimated cost of 
between $18 and 32 million. This is critical given the high volume of air traffic 
coming in and out of Somaliland, despite its lack of international recognition. 
The civil aviation reconstruction aims are to: maintain high standards of flight 
safety; review and update legislation to keep abreast with international 
standards; and expand existing airport capacity. Air transport reconstruction is 
intimately tied in with sea transport upgrading, especially in the case of 
Berbera.198 According to the economic overview, the port will require 
significant investment in infrastructure development and management if it is to 
serve as a regional port. This will entail expanding services and facilities at 
                                                 
198 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, (2005), p. 36. 
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the port as a basis for growing maritime services and stimulating greater 
employment and economic activity. This will strengthen the IGAD region’s 
economic co-operation and cross-border trade and technical co-operation in 
Somaliland, as the government of Ethiopia has started using the Berbera port 
for government imports, while the EU has used the port for the humanitarian 
shipment of food aid. Such sectoral rehabilitation and expansion should also 
fuel the momentum of external investment in other sectors, especially in 
energy.199  
 
For the past few years, there has been a growing interest in Somaliland’s off-
shore hydrocarbon potential. A British-Chinese joint venture (China’s Sinopec 
and Britain’s Rova) were granted exploration licenses in 2000 to explore oil 
deposits in two offshore blocks totalling 7 million acres. Recently, the South 
African owned Ophir energy corporation acquired 75% of the issued share 
capital of Rova, which is a special purpose company established to develop 
the Somaliland interests.200 In 2003, leading South African businessman, 
former Gauteng Premier Tokyo Sexwale, Chairman of Mvelaphanda Holdings, 
led a five-man delegation to Somaliland to assess mining and oil development 
prospects. This visit paved the way for active offshore oil prospecting by 
Mvelaphanda, which is part of the company’s pursuit of African investments in 
its upstream energy business201 (see Map of Oil Concession in Berbera).  
                                                 
199 Ibid., p. 35.  
200 Financial Mail, 'Mvelaphanda: A Matter of Timing', (2005), pp.18-21; and Ophir energy, 
http://www.ophir-energy.com/assets/somaliland.asp 
201 See also some of the debates: Rova Energy Corporation Limited, 'A Response To The 
Open Letter To His Excellency The President Of  Somaliland Regarding PSA Between The 
Government Of Somaliland And  ‘Unknown’; Company Called REC For Exclusive Right to 
Conduct Petroleum  Operations in Somaliland', Somaliland Times, (2005). 
http://somalilandtimes.net/202/28.shtml 
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In Somaliland’s case, such prospects will enhance the need for a rehabilitated 
Berbera port within the context of expanding external oil and natural gas 
exploration along coastal East Africa. Given the escalating demand for oil and 
Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), combined with Somaliland’s relative stability in 
the Somali region, exploiting its energy potential may well offer the best 
prospect for generating foreign investment in the development of Somaliland’s 
natural resources sector, thereby building momentum for increased 
international involvement in its economy, despite what is still an uphill 
diplomatic struggle for recognition. 
 
In 2001, the European Community-funded Progressive Interventions, was 
engaged with the Somaliland government and its private sector, in an effort to 
organise the mining and marketing of the country’s gemstone deposits.  
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  Map of Oil Concession in Berbera 
 
 
Source: Ophir Energy Company Ltd, http://www.ophirenergy.com. 
 
 
Among the issues that were embarked upon by Progressive Interventions 
were: investment in exploration and mining, including equipment; training of 
local miners to identify the different gem minerals; organising the miners and 
dealers into a mining and trading association; setting up marketing channels 
for the gemstones, including inviting overseas gemstone wholesalers to visit 
the country; and looking at ways to add value through cutting and polishing. 
According to South African gemologist, Dr Judith Kinnard, Somaliland has two 
known emerald producing areas, one at Alihiley and another at Simodi in 
western Somaliland. To the east of the emerald gem belt in this region, the 
gemstones are still in what are called ‘pegmatite,’ and they can, reportedly, be 
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seen as white criss-crossing bodies on the hillside. Thus, beside emeralds, in 
this generally neglected eastern region, miners are working on pegmatite with 
aquamarine, according to Kinnard. Rubies and sapphires also occur in the 
gem belt, in metamorphic rock instead of pegmatite. A bright red ruby said to 
be similar to the ruby from Longido in Tanzania, has been found in a 
metamorphic rock. However, the most abundant gemstone in Somaliland, 
according to Dr Kinnard, is garnet: “Everywhere I went there were garnets by 
the bucket loads – garnets in varying sizes and colours from red to orange, 
grossular garnet, pyrope and almandine garnets.”202 Somaliland also has an 
abundant supply of a variety of quartz.  
 
In short, the development of Somaliland’s minerals and energy potential, at a 
time of growing external market minerals and energy demand offers, perhaps, 
the best route for Somaliland to diversify its economy out of its dependency 
on livestock exports. 203 
  
Indeed, the successive Horn of Africa livestock bans imposed by Arabian 
peninsular states have spurred the country’s efforts to attract foreign 
involvement in developing these sectors. One additional comparative 
advantage that Somaliland may enjoy in attracting foreign investment as a 
means of overcoming its political isolation and, in the process, developing 
commercial services, including retail trade, transportation and professional 
services as bases for generating urban employment, alongside developing the 
                                                 
202 Jewellery News Asia, ‘Rich gemstone potentials discovered in Somaliland’, No. 195, pp. 
58-63, (24 January 2001). http://www.somalilandforum.com/articles/gems_in_somaliland.htm 
203 Jennifer Henricus, ‘Mining and marketing Somaliland’s resources,’ Jewellery News Asia, 
No. 95, p. 63, (January 2001).  
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minerals and energy extractive sector, is the fact that, out of circumstances of 
necessity, it has developed what could be one of the largest African 
indigenous private sectors relative to the governmental private sector.204 This 
is a phenomenon that ties in with the Somaliland – and larger Somali – 
diaspora, spawned by the upheavals along the Somali peninsula. Over the 
decades, conflict throughout the region has generated a far-flung diaspora of 
refugees and exiles alongside an already existing pool of migrant labourers, 
who have worked in countries throughout peninsular Arabia and the Persian 
Gulf. This diaspora, in turn, has spawned a remittance economy which has 
helped to sustain the people of Somaliland and act as a stabiliser to the 
benefit of a government hard-pressed to deliver public services. Thus, it is 
important to gain some appreciation for the role that the Somaliland diaspora 
(and migrants), and the remittances it  generates, has played in Somaliland’s 
reconstruction. 
 
3.11 Somaliland’s Diaspora 
 
Roughly half of Somaliland’s 3.5 million nationals have been estimated to 
live outside its borders. The past 15 years and more have meant numerous 
cross-border displacements, leaving the entire population as either 
repatriated/repatriating refugees or IDPs. In producing this exodus, 
Somaliland’s wars have, in the process, displaced a substantial middle class 
of Somalilanders, who have had the means to relocate overseas and, 
                                                 
204 Somaliland Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, 'Somaliland Trade Directory 
2001', Hargeisa (2001) and Somaliland Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, 
'Somaliland Trade Directory 2003/2004', Hargeisa (2004). 
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therefore, transfer portions of their income to their relatives back home while, 
on the other hand, remittances have been flowing into Somaliland from 
nationals working as migrant labourers in the Middle East/Persian Gulf. The 
Somaliland diaspora/remittance phenomenon has been fairly well studied.205 
Findings have highlighted the fact that, as a result of the socio-economic 
nature of much of the exodus, most remittances from the diaspora flow to the 
cities and middle classes within Somaliland and that "these large capital 
flows have contributed to rapid economic recovery in post-war Somaliland 
and the development of a dynamic private sector".206 
  
The socio-economic composition of the Somaliland diaspora thus – in 
comparison to labour migrants – comprise families who already have access 
to financial resources and have thus been able to establish themselves largely 
in the West. Many diaspora Somalilanders have been engaged very actively 
in conflict resolution and developmental projects aimed at alleviating the 
Somali region’s humanitarian crises. They have, in effect, been employed in 
what might be characterised as the international “development industry” with 
local and international NGOs and private voluntary organisations (PVOs); 
organisations that are and have been involved in rehabilitation and 
reconciliation, in the process, helping fuel the development of Somaliland’s 
                                                 
205 Nauja Kleist and Peter Hansen, ‘Big Demonstration – A study of transborder political 
mobilization’, AMID Working Paper Series 42, Aalborg University (2005); Nauja Kleist, 
‘Somali-Scandinavian Dreaming. The Case of Somscan and UK Cooperative Associations’, 
paper presented at 'Determinants of Transnational Engagement', Santa Domingo, The 
Dominican Republic (2003); R.B. McGown, Muslims in the Diaspora: The Somali 
Communities of London and Toronto, Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto 
Press (1999); D. Griffiths, Somali and Kurdish Refugees in London. New Identities in the 
Diaspora. Aldershot: Ashgate (2002); N Farah, Yesterday, Tomorrow. Voices from the Somali 
Diaspora. London and New York: Cassell (2000). 
206 Ismail I. Ahmed, 'Remittances and their Economic Impact in Post-war Somaliland', 
Disasters, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 380-389, (2000). 
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civil society. Since 1997, many have in fact returned to Somaliland and 
countless travel back and forth, living abroad for part of the year as well as 
remaining for the other part of the year in Somaliland.207 Many are heavily 
involved in political, economic and judicial processes within the country. 
 
The remittance economy that ‘diasporisation’ has generated, is estimated to 
be in the neighbourhood of US $500 million annually for Somaliland. 
According to a paper published in 2000 by Ismail I. Ahmed on 'Remittances 
and their Economic Impact in Post-War Somaliland’, this intake was around 
“four times the value of livestock exports. In fact the livestock export ban by 
Saudi Arabia in 1998 in response to the Rift Valley fever outbreak in Kenya 
and southern Somalia was predicted to lead to the collapse in international 
trade and market exchange.208 It was feared that the shortage of hard 
currency needed to finance imports would spell disaster for the country. The 
ban lasted 14 months and the number of animals exported from Somaliland 
fell sharply from 2.9 million in 1997 to just over 1 million in 1998. However, 
this failed to affect the volume of imports mainly because remittances 
financed the entire import bill” (italics added).  
 
Tracking the Somalia/Somaliland remittance economy, according to this 
report, has been extremely difficult in terms of quantifying and monitoring 
such flows. The channels are diverse, with cash flows often taking place on 
                                                 
207 Good examples include the cases of human rights activist Rakiya Omaar, psychologist 
Hussein Bulhan, and medical researcher-businessman-politician, Ahmed Esa. 
208 Ismail I. Ahmed, 'Remittances and their Economic Impact in Post-war Somaliland', 
Disasters, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 387, (2000). 
 165
the black market. Ahmed writes that estimating remittances in Somaliland is 
problematic for a number of reasons: 
 
 First, remittances are transferred in a number of forms and through different 
channels. They can be cash in kind e.g. cars, furniture, jewellery, clothing or 
electronic goods and they can also be channelled through trusted merchants 
or hand carried by migrants when they visit home. Second, there is no data 
available on the global numbers of migrants and refugees from Somaliland. 
Third, Hawaalado (money transfer companies) who are responsible for a 
significant part of transfers, sometimes deliberately under-report the size of 
the flows for fear of government interference in the form of taxes or new 
regulations.209 
 
The study found that the average annual remittance received by households 
was US$4,170 and that there were approximately 120,000 recipient 
households throughout Somaliland – roughly one-third of the population. 
Interestingly, it was found that “for agro-pastoralists internal remittances from 
migrant workers in urban areas are more important than international ones”, 
which makes an important statement on the impact of internal rural-to-urban 
migratory labour and income flows within the country. Further, because of 
what the report sees as “recent changes in the demographic structure of 
migrants, an increasing proportion of those receiving this kind of income are 
women”.210 In broader socio-economic terms, though diaspora remittances 
have undoubtedly been an economic – and hence, social – stabilising factor 
for the country, they may constitute something of a ‘double-edged sword’ in 
                                                 
209 Ibid., p. 382. 
210 Ibid., p. 383. 
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that the study finds that “remittances have increased income inequality” and 
probably, by inference, reinforced an urban-rural economic divide in the 
process. For although the effect of remittances on households, according to 
the report, has been considerable in providing secure livelihoods. “The 
migrant workers and refugees, themselves, were found generally to come 
from better-off families who could afford the relatively high investment costs 
involved in sending someone abroad".211 
 
Yet another off-setting impact of the diaspora-remittance dimension of 
Somaliland’s recovery and reconstruction, apart from its relationship with 
growing socio-economic inequality, is the fact that this phenomenon has been 
the source of large capital flows that have contributed to a relatively rapid 
post-war economic recovery and dynamic private sector development. This 
latter outcome is particularly noteworthy as, given the capacity deficits of the 
state, the Somaliland private sector within and outside the country has, of 
necessity, played a major and strategic role in Somaliland’s governance and 
development. A study conducted by Peter Hansen entitled 'Migrant 
Remittances as a Development Tool: The Case of Somaliland' notes, for 
example: 
 
 Partly because of the absence of a functioning state with its financial, 
economic and social institutions, the private business sector has grown 
tremendously in Somaliland. Even though Somaliland has the most stable 
administration in the former Republic of Somalia, traditional government 
services such as the provision of education, health services and electricity 
                                                 
211  Ibid.,p. 387. 
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have largely been taken over by private companies or at least have been 
privatized in practice. Somaliland may not officially be a state providing these 
services, but, in fact, Somaliland is a free trade zone where it is possible to 
import and export goods almost without taxation. Many Somalilanders from 
the West come to invest in the supposedly booming and unregulated 
economy. Their investments have created jobs and stimulated the provision of 
services (italics added). 212 
 
This is, indeed, a revealing insight into the nature of Somaliland’s post-war 
reconstruction as a harbinger of the country’s future economic development; 
in essence, a country embarked on a development path imposed by 
circumstances that dictated the fashioning of an indigenous African public-
private partnership state integrated into the global economy through a 
diaspora spawned by Somaliland’s adversity but which has become intimately 
involved in the home-country’s development. This carries both internal 
domestic and external geo-political implications. Internal domestic political 
implications are evident in Somaliland’s culminating governance 
reconstruction, which revolved (at the time of writing) around the country’s 
parliamentary elections, which were expected to conclude the transition from 
clan-based governance to multi-party parliamentary governance. With the fact 
that the opposition Kulmiye and Ucid parties emerged as serious contenders 
in the election, this signalled the emergence of the diaspora and its remittance 
economy as an ascendant socio-economic political force in Somaliland’s 
governance. 
                                                 
212 Peter Hansen, 'Migrant Remittances as a Development Tool: The Case of Somaliland', 
International Organisation for Migration, Working Papers series, No. 3, (June 2004). 
http://www.iom.int/DOCUMENTS/PUBLICATION/EN/mpr3.pdf 
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A major part of Kulmiye’s political base is reported to be in the diaspora. 
Because of the already referred to class composition of this diaspora, 
Kulmiye’s emergence also signifies, perhaps, the beginning of a consolidation 
of political dominance by Somaliland’s middle class and educated elite, over 
more traditionalist sources of power and influence in the society. Whether this 
could lead to a widening polarisation between urban and rural Somaliland is 
still questionable. The latter’s increased marginalisation would depend on how 
inclusive Kulmiye’s leadership and allied coalition of forces prove to be, and 
how committed they are to preventing such polarisation; an important 
consideration in as much as rural Somaliland has provided the country its 
reconciliatory base which, up to now, has successfully bridged ‘bifurcation’ 
between urban modernity and rural tradition. Otherwise, the diaspora provides 
Somaliland with a crucially strategic link to the outside world in a way that has 
helped it to overcome the diplomatic isolation imposed by non-recognition.213 
Somalilanders from the diaspora have provided much of the person-power for 
implementing any number of international ‘development industry’ 
humanitarian and rehabilitative activities not just in Somaliland, but throughout 
the Somali region. In the process, as has already been indicated by the 
involvement of the UN, international organisations and NGOs have been, 
because of the chaotic political circumstances in southern Somalia, 
                                                 
213 Three key Somaliland diaspora organisations are: the US based Somaliland Policy and 
Research Institute, the UK based Somaliland Societies in Europe and the Somaliland Forum. 
See their activities at: http://www.sopri.org/, http://www.sse4.com/, 
http://www.somalilandforum.com/ and Irin News, ‘SOMALIA: IRIN Interview with Mohamed 
Diriye Abdullahi, spokesman for Somaliland Forum’ (13 July 2000) 
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unavoidably drawn to co-operating with Somaliland in undertaking any 
number of reconstruction and development undertakings.  
 
Although concerns exist that southern Somalia’s post-Mbagathi transition, 
under its new TFG, may draw donor support away from Somaliland, the latter 
may have already established itself, de facto, as the centre of gravity of the 
Somali region’s recovery by dint of the fact that this is where the region’s 
indigenous capacity resides. Even with Somaliland’s own capacity deficits, the 
country’s diaspora has helped to offset these shortcomings by their own 
devotion to rebuilding their country as a base of political and economic 
stability in an otherwise chronically unsettled region. Somaliland has thus 
developed an ambivalent relationship with the international community that, in 
a sense, cannot ignore its presence. This is amply reflected in the case of the 
UN which, at a political level, has up to now felt committed to recognising 
whatever regime emerges in Mogadishu while, in practice, is engaging 
Hargeisa as a necessity in implementing development undertakings.214 In this 
regard, the June 2004 update report to the UN Security Council is instructive: 
 
 In general, areas in the north of the country offer a more secure environment 
for aid operations than parts of the south where continuing instability poses 
greater challenges. This is far from saying, however, that the north is secure. 
In June, ‘Somaliland’ authorities are reported to have arrested several 
members of militant groups in Burao who were alleged to be carrying 
                                                 
214 See the recent visits of senior UN staff to Somaliland: ‘SOMALIA: UN envoy commends 
Somaliland's stability’, Interview with UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to 
Somalia, François Lonseny Fall, Hargeisa, IRIN News, (1 Nov 2005); and IRIN News, 
‘SOMALIA: Interview with Maxwell Gaylard, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, 
Hargeisa (27 Oct 2005).   
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explosives. Such groups, also reportedly based in Mogadishu, are believed to 
oppose international activity in Somalia, including the deployment of foreign 
troops, even as observers.215 
 
This relative security has led the UNDP into anchoring its public 
administration support programme on the Somali region with the Civil Service 
Commission of Somaliland; an initiative aimed at making the Somali civil 
service more effective in delivering services to the general public and which 
"required a comprehensive training needs assessment”.216 This was carried 
out in late 2003 by a team drawn from the Somaliland Civil Service 
Commission. The project’s terms of reference were intended to develop 
capacity for the TFG. Hence, Somaliland seems inextricably linked, within the 
context of the international politics of aid to the Somali region, to 
developments in Mogadishu wherein its relative stability and capacity have 
conferred on it a degree of de facto international recognition at certain 
operational levels of multilateral engagement. Moreover, this is an 
engagement that reinforces the diaspora connection in the Somaliland 
equation through UN programmes such as the Qualified Expatriate Somali 
Technical Support (QUEST) project, a modified version of the UNDP’s global 
Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) initiative.217 
Nevertheless, as the report makes clear in its reference to ‘the north’, the risk 
of terrorism in the region is a high one and the proximity of Somaliland to the 
instability of southern Somalia has made it vulnerable to such pressures. 
                                                 
215 United Nations Security Council, p. 6, (8 October 2004). 
216 “UNDP Institutional and Capacity Development”, Somalia (2006). 
http://www.so.undp.org/page.asp?id=663 
217 http://www.so.undp.org/Themes/PRESR/QUESTS.htm 
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Thus, in almost siamese twin-like fashion, the US-led anti-terrorist 
international crackdown on the largest Somali remittance agency, Al-Barakat, 
has affected Somaliland and Somalia alike. However, Somaliland has 
remained resilient in the face of this challenge as the Hansen report makes 
clear, noting that: “Despite the fear that the closing down of Al-Barakat would 
cause a severe hardship to people in Somaliland, international financial 
transfers to Somaliland have not declined. Quite the contrary, remittance 
companies have noticed an increase in the period 1998 and 2003.”218  
 
This resilience, within a ‘rough neighbourhood’, may also benefit Somaliland 
in a larger regional co-operation context, where it stands to benefit from its 
proximity to Ethiopia which, as a landlocked incipient sub-regional power 
locked in a stalemated confrontation with neighbouring Eritrea, has a security 
interest in a friendly Somali coast outlet to the sea. Within this context, a fitting 
conclusion to this chapter’s survey of Somaliland’s post-war reconstruction is 
to note the 2005 Economic Overview’s “commerce and industry” references to 
its reliance on a larger regional environment, in which to grow and develop its 
economy. With potentially decisive implications for its ultimate international 
recognition within Africa and beyond, the report reveals that, “on the external 
side, the government is negotiating with Ethiopia on entering in agreement on 
[sic] a customs union” while also “embarking on active participation in regional 
and international integration and cooperation schemes such [sic] as the East 
                                                 
218 Peter Hansen, (June 2004), p. 10. 
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African Community, COMESA and ACP-EU.”219 This is a dimension to 
Somaliland’s economic development that ties into a broader diplomatic 
recognition agenda. In the final analysis, Somaliland’s positioning as a 
strategic outpost of democratising stability along the Somali coast/Gulf of 
Aden littoral may ensure that its post-conflict reconstruction and economic 
recovery gains momentum, pending the ability of Hargeisa to sustain an 
effective governance track record.220  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
219 Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, (2005), p. 17. 
220 Mark Bradbury, ‘Somaliland’s Parliamentary Elections’, Paper for the Roundtable 
Conference on Somalia, U.S. Department of State, Africa Bureau, Arlington Virginia, (13 
October 2005); Irin News, ‘SOMALIA: Interview with Mark Bradbury, Somaliland poll 
observer’, Hargeisa, (10 Oct 2005) and William Reno, 'Somalia and Survival In the Shadow of 
the Global Economy', QEH Working Paper series No. 100, Development Studies at Oxford, 
Queen Elizabeth House, (February 2003). 
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Chapter 4: Religion 
Somaliland and the Upheaval  
within Global Islam  
 
 
Gaal dil oo gaartisa sii 
 
You may kill an infidel but do it justly (Somali proverb) 
 
 
4.1 Preface 
 
This chapter, written in 2005, is particularly relevant in placing in context the 
most recent 2006 developments in southern Somalia, which saw the eclipsing 
of US-backed warlords by Somali Islamists. In many ways, the scenario 
implications outlined in the body of this chapter anticipated the events that 
actually unfolded and remain relevant to the continuing saga of developments 
in the Somali region. 
 
A major factor that will have a continuing bearing on the sustainability of 
Somaliland’s stability in terms of ongoing reconciliation and reconstruction, 
ultimately affecting its international recognition prospect, is the influence of 
Islam; the interaction between Islam as it has been practised in Somaliland 
over the centuries in its pastoral Sufi forms221 with the more recent rise of 
                                                 
221 Abdur Rahman bin Ahmed al-Zaila’i, Al-Fid Al-Rahmani fi Nubza min Manaaqib al-Qutb Al-
Jilani, (not dated and no publisher); I.M. Lewis, ‘Sufism in Somaliland: A Study in Tribal 
Islam—I’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 17, 
No. 3, pp. 581-602 (1955); ‘Sufism in Somaliland: A Study in Tribal Islam—II’, Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 145-160 
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‘political Islam’, ‘jihadi Islamism’ and ‘missionary activism’ and the geopolitics 
of the so-called ‘war on terror’.222  
 
This chapter, therefore, will delve in more detail into Somaliland’s Islamic 
identity within that great swathe of geo-cultural terrain defined by Ali Mazrui as 
‘Afrabia’.223 This entails looking at the evolution of Islam in the manner in 
which it has constituted the religious foundations of Somaliland society 
interacting with Somaliland’s links with the Arabian peninsula. The 
Arab/Islamic dimension of Somaliland society forms the historical backdrop for 
exploring the more recent contemporary developments associated with the 
rise of political Islam in North-East Africa. 
 
The rise of political Islam, especially in the wake of the September 11, 2001 
hijacking terror attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., brings into view 
the contemporary context of Islam as a religious and political force along the 
Somali coast. How this impinges on Somaliland entails locating the rise of 
political Islam and its links with the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ within a much 
broader context of the upheavals underway throughout the Muslim world.224 
                                                                                                                                            
(1956); Francesca Declich, ‘Sufi experience in rural Somali: A focus on women’, Social 
Anthropology, Vol. 8, No. 3, Cambridge University Press (2001).  
http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=62998 
222 Ken Menkhaus, 'Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism', Adelphi Paper 364, 
Oxford University Press (2004); and International Crisis Group, (12 December 2005).  
223 See the seminal lecture, Ali Mazrui, ‘Africa and the Arabs in the New World Order?’, 
UFAHAMU, UCLA (1992) and Abdalla Bujra, 'Afrabia and African Union', lecture delivered at 
ACARTSOD, Tripoli, Libya (September 2002). http://www.dpmf.org/meetings/Afrabia-AU.html 
224 A number of Muslim scholars such as Yusuf Qardawi have probed the current 
contradictory interpretations of Islam. See Asghar Ali Engineer, ‘Clash of Terrors?’, Secular 
Perspective, Vol.16, No. 31, (October 2001) http://ecumene.org/IIS/csss60.htm See also 
Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam, Columbia University Press (November 2004). Roy explores 
how neo-fundamentalism has been gaining ground among a rootless Muslim youth—
particularly among the second- and third-generation Muslims —and how this phenomenon is 
feeding new forms of radicalism, ranging from support for al-Qaeda to the outright rejection of 
integration into Western society. 
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Political Islam’s impact within North-East Africa generally and along the 
Somali coast in particular may be seen as representing one theatre in what 
might be defined as a Global Islamic Civil War. This larger struggle taking 
place within Islam, it will be argued, has shaped the geo-political terrain of the 
‘war on terror’ wherein the anti-US sentiment has become a convenient 
organising prop around which to mobilise the different revolutionary 
tendencies at play within the Muslim world.225 The Somali coast forms an 
integral part of this geo-political terrain of Islamic civil war-cum-war on terror 
dynamics.226 The localised manifestation of this larger upheaval, in turn, 
inevitably impinges on the influence of Islam in Somaliland given the fertile 
ground for jihadi militant Islamist tendencies that have gained a foothold in 
southern Somalia amid the different geo-political forces attempting to 
determine the current and future trajectory of the greater Somali region.227 
 
A major agency for disseminating Islam as a religion and culture in 
Somaliland, as elsewhere throughout the Muslim world, has been through 
education. The funding of religious and/or religious-based education by 
                                                 
225 “For Muslims in the Horn, 9/11 came at a moment when the Islamist project had been 
overtaken by the politics of exhaustion. By declaring his War on Terror, President Bush 
provided a convenient new enemy, but resisting America is so remote from the real problems 
faced by ordinary Muslims as to be meaningful only to a handful of misfits and criminals. Luuq 
was a real and courageous attempt to build an Islamic community in Somalia’s ruins, though it 
was fatally hijacked by al-Qaida. Ayro’s murders, by contrast, are utterly meaningless.” See 
Alex de Waal, ‘Chasing Ghosts - rise and fall of militant Islam in the Horn of Africa’, London 
Review of Books, Vol.27, No.16, (18 August 2005). 
226 “Cross-cutting the New Regionalism is the worldwide Islamist movement, which was the 
pretext for the Iraq intervention (the notion of Saddam Hussein giving weapons of mass 
destruction to terrorists). That the United States has lost credibility in the Islamic world is a 
platitude. Islamic militancy has not diminished since the Iraq intervention and all reports point 
to its increase. Rather than advancing the "war on terrorism", the Iraq intervention has pushed 
it back.” See Michael A. Weinstein, 'The New Regionalism: Drifting Toward Multipolarity', 
Power and Interest News Report (7 June 2004) 
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=178</A&language_id=1 
227 See Andre Le Sage, ‘Somalia and the War on Terrorism, Political Islamic Movements and 
US Counter-terrorism Efforts’, (June 2004); and International Crisis Group, (11 July 2005). 
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Arab/Islamic charities which have emerged as a major vehicle for channelling 
what are identified as Wahhabist-Salafist expressions of Islamic 
fundamentalism and jihadist tendencies, comes in for major scrutiny in terms 
of how the education-charities link is influencing Somaliland society. This 
examination relates directly to a prognosis of Somaliland’s current and future 
stability in terms of Islam’s impact on the country’s political and security 
environment. The prospects for sustainable stability, in turn, are a constant 
factor in Somaliland’s politics and diplomacy of gaining international 
recognition, which becomes the focus of the following chapter. 
 
4.2 Somaliland’s Islamic Identity in ‘Afrabian’ Perspective 
 
Somali Islam is what Said S. Samatar, in a March 2005 presentation titled, 
'Unhappy masses and the challenge of political Islam in the Horn of Africa', 
labelled a “frontier Islam”; an Islam “hemmed in on all sides by pagan and 
Christian interlopers” characterised by bellicosity, xenophobia and what Abdi 
I. Samatar describes as “profoundly suspicious of alien influences”.228 Islam 
emerged in the Somali region during the 9th century. Although virtually 100% 
of the population are Muslim, there are many recognised interpretational 
differences in social practices among Somalis with regional differences. 
These differences are reflected between northern and southern Somalia and 
                                                 
228 Abdi Ismail Samatar, 'Social Transformation and Islamic Reinterpretation in Northern 
Somalia: The Women's Mosque in Gabiley', in Ghazi-Waud Falah and Caroline Nagel (eds.), 
Geographies of Muslim Women. Gender, Religion and Space, New York and London: The 
Guilford Press, (2005), p. 2.   
Said S. Samatar 'Unhappy masses and the challenge of political Islam in the Horn of Africa' (9 
March 2005), p. 2. 
http://www.wardheernews.com/articles/March_05/05_political islam_samatar.htm 
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may, in fact, shed light on differences in their contemporary comparative 
stability. Thus, writing in Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, 
edited by Alex de Waal, Roland Marchal points out, when referring to 
Somaliland, that: “The former British colony of Somaliland (north-western 
Somalia), being the closest to Arabia, has more cultural bonds with Arab 
culture than other parts of the country” which “is reflected by the fact that 
women’s public life is less developed than in the South and that up to now, 
fewer girls are sent to school than in the South, while the influence of the state 
has been weaker. The pastoral way of life, which is the main mode of 
production in Somaliland, does not encourage schooling and the reluctance to 
send children to school was certainly reinforced by the impact of the indirect 
rule practised by British colonisers who, for budgetary reasons, tried to 
minimise any disruptions to Somaliland’s social fabric.”229 
 
Abdi Samatar contends “The country’s colonization and the economy’s 
commercialization induced contradictory social processes. These processes 
simultaneously intensified men’s control over women and their resources and 
created new opportunities for women’s advancement. The dynamics 
generated by these twin processes conditioned emerging patterns pertaining 
to women’s role and social location in northern Somalia” (Somaliland).230 
 
Roland Marchal’s brief commentary is illuminating in terms of its implication 
regarding Somaliland’s relative stability compared to the anarchy in the south, 
                                                 
229 Marchal in De Waal, (2004), p.116.  
230 Abdi Ismail Samatar, ‘Social Transformation and Islamic Reinterpretation in Northern 
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the strong possibility that Somaliland’s current stability is a function of its 
comparative conservatism due to British colonial policies that did not 
encourage assimilationist modernity. Hence, in a sense, southern Somalia’s 
instability is a function of an urbanising modernity that fragmented the 
southern Somali social formation formerly under Italian rule. Another view by 
William Reno opines that “evidence below shows, colonial experiences were 
not decisive in shaping contemporary identity and political organisation, 
though they are important for their significant influence on shaping social 
categories and social distribution of resources”.231 
 
This observation also reinforces earlier observations about the role that 
tradition has played in mediating modern expressions of Somali nationalism in 
the north-west as a contribution to the region’s relative stability though, as has 
been clear, Somaliland’s transition to its current stability has been far from 
smooth. To be picked up on later, the reference to the low level of schooling 
may also be instructive in terms of the current role of Islamic education in 
Somaliland and elsewhere in North-East Africa within the current climate of 
post-9/11 turbulence in the Muslim world. In the meantime, however, it is 
important to get a better handle on the historical background of the Somali 
region’s encounter with Islam. Overall, the Somali Islamic experience is 
depicted as unique within the North-East/Horn of Africa context. 
 
Marchal points that, apart from the Somali’s long intimacy with Islam, “the 
social structures and organisations in the country, including the low level of 
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urbanisation, the co-existence of pastoral production systems in a large part 
of the country and agriculture in the inter-riverine area, and clanship” have 
combined to shape a form of Islam distinct from that in other countries in the 
Horn of Africa.232 In a dissertation written by Ali Abdirahman Hersi in 1977 on 
'The Arab Factor in Somali History: The Origins and the Development of Arab 
Enterprise and Cultural Influences in the Somali Peninsula', Hersi contends 
that “Somalis today are all Muslims largely observing the Shafi’i Sunnite 
school of law.”233 Moreover, Somalis "do not only constitute one of the two 
most thoroughly Islamized societies in tropical Africa (the other Zanzibar), but 
they also boast one of the highest percentages of adherence to Islam 
anywhere in the world. Islam as a religion and a system of values so 
thoroughly permeates all aspects of Somali life that it is difficult to conceive of 
any meaning in the term Somali itself without at the same time implying 
Islamic identity”.234  
 
According to Hersi, despite the geo-cultural presence of Somalis in Africa, 
including ethno-linguistic and cultural affinities with other neighbouring African 
communities, “the Somalis identify through their religion, emotionally and 
culturally with Arabia and the wider world of Islam.”235 But how, what he 
terms, an “Arabico-Islamic identity” came to be in terms of the when and 
whom of conversion was not well established. Given the fact that the 
Islamisation of the Somali region was one of the least documented aspects of 
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Somali history, one of Hersi’s objectives was to attempt to reconstruct, with 
the help of Somali oral traditions and external written sources, a “fairly well 
defined outline” of this process. However, to start with, ethnographically, Hersi 
points to Somalis belonging to “Eastern Cushites” and that the original 
movement of Somalis in North-East Africa was northward and eastward into 
the Horn rather than south and westward out of it. These movements placed 
them in close proximity to the Oromo ethno-linguistic bloc that is also heavily 
Islamic and constituting a major if not majority population within current day 
Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous country. The introduction of Islam 
into this region is associated with the emergence of Arab and other south-
west Asian Muslim influences in the North-East African region though it 
appears, from Hersi’s account, that Somalis gravitated more toward Islam 
than an Arab-Islamic identity. 1974 witnessed Somalia’s formal entry into the 
Arab world’s multi-lateral body, the Arab League, with economic advantages 
in mind. Ioan Lewis concluded that this move “did, however, make the Somali 
government’s internal policies and external alignments much more directly 
susceptible to the powerful scrutiny of the conservative Arab states”.236  
 
In summary, the introduction of Islam into the Horn of Africa, according to 
Hersi, and its subsequent spread inland was an essentially peaceful 
phenomenon; the region being spared the Arab wars of conquest when 
Muslims were forcibly exploding into the regions of Byzantium and the 
imperial realms of Persia. The explanation offered for this relative non-
violence and Arab restraint is the unavailability at the time of a Muslim navy. 
                                                 
236 I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali, Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, 4th 
Edition, Oxford: James Currey, (2002), p. 220.  
 
 181
Further, it is suggested that African territories across the Red Sea were less 
attractive to Arabs than those regions in and around their south-west Asian 
locus of Islamic expansion, including the Byzantine province of the Levant, 
Egypt. Five Muslim armies are recorded to have penetrated into North-East 
Africa prior to the 16th century, according to Hersi. Of these, only the one 
despatched by the Umayaad Caliph Abdulmalik Ibn Marwan (685-705) to East 
Africa in the closing years of the 7th century, had the intention of spreading 
Islam. In the absence of conquering Muslim armies, the task of teaching Islam 
to the Somalis, at least in the initial stages of its introduction, devolved upon 
individual missionaries and Muslim merchants, “and the more so upon the 
latter since there never was a properly organized program of missionary effort 
in Islam during this early period.”237 
 
With particular reference to Somaliland, Hersi contends that some authorities 
maintain that Islam was introduced to the Zaila region of “northern 
Somaliland” in the early years of Muhammed’s teaching by Muslim escapees 
who sought refuge from Meccan attacks in “Abyssinia” though, in fact, “there 
is strong evidence to show that Islam was present in Somalia within the first 
century of its history.”238 Hersi places the period of Islamic proselytising and 
conversions on a significant scale as only taking place after the arrival of 
immigrant groups into the Somali region towards the end of the 7th century. 
Initially, in the north-west of what is now Somaliland, the introduction of Islam 
is associated with the arrival of a few Arab sheikh notables. Hersi refers to 
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there being “three Arab notables who are in northern Somalis traditions most 
closely associated with the spread of Islam in the Horn of Africa during the 
first five centuries of the Islamic era”. The first to arrive was a Sheikh 
Abdurahman Ibn Ismail Jabarti followed by Sheikh Ishaq ibn Ahmed of Alawi 
pedigree, having left Baghdad in. 498 A.H /1104-5. The third was Sharif Yusuf 
Aw Barkhadle a.k.a. Yusuf al-Ikhwan, “the single most accomplished 
missionary saint in Somali popular memories”.239 
 
It is estimated that in the neighbourhood of the Banaadir coast of southern 
Somalia, there would have been no awareness of Islam before the 
convergence there of the Omani Julanda refugees and Abdulmalik’s Syrian 
forces in the 690s. An early sectarian Sunni-Shiite divide is suggested by 
Hersi by his reference to the Shiite Zaidis arriving on the Banaadir coast in the 
year 739-740 and dominating this region for almost two centuries, though, on 
the basis of Ibn Battuta’s reports, the influence of Shia Islam in the Somali 
region is generally overlooked. “These authors … conveniently overlook the 
obvious Shii elements in the contemporary Somali Islam as well as the 
occasional reports by mediaeval authorities of Shiite presence in the Horn of 
Africa.”240 The Shia presence was apparently the source of no small amount 
of tensions between the Islamic presence in greater eastern Africa and Middle 
Eastern seats of Muslim authority. Hersi notes that “one cannot help but 
suspect that the reported antagonism between the East African coast and the 
Baghdad Caliphate during the eighth and ninth centuries, and the repeated 
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East African rebellions against Abbasid suzerainty were in part at least 
expressions of sectarian hostilities inspired, or led, by these Zaidis.”241  
 
It appears that from both local oral traditions and supportive external sources 
that in the first few centuries, Islam was confined to what Hersi calls “the 
coastal Asiatic settlements” and neighbouring Somali groups. According to 
contemporary Chinese reports of that period, 9th century Berbera in what is 
now Somaliland, was either non-Islamic or hardly touched by Islam. However, 
by the 13th century, Islam had become well-entrenched throughout the Somali 
region. Islamisation appears to have occurred fairly rapidly along the coast, 
given its proximity to the Arabian Persian Gulf, but was slow to disseminate in 
the countryside. It took many more centuries of dedicated, and sometimes 
concerted, effort of Arab missionary labour before anything approaching 
universal acceptance of Islam was reflected amongst the nomads of the 
interior. Arab missionary activity, which, at its initial stages concentrated on 
the coast, was, by the 12th century, beginning to move inland and have impact 
in the interior. This momentum was accompanied by a larger body of Arab 
and Persian political, and sometimes, religious, dissidents fleeing the 
persecution of south-west Asian Islamic Caliphates.  
 
The movement of Islam inland was given further impetus by the 14th century 
polarisation between Abyssinian Christendom in what is now Ethiopia and the 
Muslim principalities to its southeast. Contestation between Islam and 
Christianity for dominance in the Horn of Africa dates from the 7th century 
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advent of Islam in North-East Africa. This struggle was accompanied by 
internal ‘jihads’ within Islam as war was waged against semi-nomadic groups 
and remnants of indigenous non-Christian as well as non-Islamic faith 
communities. These struggles were fuelled by the larger struggle against the 
Christian Abyssinian highlands. As this sectarian war unfolded, by the 16th 
century, according to Hersi, Islam had become the “national religion” of 
Somalis. Somalis “bore the brunt of the struggles against Christianity on the 
Horn of Africa, and from that time on became culturally and, especially, 
emotionally tied to the Arab world”.242  
 
The irony of this account by Hersi is that Abyssinian Christendom has been 
depicted by some, such as Said Samatar, as an early refuge for Muslims 
fleeing persecution. In Samatar’s account, “Islam may well have come to the 
Horn of Africa before the new religion flourished in Arabian soil” since some 
years before the Prophet Muhammed’s … flight from Mecca in 622, a party of 
more than seventy Muslim converts fled fearful persecution in Mecca to seek 
refuge in the Christian court of the Abyssinian king in Axum (Axum is today in 
the province of Tigrai in Ethiopia). Astonishingly – and mysteriously – the king 
promptly gave sanctuary to the fleeing Muslims. The pagan chiefs of Mecca 
gave chase and demanded the immediate surrender of the Muslim refugees, 
but the king adamantly refused to hand them over risking “irreparable damage 
to the cordial relations in trade and goodwill between the two Red Sea 
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neighbours.”243 This prompted a later Hadith, a canonical prophetic statement 
that “Abyssinia is a land of justice in which nobody is oppressed” conveying 
the unmistakable point: “no jihad against Abyssinia”.244 In Samatar’s view “the 
Hadithal injunction of no jihad against Abyssinia does more to explain the 
survival of Abyssinian Christianity in the age of Islamic eruption on the global 
scene” of that period.245 Of course, the Christian-Islamic contestation referred 
to by Hersi erupted centuries later, especially during the 16th century after the 
14th century polarisation between the faiths referred to earlier by Hersi and, as 
Samatar describes characterised by “the devastating invasions” carried out by 
Ahmad al-Ghazi in an outbreak of hostilities between Muslims and Ethiopian 
Christians that Samatar attributes to “the threat felt by the Muslims of an 
expansionist, re-energized Christian empire steadily – and inexorably – 
pushing eastwards towards the Muslim lowlands.”246  
 
The above account by Samatar may be instructive in terms of explaining the 
relative inter-faith détente that has existed between Christian and Islamic 
spheres of influence in the Horn of Africa. This tolerance has coincided with 
something of a natural geo-cultural co-existence between the Abyssinian 
Christian highlands of alternating Amhara-Tigrinia dominance and the coastal 
Red Sea Muslim lowlands stretching from Eritrea to the Somali coast. 
Attempts have been made by the Saudi version of Wahhabi Islam to upset 
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this religious ecology.247 Some analysts248 are of the view that Samatar and 
others overlook the simple fact that Somali xenophobia does not extend to 
other fellow Muslims, thus Muslims foreigners (including Arabs, Pakistanis 
and others are welcomed easily into Somali society), which would mean that 
Somalis are open to their influences. The interaction of Sufi Islam with East 
Africa and Iraq, including political Islam’s interaction with Egypt and Sudan, 
Wahhabism and other forms espoused by them is a case in point. Islam is a 
profound cohesive factor in Somali society, more so than in other non-frontier 
Muslim countries, not surrounded by non-Muslims. 
 
This base-line historically-rooted cultural geography may account for the 
relative stability that has existed in the Horn of Africa as far as religious 
rivalries are concerned. With respect to Somali Islam, however, this tolerance 
is reinforced by other attributes which, in Samatar’s view, militates against the 
emergence of a militant political Islam in the region. Apart from the frontier 
quality of the Somali region’s Islamic identity, bringing with it a bellicose 
xenophobia and aversion to external influences,249 the underlying social 
disorganisation endemic to the “segmentary lineage system” of Somali culture 
and what Samatar asserts to be its individualistic self-preservation tendency 
further inhibits sectarian political mass mobilisation and agency. The political 
potential of militant Islamism will be discussed at greater length later in this 
chapter. Suffice it to stress here, however, that Somaliland’s Islamic identity 
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within the broader context of Somali Islam appears to be solidly located within 
a tradition of regional geo-cultural peaceful co-existence between Christianity, 
Islam and indigenous animistic tendencies. This tradition is defined by 
adherence to “the Shafi’i school of Islamic jurisprudence” and what Samatar 
describes as a tenuous affiliation to Sufi brotherhoods.250  
 
Such brotherhoods, or 'religious orders', have played a significant role in 
Somali Islam following Islam’s initial expansion into the region. Furthermore, 
they appear to reinforce a pattern of Islamisation of the Somali coast that 
starts in the north and penetrates into the Ethiopian Ogaden before 
disseminating south. The three Sufi orders in the order of their introduction 
into the region are: the Qadiriyah, the Idrisiyah and the Salihiyah; the 
Qadiriyah being the oldest order in Islam with its introduction into Harar 
(Ethiopia) in the 15th century. Northern Somali sheikhs were the agents of the 
order’s spread amongst Oromos and Somalis in Ethiopia and later into the 
southern Somali interior. The Salihiyah also spread initially in the Ogaden 
region following its emergence out a rupture in the Idrisiyah among the latter’s 
Arab founders. Membership in a brotherhood is theoretically a voluntary 
matter unrelated to kinship though, in reality, “lineages are often affiliated with 
a specific brotherhood and a man usually joins his father’s order”.251 
 
During the military regime of Mohammed Siad Barre, this historically-rooted 
and avowedly Islamic social and cultural infrastructure was largely 
suppressed. An example many human rights activists recall is Siad Barre’s 
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ghastly execution by a firing squad of eleven clerics or Imams who opposed 
the reform of women’s Family Laws on inheritance and branded it un-Islamic. 
This incident and the uproar expressed by the then Syrian ambassador and 
dean of the Arab diplomatic corps, led to his expulsion from Mogadishu.252 
  
As a result, charting the evolution of Somali Islam into the more contemporary 
phase of its expression in the region is difficult. As Roland Marchal points out, 
“there is very little information on modern Islamist groupings during the Siyaad 
Barre regime,” though before the end of the 1980s there seemed to be a 
number of mostly underground formations that began taking shape. Based 
mostly on conjecture, what was to become Somaliland again figures 
importantly in these developments. According to Marchal, a movement called 
‘Waxda’ – and he stresses that this formation was established in August 1969 
in Hargeisa as an “Islamic institution whose teaching referred increasingly to 
Islamists such as Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi, Nadawi and other new Islamist 
thinkers. When the secularist trend became prominent in the regime, they 
went underground and started publishing leaflets against the 'socialist' 
state.”253 By the late 1970s, they had spread south.  
 
After the Barre regime wreaked devastation on Hargeisa and Burco in 1988, 
Waxda resurfaced in Ethiopian refugee camps as a supporter of the SNM.  
A counter-perspective contends that most of the young Waxda adherents 
immigrated to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf and many engaged in further studies 
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in the West. They did not figure at all in the SNM movement.254 Waxda has 
not been revived as an institution, but many of its members remain together 
informally and in trade, NGO work, etc. Existing evidence suggests that the 
Waxda movement has adapted a long-term strategy of developing a Muslim 
society by influencing by example via schools, charitable work, trade, etc, 
much in the same way of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. They have given 
up any radical appearance including the adoption of secular-like clothing such 
as western suits and ties.  
 
Importantly, after Somaliland’s declaration of independence in 1991, Waxda 
“became deeply involved in educational institutions, keeping close links with 
Kuwait”.255 Apart from Waxda, other proto-Islamist groupings in the Somali 
region appeared to have their origins and locus in southern Somalia in and 
around Mogadishu. This pre-September 11, 2001 evolution of Islamist 
precursor groups before and after the demise of the Barre regime sets the 
stage for examining the rise of political Islam in the greater North-East African 
sub-region amid the emergence of Somaliland as an independent, though 
unrecognised state. 
 
4.3 Somaliland and the Rise of Political Islam in North-East Africa 
 
The rise of political Islam in North-East Africa, the Middle East and south-west 
Asia is intimately linked to the legacies of cold war destabilisation resulting 
from proxy wars that raged throughout these regions, fuelled by US-Soviet 
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competitive militarisation. Somalia is an exemplary case in point. Mamdani 
contends, though this view remains contentious, that “under the presidency of 
Ronald Reagan, who was eager to use the Saudis as foils for the Soviet 
Union, Wahhabism was elevated to the status of a liberation theology – one 
that would free the region of communism”.256  
 
Under Siad Barre, ‘scientific socialism’ was imposed as the official ideology 
which, combined with the suppression of clan-based affiliations, was a basis 
for political mobilisation. This fuelled resentment amongst Somalis generally 
as a result of their continued adherence to more relaxed traditional forms of 
“eclectic, Sufi Islam,” according to a recent conference presentation on 
'Strategic Security Challenges: The Special Case of the Horn of Africa', by 
Ruth Iyob and Edmund Keller.257 Similar ‘scientific socialist’ and/or military-
nationalist suppressions of traditional culture and Islamic observance in the 
Muslim world, in Algeria and Afghanistan for example, helped stoke even 
more intense backlashes of resentment.258 These ultimately fuelled Islamist 
political mobilisation in opposition to such regimes. This was especially the 
case in countries like Somalia and Afghanistan that had been closely aligned 
with the Soviet Union; more so in the case of Afghanistan than in the case of 
Somalia. However, the politicisation of Islam in Somalia occurred in a larger 
                                                 
256 Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Whither Political Islam?’, Foreign Affairs, (January/February 2005) 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050101fareviewessay84113b/mahmood-mamdani/whither-
political-islam.html 
257 See also Ruth Iyob and Edmund Keller, ‘US Policy in the Horn of Africa: Grappling with a 
Difficult Legacy’, pp. 101-125 in Dorina A. Bekoe, (ed), East Africa and the Horn: confronting 
challenges to good governance.  Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, (2006). 
258 Matt Bryden, ‘No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam, and Statelessness 
in Somalia’, Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2, (Fall 2003). 
 191
sub-regional North-East African context that saw Sudan emerge as the 
epicentre of Islamic militancy in the run-up to 9/11.       
 
Iyob and Keller make reference to the coup d’état in the Sudan that occurred 
in 1989, leading to the establishment of a theocratic Islamist state. In their 
view, this was “a culmination of the long struggle of Islamists against local 
communists and liberal capitalists” while “indicating the opening of a new 
chapter of open animosity against the West in general and the United States 
in particular”.259 
 
Meanwhile, the unravelling of the Barre regime in Somalia and escalating 
warfare in the north generated an exodus of Somalis to the Middle East and to 
Italy and throughout the world. Thus, the rise of political Islam in the Middle 
East and North-East Africa coincided and interacted with a repression and 
conflict-generated social upheaval throughout the Somali coast.260 This 
resulted in the growth of a globalised Somali diaspora community with 
increasing exposure to the outside world and the creation of expanded links 
between Somalis in the homeland and the rest of the world.261 This process 
reflected a growing integration of all Somalis into the escalating process of 
globalisation through remittances of foreign currency referred to in Chapter 
Three along with Somalis’ adaptation of modern communications 
technologies, receptivity to new ideologies and concepts of political 
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alignment.262 In fact, “the large-scale migration of Somali workers to the 
Middle East and elsewhere from the 1970s until the early 1980s led to the 
growth of a remittance economy (much like that of the Sudan during the same 
period) and the emergence of a diasporic community with political clout as 
has already been demonstrated in Somaliland’s politics".263  
 
One of the socio-ideological spin-offs of this diaspora phenomenon among 
Somali migrants in the Middle East were conversions to Saudi-based 
Wahhabism.264 According to Iyob and Keller, this resulted in clashes with the 
Somali region’s indigenous brotherhoods. The interesting twist here is that in 
the north-west region that has emerged as Somaliland, the comparative 
stabilising influence of the Qadariyyah is a positive development. “The north, 
historically linked to the Wahabbists because of the preponderance of 
adherents of the Salihiyya … proved more amenable to the gradual 
Islamization of its society” compared to southern Somalia. There, southerners, 
according to Iyob and Keller, tended to view the revival of Islam as part of a 
“faith-centered conflict” in a continuing proliferation of fragmenting internal 
differences among Somalis.265  
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This serious tension between the Wahhabi inclined Salihiyya order (Arabic: 
tariqah) and the Qadariyyah tariqah, emerged in 1909 when Sayyid 
Muhammad ‘Abd Allah Hasan and his followers killed the Qadariyyah Sufi 
leader Shaykh Uways bin Muhammad and his followers.266 Sayyid 
Muhammad was head of the Salihiyya order and was influenced by the most 
conservative reformist voices in the Arabian peninsula, including the 
teachings of Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d.1787). Much has been written 
on Sayyid Muhammad’s credentials as a nationalist leader267 who opposed 
British colonialism, but little has been written on the Somali Shaykhs and 
‘ulama who opposed the Sayyid’s austere interpretation of Islam.268 As the 
case of Shaykh Uways demonstrates, many opposed the pro-Wahhabi 
approach of Sayyid Muhammad’s teachings.269 
 
Clearly, the Qadariyyah tariqah of Uways as a pan-Muslim order far 
outstripped Sayyid Muhammad’s Salihiyya order in membership and territorial 
scope. Under the Qadariyyah banner, the tariqah spread throughout southern 
and central Somalia and along the East coast of Africa, as far south as 
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Mozambique. Of particular note, Qadariyyah leaders permitted the practice of 
xeer, Somali customary law in local communities as long it did not violate the 
sprit of Islam too seriously. On the regional front the Qadariyyah tariqah 
developed active links in regional town such as Harar in Ethiopia and Jigjiga. 
The Qadariyyah were popularised in the Horn of Africa by many Shaykhs 
notably by Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahman bin Ahmed al-Zayla’i (c.1820-1880), who 
hailed from the Somaliland northern coastal town of Zayla’. Shaykh Zayla’i is 
credited with the foundation of a new sub-order of the Qadariyyah known as 
Zayl’iyya.270 
 
A closer examination of Qadariyyah sources not only reveals the existence of 
early Somaliland ulama who were vehemently opposed to the spread of pro-
Wahhabi ideology but shows that they were also in touch with the intellectual 
currents of the wider Muslim world. Qadariyyah sources introduced their 
followers to the writings of the classic Sufi scholars such Ibn Al’Arabi and Sahl 
Tustari. Shaykh Uways' poetry was a strong medium of literacy and in one of 
his noted poems he defamed the followers of Sayyid Muhammad referring to 
them as: 
“They make a clamour, a wailing and groaning 
“And howling like mournful dogs”271 
(lahum zajij wa ineenun wa janeenun wa fahihun kal kilab al-nahiya) 
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Often, in popular trading circles in the 1950s and early 1960s, Somaliland 
traders who had been to Saudi Arabia referred to all poorly trained religious 
teachers as “Wahhabis who did not know much about Islam”.272 
 
This regional difference between north and south is additionally ironic in as 
much as the progressive collapse of the state in southern Somalia would 
come to be viewed as a facilitative breeding ground for the very Wahabbist-
aligned Islamist terrorism that was reasonably absent in an increasingly stable 
and autonomous north-west with closer historical ties to Saudi Arabia. This is 
suggestive of differing social impacts linked to comparably different political 
outcomes between north and south; the fact that this distinctly Islamist revival 
associated with new Somali converts to Wahhabism carried with it a growth in 
Islamic charities established by adherents of the local brotherhoods that, 
according to Iyob and Keller “loosened the hold of state institutions on both 
urban and rural communities” throughout the Somali region.273 Though Iyob 
and Keller do not carry their analysis into how the migratory-rooted influence 
of Wahhabism impacted on the state’s hold on Somali society into the growth 
of regional autonomies in Puntland and Somaliland, what is suggestive from 
their account is a situation whereby a comparatively less urbanised and 
centralised north was better able to cope with these new influences which, in 
the southern context, only reinforced the south’s centrifugal tendencies toward 
state collapse amidst the privatising balkanisation of southern Somali’s 
warlord political economy in the post-Barre period.  
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What emerges then, with the rise of political Islam in North-East Africa in 
terms of the Somali region are differential impacts of external forces – in this 
case, Wahhabism – on the north and south as these influences interacted 
with local brotherhoods (or tariqas) which, in turn, were interlinked with clans. 
In the north-west that became Somaliland, the centrifugal tendencies of such 
developments did not materialise and/or were contained. In the south, things 
were different. As Iyob and Keller describe:  
 
In an environment where the boundaries of the Somali body politic had been 
shattered by violence, chaos, famine, and the ineffective yet disturbing 
presence of foreign troops, Somalis divided along clan lines, ideologies, and 
religious tariqas throughout the 1990s. They were plunged into a Hobbesian 
world, where communities were turned against each other in the pursuit of 
power, resources, and legitimacy. Submerged historical conflicts, which had 
been subordinated to the larger goals of Pan-Somalism and nationalism, re-
emerged with the collapse of state institutions and superpower patronage … 
The north-south divide – between the former British Somaliland and Italian 
Somalia – exploded into full force, bringing with it the religious-cum-clan 
cleavages that had characterised the two regions’ relationship in the colonial 
and postcolonial period.274 
 
Esa believes the above conclusion is not entirely correct. The North-South 
cleavages were already in place from the very beginning of the Union. It did 
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not re-emerge. It only found expression in the collapse of the state. Islamic 
sectarianism did not figure in this and had no influence at all. 275 
 
In Iyob and Keller’s view UN-sponsored and US-led humanitarian intervention 
in 1992 accelerated what they depict as the “globalization” of Somali political 
and ethno-regional conflicts of which Somaliland is seen as an outcome.276 
This evolution of the interaction between religion and politics in a 
disintegrating Somali environment coincided with the evolution of political 
Islam in the crucible of anti-Soviet conflict in south-west Asia centring on 
Afghanistan. This cold war struggle facilitated a convergence between the US 
and Pakistan under the Islamist-oriented military regime of Zia-ul-Haq and 
Saudi Arabia in nurturing the jihadist tendencies within political Islam that 
would blossom into the insurgent force currently challenging the status-quo 
throughout the Arab/Muslim world and international stability generally.277  
 
In terms of setting the stage for a more religiously-charged political 
environment in the North-Eastern Horn of Africa, the jihadist momentum 
emanating from the anti-Soviet victory in Afghanistan was further fuelled by 
the growing US military presence in the Persian Gulf following the first US-led 
war against Iraq in 1990. This brought about a shift in focus from a jihadist 
challenge to the eventually defeated Soviet occupation in Afghanistan to a 
new focus on challenging the growing US strategic presence in the Persian 
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Gulf and the Middle East generally, interacting with mounting frustrations over 
US-backed Israeli occupation of the Palestinian West bank and Gaza.  
 
East Africa emerged as the initial battleground in the rise of the anti-US 
jihadist challenge with the 1996 US embassy bombings that occurred in 
Kenya and Tanzania, followed by retaliatory US bombing raids in the Sudan 
and in Afghanistan. This explosion of anti-US jihadist attacks helped 
contribute to a growing militarisation of North-East Africa in the encirclement 
of Islamist Sudan by Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda in an anti-Khartoum 
coalition bolstered by US military aid. At the same time, the Islamist bombings 
in Kenya and Tanzania that ushered in the international awareness of al-
Qaeda, placed the spotlight on greater east Africa and the Horn as an 
emerging base of operations for jihadists; a development seen as facilitated 
by the destablising influence of state collapse in Somalia.278 According to 
some observers the rise of political Islam in North-East Africa appears part of 
a growing sectarian trend that includes Ethiopia as well.  
 
In an assessment last year of the state of federalism in Ethiopia, a report by 
Tom Patz in Federations referred to the growing sectarian dimension to ethnic 
clashes in Ethiopia associated with a lack of clear border demarcations 
between the country’s provinces: “In sharp contrast to the past, conflicts 
based on religion are rising. Aggressive campaigns by Protestants and 
Wahhabis – a fundamentalist Muslim group – have led to violent clashes.”279 
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D.C., (15-16 November 2005).  
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This observation sets the stage for one of Ethiopia’s major terrorist-related 
preoccupations emerging from Somalia’s state collapse; the emergence of the 
Somali Islamist insurgent group, Al-Itihaad al Islaami (hereafter Al-Ittihaad). In 
1992, according to Marchal, Al-Ittihaad emerged as the most visible of several 
Somali Islamist movements located in and around Mogadishu (the others 
being Ahlus Sunna wa Jama’a as a loose gathering of prominent Islamic 
traditionalists in the south; Ansar-e Sunna, a Wahhabist organisation; and Al-
Majma al-Islami which tried to play the role of a Supreme Islamic Council in 
the wake of the collapse of the Siad Barre regime). 
 
Al-Ittihaad was the only Somali Islamist grouping that became armed and, 
according to Marchal, “established organisational rules to differentiate 
between sympathisers and full members and thereby exercise effective 
organisational discipline, including keeping the confidentiality of its internal 
discussions.” Marchal continues: 
 
Its strategy of taking power by violence was one major point of difference with 
the others. There is also another striking difference: it was recruiting urban 
and semi-educated youth while other armed groups were giving priority to 
nomads. To a large extent it is the only group that set up a national or at least 
regional strategy and tried to organise its activities all over Somalia and in the 
Ethiopian Ogaden. Since very little is known on its internal coordination and 
membership, it is difficult to describe the conditions in which it developed. 
What is sure is that it obtained support and training from Sudan and invited 
‘Afghans’ to help establish training centres for its new members. Since some 
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of its cadres were senior officers from the former national army, it had 
informants in all factions and was seen by them in a very ambivalent way. At 
certain times, it was instrumental in challenging a contested leader or 
weakening his political discourse but, despite all its connections, Al-Ittihaad 
was never accepted among the factions because this would have allowed it to 
monopolise the Islamic reference.280 
 
In summarising the Islamist identity of Al-Ittihaad and other such groups, 
Marchal saw difficulty in establishing their ideological profile; Al-Ittihaad had 
never spelled out an international terrorist agenda, except for expressing 
solidarity with other radical Islamist groupings. Its involvement in Ethiopia was 
linked to a twenty-year history in which many Ogaden Somalis found refuge in 
Somalia and later played a role in connecting Somali armed factions with 
Ethiopian ethnic insurgent nationalist movements such as OLF and ONLF. 
The Ethiopian government’s vested interest in portraying Al-Ittihaad as a 
terrorist-driven movement inhibited an independent assessment of its 
influence and alleged threat level within Ethiopia.281 Otherwise, according to 
Marchal, it is debatable to closely associate Al-Ittihaad with al-Qaeda.282 
 
 In as much as Al-Ittihaad and similarly inclined groups appeared to all have 
the same Islamic reference points, there has been no clear-cut doctrinal or 
ideological boundaries between them and their sympathisers, many of whom, 
have shifted from one group to another. This seemed to be attributed to the 
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fact that religious education was not impressive in Somalia for lay people as 
compared to the Sudan. Otherwise, Al-Ittihaad and an Islamist NGO called al-
Islaah further distinguished themselves by establishing social welfare support 
infrastructures that helped fill gaps left by the collapse of government. This 
included the managing of orphanages, schools and health centres manned by 
recruited staff who had no future in the context of a civil war and state-
collapse environment. In terms of security, the instability of Mogadishu 
encouraged Al-Ittihaad as early as 1991 to redeploy its militias elsewhere in 
the southern Somalia and even more northerly in Puntland’s Boosaaso 
community. This latter proximity is what has presented the potential of Al-
Ittihaad as a destabilising security threat to Somaliland. The idea of the 
redeployments from Mogadishu was to establish coastal strongholds that 
would allow the movement to take over the ports and get resources from them 
to underwrite other activities, at first “military reinforcement and then other 
socially-oriented projects including control of mosques, schools and the 
like”.283 
 
The emergence of Al-Ittihaad and other Islamist formations in the Somali 
region during the 1990s coincided with the early stages of the Somaliland 
national experiment in the north-west. The emergence of these groups 
reflected what has been described as an ‘Islamist revival’ in Somaliland.284 
During the first decade of Somaliland independence when the new republic, 
isolated by non-recognition from the rest of the world, was struggling internally 
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to establish itself as a credible state alongside the neighbouring regional 
autonomy experiment in Puntland, the existence of an Islamist threat to 
Somaliland’s integrity does not seem to have emerged as a major factor. In 
any case, the region’s historic geo-cultural affinity with the Arabian Persian 
Gulf and its conservative Islamic influences may have obscured the impact 
that such tendencies could have on its local politics relative to a more 
urbanised south dominated by Mogadishu where the polarisation between 
modernity and tradition within the Somali national project appeared more 
pronounced. After all, as indicated earlier by John Drysdale’s observations (op 
cit), there was more aversion to tradition in the south than in the north-west 
where the brand of post-colonial Somali nationalism embodied in the SNM 
made allowance for an accommodation between tradition and modernity that 
would, no doubt, have reinforced the conservatism of Somaliland’s Islamic 
identity as an integral part of the society’s new republican identity vis-à-vis the 
rest of the Somali region. A case in point is the Islamic creedal formula in 
Arabic that appears on the new Somaliland national flag (La ilaha illa Allah 
Muhammad Rasool lul-Allah).  
 
The Islamic groups in Somaliland often have tried to influence state building 
and reconstruction. Compromises were made. Often their efforts were curbed 
and kept in check. The late President Egal was wary of the Islamic movement 
and did not allow any intrusions from Islamic leaders. During the 2001 
constitutional referendum, when a religious elder denounced the referendum 
as non-Islamic, Egal went on to Radio Hargeisa to publicly taunt him to a 
debate on that subject. Later, when the Wahhabist inclined self-proclaimed 
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Authority for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (al-Hay’ah bil amri 
bil mahruf wan nahyi an al-mukar) tried to influence legislation in Parliament, 
Egal put their chief in prison for almost a full month.285 
 
But then, throughout this period, the politicisation of Islam within a broader 
geo-political context had yet to become the phenomenon that it was to 
become later in the 90s beginning with the al-Qaeda US embassy bombings 
in Kenya and Tanzania and reaching its international flash point in the jihadist 
suicide attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001. 
The September 11, 2001 attacks transformed the global environment as well 
as the regional security context in the Afrabian Red Sea and Persian Gulf 
regions embracing North-East Africa and the Middle East.286 
 
The close association that began to be made between state failure and 
collapse as a breeding ground and safe-haven for terrorism placed the 
turbulent politics of successive state rebuilding initiatives in the Somali coast 
in a new light. Within this context, Somali brands of militant Islamism and their 
international links in the Arab/Islamic world began to take on more of a sense 
of urgency which, in turn, has over time heightened the political and security 
risk factors impinging on Somaliland’s lone governing experiment as well. For 
as the geo-political stakes surrounding the reconstitution of a Somali 
government have escalated in terms of the Arab stake running up against the 
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security interests of Ethiopia, the political role of Islam within this mix has 
come to take on a greater importance and, in the process, has emerged as a 
factor in Somaliland’s survival prospects. 
 
Thus, it becomes necessary to take a closer look at the nature of the 
international and regional dynamics at play surrounding the rise of political 
Islam in North-East Africa in the new post-9/11 environment as it affects 
Somaliland. This new environment has come to be billed as one characterised 
by what, in the West is considered the ‘war on terror’ being led by the United 
States but which may reflect something much more profound in terms of how 
this preoccupation with ‘terrorism’ relates to the international upheaval 
unfolding within the Muslim world which, necessarily, engulfs the Somali coast 
as well, including Somaliland. 
  
4.4 The Geo-Politics of the War on Terror and the Global Islamic Civil 
War 
 
This thesis holds that the so-called ‘war on terror’ as it affects the Somali 
coast in general and Somaliland in particular relates to a more seminal conflict 
within the Islamic branch of the Abrahamic inter-faith complex (which also 
includes Judaism and Christianity, hence belying notions of a civilisational 
clash between Islam and the West); what in effect involves the emergence of 
a ‘global Islamic civil war’ in which the West emerges as a convenient and 
unwittingly willing accomplice through its predictably militarist responses to 
jihadist provocations which may not be aimed at the West as their main target, 
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as much as at mobilising support throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds for a 
thorough-going internal transformation within the Ummah.  
 
While this concept has emerged as only a tentative interpretation of 
contemporary ‘call and response’ in the dynamics of conflict between 
Western, primarily Anglo-American-led militarist interventions in the Muslim 
world and that world’s jihadist vanguard, it requires substantial fleshing out in 
the light of the actual conflicted internal dynamics unfolding within Islam. 
Somaliland and the Somali coast generally are caught up in the eye of the 
storm of this conflict. The Somali coast provides this strategy a proving 
ground and an opportunity that is not yet available to them in the Middle 
Eastern incumbent regimes. 
 
One commentator, Francis Kornegay, in analysing the post-9/11 backdrop to 
the ongoing war in Iraq and efforts by the US to extricate itself from this 
conflict, contended that “what the Bush administration and allies have not 
grasped is that they transformed Iraq into a major theatre in an essentially 
global Islamic civil war, one featuring a transnational guerrilla ‘terror war’ 
against the US, though America, arguably, is not the main target”.287 
Kornegay continues: 
 
September 11 has been misdiagnosed as an attack against America as a 
beacon of freedom and prosperity. More probably it was a means of baiting 
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the world’s lone superpower into assuming the kind of militarist patsy role it is 
currently performing; of unwittingly helping the jihadist coalition associated 
with al-Qaeda in mobilising a world revolution within Muslim lands against 
incumbent regimes and elites. In the process, it aims to decouple these 
regions from western-led globalisation while realigning them into a neo-
traditionalist Islamist version of world federalism through a network of local 
and regional caliphates. This revolution would target moderate Islamic 
democratic alternatives to jihadism such as pro-western, secular Turkey as 
well as more authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia. It has the potential 
to fracture into a many-sided intra-Islamic upheaval among different Sunni 
and Shi’ite tendencies interacting with an array of ethnic, tribal, class, inter-
generational and regional rivalries throughout the Muslim world …288 
 
The political geography of this conflict tracks the militarisation of the entire 
‘Afrabian’ expanse with the US-supported activities and/or basing presences 
and operations from the north-west African trans-Sahara to Djibouti which has 
served as a major backstop to US military activities in the Persian Gulf and 
south-west Asia. The Djiboutian Horn of Africa US military presence, in turn, 
extends across the Indian Ocean into America’s Asia-Pacific theatre of 
operations supporting the Philippines in its counter-insurgency against Islamic 
guerrillas and terrorists.289 It is, therefore, against this backdrop of the US-led 
‘war on terror’ centred in its occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, that this 
broad upheaval within the Muslim world interacts locally with the geopolitics of 
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political Islam in North-East Africa; North-East Africa having been very much 
caught up in this ‘war on terror’-cum-Islamic civil war as witnessed in the 
alignments of both Ethiopia and Eritrea on the side of the US and Israel in 
waging the anti-terrorist war against jihadism in North-East Africa even as 
they confront one another in their stalemated border war. 
 
The apparatus of jihadism’s geo-political dissemination into the Horn of Africa, 
as elsewhere in the Muslim world, took shape during the anti-Soviet 
collaboration principally between Pakistan and the US under the ‘Reagan 
Doctrine’ of supporting anti-communist ‘Vietnams’ in the Third World regional 
conflicts in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In Afghanistan, this was in support 
of Islamic fundamentalist mujahideen; a project that also involved the 
emergence of a strategic Sunni Pakistan-Saudi Arabia funding and 
recruitment nexus with Islamabad’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and 
Riyadh’s Islamic charities-education infrastructure at the coalface. This 
collaboration became instrumental in disseminating what has come to be 
widely identified as the most intolerant strands of Wahhabist ideology 
throughout the Muslim world. In a review by Max Rodenbeck of The 
Economist, of a new book entitled No god but God: The War Within Islam, by 
Reza Aslan, the author argues that what Kornegay terms a global civil war 
within Islam “is nothing less than a struggle over who will ultimately define the 
sweeping ‘Islamic Reformation’ that he believes is already well under way 
across much of the Muslim world.”290 In support of an Islamic global civil war 
thesis, Rodenbeck goes on to report that in Aslan’s view, “The West … is 
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‘merely a bystander – an unwary yet complicit casualty of a rivalry that is 
raging in Islam over who will write the next chapter in its story’.”291 Hence, the 
strategic importance of the Islamabad-Riyadh axis in nurturing the world that 
produced Osama bin Laden, with the covert connivance and funding of the 
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), combined with the anti-Soviet alchemy 
of such intellectual gurus as Zbigniew Brzezinski, which was hell-bent on 
defeating the Soviets and, beyond that, balkanising the Russian successor 
federation.292 
 
Post-9/11, the umbrella of global jihad associated with bin Laden and al-
Qaeda was identified to be the so-called International Islamic Front (IIF), 
operating through such fund-raising entities as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), 
which is linked to several madrassas in Pakistan. The extent of the reach of 
this network into Africa (as well as Asia) was described almost two years ago 
in an Asia Times Online article by B. Raman:293 
 
A report carried by the News, the largest circulated English daily of Pakistan, 
on September 23, said that 147 foreign students were studying in the 
madrassa Jamia Abu Bakar of Karachi and that they have come from 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Uganda, Djibouti, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, the 
Philippines, Maldives, Australia, Ghana, Somalia, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Kenya, Senegal and Afghanistan (italics added).  
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This birds’ eye view provides a context for honing in on the functioning of the 
Islamic charities-education connection in Somaliland. However, before 
focusing on this institutional ensemble, it is important to further recapitulate 
the geo-political environment impinging on the Somali region, within the 
context of this global Islamic civil war. To some degree, it could be argued 
that the climate generated by this internal upheaval to Islam, provided a 
convenient tool for maintaining a destablised region by external powers, 
principally Egypt and Saudi Arabia, allegedly under the guise of the Arab 
world desiring a regime of Arab/Islamic unity along the Somali coast as a 
countervailing force for containing Ethiopia. To be sure, none of the 
governments in this region have an interest in stoking a jihadist momentum, 
which could conceivably mutate into a threat to these very governments. But 
geo-political pragmatism might also dictate (or could have dictated in the past) 
the encouragement of such extremist tendencies as a means of disrupting the 
consolidation of any political experiments, which counter their geo-political 
and geo-cultural interests, and containment of Ethiopia. In short, this could 
discourage developments that might strengthen Ethiopia’s regional position.  
 
This is where the threat of an insurgent movement like Al-Ittihaad becomes 
relevant to Somaliland’s stability, though this movement was dismantled 
during the mid-1990s.294 Such concerns would also extend to jihadist 
infiltrators who might, as a result of statelessness in the south, extend 
regional terror networks into Somaliland and threaten the foreign expatriate 
presence that has come to make that country its base of operations. 
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Heightened concern about Somaliland’s vulnerability in this regard was 
generated by the murder of two British nationals outside Hargeisa on 21 
October 2003. The deaths of Richard and Enid Eyeington followed closely on 
the heels of the killing of an Italian nurse, Annalena Tonelli, at a hospital in 
Boroma. Then, in April 2004, a German GTZ vehicle was attacked on the road 
between Hargeisa and Berbera, killing a Kenyan woman and injuring a 
German project manager. Noteworthy about these murders and attacks, at 
the time, was that these developments coincided with the perceived interest of 
Somaliland’s detractors in its destabilisation, which would put it on par with 
Somalia in the south and deflect from its eventual – though elusive – 
recognition prospects.  
 
Somaliland’s former Foreign Minister, Edna Adan Ismail, claimed that the 
murders were carried out by al-Qaeda-linked terrorists.295 This possibility 
appeared to foreshadow the unbalancing of North-East Africa’s finely tuned 
co-existence between Islam, Christianity and indigenous faiths throughout a 
region characterised by stable religious pluralism. More specifically, if the 
murders were harbinger to more sinister trends, Somaliland’s pastoral-Sufi296  
Telephonic religious, cultural and social ecology could be placed under threat 
amid the expanding influence of extremist Saudi Wahhabism. In the wake of 
9/11, the Saudis had come under increasing pressure from Washington to 
rein in their tendency toward exporting Wahhabist extremism. The prospect 
was that, under the circumstances of war and occupation in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, along with the growing US military presence in Central Asia, plus 
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anti-terrorist pressures in this region from Russia and China, Saudi 
Wahhabism could be shifting its export focus to the Horn of Africa. 
 
According to Somalilander Bashir Goth, at the time the British murders 
occurred, “anyone who followed recent press reports from Somaliland would 
have read that a group of Saudi-oriented clerics calling themselves 'the 
Authority for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice' (Hay’at al- amri 
bil mahruf wa al-nahyi an al-munkar), an offshoot of its Saudi counterpart, has 
been demanding the enforcement of draconian rules on what Somalilanders 
wear, say and do in their private lives, compared with the historically relaxed 
harmony between Islam and Somali culture”.297 Goth’s observation and the al-
Qaeda claim made by former Foreign Minister Edna Ismail signalled, at the 
time, the possibility that a growing al-Qaeda presence might reflect a growing 
Wahhabist influence. Such a trend would converge with the interests of those 
regional actors in frustrating the Somaliland experiment. These possibilities 
were seen as ample indication of the need for an escalated and intensified 
peace diplomacy in the region to defuse conflicts in the Sudan, and tensions 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as reinforce the stabilisation of the 
Somali coast.  
 
Particularly unsettling, were the results of an investigation into the 2003-2004 
killings, indicating the establishment of a Somaliland jihadi network, which 
was linked to jihadist influences in Mogadishu. One suspect suggested the 
existence of a highly organised network headed by a self-styled Jihadist from 
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Mogadishu, who had earlier been linked to Al-Ittihaad. These links also 
reportedly included contacts to al-Qaeda. At least two of the Somaliland 
assassins connected to these crimes had trained in al-Qaeda’s Afghan 
camps. According to the International Crisis Group’s research, while al-Qaeda 
never adopted the Somali region as a major base area, it has apparently 
maintained a “close association” with the region since the early 1990s. 
“Somalia’s lack of a functioning central government, unpatrolled borders, and 
unregulated arms markets make it a useful platform for actions aimed at 
foreign interests elsewhere in the region.”298  
 
The International Crisis Group, however, also points out that the fortunes of 
Somali militants and/or those with jihadist tendencies, had been in decline, 
though the 2003-04 incidents are indicative of the extent to which such 
influences could penetrate into Somaliland. In fact, Al-Ittihaad or not, the ICG 
report contends that al-Qaeda’s cell is still considered a regional security 
threat.299 More recently, the arrival of a new Somali settlement in Kenya, 
ushering forth the formation of the TFG, appeared to re-energise Somali 
jihadists, who were quick to denounce the settlement and any external 
peacekeeping intervention to help re-establish the TFG as a new government 
in Mogadishu. The ICG references the pronouncements of prominent Somali 
jihadist Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, who denounced the proposed 
deployment of an AU peacekeeping force, especially the prospect of such a 
force containing Ethiopian contingents.300  
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Even without Ethiopian forces in such a deployment, the very prospect of 
external intervention – even an African peacekeeping force under AU 
auspices – generated warnings and forebodings that popular opposition to 
such a development would, in effect, galvanise southern Somalia into a 
transition from stateless warlordism to an incipient theocracy. Many feared 
that popular resistance would propel Islamists into leadership roles with 
intervention tilting the balance toward the jihadists, as opposed to more 
moderate Islamists. To head off such a development, the US came out 
against such a deployment with the EU, IGAD’s Partners Forum and the 
UNSC, following suit. 
 
Fear of sparking a 'jihadist movement' effectively retarded peacekeeping 
progress, accompanied by an expeditious transfer of the TFG from Kenya to 
Somali soil. This and more general threats of endemic violence and instability 
generated further complications, surrounding whether or not the UN should 
exempt prospective AU peacekeeping forces from a 1992 arms embargo on 
Somalia, in order for such a force to bring weapons into the country as a 
means of reinforcing its ability to protect the TFG’s transitional institutions. 
Apart from the fact that the embargo has reportedly “had no practical effect – 
with the exception of barring the deployment of the AU-backed peacekeeping 
mission that would initially draw troops from Uganda and Sudan,” this issue 
and the matter of external intervention and where the TFG should be located, 
have split the new transitional regime down the middle, threatening to result in 
yet another failed Somali peace process.301  
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It is not clear, however, how the disintegration of the TFG, amid the 
contradictions inherent in the transition process, interacting with the threat of a 
militantly Islamist upsurgence in the south, will resonate within Somaliland 
itself. Based on past developments becoming seeminlgy militant, if not jihadist 
in Mogadishu, infiltration into Somaliland from the south, which is a 
particularly dangerous prospect, may in turn create a situation in which the 
TFG fails to fill the governing vacuum. This vacuum would then be filled by a 
more avowedly Islamist presence; a presence that could, in Taliban fashion, 
bring order out of the chaos of warlord statelessness while assuming the 
mantle of uniting all of the Somali coast, possibly even rekindling the 
irredentist dynamic of the old, under the motivation of an expansionist Islamist 
militancy.  
 
Such a scenario could conceivably rebound to Somaliland’s benefit politically 
in terms of its quest for recognition being forthcoming, to strengthen it as a 
bulwark against a militantly Islamist southern Somalia which, in turn, would 
represent a clear and present danger to the more moderately Islamist order in 
Somaliland. Alternatively, the historic cultural roots of co-existence between 
Islam and the clan system in Somaliland could well serve as something of an 
indigenous inoculation of Somaliland society from a militant political Islam. 
Somaliland, given its history of closer geo-cultural proximity to the 
Arab/Islamic Middle East, represents a comparatively ‘soft’ Islamism 
underpinning an increasingly secularised polity. Secularisation of the social 
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order in Somaliland appears to organically emerge from what Marleen 
Renders identifies as the co-existence of Islam and the indigenous clan 
system in the north-western Somali region, emanating from the very 
beginning of Islam’s introduction into the region.302 According to some 
sources, “during the very first century of the Islamic calendar, Islam 
immediately blended with the emerging Somali clan system” in the north-west 
coastal region of what is now Somaliland.303 The emergence of the clan 
system in the Somali north-west is believed, according to Renders, to have 
occurred with “the advent of Islam to the Somali lands: thus, Somali clans 
take pride in never having known ‘paganism’ ”.304 This organic integration 
between religion, society and polity in Somaliland forms the context within 
which to look more closely at the Islamic-based system of charity and 
education. 
 
As is the case with the more militant Islamist tendencies within and external to 
Somali society, Somaliland’s Islamic – as opposed to Islamist, in the sense of 
an avowedly political Islam, whether militant or moderate – social order 
embraces the same network of charitable and educational institutions and 
services as is characteristic in differing variations throughout the Muslim 
world. Given the importance of education as a vehicle for Islamist 
dissemination, a discussion of educational institutional arrangements in 
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Somaliland may be instructive in assessing the country’s susceptibility to a 
more general Islamist ascendancy. 
 
4.5 Somaliland’s Islamic Culture of Education: The Influence of 
Arab/Islamic Charities  
 
From an historical perspective, the organisation of education, according to 
Renders,305 was a prerogative that Somaliland’s ‘religious men’ were said to 
guard jealously during Britain’s ‘indirect rule’ colonial administration between 
1890 and 1960 in north-west Somalia. Quite a few British officers were 
chased away or stoned when trying to set up schools in Somaliland. This 
seems to have constituted mainly an expression of local cultural nationalist 
resistance to colonialism rather than an overtly political challenge. Renders 
contends that the Qadiriyah leaders seemed “politically quietist”.306 Within 
their indirect rule accommodation with the British, the brotherhood’s leaders 
would have presumably had no need to challenge British authority in as much 
as this authority refrained from intervening in the social and cultural affairs of 
Somaliland society. The prime Qadiriyah concern was the introduction of 
Christianity into Somaliland. Once this was ironed out, it was the Qadriyah 
leaders who welcomed the establishment of schools, especially into the Sahil 
area of Sheikh.307 In fact, according to Renders, the Qadiriyah leaders 
cultivated excellent relations with some among the colonial regime.308 
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Fast forward to the contemporary period of north-west Somalia’s ‘second 
coming’ as Somaliland, where education, along with other social services 
such as health, are enshrined in the constitution. The problem, however, is 
that the state has had little in the way of resources to oversee the provision of 
education. “… there is hardly any money to keep existing schools more or 
less running, let alone to prop up the quality of teaching or to extend the state 
school network.”309 This is where Islamic charities enter the picture, in what 
amounts to something akin to an Islamic version of the ‘public-private 
partnership’. A substantial part of the private initiative in the education, health 
and welfare sectors is deployed by Islamic charity initiatives. These are 
usually funded by zakaat, the religious tax on income. Renders explains:  
 
The concept of zakaat is profoundly connected with the idea of social jjustice 
in Islamist ideology: an Islamic welfare system driven by zakaat would 
guarantee the collective welfare of the Ummah through social and distributive 
justice…The alms tax is collected and re-distributed by private actors, to such 
an extent that it is of course difficult to trace origins as well as destination. 
Moreover, money moves freely and unregistered in Somaliland and Somalia: 
there is no official banking system, though this may be changing or about to 
change in Somaliland.310 
 
A portion of the zakaat which funds Islamic charities in Somaliland is likely to 
come from the Persian Gulf, although, according to Renders, “this is 
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vehemently denied by people concerned with these charities.”311 One study 
devoted to Arab funding of education in Somaliland, which may shed more 
light on this sensitive issue, is one carried out by Oxfam Netherlands and the 
World Association of Muslim Youth, supported by the EC Somalia Operations. 
In a report issued in September 2004 titled 'Arab Donor Policies and Practices 
on Education in Somalia/land',312 Arab assistance to Somalia and Somaliland 
was said to take several forms: 
 
• Official government donors; 
• International NGOs (or Islamic charities) registered in one of the 
member states of the Arab League; 
• Arab-based multilateral institutions; and 
• Local Somali NGOs that receive support from organisations based in 
Arab countries. 
 
Among the Arab donors in the education sector are some “governments that 
maintain consular presence in Somalia/land. These include Egypt, Libya and, 
on a temporary basis, Sudan”.313 Although this report tends to refer to 
“Somalia/land”, much of the Arab funding sources concentrate on Somalia 
rather than on Somaliland, in keeping with the political bias that Arab 
governments and most non-governmental entities have against Somaliland 
and for Somalia. As such, the study’s conflation of Somalia and Somaliland in 
one terminology is somewhat less than edifying in terms of pinpointing Arab 
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donor involvement and educational links with Somaliland. Nevertheless, Arab 
countries in Somalia/land are enumerated as: 
 
• Africa Muslims Agency (AMA), Kuwait; 
• African Relief Committee (ARC), Kuwait; 
• World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), Saudi Arabia; 
• International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO), Saudi Arabia; 
• Red Crescent Society, United Arab Emirates (UAE); and 
• Munazzama al-Dawa, Sudan. 
 
According to the study, there is no uniform policy for funding projects in 
Somalia/land among Arab/Islamic donor organisations. Among the 
organisations interviewed for the study, older organisations and international 
organisations tend to understand the policies of their donors more than 
younger or local organisations. Some donors provided a list of criteria for 
funding, and policies varied according to the kind of funding; conditions for 
dispersal of zakaat funds were different to those provided for programme 
support. The predominant reasons for funding projects in Somalia/land given 
by Arab donors (both individuals and organisations) were humanitarian and 
socio-cultural. An important source of funds for charities, which has been 
omitted in many studies, but included therein, was the voluntary out-of-pocket 
collections at mosques and other religious locations.314 
 
                                                 
314 A consistent feature noted during the field visits to Somaliland. 
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In an attempt to gauge the anti-Western potential of Arab-linked organisations 
in the Somali region, the research findings indicated that “it was apparent that 
there is a huge interest on the part of Somali-based Islamic and Arab charities 
to co-operate with Western donors. Citing the observations of a recent article 
at the time of the study, it was noted that “[c]ontrary to what one would expect 
of organisations rumoured to be preaching against the West, Somalia’s 
Islamic charities are generally open to relations with Western governments, 
non-governmental organisations and international institutions such as the 
United Nations and the European Union”.315 In another study by Andre Le 
Sage and Ken Menkhaus, it was observed that “probably the most important 
distinction of Islamic charities is the widespread public perception in the West 
that their activities are inherently political”,316 when, according to an ICG 
study, the majority of Islamic social welfare organisations around the world 
are politically unaffiliated. Nonetheless, the studies cited thus far do not shed 
much light on the Islamic charities funding situation inside Somaliland with 
regard to the education and other social sectors. 
 
The picture that emerges is not one that would suggest considerable Islamic 
donor funding flowing into Somaliland’s social sectors. Thus, in a study of 'Old 
institutions, new opportunities: the emerging nature of Koranic schools in 
Somaliland in the 1990s', Erasmus U. Morah found that Somaliland’s 15% 
enrolment in upper primary school (grades 5-8) was almost double that of 
‘Greater Somalia.’ This was seen as “all the more impressive in view of the 
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fact that no primary schools in Somaliland were operated by international 
NGOs, compared to Greater Somalia where 23% of the schools were 
managed and financed by NGOs and aid agencies”.317 Instead, “more schools 
are managed and supported by local authorities (48%) and parents (27%) in 
Somaliland compared to 39% and 22 % Somalia-wide”.318 Perhaps this is why 
there was vehement denial of Gulf donor support for zakaat. Nevertheless, 
Renders refers to Islamic charities as a major source of educational funding in 
filling the gap that the government cannot address,319 while key individuals 
also help fund schools in Somaliland.320 
 
In a summary of Renders and Morah, the provision of education in Somaliland 
can be pieced together as a pragmatic combination of religious and secular 
education relying on heavy doses of self-help initiative combined with private 
funding. What follows is a condensation of Renders and Morah’s accounts. 
Education in Somaliland has, for centuries, been primarily Koranic, wherein 
religious education is traditionally viewed as a moral and religious obligation. 
This was the only kind of education available until 1945 and such education 
continues to play a major role today. This, in combination with the fall of the 
military regime, the collapse of all state institutions in the whole of Somalia 
and the incapacity of the Somaliland successor government in the north-west 
to kick-start a new state-sponsored education system, provided Islamic 
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charities with the opportunity to fill the gap.321 Through a combination of self-
help and support from international aid agencies, the Somaliland Ministry of 
Education, Youth and Sports (MEOYS) had 159 primary schools in operation 
by 1995-96 with 27,178 pupils (25.3% girls). Some public funding was 
provided, though in 2000 this was reportedly equivalent to only 3% of 
recurring costs.322 
 
Teachers are paid US$8 per month, with parents paying an equal amount in 
monthly fees. The total of US$16 covers 10-20% of the living costs of 
teachers, who are forced to double-up by taking on other jobs and/or 
entrepreneurial activities to survive. Renders contends that education in 
Somaliland receives very little donor funding (about 10% or US$11 million per 
year for the whole of Somalia/land).323 This, according to the UNDP, sharply 
contrasts with what it calls ‘non-traditional’ donors, such as Islamic charities, 
for whom long-term educational investment is a priority. Given the cultural 
importance of religious education in Somaliland, such funding dovetails 
conveniently with the need to fill the educational funding vacuum. Such 
charities are said to have established educational institutions similar to the 
écoles franco-arabes in the West African Sahelian region. These institutions 
offer a broad curriculum but with what Renders calls a “sometimes strong 
religious orientation”. They teach Arabic and Islamic sciences, as well as 
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courses in Maths, English and geography.324 There are estimated to be some 
65 such schools in Hargeisa.  
 
The Somaliland government does not aim to curtail these private initiatives, 
nor do such initiatives seek a high profile or confrontations with the 
Somaliland authorities. Moreover, this type of Islamic education is seen as 
commendable in the eyes of Somalilanders. The schools appear of better 
quality than state schools and sometimes belong to a formalised and 
internationally recognised system, which gives direct access to further 
education at Arab or Islamic universities worldwide.325 Perhaps because of 
the importance of such ‘non-traditional’ donor support, the Somaliland 
MEOYS, as a means of compensating for the limited opportunities of 
acquiring formal education, established its own department of Non-Formal 
Education. As a result of both pressure and support from aid agencies and 
women’s groups, it has managed to open 12 family life centres for women 
since 1995, with more than 1,300 students, many of them women. 
Furthermore, new types of business schools have emerged in major urban 
areas providing training in management, computers and secretarial skills. But 
beyond such initiatives, the Department of Non-Formal Education and the 
handful of non-formal education programmes in Somaliland are seen as weak 
and lacking in effective co-ordination. 
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According to Morah, the non-formal Koranic school education in Somaliland 
has not been properly studied since 1988.326 A UN survey in 1996 showed 
only 17% of Somaliland children were enrolled in primary schools, of which 
60% were enrolled in the Koranic schools. Koranic schools are not closely 
linked to mosques or places of worship, as stated by Morah. They are 
administered by single private teachers who set up Koranic schools in each 
neighbourhood. In Somaliland, Koranic schools are pre-schools, not part of 
the governmental or private post-kindergarten school system. 
 
 As a result of the affordable tuition of Koranic schools, which is carefully 
keyed to the means of the population, and simplicity of learning materials, no 
interested parent is ever turned away because of costs. This practice, apart 
from the current concern about intolerant, pro-jihadist content, is sustained by 
the fact that Koranic recitation is universally considered a responsibility of 
every good Muslim.  
 
In a survey of 58 Koranic schools conducted by Morah, it was found that they 
were 100% financed by parents. This financial support, contrary to old beliefs, 
took the form of cash payments made directly to the teacher by the parents. 
Some 32% of teachers state that they received less than US$40 per month in 
fees whereas 60% reported receiving between US$40 and $80 per month.327 
Contrary to popular belief among Somalilanders and foreigners alike, there 
was hardly any evidence of community involvement in the management of the 
Koranic schools beyond the payment of fees by parents. What pupils learn 
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and how they progress is entirely the prerogative of the teacher and possibly 
the student. Morah concluded his study with some of the following 
observations:328 
 
• Many of the Koranic schools in the survey have begun transforming 
themselves by acquiring some of the characteristics of formal schools, 
such as permanent physical structures and the introduction of 
components of basic education; 
• Virtually all the Koranic schools surveyed offered more than the 
memorisation of the Koran: 87% taught at least two subjects in addition 
to the Koran; 43% offered up to three courses, namely Arabic, 
arithmetic and the Somali language; 
• The Koranic schools are undergoing transformations completely on 
their own, using self-help and ad hoc methods with no coordination 
with formal guidance; a process that might be bridged via the 
department of Non-Formal Education as the interface between such 
schools and the formal system; 
• These new, mutated forms of Koranic schools seem to have gained 
substantial maturity and popularity since the early 1990s, as the state-
sponsored public schools reeled and tried to recover from years of 
wartime devastation and pre-war neglect; 
• Koranic schools have certain advantages such as their high coverage, 
low cost and willingness of parents to pay but unless an effective 
bridge can be built to link formally Koranic schools and primary 
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schools, Somaliland may never be able to achieve the global objective 
of education for all; 
• Somaliland will also not meaningfully aspire to any future 
developmental objectives that are based on a large educated labour 
force; 
• On the other hand, the introduction of basic education in Koranic 
schools will contribute both immensely and instantly to the goal of 
education for all, by targeting the large number of in-Koranic-school but 
out-of-primary school children; 
• The Koranic system learned its first major lesson from the public 
schools by introducing co-education; 
• In the 1990s, the Koranic schools learned their second major lesson by 
beginning to integrate elements of basic education on its own with the 
added emphasis that this trend and consequent transformation 
deserves to be encouraged deliberately and without delay – something 
that would seem to imply a more proactive role for the MEOYS 
department of Non-Formal Education; 
• Koranic education has remained remarkably strong since its 
introduction in Somaliland about 700 years ago, demonstrating 
continuing longevity and resilience, however, parents were found to be 
agreeable to the systematic introduction of formal basic education in 
Koranic schools, provided that cultural/religious sensitivities are 
respected and there is no interference with the existing provision of 
Islamic education; 
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• The challenge of upgrading the intellectual knowledge base and class-
teaching skills of the Koranic teachers will prove the biggest threat to 
success. With training and learning materials costs borne by the 
government and donors, the teachers should not have a problem 
charging parents a marginal cost for the basic education component, 
thereby facilitating basic education-Koranic schooling integration. 
 
From a political and security perspective, the Koranic school system in 
Somaliland has warranted attention because of the growing international 
awareness of the role the Islamic charities-education nexus has played in 
disseminating militant brands of political Islam, jihadist tendencies in 
particular.329 The apparent lack of control that government exerts over this 
sector, amid some of the violence that occurred during 2003-04, has 
suggested that the Koranic school system linked to Islamic charities, might 
pose a threat of destabilisation. 
 
 Such anxiety has been heightened by the fact that Somaliland remains 
dependent on the Koranic school system as a means of ensuring that 
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education is accessible to Somalilanders, in spite of government’s lack of 
capacity and resources. However, the decline of overt Islamist movements, 
such as Al-Ittihaad, the dismantling of their militia capacity and the adoption 
by its members of non-violent modes of proselytising along with the more 
recent turn-around of Somaliland’s relations with its neighbours, principally 
Djibouti, may combine to defuse these concerns about Islamic charities and 
religious education in Somaliland. The TFG settlement in the south has 
contributed to this less threatening environment, irrespective of the stability of 
that settlement. 
 
The fact that there has been an unfolding trend toward integrating Koranic 
schooling with formal basic education, within the context of an already 
entrenched Islamic social order, may also bode well for the role of religious 
education as a factor for stability, rather than destabilisation in Somaliland. 
This may hold for other aspects of interaction between religion and society 
and polity within Somaliland. Here, the role of Sharia, within the context of 
Somaliland’s legal system, may reinforce this profile of what could be termed 
a modernising co-existence and pragmatic accommodation between Islam 
and more secular tendencies in the social order.   
   
Although Somaliland has a conventional court system in place, officially 
Sharia law is recognised as having precedence in Somaliland society. In 
Renders’ account, “in principle, this is a situation that seems to be endorsed 
by the large majority of the country’s population.”330 This is said to especially 
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be the case since the Islamic revival challenged Somaliland policy-makers 
after its inception as a state independent from the rest of the Somali coast. In 
fact, this sentiment seemed to coincide with a similar Islamic revival in the 
south which, for a while, saw the flourishing of Islamic courts. Sharia, 
however, is not codified law and it is not the only law that applies. As indicated 
in the first chapter, John Drysdale enumerated the existence of three 
concurrent legal systems: English language secular law, Islamic law in Arabic, 
which would refer to Sharia, and Somali traditional law.331 
 
Apart from the Sharia, Somaliland relies on a codex of laws dating from 
various periods in the society’s history. In criminal cases, according to 
Renders, Somaliland uses the Somali Penal Code of 1962,332 together with 
the Sharia. Customary law is supposed to be the lowest in this eclectic 
hierarchy, after Sharia and positive law. However, Renders reports that the 
reality on the ground proves to be different in as much as many of the 
country’s judges are barely trained in either Sharia or positive law. The judges 
who do have legal training did so under the military regime of Siad Barre. This 
has heavily influenced the post-war rule of law in Somaliland, as the system 
obtained under Barre is that with which they are most familiar. Thus, the 
unified civil code and procedure enacted in the mid-1970s is used rather than 
the pre-1969 law.  
 
Courts, police and legal professionals in Somaliland, all tend to use positive 
law. The reason given is that, in this way, the penal system and the law 
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enforcement system are complementary and adapted to one another. 
Furthermore, as a practical consideration according to Renders, legal 
professionals are “profoundly unfamiliar” with the interpretation and 
application of Sharia law.333 Thus, Sharia is actually hardly used in legal 
proceedings at all. On the other hand, positive law, while applied in some 
instances, often gives way to judges applying or taking into account 
customary law. And here, there is the view that customary law “effectively 
undermines the application of other legal codes”.334 Whether in fact this is the 
case, Drysdale’s account of the Xeer system, as cited earlier, stresses the 
exclusive role that Somaliland’s clan elders played in the application of 
customary law under the British colonial administrative system, which 
deferred to indirect rule.335  
 
Given the central role played by these elders in the political development of 
the Somaliland Republic, this would seem to guarantee a central role for 
customary law, hence the strategic role played by Somali culture and tradition 
in mediating religion and modernity. Within this context, Somaliland society 
has evolved its own approach to navigating the application and interaction of 
the different codes. This is illustrated by an example that Renders provides on 
how ‘the law’ applies to criminals. A Commander of the Custodian Corps in 
Burco explained as follows: 
 
… the police catches him and puts him in prison after which he is tried before 
a district or regional court. Meanwhile his relatives negotiate with the victim’s 
                                                 
333 Renders, (2005), p. 16. 
334 Ibid. 
335 Drysdale, (2004). 
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relatives about a settlement. If they agree, the case is solved. When a 
settlement is reached, the sentence is reduced, but police will hold him in 
prison for some more time to have him re-educated in Islamic faith. When he 
comes after some time, he will be a changed virtous man.336 
 
Such is the pragmatism in the action of drawing upon an eclectic mix of 
religion, tradition and modernity in adapting Somaliland’s Islamic 
conservatism to current-day realities. The episode cited by Renders illustrates 
how something of a division of labour has been arrived at, that, in effect, is 
mediated by tradition. Renders concludes by referring back to how Somali 
Islamists, at their inception in the context of secular military rule under Barre, 
wanted to establish an Islamic public order in the course of establishing an 
Islamic state based on the Sharia. The fact that, as she points out, their top-
down strategies of attempting to forcibly impose Islamist rule were compelled 
to give way to a grassroots approach, attests to the apparent power and 
resilience of the Somali traditional sphere presided over by clan leaders. As 
Renders makes clear, “Islamist personnel turned to the traditional roles of 
‘religious men’ (wadaads) in the traditional Somali clan-system.”337 What she 
describes, in effect, amounts to a defusing process of assimilation and co-
optation of the Islamist challenge into the already existing Somaliland 
traditionalist-Islamic public order. An Islamic order did not have to be 
established – it already existed, albeit on Somali terms.  
 
                                                 
336 Renders, (2005), p. 16. 
337 Ibid., p. 17. 
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Thus, while at the same time challenging traditional Sufi beliefs as well as 
religious and societal practices, the Islamists took on “very similar socio-
political roles. Like the wadaads, they engaged themselves in peace-making 
and social service provision, caring for the sick, handicapped and orphaned, 
providing religious (added with marketable) knowledge, mediating in conflicts 
and clan fights. They are part and parcel of their own clans … but have a 
horizontal solidarity with ‘religious men’ in other clans because of their 
common role.”338 This absorptive capacity of Somaliland’s culture to adapt 
Islam to Somaliland’s traditions again reflects on the niche role played by 
Sharia. As Renders observes:  
 
Shari’a is an important notion in the political context of Somaliland. People 
insist that it be used. Yet, the importance of Shari’a does not lay in its official 
status as source of all laws and all legal dealings in Somaliland, but in its role 
as a part of customary law as interpreted and administered by clan elders and 
‘religious people’ of various denominations. The application of codified law 
based on the Shari’a is an ideal which is duly professed by politicians, 
sheikhs and the population, but it is not applied in reality. Because of the lack 
of a strong central government authority that is able to enforce the law, this is 
not likely to change any time soon. The various actors: government, judges, 
citizens and ‘new’ as well as ‘old’ wadaads know this and act accordingly, 
dealing pragmatically with any given situation that arises”. 339.340341 
 
                                                 
338 Ibid. 
339 Ibid., p.18, italics added. 
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This, in Renders’ view, interacts with a security situation associated with the 
lack of strong enough government institutions, not in the least the judiciary 
branch, to preclude any initiative to give priority to any other law than 
customary law, hence, the ascendancy, indeed hegemony, of the traditional 
customary sphere over the religious realm of Islam in dictating the terms of 
Somaliland’s social order. The conclusion that Renders arrives at is worth 
exploring at some length as it may well provide the clue to Somaliland’s 
stability over the long term and capacity to cope with the destabilising 
pressures that could emanate from yet another conflicted attempt to 
reconstitute the Somali state in Mogadishu.  
 
Renders concludes: 
 
One could contend that the Islamists who wanted to introduce the Shari’a and 
the Islamic state, have now in fact become ‘new’ wadaads in a clan-based 
polity. The Islamists now seem (like the Sufi brotherhoods) to be perceived as 
just a particular doctrinal affiliation a wadaad could have. As ‘new’ wadaads, 
they keep the community together, morally upright and cared for. This does 
not mean that these religious actors are a-political. They are political actors 
as individuals and as a collective: religious affiliations can just as well as clan 
affiliations be used in the power game … What does seem new, however, is 
perhaps the economic status of the new wadaads. The old wadaads were (in 
theory at least) to an important extent economically dependent on their 
clansmen…The ‘new’ wadaads, showing outright contempt for this practice, 
emphasise their ability to make their own money by doing business. They do 
not want to be dependent on their clansmen. The question whether and how 
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their presumed economic independence makes for enhanced political 
independence in a polity which is to an important extent still determined by 
clan-driven politics is a matter for further research.342  
 
4.6 Religion and Stability: the Somaliland Prognosis 
 
What projections can be made about the implications of post-9/11 Islamism 
for Somaliland’s stability during the current period of upheaval within the 
Muslim world?  
 
Renders’ account of the pragmatic interplay between tradition, Islam and 
modernity in Somaliland amplifies Drysdale’s343 observations about the 
stabilising influence that nationalism’s accommodation of traditional culture 
has had, in comparison to the lack of equivalent accommodation in the south. 
The allowing of ‘Xeer Soomaali’ to exert an apparently culturally stabilising 
influence on Somaliland’s politics and observance of the role of religion in 
society may, based on what Renders’ has drawn from the country’s heterodox 
legal order, proved decisive for Somaliland. Jama Gabush argues that “if the 
democratisation process is to be accelerated, the careful integration of 
Islamization and democratization is indispensable in Somaliland politics”.344 
 
                                                 
342 Ibid. 
343 Drysdale, (2004). 
344 Jama Gabush, ‘Islamisation and Democratisation of Somaliland Politics’, in Richard Ford, 
Hussein M. Adam and Edna Adan Ismail, (eds.) War Destroys, Peace Nurtures: Somali 
Reconciliation and Development, Somali Studies International Association, Lawrenceville, NJ: 
The Red Sea Press, (2004). 
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The Somaliland system of clan elders has served as something of a mediating 
force in managing pragmatic interaction between custom and tradition, Islam 
and the secular realm of modern nationalism. During an age of upheaval 
within the Muslim world, where political Islam has emerged to challenge the 
Islamic authenticity of incumbent regimes and social orders, Somaliland may 
be unique as an organically Islamic society; one in which the intimate interplay 
between the clan-state, as it transitions into a modern polity, Islam may be 
pre-empting and/or containing Islamism’s impact in Somaliland. 
 
The organic relationship between Somali culture and tradition on the one 
hand and Islam on the other appears to guarantee a stabilising role for 
religion in the society as a whole and, by extension, in the fledgling political 
system. Because of this integration, Somaliland society appears to have an 
inherent resiliency that allows it to absorb and co-opt change in meeting the 
challenge of political Islam. The taming of the Islamism of the ‘new’ wadaads 
would appear to be a fitting case in point alongside the manner in which the 
‘public-private partnership’ between Somaliland’s resource and capacity-
starved public education system, and the Koranic schools, have allowed the 
two spheres of education to find one another in pragmatic compromises. In 
fact, these two instances of system resiliency and adaptability may be 
instructive in terms of the potential for Somaliland to withstand the challenges 
of the global Islamic civil war. 
 
The ideological apparatus of a nexus between charities and education has 
been political Islam’s means of proselytising jihadist sentiments. In 
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Somaliland, however, on the basis of Renders’ account, the ‘new’ wadaads 
took on the same mediating and peace-building role in the interest of 
promoting social and political stability at a grassroots level as had the ‘old’ 
wadaads.345 This culture of mediating tensions and contradictions in 
Somaliland society is what has stood the republic in good stead in overcoming 
its challenges. The erstwhile Islamists, in effect, appear to have been co-
opted by the system at the very time when an Islamic revival was underway.  
 
The authenticity of Somaliland’s brand of Somalised Islam is reflected in its 
popular support among all sectors of society. The Koranic schools apparently 
enjoy popular support and society as a whole feels committed to paying 
tribute to Sharia as the system of law at the apex of Somaliland’s legal 
system, even as customary law prevails, again with the underpinning of an 
apparent social and cultural consensus that this is how the system must be 
made to work. To reiterate Drysdale’s earlier observation about the decisive 
role of tradition in this pragmatic mix: “… However ancient traditional law may 
be, Somalis are comfortable with its judgement to this day, whether disputes 
coming before the elders are peacemaking in character, or the result of 
injuries sustained in a road accident, or compensation for injuries inflicted on 
a person’s pride or wellbeing”.346  
 
 Somaliland custom, therefore, represents an ‘indigenous knowledge 
system’347 that mediates the sacred and secular realms in the country’s 
                                                 
345 Renders, (2005), p. 18. 
346 Drysdale, (2004). 
347See ‘Indigenous Knowledge System Project’, 
http://www.tsa.ac.za/corp/bureaus/idset/iks.htm and Unesco ‘Local and Indigenous 
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Islamic public order. But is such a religio-social compact sustainable over the 
medium to long term? This is where Renders’ intriguing speculation on where 
the ‘new’ wadaads may be heading is worth exploring. 
 
Renders closes her analysis by observing that the new wadaads show 
outright contempt for the older practice of wadaads accepting a dependency 
on their clansmen; the newer generation that has emerged from the Islamic 
revival is emphasising a desire and an ability to make its own money by 
pursuing business initiatives.348 These are wadaads with an entrepreneurial 
spirit.  They are not concerned with acquiring gifts and services or in any other 
way relying on the clan system. Could this indicate the potential for the new 
wadaad generation to mutate into a ‘new class’ among Somaliland’s religious 
elite? 
 
 To reiterate the question posed by Renders: “… whether and how their 
presumed economic independence makes for enhanced political 
independence in a polity which is to an important extent still determined by 
clan-driven politics is a matter for further research”.349 Could this mean a 
rupture in the clan system in the making? Or, further still, a rupture in the 
centuries-old compact between Islam and the clan system, to the extent that 
                                                                                                                                            
Knowledge System (LINKS)’, which “promotes local knowledge, values and world views as 
tools to shape and achieve poverty eradication and environmental sustainability. It builds 
dialogue amongst traditional knowledge holders, natural and social scientists, resource 
managers and decision-makers to enhance biodiversity conservation and secure an active 
and equitable role for local communities in resource governance. It enhances the vitality of 
indigenous knowledge as a dynamic and vibrant resource within rural and indigenous 
communities by strengthening its continuing transmission from generation to generation.” 
http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-
URLID=4943&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html 
348 Renders, (2005), p. 18. 
349 Ibid. 
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the new wadaads remain the repository of Somaliland’s spiritual guidance 
while, at the same time, seeking to make themselves economically 
independent from the clan system. Of course, such a socio-economic 
transformation in religious leadership, which is linked to the clan system, 
would not be unfolding in isolation from a wider environment of upheaval in 
the Muslim world and the Somali region. 
 
It seems reasonable that Somaliland society, as currently constituted, is 
capable of containing challenges of Islamist infiltration.350 A new group of the 
traditional Somali Sufi orders have recently been emboldened to revive the 
Sufi Mawlid ceremonies in Borama, while very recently Sh. Cabdirasaaq 
Yuusuf Aadan, Head of the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaaca of Southern Somalia, 
has lectured in Borama and Hargeisa, where he preached to people to return 
to their traditional Somali Sufi Islam and condemned Wahhabism publicly.351 
 
After all, it would appear that Somaliland has already weathered the Islamist 
upsurge in as much as the organisational cohort of movements like Al-Ittihaad 
have come and gone without traumatising Somaliland society. But, as the 
entrepreneurial new wadaads may indicate, what would have seemed as 
likely insurgent challenges to Somaliland’s fledgling political order, may not be 
                                                 
350 Ibid., Somalia’s Islamists. The question of the missionary organisation Jama’at Al-Tabligh 
in Somaliland is briefly explored, notably the case of a former Tabligh school student in 
Mogadishu who was arrested in September 2005 in Hargeisa after a gun battle with 
Somaliland security forces.  
351 ‘Aragti- Culamaa'u Raxmaantii Reer Awdal oo hoggaankii diinta ka la soo noqotay culimo 
shaydaanti’, Awdal News (25 April 2005). 
http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=5280 
Hashim Goth, ‘Dhakhaatiirtii Indhaha ee Kikuyo oo Boorama yimid iyo warar kale’, Awdal 
News (24 January 2006) http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=6815  
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where the challenges lie. Rather, it may be the emergence of a new echelon 
of social power that becomes a ‘class for itself’, expressing a commitment to 
Islam that converges with what could be a similar mutation taking place to the 
south. This scenario could reflect a trend where warlordism in the south is 
eventually overtaken by the already perceived threat of an extremist political 
Islam filling a new vacuum – or a continuing vacuum – that fails to be filled by 
the TFG.  
 
Meanwhile, a second generation of Islamism resurfaces from the ascendancy 
of a new class of politically conscious and entrepreneurially aggressive 
wadaads in Somaliland, who would compete for political leadership within the 
country’s democratic system. Whether or not this new challenge will reflect a 
moderate Islamism or something more militant, in line with what some fear 
could be looming behind a failed TFG, is unclear. Should such an eventuality 
emerge, this could be accompanied by a destabilisation of the traditionally 
integrated Islamic-clan partnership, which seems predicated on an 
interdependency of which the new wadaads, according to Renders, are 
contemptuous.352 For, as this new wadaad class becomes more economically 
independent and less interdependently interlinked with their clansmen, this 
would seem sure to cause a rupture in the social system, which would 
become beset by increasing social/class conflict between an ‘old guard’ with a 
vested interest in such interdependence which, after all, is centuries old, and 
those who want to break free from this system. 
 
                                                 
352 Renders, (2005), p. 18. 
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Alternatively, Somaliland may very well weather this new speculative 
challenge as well and deal with nascent Islamic organisations.353 This could 
lead to yet another configuration of the Somali coast, should the TFG fail to 
gain traction in the south. In other words, this could lead to an increasingly 
stable Somaliland, reflecting the resilience of its Islamic-clan system 
compact354 uneasily co-existing within the same region with an increasingly 
Islamist southern Somalia, either reflecting the clear ascendancy of militant 
political Islam in the south or some combination of partnership, collaboration 
or co-existence between militant Islamism and faction warlord rule. This would 
undoubtedly heighten the dilemmas of recognition in an era of upheaval in the 
Muslim world, amid the ‘war on terror.’   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
353 ΪϧϼϴϟΎϣϮλ ϲϓ ΔϓήτΘϤϟا مΎμΘϋϻا ΔϤψϨϤϟ عήϓ دϮΟو Ϧϋ ϒθϜΗ ϒΗΎϬϟا 
Al-Haatif al-Arabi (5 January 2006) http://students.washington.edu/jamali/hatarab206b 
354 Abdurahman M Abdullahi, ‘Recovering Somali State: The Islamic Factor’, paper presented 
at the 9th Somali Studies International Association Conference, Aalborg University, Denmark 
(3-5 September 2004). Abdillahi refers to the Somaliland Borama conference being 
successful on the bases of the credibility and legitimacy of traditional clan elders. 
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Women Celebrating Somaliland’s Declaration of 
Independence, 18 May 1991 
 
 
 
Source: Hamish Wilson, Panos Pictures,  
http://www.panos.co.uk 
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Chapter 5: Recognition   
Recognising the Unrecognised  
 
 
 
Nin aanad saacad ku baran, sanad kuma baratid 
 
The man whom you failed to know within an hour, you will not know within a year 
(Somali proverb) 
 
5.1 Recognising the Unrecognised 
 
The Somaliland international relations and politics of reconciliation, 
reconstruction and religion dovetail into what has become the ultimate 
‘bottom-line’ in the quadrilateral framework nexus of this thesis: the 
achievement of international diplomatic recognition – or, at the very least, 
some workable contingent status that will facilitate the normalisation of 
Somaliland’s international relations, where the “absence of recognition of 
Somaliland’s status is hindering our economic development”.355  
 
This, in turn, would facilitate the country’s ongoing post-conflict reconstruction 
and recovery.356 Hargeisa’s uphill quest for recognition amid the continuing 
unsettled collapsed political environment in the southern Somali non-state, 
                                                 
355 Letter from Somaliland President Dahir Rayale Kahin to Nigerian President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, Chairperson of the African Union, (13 December 2005).  
356 See the African Union’s ‘Draft Policy Framework for Post-conflict Reconstruction and 
Development (PCRD)’, Addis Ababa 
http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Conferences/Past/2006/February/PSC/Framework_PCRD.
pdf 
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has worked as an incentive for Somaliland’s leaders to demonstrate effective 
governance.357 Effective governance in Somaliland translates into ongoing 
consolidated politics of reconciliation and reconstruction, while keeping the 
extremist politics of Islamism – as opposed to the religion of Islam itself – at 
bay in the process of nation-building.  
 
The advancement of reconciliation into the construction of workable 
institutions of governance and sustained reconstruction (however imperfect 
this process may appear to some critics of Somaliland’s internal politics) has 
steadily sharpened the contradictions of how the rest of Africa and the 
international community should relate to the Somali coast in light of the 
struggling efforts to reconstitute Somalia as a ‘federal republic’ in Mogadishu. 
Given the fourteen unsuccessful attempts to re-establish Somalia as the 
status quo in the Somali coast and in the five ‘transitional governments’, and 
Somaliland’s steady progression toward credible statehood, a stalemate has 
ensued.358 This stand-off confronts Africa and the world with difficult questions 
on how to proceed toward an acceptable de jure framework for interacting 
with Hargeisa as well as Mogadishu. If Somaliland’s quest for recognition is 
an uphill struggle (as surely it is), given the AU members’ reluctance to set a 
precedent which departs from the old OAU strictures on perceived secession 
and ‘territorial integrity’, Somalia's internationally-backed efforts to reconstitute 
itself as a functioning state have proven to be equally uphill to the point of 
                                                 
357 "Somaliland has proved its commitment to democratic governance, avoided conflict with all 
of its neighbors, and generally maintained peace and security.” See David H. Shinn, ‘Somalia: 
U.S. Government Policy and Challenges’, hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs 
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, (11July 2006), p. 6. 
358 Richard Cornwell, ‘Somalia: Fourteenth time lucky?’, Institute for Security Studies, 
Occasional Paper 87, (April 2004). Ken Menkhaus, ‘Somalia in 2005: No Exit’, Les Annales 
d’Ethiopie, (2005).  
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exhausting international patience with conferring automatic international 
recognition on Mogadishu. 
Most “… external actors with interest in Somalia [and Somaliland] have 
proven unable to adapt to the rise of the [Islamic] Courts and the collapse of 
the T.F.G. with coherent strategies, and have remained at least one step 
behind events on the ground”.359 In addition, external actors have to come to 
terms with the reality, which Professor Ali Mazrui describes as: 
 
In the post-colonial history of the Muslim world the two worst cases of such 
spousal abuse concerned the marriage between former British and former 
Italian Somaliland, and the marriage between the old East Pakistan (of 
Bengalis) and the old West Pakistan (partly led by Urdu speakers).360 
 
5.2 Somaliland Quo Vadis I: Overcoming Africa’s Post-colonial Self-
Determination Conundrum 
 
The OAU’s tendency, partially inherited by some member states of the African 
Union (AU), toward non-recognition of entities viewed as break-away 
secessionist fragments of recognised established states, has established a 
track record regarding conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa that has to be 
considered discouraging for resolving the Somaliland-Somalia recognition 
conundrum. To be sure, as Africa (under the AU) becomes increasingly 
                                                 
359 Michael A. Weinstein, 'Somalia Enters a Revolutionary Situation', Power and Interest 
News Report (18 July 2006). 
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=527&language_id=1 
360 Ali A. Mazrui, ‘Cultural Continuities and Constitutional Innovation: Plenary Address to an 
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committed to sub-regional consolidation and regional integration, the 
conferring of diplomatic recognition on new states emerging from established 
ones is a hard sell. This is something that Somaliland’s leaders early began 
showing signs of factoring into their diplomatic calculus as they sought to 
advance Somaliland’s case for recognition.  
 
 The AU’s continental integrationist agenda, after all, places all outstanding 
self-determination questions in a new light. That said, the track record the AU 
inherits from the OAU in dealing credibly and effectively with such issues is a 
dismal one. This is especially so in the Horn of Africa, in light of the unique 
nature of its self-determination/ ‘national questions’.361 In summary, these 
include: the forcible Ethiopian annexation of Eritrea which clearly enjoys a 
distinctive history vis-à-vis the rest of Ethiopia, irrespective of whether this 
justifies its status as a state independent from Ethiopia; Arabicised northern 
Sudan’s relentless campaigns to forcibly incorporate the non-Arabicised 
Christian-animist south under a racist cultural imperium, now compounded by 
Khartoum’s attempts to militarily centralise power over all other regions in the 
country, even as it has reached an interim accommodation with the south; and 
the question of Somali irredentism emanating from the colonial fragmentation 
of Somali-speaking communities throughout North-East Africa and the Red 
Sea coast. This challenge merges with the ethno-regional/religious pluralism 
of the Ethiopian state which, in turn, revisits tensions between Ethiopia and 
                                                 
361 Nene Mburu, Bandits on the border: the last frontier in the search for Somali unity, 
Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press (2005). See Chapter 4 on Self-determination: The Somali 
Question and Chapter 7, Somalia's Unsustainable Irredentism. Ian S. Spears, ‘Reflections on 
Somaliland and Africa's Territorial Order’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 30, No. 
95, (March 2003), pp. 89–98. Ian S. Spears, ‘Debating Secession and the Recognition of New 
States in Africa’, African Security Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2004). 
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Eritrea, the latter forming an integral geo-cultural component of the Tigreyan 
Axumite-Abyssinian highlands which is fundamental to Ethiopia’s historical 
identity.  
 
The dynamic tensions surrounding Ethiopia’s cultural unity and pluralism as 
the sub-region’s land-locked ‘empire state’ form part of the Horn of Africa’s 
exceptionalism on questions of self-determination, which the OAU never had 
the will to confront. This was the predictable result of Emperor Haile 
Selassie’s successful bid in making Addis Ababa the effective diplomatic 
continental ‘capital’ of Africa. Somaliland forms part of this historical baggage. 
This includes the contested status of Ethiopia’s Somali-speaking Ogaden 
region, to which Somaliland is regionally contiguous, though Hargeisa has 
renounced the ‘Greater Somalia’ irredentist agenda.362 The resolution of these 
issues, including the status of Somaliland within the context of relations 
between Ethiopia and the Somali coast, contains broader regional security 
significance regarding the importance that Egypt attaches to its access to Nile 
Basin waters, for the survival of its economy.363 “Egypt has a long historical 
interest in Somalia and has in the past used Somalia as a pawn to distract 
Ethiopia. Egypt, for example, supported Somalia during its war against 
                                                 
362 Letter from Somaliland President Dahir Rayale Kahin to Nigerian President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, Chairperson of the African Union, (13 December 2005); Hassan Essa Jama, ‘SNM 
Executive Committee Memorandum, Somaliland: On The Restoration of Its Sovereignty and 
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Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, ‘Statement by Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, President of Somaliland’, 
Somalia News Update, Vol. 3, No. 14, ( 3 May 1994). 
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363 Alex de Waal, ‘Prospects for peace, security and human rights in Africa's Horn’ in Gunnar 
M Sorbo and Siegfried Pausewang (eds.), Prospects for peace, security and human rights in 
Africa's Horn, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget (2004), p. 14. 
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Ethiopia in 1977.”364 It's also known that Egypt supported Somalia against 
Ethiopia in the1964 war when Egyptian President Nasser sent rifles to the 
Somali army with the Arabic inscription "Mautul Habash, Wa Hayat al-Somal" 
(Death to Ethiopia and Long Live Somalia). Significantly, Egypt was active in 
Somali politics during the colonial era. It administered a Somali language 
radio programme directed at the Somali-speaking people of the Horn to 
counter British, Italian and French policies.  
 
Egypt’s concerns, in turn, expand into a wider Arab League interest in the 
political outcome of the reconfiguration of the Somali region in 
contradistinction to the security interests of Ethiopia. These geo-political 
questions surrounding the status of the Somali coast underlie the tug-of-war 
between rival conceptions of ‘unitary state’ centralism versus federal and 
confederal options which, heretofore, Africa as a whole has been unwilling to 
entertain. The African unity consensus has been characterised by an 
assumption of territorial integrity based on ‘unitary states’ wherein federalism 
and/or confederations were discredited as way-stations toward secessionist 
independence.  
 
This unitary state-centralist bias is shared by Egypt and other Arab state 
actors. This is further reinforced by the overlapping African Union and Arab 
League memberships. Hence the tendency toward federal arrangements, 
such as once obtained between Ethiopia and Eritrea, being overridden under 
                                                 
364 David H. Shinn, ‘Somalia: U.S. Government Policy and Challenges’, hearing before the 
Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate, (11July 2006), p. 4. 
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the guise of building strong centralised states, irrespective of the regionally-
based cultural pluralism of such states and the authoritarian implications that 
such annulments carried for effective governance.  
 
Federalism thus discredited, the OAU could never openly admit to the 
tensions and conflicts that clearly begged creative flexibility in the exercising 
of political imagination in bringing North-East Africa’s interminable conflicts to 
closure. The Ethiopia-Eritrean conflict thus ultimately had to be settled 
militarily, in favour of the latter’s independence.365 This carried with it 
implications that resonated within Ethiopia itself, as reflected in its current 
ethnic ‘self-determination’ federation experiment. Sudan’s north-south conflict 
had to be fought to the mutually assured exhaustion of both parties, before 
the OAU’s increasing focus on conflict resolution in the interests of stabilising 
Africa, began to move inexorably toward a negotiated settlement that now, 
under the AU, contemplates south Sudan’s possible independence as an 
ultimate solution.366 Thus, Eritrea and, most recently, south Sudan, have set 
precedents for the type of flexibility that the AU and its sub-regional economic 
communities (RECs) must show in seeking peaceful resolutions of intractable 
post-colonial intra-state conflicts, where armed African opposition movements 
seek self-determination from regimes that no longer enjoy the legitimacy of 
the supporters and constituencies of such movements.  
 
                                                 
365 Michela Wrong, I Didn't Do It for You, How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation, 
New York: Harper Collins, (2005).  
366 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the 
Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, 
Nairobi, Kenya, (9 January 2005). See p. 8 on ‘The Right to Self-Determination for the People 
of South Sudan’. 
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Law professor Garth Abraham sums up the situation by arguing:  
 
The boundaries of Eritrea, a successful secession, conforms to the Italian 
colony prior to its federation with Ethiopia in 1952; the boundaries of 
Somaliland, a secession that has yet to receive international recognition, 
conforms to the British colony of Somaliland prior to the creation of the 
Republic of Somalia in 1960; the boundaries of Southern Sudan, a potential 
secession, conforms to the three provinces of the southern Sudan during the 
period of British colonial administration.367 
 
As the AU approaches the resolution of the Somali coast conundrum, it has 
arrived at such lessons as the Eritrean and Sudan conflicts have to offer, at 
great cost, in the destruction of lives and infrastructure throughout a vast 
expanse of the greater Horn of Africa. Eritrea’s struggle for independence 
spanned 1961 to 1991. Somaliland’s quest for recognition is one that, like 
Eritrea and south Sudan, similarly emerges as a variation of the theme of 
post-colonial African liberation struggles for self-determination and/or 
democratic autonomy from oppressive centralised power. Somaliland’s 
struggle has also been similarly decided upon by military means in as much 
as the SNM, which led it into unilateral independence, contributed to the 
military defeat and ousting of the Siad Barre regime in coalition with other 
Somali armed opposition movements.  
 
                                                 
367 Garth Abraham, ‘Africa and its boundaries, a legal overview: From colonialism to the 
African Union’ in Christopher Clapham, Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills (eds.), Big African 
States, Johannesburg: Wits University Press (2006) pp. 273-290. 
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However, unlike the case of Eritrea, in relation to Ethiopia and south Sudan, 
vis-à-vis the Khartoum government, the successful military outcome of the 
anti-Barre resistance in Somalia resulted in the collapse and break-up of the 
Somali state. Yet, Africa and the rest of the international community have 
responded to developments in the Somali coast as if all that needed to be 
achieved was the installation of a successor regime in Mogadishu. The very 
real ‘facts on the ground’ in the actual territorial disintegration of the state in 
and around Mogadishu have been ignored, as have the independence of 
Somaliland and the short-of-independence autonomy of Puntland. 
Realistically, Somaliland’s independence from the rest of Somalia can no 
more be reversed by military means than Eritrea’s independence from 
Ethiopia can be militarily reversed – or south Sudan be forced militarily to 
remain part of Sudan after the south’s referendum on self-determination in six 
years' time. Mark Bradbury refers to the international attitude to Somaliland: 
 
The strategy in Mbagathi [peace talks] was to ‘park’ the issue of Somaliland, 
in order to protect the stability in that region. The message from Somaliland, 
as always, is that it won’t wait, that it pulled out of the car park some time ago. 
It is steering its own course, and hopes that the international community will 
follow this.368 
 
Another prominent academic of Somali studies, Ken Menkhaus, sums up the 
situation by asserting: 
 
                                                 
368 Bradbury, (13 October 2005), p. 10.   
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Whether one embraces, rejects, or is ambivalent about Somaliland’s bid for 
recognition, Somaliland’s progress in democratization, stability, and economic 
recovery constitutes one of the few pieces of genuinely good news in the 
troubled Horn of Africa.369  
      
5.3 Somaliland Quo Vadis II: The Dilemmas of Self-Determination and 
Regional Integration 
 
If the AU and the rest of the international community must now come to grips 
with Somaliland as an established ‘fact on the ground’ amid a still-to-be 
reconstituted Somalia, the leaders of Somaliland, in their quest for 
recognition, are also confronted with having to face the realities of an 
emerging new post-OAU inter-African order; one that further complicates their 
self-determination/recognition project. Acknowledgement of this reality, in fact, 
proved itself as early as 2000, when the late President Egal called on the UN 
to afford it an interim “special status” which, at the time was reported as “a 
significant climbdown from his previous determination to secure international 
recognition for Somaliland as an independent state”.370  
 
This special status option will be elaborated on in greater detail later in this 
chapter, in terms of the AU’s capacity for flexibility and creativity. Otherwise, it 
is useful here to address more fully the realities confronting Hargeisa’s 
leaders. The significant point to be stressed here is that the AU, unlike the 
                                                 
369 Ken Menkhaus, ‘Somalia in 2005: No Exit’, Les Annales d’Ethiopie, (2005). 
370 BBC News, (15 August 2000). 
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OAU, is emerging as an embryonic continental proto-government of what 
could well evolve into a “union of African states.”371  
 
Interacting with NEPAD, as its blueprint for the continent’s economic 
development and regional integration, both politically as well as economically, 
tops the AU’s agenda. Thus, within this context of continental ‘African unity’, 
all outstanding African self-determination questions will have to be re-thought 
and re-conceptualised in terms of how they contribute to or detract from 
African integration, and reinforce or overcome Africa’s already debilitating 
fragmentation.372  
 
In fact, to the extent that this fragmentation remains in effect, in a very real 
sense, Africa cannot be said to have fully progressed beyond the era of 
colonialism, as it is this penultimate colonial legacy that is at the root of the 
continent’s endemic weakness and disarray. That being the case, 
Somaliland’s quest for recognition must be approached, factoring in this new 
continental integrationist agenda – as must other self-determination issues or 
incipient issues like Western Sahara, southern Sudan, Cabinda, the 
Senegalese Casamance, Zanzibar’s relations with mainland Tanzania and 
any number of outstanding boundary disputes.     
       
                                                 
371 Address by Prof. Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, at 
the University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, (24 June 2006). 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2006/konare0624.htm 
Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, 'AU leader spells out united Africa vision', Business Day, (26 
June 2006). http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/national.aspx?ID=BD4A221809 
372 Daniel C. Bach, (ed.), Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Disintegration, 
Oxford: James Currey (1999). Peter Woodward, The Horn of Africa: Politics and International 
Relations, London: I.B. Tauris, (2002). Daniel Bach, ‘Regionalism as Fragmentation’, 
International Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, (March 2005). 
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The Somaliland recognition conundrum, therefore, must be approached within 
the context of considerations pertaining to the future of regional integration in 
North-East Africa, including the greater East African community.373 This poses 
thorny questions for Somaliland’s leaders, as it does for other actors, 
including the AU, IGAD and EAC, the chief one of which is how to approach a 
resolution of the recognition question vis-à-vis Hargeisa and a reconstituted 
Somalia based in Mogadishu, in such a manner that advances the overall 
stabilisation of the Somali coast, while promoting its incorporation into a larger 
‘regional integration community’, as envisioned by the AU. Within this context, 
related to the AU’s larger vision for the continent and its sub-regions, can 
Somaliland’s leaders and their sympathisers afford to view Somaliland's 
independence and international recognition – beyond a special interim status 
– as an end in itself?  
 
To be sure, Somaliland has an unassailable legal case for remaining outside 
the current Somalia re-building project.374 But, how politically – and 
economically – sustainable is such a posture in the long term, given the 
current integrationist trajectory of African development and inter-state 
                                                 
373 Rok Ajulu (ed.), The Making of a Region, The Revival of the East African Community, 
Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, (2005). Ahmed Mohiddin (ed.), Deepening 
Regional Integration of the East African Community, Addis Ababa: Development Policy 
Management Forum, (2005). 
374 Michael Schoiswohl, Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto 
Regimes in International Law: The Case of ‘Somaliland’. The Resurrection of Somaliland 
Against All International ‘Odds’: State Collapse, Secession, Non-Recognition and Human 
Rights, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2004); For a review of this latter text, see Yael 
Ronen, Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-recognized De Facto Regimes in 
International Law: The Case of 'Somaliland', Book Review, American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 99, No. 4, (Oct 2005), pp. 953-959. I. M. Lewis, ‘As the Kenyan Somali 'Peace' 
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http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2005/213/10.shtml 
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relations? And if full independence/recognition is not, ultimately, an end in 
itself, what are the intermediate options for Somaliland and all other actors 
with a vested interest in stabilising the Somali coast?  
 
The foregoing are the questions which this concluding chapter attempts to 
address. This entails examining the pros and cons of Somaliland’s case for 
recognition; how its diplomacy of gaining recognition relates to its inter-state 
and regional relations with its neighbours and key players in the IGAD 
Somalia peace process – principally Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, as well as 
those traditionally opposed to its aspirations such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
the Arab League. This analysis, then, expands into assessing the role of the 
AU and important ‘'out of area'’ African actors such as South Africa, before 
examining how the broader international community factors into the equation. 
Against the sub-regional, regional-continental and extra-continental backdrop, 
Somaliland’s recognition prospects are then explored vis-à-vis the 
reconstitution of Somalia and the overall question of stabilising the Somali 
coast. This involves considering possible scenarios within the quest of the 
AU’s advancement of ‘regional integration communities’.   
 
5.4 Who Will Take the First Step? The Dynamics of Somaliland and 
the IGAD Sub-Region – Scenario I 
 
At this stage, Somaliland’s diplomacy could be summed up in the recurring 
refrain that greets its leaders and officials: “We will be the second to recognise 
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Somaliland.”375 Which begs the pregnant question: Who will take the first step 
in breaking the diplomatic ice in recognising the Hargeisa regime? Non-
African powers like the US and Britain, which seem reasonably-to-favourably 
disposed toward Somaliland, are looking to the continent for their cues.376 To 
this effect, UK’s Minister for Africa, Lord Triesman, asserted:  
 
My Lords, there are continuing contacts with the Government of Somaliland. I 
pay tribute to that Government; although they are not internationally 
recognised, in the sense of there being a fully fledged state, the stability of 
Somaliland stands in sharp contrast to the position across most of the rest of 
Somalia, with the possible exception of Puntland, directly to the east of 
Somaliland. Anything that can preserve that stability is very important. I 
believe that that will be the subject of some discussion at the African Union 
conference in the Gambia in the first few days of July [2006]. 
 
This, in turn, shifts the spotlight on Somaliland’s relations within its immediate 
neighbourhood among the IGAD stakeholders intimately involved in the 
politics of resolving both the Sudan and Somalia questions and those ‘out of 
area’ states like South Africa and Nigeria. Before surveying these 
relationships, it is instructive to examine Somaliland’s legal case for 
recognised sovereign status. 
 
                                                 
375 Ethiopia has consistently held to the view that it will be the second country to recognise 
Somaliland. See for example the news report, ‘Ethiopia would be last to give recognition', IOL 
(3 February 2006). 
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=87&art_id=qw1138954861615B231 
376 Lord Triesman’s Response to Lord Averbury’s question on Somaliland, House of Lords 
Hansard Text, Column 419 (16 January 2006). 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60116-
01.htm#60116-01_star0 
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5.4.1 A Legal Advisory  
 
In April 2003, the Office of the Chief State Law Adviser (International Law), 
Department of Foreign Affairs, in South Africa, prepared a legal brief on 
‘Somaliland’s Claim to Sovereign Status’.377 After establishing that “there is no 
generally accepted and satisfactory modern legal definition of statehood” in 
international law, it was noted that “the best known formulation of the basic 
criteria for statehood is that laid down in Article 1 of the Montevideo 
Convention, 1933”, defining a state as “a person of international law”, 
possessing such attributes as “a permanent population, a defined territory, 
government and capacity to enter into relations with other states”. On this 
latter point, which impinges on the question of recognition, the brief advised 
that “although recognition may not create a state”, which should be borne in 
mind in the case of the Mogadishu-based Somali TFG in terms of Somaliland, 
“it seems it should be taken into account in deciding whether the fourth 
requirement is met” – which, in the case of Somaliland, remains elusive. On 
the other hand, it is also advised that “the role played by the principle of self-
determination in the process of creation of states cannot be ignored” either.378  
 
Importantly, the brief establishes the circumstantial context in which 
Somaliland’s independence was declared, one that has yet to change to this 
day; the fact that “as the struggle for power in Southern Somalia degenerated 
rapidly into civil war, the SNM leadership abandoned hopes that an 
acceptable government could be established in Mogadishu”, which effectively 
                                                 
377 Tandeka Lujiza, ‘Somaliland’s Claim to Sovereign Status’, Office of the Chief State Law 
Advisor (International Law), Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs, (29 April 2003), pp. 1-6. 
378 Ibid., p. 3. 
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created a default situation which, under the pressure of popular sentiment led 
to a declaration on the dissolution of the 1960 union and “restoration of 
Somaliland as a sovereign state” – this last caveat alluding to Somaliland’s 
sovereign, though brief existence separate from the south prior to union.379  
 
While not formally recognised, the ability of Somaliland to interact with other 
states is noted by the fact that it has “established bilateral relations with 
several countries including Djibouti and the European Union”, where the EU 
had “approved an extensive project to support rehabilitation of the core road 
network in Somaliland, with a total budget of 4.5 million Euro”. The 
government was also “involved in a number of multilateral agreements 
involving the United Nations Specialised Agencies” although “according to the 
EU and other countries, Somaliland doesn’t exist …”380 
 
In concluding the South African international law analysis, the legal brief 
pointedly notes a piece of OAU history, as a precedent for the AU that is little 
known; the fact that “the OAU consistently permitted states to retrieve their 
sovereignty following an unsuccessful union,” citing Egypt, Gambia and 
Senegal,381 which are the points of reference that Somaliland’s leaders and 
supporters stress in arguing for recognition of its sovereign status. Reinforcing 
this point, the brief states that “Somaliland had not only been a separate 
                                                 
379 Ibid., p. 4. 
380 The United Nations special envoy on Somalia is making an effort to bring updates on the 
case of Somaliland to members of the UN Security Council. He has visited Somaliland in 
2005 and 2006 on a fact-finding mission and consultations with the government of 
Somaliland. See United Nations, ‘Briefing of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General to the Security Council on Somalia’, 6-page report, unpublished, (November 2005) 
(Somaliland p. 4, points 15, 16, 17 and 18).  
381 The legal advisory refers to the following former unions: United Arab Republic (Egypt – 
Syria, 1958-61); Mali Federation (Mali – Senegal, 1960); Senegambia (Senegal – Gambia, 
1982-89) 
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colonial unit but actually a separate independent state for five days” … which 
makes Somaliland’s case unique and special as a legal justification for 
secession when things have not worked out”.382  
 
Comparing Somaliland's case to that of Eritrea, which, according to the brief, 
had a less compelling justification for secession, apart from military facts on 
the ground, whereas Ethiopia and Eritrea separated by mutual agreement, 
“Somaliland is unable to receive an agreed farewell that was so helpful to 
Eritrea”.383 This says volumes about how unhelpful the OAU was, a track 
record which the AU must try to overcome. In the final analysis, the legal brief 
concludes that “it is undeniable that Somaliland does indeed qualify for 
statehood, and it is incumbent upon the international community to recognise 
it.”384 This brings one back to the question that animates much of the rest of 
this concluding chapter: 'Who will take the first step?'  
 
                                                 
382 Ibid., p. 6. 
383 The current TFG Prime Minister of Somalia, Mohammed Gedi, in an interview with the 
BBC Somali service, (11 November 2005) welcomed Somaliland’s democratic gains and 
expressed the view that "although his government will not be the first one to recognize 
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Somalia Prime Minister, Ali Mohammed Gedi’, (27 November 2005). 
http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=6533 
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then interim capital Jawhar, is a self-proclaimed governor of Middle Shabelle and a 
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causes of the conflict in Somalia has been Somaliland. I think if they believe they can stand 
on their own and want to test themselves, the rest of Somalis should support that and I would 
suggest to the international community to recognize Somaliland.” Radio Golis, (24 Dec 
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384 Ibid., p.6. For some of the current issues on the legal case of Somaliland’s sovereignty, 
see the report of the International Crisis Group, ‘Somaliland: Time for African Union 
Leadership’, Africa Report No. 110, Brussels/Nairobi, (23 May 2006). 
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5.5 Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and the IGAD Factor 
 
5.5.1 Ethiopia 
 
Ethiopia is the most strategic African actor in Somaliland’s recognition 
calculus. Moreover, the ‘empire state,’ in the wake of Somalia’s collapse and 
in terms of the role it – Addis Ababa – has played within IGAD in the politics 
and diplomacy of reconstituting the Somali state, has emerged in a 
hegemonic position in determining the fate of the Somali coast.385 Addis 
Ababa rides several horses in the Somali regional calculus, much to the 
chagrin of other state actors like Egypt and its Arab League allies, such as 
Saudi Arabia. It not only assists Somaliland, but it has also been an important 
backer of Puntland and its erstwhile leader, now the Somalia TFG’s President 
Adullahi Yusuf. In its backing of Yusuf, it has also been the main backer of the 
coalition of southern Somali clan factions and warlords – the former Somali 
Reconciliation and Reconstruction Council (SRRC) – which opted for a federal 
dispensation in opposition to the ‘Arab caucus’, led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
which had been the main backers, along with Djibouti, of the Arta Transitional 
National Government regime, which emerged from the Arta process of 2002 
and were proponents of a ‘united Somalia’ as a bulwark against Ethiopia.  
 
The above is all by way of underlining the essentially geo-political ‘proxy’ 
nature of the politics of reconstituting and stabilising the Somali region. The 
diverse Somali protagonists, Somaliland included, are essentially proxies in 
                                                 
385 Christopher Clapham, ‘Ethiopia’ in Christopher Clapham, Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills 
(eds.), Big African States, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, (2006), pp. 17-38. 
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what has been a long and protracted geo-political power-struggle between the 
Nile Basin powers of ‘downstream’ Egypt – dependent as it is on the Nile in 
terms of its security interests – and its Arab League allies, and ‘upstream’ 
Ethiopia. The latter’s land-locked status and sense of encirclement by Arab-
Islamic forces drives its vested interests in the outcome of the Somali 
question. Hence Ethiopia’s vested interest in a federalist resolution of conflict 
throughout the Somali region, as a safeguard against any future resurgence 
of Somali irredentism and Egypt’s vested interest in a Somali unitary state 
throughout the entire expanse of the Somali coast, including Somaliland, as a 
bulwark against Ethiopia and any possibility that Addis Ababa might disrupt 
Egypt’s access to Nile waters. Egypt currently enjoys predominant access in 
the face of growing opposition by other riverine states in greater East Africa, 
who feel their development retarded by Cairo’s opposition to any 
developments – political or developmental – that would affect this status quo. 
Within this greater Nile basin context, Somaliland, along with south Sudan, 
represent incipient revisionist states against the status quo desired by Egypt.  
 
In the wake of the federalist outcome of the Mbagahti talks, Ethiopia’s 
interests have been considerably advanced, irrespective of whether or not the 
TFG actually gets off the ground. Within the wider regional context, the 
continued existence and viability of Somaliland as an independent entity, 
separate from the TFG, contributes to the de facto confederacy of 
autonomous and federated Somali actors that, in terms of Addis Ababa’s 
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security interests, enhances its position.386 On the other hand, Ethiopia’s 
hegemonic position has generated a strong backlash against the TFG in 
Mogadishu. Here, opposition has mobilised against any prospect of Ethiopian 
troops comprising part of an AU or UN peacekeeping contingent that 
materialises to facilitate implementation of the Mbagathi accord. Seen from 
this vantage point, such a force containing Ethiopian elements would be 
perceived as an instrument for imposing and entrenching a Yusuf ‘puppet 
regime’ on Somalis.387  
 
Thus, Ethiopia’s position vis-à-vis Somalia and Somaliland is a delicate one. 
This refers not only from the standpoint of opposition within southern Somalia 
to Ethiopia’s perceived dominance over a TFG seen as its proxy, but also 
from the standpoint of Ethiopia’s need not to push its luck in antagonising 
Arab League powers, given the economic interdependence that ties Addis 
Ababa to the Persian Gulf. Recognition of Somaliland would likely trigger such 
a backlash. Furthermore, since Ethiopia would become a major beneficiary of 
any advances that could be made toward regional integration in the Horn of 
Africa, its calculus in terms of Somaliland’s status would have to favour an 
arrangement that facilitated Somaliland’s integration into a regionally 
integrated greater Somali region, linked to a larger North-East African 
                                                 
386 Scott McDonald Pegg, 'On the margins: International society and the de facto state', Ph.D. 
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integration project; perhaps one associated with the prospective East African 
federation and customs union.  
 
The fact of the matter is that regional integration in East and North-East Africa 
is still very much up in the air in terms of how this mega-region will finally be 
configured. Ethiopia, therefore, will not want to initiate any major diplomatic 
moves, such as recognising Somaliland. That would prematurely foreclose 
greater East-North-East Africa’s integration options. This is probably why, in 
an August 2003 statement, Ethiopian Information Minister Bereket Simon, 
after a visit to Addis Ababa by President Kahin, stressed that Somaliland’s 
future lies within a united Somalia.388 On the other hand, as a three-year 
member of the AU’s PSC, and in terms of its need for regional stability, 
Ethiopia has a major vested interest in ensuring an environment of peace and 
security between all Somali coast actors: the Mogadishu TFG, Puntland and 
Somaliland. For these reasons, in addition to the OAU-inherited tradition of 
maintaining ‘territorial integrity’, irrespective of the legal case in favour of 
Hargeisa’s sovereign status, Ethiopia, for the time being, may opt for the 
status quo, while focusing on developing a close bilateral economic 
relationship with Somaliland. 
 
Toward the end of 2000, Somaliland signed agreements with Ethiopia, aimed 
at boosting trade and communications. This was announced following a visit 
by the late President Egal on a three-day official visit to Addis Ababa. The 
core of the agreement centred on enabling greater use of the strategic port of 
                                                 
388 Irin News, 'Ethiopia: minister says Somalia should be united, denies interference', (8 
August 2003). 
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Berbera, on the Gulf of Aden, by improving the road link to the Ethiopian 
border. Ethiopia would install a microwave communication link between 
Burao, Hargeisa and Berbera. Ethiopian and Somaliland central banks were 
intended to facilitate trade by providing links to the outside world. From the 
Hargeisa standpoint, the agreement was seen as a significant boost for 
Somaliland in its efforts to gain international recognition.389 This transport 
communications development between Ethiopia and Somaliland has proven 
to be in the pragmatic interests of the international community, as well as in 
the interests of those two countries.  
 
In August 2003, the EU, for the first time, shipped food aid to Ethiopia through 
Berbera. At the time, it was reported that “some 15,000 tonnes of relief food 
have already arrived and more than 100,000 tonnes more will have arrived by 
next Monday, all through the port of Berbera. Security is not a problem in the 
region and 15,000 tonnes have arrived in Ethiopia without any a hitch”, which 
President Kahin said demonstrated “the credibility and confidence on the 
security situation”.390 For Ethiopia, the Berbera outlet helps alleviate the 
problems of congestion which it confronts in its use of the port of Djibouti.391 
Thus, given Ethiopia’s status as Africa’s largest land-locked state and Africa’s 
second most populous country, it is not putting all its ‘eggs in one basket’, as 
it had also signed, at that time, a memorandum of understanding with Sudan 
for the use of its Red Sea ports and roads.  
                                                 
389 CNN.com, ‘Somaliland, Ethiopia sign trade accord’, (12 November 2000). 
390 Eubusiness, 'EU ships food aid to Ethiopia through Somaliland port of Berbera', (15 
August 2003). EIU ViewsWire, ‘Ethiopia signs new agreement to use Berbera port’, (12 July 
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All this relates to the state of hostilities that exists between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, which has placed the latter’s Massawa and Assab ports off-limits. 
However, given the capacity of the Berbera port and its strategic location vis-
à-vis Ethiopia, further reinforcing its position as a regional transport hub with 
international backing, which cannot but help Somaliland. In this regard, the 
EU also undertook, in 2003, a feasibility study in preparation for rehabilitating 
a road linking Somaliland and Ethiopia. The study covered the road network 
from Berbera to the border town of Tog Wajale and to Addis Ababa. The 
French consultancy firm that undertook the study was also involved in 
consultations with Somaliland and Ethiopia on the prospects of a ‘Berbera 
corridor’ handling part of Ethiopia’s import-export cargo.392  
 
Prior to the EU-assisted strengthening of the Berbera link, Ethiopian Airlines 
had established a regular service between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa. 
Somaliland and Ethiopia have established rudimentary diplomatic presences 
in one another’s capitals; liaison offices as a means of managing their growing 
bilateral ties. In 2006, Ethiopia upgraded its representation in Hargeisa at the 
ambassadorial level.393 These ties are reinforced by regular official visits by 
Somaliland leaders to Addis Ababa for consultations, including the heads-of-
state level, though such visits at that level reflect a one-way pattern without 
Ethiopia’s President Meles Zenawi reciprocating by visiting Hargeisa. There 
                                                 
392 Eubusiness, ‘EU to undertake study of Ethiopia-Somaliland road corridor’, (17 August 
2003).  
393 Interview with Ethiopian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Minister Tekeda Alemu, Addis 
Ababa, (28 January 2005). See also ‘The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Foreign 
Affairs, Ethiopia’s Policy towards Somalia’ (12 June 2006). 
http://www.mfa.gov.et/Foreign_Policy_And_Relation/Foreign_Policy_And_Relation.php 
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have, however, been several two-way ministerial visits. Clearly, as David 
Shinn wrote in the Addis Tribune in 2002, while “probably sympathetically 
inclined, Ethiopia is unwilling to be the first to recognize Somaliland” as 
“Somalia would immediately attribute nefarious motives to Ethiopian 
recognition of Somaliland, arguing that it wishes to balkanize Somalia and 
weaken Somali unity.”394 Ethiopia’s growing ties with Hargeisa has led the 
doyen of Somali studies, Ioan Lewis, to conclude that Ethiopia has more ties 
with unrecognised Somaliland than it possesses with many other recognised 
African countries.395 Recently, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi 
summed up Ethiopia’s diplomatic position towards Somaliland, taking into 
account some of the key internal politics of identity challenges with which he 
is faced: "Others can be more adventurous than we are" to recognise 
Somaliland.396  
 
Ethiopia was "indicted for furthering Eritrea's independence" and given 
Ethiopia's historical baggage on Somali issues, it will be best for another 
country to take the lead.397 Short of formal recognition, Ethiopia will develop 
all the links possible with Somaliland. "Behind the scene, we will support 
justice and self-determination of Somaliland”.398 
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Somaliland’s new 2006 Foreign Minister, Abdillahi Duale’s first external visit 
was to Addis Ababa for bilateral talks with Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister and to 
consolidate follow-up discussions with the African Union’s Professor Alpha 
Konare.399 
 
 The June 2006 East African diplomatic tour of Somaliland President Kahin to 
Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda, has opened new avenues 
for Somaliland’s case to be heard by other East African states and has lifted 
the pressure on Ethiopia to be the prime neighbouring champion of 
Somaliland’s case in Africa.400  
 
5.5.2 Djibouti 
 
Djibouti, former French Somaliland, also shares a northern border with 
Somaliland. More than that, given the Isaaq predominance in Somaliland, 
there are important clan affinities between it and Djibouti.401 However, this has 
not made for a history of smooth relations between the two. As Shinn 
describes it, “relations between Somaliland and Djibouti are correct but not 
warm. Somaliland resents Djibouti’s initiative in helping to create the TNG in 
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Somalia and is not comfortable with the current Djiboutian leadership. Djibouti 
continues to have a complex set of financial and commercial links with the 
TNG” while Djibouti’s “commitment to the preservation of Somali unity 
suggests that it wants to prevent the emergence of a viable and independent 
Somaliland”.402 Though relations between Somaliland and Djibouti have 
improved, as witnessed by the 2005 visit by President Kahin to that country, 
Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh’s mentoring of the Arta Somalia Peace 
Conference, which gave rise to the TNG, has made for a tense relationship.  
 
In effect, Guelleh, in the eyes of Somalilanders, became an Egypt/Arab 
League proxy in its quest to influence Somali regional politics – a niche for 
Guelleh that – for a time at least, was quite lucrative. As articulated in a 
Somaliland Forum press release during July 2000,  
 
… this move instantly won him some international friends and money – 
a badly needed cash infusion for his crumbling economy. The regional 
organizations such as the Arab League, OAU and IGAD, of which the 
old Somalia once was a member, all came aboard and bank-rolled Mr 
Guelleh’s latest political gamble on the Somali issue.403  
 
Hosting the Arta process was accompanied by Guelleh’s closing of Djibouti’s 
border with Somaliland; banning of Somaliland’s leading opposition daily 
newspaper, Jamhuuriya, from entering Djibouti; promoting/sanctioning of anti-
Somaliland propaganda and attempts to co-opt “a token few Somalilanders to 
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his conference, whom he thought, and still thinks that the world would believe 
that they represent the people of Somaliland”.404 This latter ploy would 
resurface during the Mbagathi process in the creation of what Afrol News 
termed a “new” Somali ethnic group called the “Northern Dir clan”.405 
However, the upshot of these manoeuvres was to bring relations between 
Djibouti and Somaliland close to a flashpoint.  
 
The descent of the Arta-engineered TNG, led by ‘President’ Abdikassim Salat, 
into dysfunction and disarray, and the triggering of the 14th attempt at 
reconstituting Somalia, placed Djibouti and its Arab-backers on the defensive 
vis-à-vis Ethiopia’s backing for the federal ‘solution’, which emerged as the 
successor to the TNG. The Afro-Arab geo-political confrontation surrounding 
Arta and the successor Mbagathi process ranged Ethiopia and its allies in 
Somaliland, Puntland and the pro-federalist SRRC against an increasingly 
fractured TNG, backed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia (which underwrote it), Eritrea 
and Yemen, as well as Djibouti. The terminal disintegration of Arta and its 
TNG progeny inexorably played into the hands of Ethiopia and its Somali 
regional coalition allies. These dynamics worked to eventually depolarise the 
tense relations between Djibouti and Somaliland, although the distrust that the 
Arta process had generated appeared to linger, fuelled by regional 
insecurities generated by jihadist tendencies of a fundamentalist political 
Islam associated with the post-September 11, 2001 ‘war on terror’. 
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As recounted in the previous chapter on religion, the destabilising potential of 
this threat to Somaliland, internally and in its relations with Djibouti, surfaced 
during the murders of the two British nationals outside Hargeisa in 2003. This 
episode suggested, to some, the possibility that, as a corollary to promoting 
‘Somali unity’ at Mbagathi, Somaliland’s stability was being sacrificed in the 
process by Arab acquiescence in, if not outright promotion of, terror attacks 
that would undermine confidence in Somaliland’s stability and hence work 
toward its isolation. Djibouti was thus seen as a possible partner in such 
machinations. 
 
In spite of Somaliland’s tensions with Djibouti, the two states are inextricably 
linked through geographical proximity and culture. Shinn points out that “even 
with the current tension in the relationship, there is considerable informal 
trade between the two countries and, because taxes are lower in Somaliland, 
many Djiboutians buy goods there. Somaliland officials argue that Djibouti 
needs Somaliland more than Somaliland needs Djibouti. They also suspect 
that Djibouti fears competition from the port of Berbera once it is fully 
rehabilitated”, though at the time, prior to EU assistance, Shinn could add that 
“with so few ships now using the port, there is little incentive to rehabilitate 
it”.406 In any case, relations between Somaliland and Djibouti began to thaw 
during the latter part of 2001 when the two countries signed a six-point 
agreement. 
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Somaliland’s Foreign Minister at the time, Abdihamid Garad Jama, in 
announcing the six-point agreement, said that they had agreed to “cease all 
propaganda and other activities that have damaged relations between them in 
the past”. The agreement includes facilitation of the “free movement of 
people, goods and livestock between them”. A joint committee was 
established to ensure that Somaliland and Djibouti would “enjoy friendly 
relations in the future” and “join forces against anything that threatens their 
security”.407 Thus ended the border closure confrontation, which had brought 
relations to a new low. 
 
In the wake of the conclusion of the Mbagathi process, resulting in the TFG 
successor to the TNG, President Kahin’s January 2005 visit to Djibouti, as his 
first stop on a tour that would also take him to Ethiopia and South Africa, 
demonstrated how far Djibouti-Somaliland bilateral relations had progressed.  
 
Reporting on the Djibouti visit, Afrol News described the Somaliland president 
as having been accorded “an official welcome at Djibouti airport”.408 With him 
and his delegation (which included Foreign Minister Edna Adan Ismail and 
Information Minister Abdillahi Mohammed Dualeh, among others) immediately 
going into “talks with Djiboutian Prime Minister at the State House before 
holding official talks with President Ismail Omar Guelleh at the Presidential 
Palace".409 As in Ethiopia, there is now a Somaliland Representative Office in 
Djibouti, which Kahin toured. The fact that the visit, overall, was seen to 
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include all of the ceremonial symbols of an official visit by a foreign head of 
state was regarded as an “important symbolic victory” for President Kahin, as 
“Djibouti long has been regarded one of the principal opponents to the 
recognition of Somaliland, supporting Somali unity”.410 While the Djiboutian 
public position “is to continue to support a unified Somali state”,411 it took 
active steps, in 2005, to support Somaliland’s diplomatic office in Djibouti412 
and is slowly beginning to incline towards support of Somaliland’s 
recognition.413 A key factor in this regard is Djibouti’s efforts to ensure a safe 
environment for the US military base in Djibouti and its key national interests, 
notably the substantial US aid to Djibouti. 
 
5.5.3 Kenya 
 
David Shinn, in his survey of Somaliland’s bilateral ties with different member 
states of IGAD, makes no mention of Kenya in spite of Kenya’s sponsoring 
role in the Somali talks, known as Mbagathi talks. Apart from Nairobi’s 
facilitating role, personified by that of its Special Envoy on behalf of IGAD, 
Bethuel Kiplagat, there is little to go on regarding how Kenya views 
Somaliland. Within the context of the Mbagathi process, it seems that Kenya 
and Kiplagat’s main preoccupations, as far as they had any relevance for 
Somaliland, were to manage any possibility that those talks might generate 
regional tensions between the Hargeisa republic and Somali parties to the 
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talks by Mbagathi extending its mandate to cover the north-west Somali 
region – Somaliland. To the extent that these problems surfaced, Somaliland 
appeared to be ambivalent about Kenya’s intentions and those of Kiplagat. An 
object example, in this regard, was cited in the 2 September 2004 issue of 
Afrol News: “Somaliland protests being called ‘Northern Dir clan’ ”. This 
controversy arose during the especially sensitive concluding phase of 
Mbagathi. 
 
According to Afrol News at the time, “a ‘new’ Somali ethnic group has been 
introduced at the ongoing Somali peace conference in Kenya; the ‘Northern 
Dir clan’. As Somaliland authorities refuse to partake in the Kenya talks, this 
new clan is to represent the people of the unrecognised state. Somalilanders 
however hold there exists no such thing as a ‘Northern Dir clan’ ”.414 From the 
report, this alleged clan that surfaced at Mbagathi first reared its head at Arta, 
allegedly “invented by Djibouti’s President Ismael Omar Guelleh”. In terms of 
the Kenya talks, the reappearance of this clan was seen as part of a 
fabrication of a “new Dir confederacy” serving as a “conduit through which 
fake delegates could be introduced in the Mbagathi conference as 
representatives of Somaliland”.415 Despite the elusiveness of the ‘Northern Dir 
clan’ term, the report went on to point out that “there is however 
documentation of IGAD country representatives admitting the term was 
created to embrace Somaliland representatives to the Somali peace talks 
despite the unwillingness of Somaliland’s government to participate”. This is 
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where distrust regarding the role of Kenya emerges more clearly. The Afrol 
News article concludes: 
 
Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, Kenya’s special envoy to Somalia who heads 
the peace talks, has made it clear that IGAD will pressure for a united 
Somalia. IGAD does not recognise Somaliland. ‘Hence, you could say they 
are for territorial integrity and the unity of Somalia. It is implied that 
Somaliland is included in Somalia,’ Mr. Kiplagat last year told the ‘East 
African Standard’. 
 
Somaliland authorities had been invited to the Mbagathi peace talks, Mr 
Kiplagat further emphasised. They were however invited on the same basis 
as Somalia’s war lords. The Somaliland government rejected the invitation, 
saying it had ‘no mandate to compromise Somaliland’s sovereign status’ 
following a pro-independence referendum. Consequently, the Djiboutian 
scheme to invite the ‘Northern Dir clan’ on behalf of Somaliland was endorsed 
by IGAD.416 
 
Thus, it appears that Djibouti’s mischief became Kenya’s mischief which, in 
turn, was given an IGAD identity. In fact, though Kiplagat and Kenya have, 
understandably, articulated an obligatory commitment to Somalia’s territorial 
integrity, they obviously did not push energetically for Mbagathi to extend its 
writ to Somaliland and, moreover, appear to have abided by the expectation 
that no unity talks between Somaliland and Somalia could take place until a 
new Mogadishu government was in place. On the other hand, it has been 
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suggested that Kenya’s large Somali population in its historically contested 
‘Northern Frontier District’ – as in the case of Ethiopia’s Ogaden Somali 
region – has rendered Kenya suspect in terms of its own commitment to 
Somalia’s territorial integrity as a counter to any possibility of a resurgent 
Somali irredentism. Hence, Kenya’s emphasis on a united Somalia during the 
course of Mbagathi could be seen in this light. Shedding light on this 
dimension was an interesting commentary by M.S. Ahmed who, in a March 
2004 article,417 pointed out that “Kenya, which has a longstanding territorial 
dispute with Somalia, has an interest in confirming Somalia’s de facto 
disintegration into two separate entities (Somaliland and Somalia), as it has in 
the division of Sudan into a Christian-controlled south and a Muslim north”.418 
The author links this calculus to the ongoing Nile controversy between 
regional states and Egypt by continuing: 
 
Such a break-up will provide it (along with Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia) 
with an opportunity to demand the revision of the treaty governing the 
distribution of the River Nile’s waters. In fact it has already announced (as 
Tanzania has also done) that it will withdraw from the treaty, sensing no doubt 
that Washington’s success in forcing Khartoum to concede to southern Sudan 
the right to secede will eventually consign the treaty to the past.419 
 
The author’s case is backed up by a March 20, 2003 ‘Weekly Special Report’ 
circulated by the US State Department’s Office of International Information 
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Programmes which suggests that “Kenya does not want a strong neighbor 
that one day revives the Greater Somalia concept. For this reason, it is 
probably quietly sympathetic with an independent Somaliland. But as long as 
it is trying to solve the larger issue of peace in Somalia, it must remain 
completely neutral”.420 Thus, Ahmed concludes by contending that, while both 
Kenya and Ethiopia support the idea of follow-up peace talks between 
Somaliland and Somalia after “the southern factions reach a final deal”, 
neither Kenya nor Ethiopia “will be keen to push a project that seeks to reunite 
southern and northern Somalia, and the US will not put pressure on them to 
change their attitudes”.421 
 
Ultimately, then, it is going to fall in the lap of the AU, in pursuit of its 
continental integrationist agenda, to tackle whatever new basis for reuniting 
the Somali region emerges, as IGAD will undoubtedly pass the buck to this 
level of African diplomacy. In any case, what Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti 
appear to hold in common is the necessity to maintain a stable stalemate 
between Somaliland and Somalia. Stalemated stability may be viewed as an 
interim status quo by default, which emerges from the uncertainties pertaining 
to both and the need for those uncertainties not to be allowed to spiral out of 
control; concerns periodically reinforced by Somaliland-Puntland border 
disturbances over Sool and eastern Saanag.422 
 
Kenya’s strategy at the Somalia Reconciliation talks at Mbagathi  
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was to ‘park’ the issue of Somaliland in order to protect stability in that region. 
The message from Somaliland, as always, is that it won’t wait, that it pulled 
out of the car park some time ago. It is steering its own course, and hopes 
that the international community will follow this.423  
 
Recently, Kenyan President Kibaki (and Chairman of IGAD) invited 
Somaliland President Kahin to visit Kenya. An official invitation letter was 
extended for the planned June 2006 visit, and talks were subsequently held in 
Nairobi. It thereafter emerged that Kenya had taken a much more proactive 
stance toward consolidating Somaliland’s stability, emerging democracy424 
and its case for recognition. Kenya is willing, like Ethiopia, to establish 
diplomatic ties and advance Somaliland’s bid for recognition in African multi-
lateral fora including the suggested option of Somaliland seeking membership 
of IGAD. 425 
 
5.5.4 The Anti-Somaliland Coalition 
 
Apart from Egypt’s Nile-focused security calculus, it is hard to fathom Arab 
League opposition to Somaliland’s independence, except for geo-cultural 
hegemony concerns over the Somali region as an ‘Afrabian’ sphere of 
                                                 
423 Bradbury, (13 October 2005), p. 10. 
424 Stefan Simanowitz, ‘Democracy comes of age in Somaliland, Contemporary Review, Vol. 
287, No. 1679, pp. 335-339, (December 2005). Adan Yusuf Abokor, Steve Kibble, Mark 
Bradbury, Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, Georgina Barrett, Further Steps To Democracy: The 
Somaliland Parliamentary Elections, September 2006, London: Progressio, (2006). 
http://www.ciir.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/4B3047C0-7EEF-4A0F-B70C-
8B9DD0D1D8A8_Furtherstepstodemocracy_lowres.pdf 
425 Telephonic Interview with Somaliland President Kahin, (25 June 2006). See also Vishakha 
Apte, Sarwat Hameed, Christina Kiel, Leila Tayeb, ‘Taking the Initiative: Somaliland’s 
Regional Opportunities for International Recognition’, paper for Practicum in International 
Affairs, Graduate School in International Affairs, The New School, New York, (April 2006). 
 277
influence in North-East Africa under Arab-Islamic control. To a large extent, 
these influences impinging on the politics and diplomacy surrounding the 
reconstitution of the Somali region are held in check by the fact that, though 
pre-disintegration Somalia – and its Mogadishu rump – was a member of the 
Arab League, the region first and foremost falls within the African continental 
jurisdiction of the AU and its sub-regional economic communities. Since 
Ethiopia’s fate is so intimately intertwined with that of the Somali region in a 
way not comparable to Somalia’s relations with the Arab states, it is African 
dictates that carry the upper hand. There have been cases where the Arab 
League has tried creative diplomacy to gain the upper hand by isolating the 
AU and IGAD. A case in point is the recent “peace accord” between the TFG 
and Mogadishu's Islamic Courts Union, where the AU and IGAD were not 
involved in this diplomatic initiative.426 
 
The stalemated stability between Somaliland and a pro-Ethiopian settlement 
emanating from Mbagathi reflects these realities. Nevertheless, the negative 
and obstructionist role represented by the Arab states with respect to a 
regional settlement, and the interests of Somaliland, are not to be 
underestimated.427 Moreover, their geo-cultural and geo-political-economic 
interest in the Somali region (indeed, the entire Horn of Africa) – as underlined 
in Chapter Four – is very real and historically rooted, and therefore not a 
factor that can be ignored in the debate over Somaliland’s recognition. 
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Consequently, this section provides an analytical survey of the Arab interests 
influencing Somaliland’s fate.428 
 
5.5.5 Egypt 
 
The same ‘Weekly Special Report’ of 20 March 2003 that articulates Kenya’s 
unstated interest in a balkanised Somali coast, divided between two Somalias 
as a means of changing the status quo surrounding the Nile, counterpoises 
Egypt’s well-known concerns that reflect Cairo’s interest in “a strong Somali 
state” as a counterweight to Ethiopia and as reinforcing the status quo on the 
Nile.429 “Eighty-six percent of the water reaching the Aswan Dam in Egypt 
emanates from Ethiopia.” Therefore, “the leadership in Cairo wants to 
maintain maximum leverage over Ethiopia. A unified Somalia that might one 
day reassert its claims to Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia and has close 
links to Egypt would add to this leverage.” As a result, referring to the post-
Arta/pre-Mbagathi processes, “Egypt is one of five countries that has 
recognized the TNG and opposes an independent Somaliland”.430 
 
                                                 
428 Ahmed Qassim Ali, ‘The Foreign Factor in the Somali Tragedy’, in Hussein M. Adam and 
Richard Ford (eds.), Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21st 
Century, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, (1997), pp. 537-563. Sabrina Grosse-Kettler, 
‘External Actors in Stateless Somalia, A War Economy and its Promoters’, paper 39: Bonn 
International Centre for Conversion, (2004).  
http://www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper39/content.php 
The lack of external intervention in Somaliland and its positive implications are explored in 
Ismail I Ahmed, ‘The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: local-level 
effects, external interventions and reconstruction’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, (1 
February 1999), pp. 113-127. In Somalia, the author contends that external intervention 
entrenched “warlords and militias and to marginalise 'peacelords' (elders and merchants)”. 
429 ‘Egypt follows up Somalian security situation with Arab countries’, KUNU News Agency, 
(11 July 2006).  
430 Weekly Special Report, ‘The Horn of Africa: How Does Somaliland Fit?’, (20 March 2003), 
p. 2. 
 279
The magnitude of Egypt’s opposition to Somaliland independence provided 
interesting insight from John Drysdale at a 2004 workshop431 in Hargeisa, 
when he recounted how former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
tried everything in his power to prevent and reverse Somaliland’s Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI). Boutros-Ghali went to the extent of 
making a bid via the UN to have Egyptian troops deployed in Berbera as part 
of a ‘peacekeeping’ presence that would have given Egypt a major strategic 
military foothold in the Horn of Africa. This was part of an attempt to have a 
UN resolution passed which, according to Drysdale, would have declared the 
“territorial integrity” of Somalia, inclusive of Somaliland. Egyptian troops would 
have given force to such a resolution – had it materialised. Instead, as 
Drysdale recounts, it backfired on Boutros-Ghali and Egypt.432 
 
It effectively made Somaliland’s UDI irreversible and prejudiced future 
reconciliation between Hargeisa and any government that would emerge in 
Mogadishu. Drysdale went further in his remarks to assert that UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan and the UN Secretariat had regretted communicating the 
UN’s recognition of the TNG, in light of its dismal failure, stressing that the 
UN’s mistake in the Somali region has been its failure to balance its support 
for “territorial integrity” with the Charter’s “self-determination” principle, posing 
the question: “What is ‘territorial integrity’ vis-à-vis the fluidity and 
contestability of boundaries?”433  
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More recently, in the context of controversy over African peacekeeping troop 
deployment associated with implementing Mbagathi, Cairo once again raised 
the spectre of deploying troops in Somalia to counter any troops that might be 
deployed from Ethiopia.434 Otherwise, Boutros-Ghali’s earlier actions in regard 
to Somaliland, undoubtedly entrenched a hard-line on the part of Somaliland’s 
leaders in how they would relate to developments in the south. Perhaps this 
has been to an extent that has gone against their ‘national interest’ in 
pragmatically influencing Egypt and other Arab states to be more 
accommodative of Somaliland’s interests. Thus, “an Egyptian envoy visited 
Hargeisa in October 2002, congratulated Somaliland for the success it has 
achieved, and then urged it to participate in talks in Kenya on Somali unity 
with groups from Somalia. The Somaliland president rejected any thought of 
participating in the Kenyan-sponsored talks.435 Apart from the fact that 
Somaliland would not have been accorded differentiated status from any other 
delegates at Mbagathi – which, in fact, would probably have made such talks 
a non-starter to begin with – Egypt’s track record on Somali regional politics 
has left it with no credibility, given the outcome of the federalist, pro-Ethiopian 
outcome of Mbagathi and Somaliland’s understandable rejection of 
participation in those talks. 
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Egypt, as host of the Arab League, has witnessed the League making its first 
ever fact-finding visit to Somaliland in December 2003. Subsequently, the 
League has maintained contact with Somaliland’s Foreign Ministry. No 
change in its original diplomatic position has been detected, barring some 
basic humanitarian medical assistance to Somaliland’s health institutions. In 
September 2005, at the conclusion of the Somaliland parliamentary elections, 
the Arab League’s ambassador to Addis Ababa visited Somaliland and 
congratulated the Republic for the success of its first democratic 
parliamentary elections.436  
 
At recent African Union meetings, such as the AU Executive Council meeting 
in Sirte, Libya (2005) and in Banjul, Gambia (2006), Egypt opted, at least in 
public, not to oppose discussion on Somaliland at AU fora.437 This may have 
been due to some external pressure, possibly from the US, Egypt’s largest 
provider of foreign aid.  
 
5.5.6 Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States  
 
According to Shinn, “Saudi Arabia poses a major dilemma for Somaliland” in 
as much as the livestock ban has provided a non-belligerent reason to apply 
                                                 
436 I witnessed and engaged both Arab League delegations in 2003 and 2005 during field 
visits to Somaliland. The Arab League delegation arrived on 19 December and departed on 
25 December 2003 and it was led by the Director of the Afro-Arab Cooperation Section, Mr. 
Sameer Husni. See Sameer Husni, ‘Bayaan Sahafi’, Arab League, (25 December 2003) and  
ϲϔΤμϟا نΎϴΒϟالΎϣϮμϟا ضرا ϲϓ ϖ΋ΎϘΤϟا ϲμϘΘϟ ΔϴΑήόϟا ΔόϣΎΠϟا ΔΜόΒϟ , Al-Haatif 
al-Araby, issue 108, (1 January 2004). http://students.washington.edu/~jamali/alharab108.htm 
437 Interview with Ethiopian Foreign Minister of State, Tekeda Alemu, Addis Ababa, 
(September 2005). 
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economic sanctions against Hargeisa, without appearing to be openly hostile 
to it, while, at the same time, bank-rolling the TNG. The way Shinn put it in his 
2002 paper:  
 
 
A major financial backer of the TNG and supporter within the Arab League, 
Saudi Arabia was traditionally the major importer of Somaliland livestock. For 
the better part of the last five years, Saudi Arabia has banned livestock from 
Somaliland on the grounds that it might be infected with Rift Valley Fever. 
Somaliland denies the charges and there does not appear to be any current 
scientific evidence to support the claim. Recent investigations by the Food 
and Agricultural Organization and World Health Organization found no 
evidence of Rift Valley Fever in Somaliland. Several Gulf States that import 
small quantities of Somaliland livestock have lifted the ban. Some observers 
suspect that the ban is linked to Saudi business interests involved in the 
importation of livestock from other countries. The ban has hit nearly every 
kind of employment in the country – pastoralists, truck drivers, livestock 
traders, animal health staff, brokers, port employees and private business 
people. The impact is especially great in Berbera. The town is not 
prosperous, and the large international airport, built during the Soviet 
interlude in Somalia, is effectively shut down. Berbera is lucky to have one or 
two ships in the harbor on any given day. The problem is aggravated because 
the government of Somaliland does not have any access to the Saudi royal 
family and has been unable to make its case directly to the Saudi 
government. Governments with close ties to Saudi Arabia, including the 
United States, appear to have little interest in making Somaliland’s case.438  
                                                 
438 Shinn, (2002), p. 4. 
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While other Persian Gulf states have lifted the livestock ban, their impact on 
Somaliland’s economy has been marginal compared to that of the Saudis. 
Given the failure of Arta and the reality of the federalist TFG, which the 
Saudis, Egyptians and others of the Arab League opposed, it is not clear how 
the current interregnum – before and, indeed, if the TFG succeeds where the 
TNG failed – might be made to work on Somaliland’s behalf in its Arab 
diplomacy. In fact, all of the five states that backed the TNG are having to 
recalculate their posture.  
 
Yemen, for example, which Shinn points out “has a long history of links with 
Somaliland”439 was in the process of improving its relations with Hargeisa 
when this initiative was disrupted by Arta, and relations between Yemen and 
Somaliland suffered. It is not yet clear what diplomatic ground with Yemen 
and other regional states might be regained post-Arta and now, on into the 
implementation of Mbagathi, though Somaliland’s thaw in its relations with 
Djibouti could provide a positive precedent. However, these prospects may 
depend on ‘out of area’ African state actors and the AU demonstrating a 
departure from the ‘territorial integrity’ diplomatic orthodoxy of the AU’s 
predecessor, the OAU. Certainly, the balance of forces in favour of such a 
departure may be reflected in the composition of the AU’s Peace and Security 
Council, where both Ethiopia and South Africa are among the PSC’s three-
year de facto permanent members.  
 
                                                 
439 Ibid. 
 284
5.6 Who Will Take the First Step? African 'out of area' actors and the 
AU – Scenario II 
 
5.6.1 South Africa 
 
Outside of Ethiopia, South Africa has emerged as the main ‘out of area’ 
African state willing to entertain Somaliland’s case for international 
recognition. While Pretoria hews to the politico-diplomatic convention of the 
AU’s derived commitment to ‘territorial integrity’ and aversion to anything that 
might smack of ‘secession,’ its track record on African issues falling in the 
‘self-determination’ ambit has been decidedly pragmatic, being geared toward 
conflict resolution rather than rigid options. South Africa’s eventual recognition 
of the Sahrawi Republic, which the ruling ANC had long been committed to 
recognising,440 is indicative, as is the manner in which Pretoria has navigated 
its strategy toward the Sudan.441  
 
Rather than giving African dissident nationalists no quarter, the government, 
motivated by a diplomacy of conflict resolution and reconciliation, has made 
itself open to consultations with all parties involved in such intractable 
conflicts. Such a posture is deemed in South Africa’s national interest in 
stabilising Africa for purposes of economic development within the framework 
                                                 
440 Iqbal Jhazbhay, ‘South Africa - North Africa Relations: Bridging a Continent’, South African 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2, Winter/Spring, (2004) pp. 155-168. 
441 See for example South Africa’s post-conflict reconstruction training programme for South 
Sudan’s SPLA/M in co-operation with the University of South Africa. ‘President Thabo Mbeki 
to visit Sudan for talks with Sudanese president and vice-president’, Pretoria: Department of 
Foreign Affairs, (13 June 2006). http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2006/06061315151003.htm 
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of NEPAD.442 This, among other things, serves South Africa’s economic 
interests as a major investor throughout the continent. As such, Pretoria has 
become a major actor in the AU as a leading member of the PSC where, as in 
the case of Sudan, it chairs the PSC ministerial committee on that country’s 
post-conflict reconstruction. Moreover, the liberal human rights sentiment that 
finds expression among civil society actors on South African foreign and 
peace and security policy, reinforces the government’s outreach on vexed 
self-determination issues. This has all been on display in the case of 
Somaliland, which has managed to forge excellent relations with Pretoria, 
short of achieving recognition. A 2006 International Crisis Group report 
concludes that: “South Africa has enjoyed an especially close relationship with 
Somaliland since the late President Egal first visited in 2002.”443 
 
The manner in which Somaliland’s leaders have managed to stabilise the 
country compared to the chaotic, stateless situation in the south, has had a 
major impression on the South African media, where Somaliland has 
generally received favourable press and the attention of South Africa’s key 
international relations institutes.444 Somaliland’s relatively good governance 
                                                 
442 Walter Carlsnaes and Philip Nel, In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy after apartheid, Institute 
for Global Dialogue, South Africa (2006). Elizabeth Sidiripoulis (ed.), Apartheid Past, Renaissance 
Future: South Africa’s Foreign Policy 1994-2004, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International 
Affairs, (2004). 
443 International Crisis Group, ‘Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership’, Africa Report No. 110, 
Brussels/Nairobi (23 May 2006) p.16. See also Velimir Philo Tomulic, ‘Global Assessments of the 
Somaliland  Foreign Policy’, No. 234, Somaliland Times, (15 July 2006). 
http://somalilandtimes.net/sl/2005/234/3.shtml  
Tomulic argues: “Pointing to the fact, that the right for self-determination and subsequently national 
sovereignty could not have been "consumed" by the freely conducted unification with the Somali 
Republic, President Egal has won the sympathies throughout the (Black) Africa, specially by South 
Africa.” 
444South Africa’s public service continental TV satellite channel, SABC Africa, and its Channel Africa 
radio cover Somaliland regularly. See also the reporting by South African journalists: Jean-Jacques 
Cornish, ‘The 54th state?’, Mail & Guardian, (19 May 2006), ‘AU supports Somali split’, (10 February 
2006), ‘Somalilanders battle for independence’, (3 October 2005), ‘Somaliland has case for 
independence’, (11 Aug 2003), ‘Hope in the Horn of Africa’, (30 Apr 2003). Articles are available in the 
archive at http://www.mg.co.za/ 
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has, as a result, influenced Pretoria’s openness with Hargeisa. Through civil 
society, including the ANC, South Africa has found a means of participating in 
the important phases of Somaliland’s political transition. This has occurred 
through the encouragement given to non-governmental participation in 
election monitoring, pertaining to the referendum on Somaliland’s constitution 
and in the conducting of presidential and parliamentary elections.445  
 
Both Presidents Egal and Kahin and several of their officials have made visits 
to South Africa, where they have the attention of South African government 
officials and representatives in civil society and in the business community. 
The medical treatment that the late President Egal received in South Africa’s 
Military 1 Hospital in Pretoria, where he was hospitalised when he died, is 
indicative of the kind of relationship that has been achieved between 
Somaliland and South Africa.446 The fact that the South African Department of 
Foreign Affairs would investigate Somaliland’s status in international law, as 
cited earlier, is a further indication in this regard. As such, both South Africa 
and Ethiopia have been well positioned to influence the AU on its approach to 
the Somali coast. Needless to say, for now at least, Pretoria is not willing to 
                                                                                                                                            
Dianna Games, ‘SOMALILAND: Painful push for recognition’, Business Day, (30 October 2003), Greg 
Mills, The Security Intersection: The Paradox of Power in an Age of Terror, Johannesburg: Wits 
University Press, (2005), pp. 221-223 on The Somaliland Example. Francis Kornegay, ‘Sound AU alarm 
on destabilisation of Somaliland’, Business Day, (10 November 2003). Greg Mills, ‘Is Somaliland Africa’s 
Future’ in South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2003/04, Johannesburg: South African Institute 
of International Affairs, (2004), pp. 327-332. 
445 'Report on the South African Mission on the Somaliland Presidential Elections', Electoral Institute of 
Southern Africa, Johannesburg, (April 2003). http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/somaliland.htm 
‘SOMALIA: Somaliland elections peaceful, say observers’ Irin News, Nairobi, (3 Oct 2005). IRIN, 
‘Somalia: International observer delegations in Hargeysa’, Irin News, Nairobi (30 May 2001). ‘Somalia: 
High turnout for Somaliland referendum’, Irin News, Hargeisa, (31 May 2001). Mandla Nkomfe, ‘Press 
Statement by the South African Observer Mission to the Somaliland Parliamentary elections’, (30 
September 2005). 
http://www.radiosomaliland.com/index.php?itemid=185 
446 'Statement on the Death of Muhammad Ibrahim Egal, Leader of Somaliland', South African 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, (3 May 2002). 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2002/02050609461004.htm  
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make the first move in recognising Hargeisa. Instead, it has requested the AU 
to take the lead in the context of South Africa’s emphasis on 
multilateralism.447  
 
The early 2005 working visit of Somaliland’s President ended with a 
communiqué which asserted:  
 
The Somaliland President and ANC leaders furthermore welcomed the 
planned African Union fact-finding mission to Somaliland and exchanged 
ideas, which urged African leaders in areas of conflict on the Continent to 
cooperate with the African Union to solve outstanding problems in a peaceful, 
and fair manner. The Somaliland President praised President Thabo Mbeki’s 
peace-building efforts in Africa and his efforts to promote Nepad’s goal of 
inter-African trade, to achieve the aims of a stronger and renewed African 
continent.448  
 
South Africa’s Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad re-asserted its position in 
relation to the AU leading on this matter by saying:  
 
The African Union sent a high level team to Somaliland to assess the 
situation. Their report indicated that Somaliland should be treated differently 
to other situations of cessation. This report is now being discussed by other 
countries to determine how to proceed on the matter. It is important to note 
                                                 
447 Letter from South African President Thabo Mbeki to Somaliland President Dahir Rayale Kahin, 
(January 2005). 
448 ‘Communiqué on Somaliland President's working visit to South Africa, from 30 Jan. to 9 Feb.2005’, 
Somaliland Ministry of Information, Hargeisa, Somaliland, (9 February 2005). 
http://www.caynaba.com/Feb05/communique.html  
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however that the recognition of Somaliland is one part of a bigger situation 
with regard to Somalia.449 
 
5.6.2 The African Union 
 
Given IGAD’s direct involvement and commitment to restoring a functioning 
government in Mogadishu, Somaliland’s future is largely dependent on the 
course that the AU adopts in navigating the Somaliland-Somalia stalemate. 
Currently, the AU has opened an office in the city of Jawhar/Baidawa and 
maintains diplomatic contact with Somaliland’s government. 
 
As stated earlier, the AU’s continental integrationist agenda, linked to the 
evolution of ‘regional integration communities’ among its sub-regions, is likely 
to rule out AU official recognition of Somaliland no matter what the legal and 
political case for such a decision might be. Moreover, the very fact that the AU 
harbours major state actors belonging to the Arab League, such as Egypt and 
other North African countries, would also tend to rule out such an option. 
Nevertheless, in the wake of fourteen failed successive attempts to 
resuscitate Somalia, five transitional governments and the uncertain 
prospects facing the current attempt, the AU – unlike the OAU – has 
appeared willing at least to carefully weigh the options for stabilising the 
Somali coast in a manner that factors in the reality of Somaliland as an on-
the-ground fact which will not go away and neither be forced into a shot-gun 
                                                 
449 ‘Notes following Briefing by Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad’, South African Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Media Centre Amphitheatre, Union Buildings, Pretoria, South Africa, (4 July 2006). 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2006/paha0704.htm 
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union with the Mogadishu-based TFG. Here, the track record that the AU is 
building up on the Somalia-Somaliland issue warrants a closer look.450 
 
Assessing the AU’s approach to Somaliland revolves around two reports 
presented to its PSC in 2004 and 2005. In the 2004 document, 'Report of the 
Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia', AU Commission 
Chairperson, Alpha Konare, made the following observations about 
Somaliland: 
 
During the period under review, Somaliland has continued to experience 
relative peace and stability, compared to the other regions of the Somalia. As 
a result, Somaliland has made significant headway in the fields of health, 
education and economic development. The efforts thus made had benefited 
from the support of UN agencies and other international organizations and 
NGOs. 
 
                                                 
450 Listed below are AU reports on Somaliland. The AU’s reports have engaged with the case 
of Somaliland. It is observed that in one case, there is a full AU Commission 4-page report on 
Somaliland and in the remaining reports, the matter is examined briefly. Most analysis focus 
on reviving Somalia: African Union Commission, ‘Résumé. AU Fact-Finding Mission to 
Somaliland (30 April to 4 May 2005)’, 4-page report, Addis Ababa: African Union, (2005).  
African Union Commission, ‘Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Conflict 
Situations in Africa’, Executive Council, Seventh Ordinary Session, Sirte, Libya, 
EX.CL/191(VII)) (29 June-2 July 2005) Addis Ababa: African Union, (2005), (Somaliland p. 5, 
point 20). 
African Union Commission, ‘Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Support of 
the African Union to the Transitional Institutions of Somalia’, Peace and Security Council, 
22nd Meeting, PSC/PR/2(XXII), Addis Ababa: African Union, (5 January 2005), (Somaliland 
p. 8, points 22 and 23). 
African Union Commission, ‘Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in 
Somalia’, Peace and Security Council, 6th Session’, PSC/PR/2(VI), Addis Ababa: African 
Union, (29 April 2004), (Somaliland p. 11, point 44). 
African Union Commission, ‘Statement of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African 
Union’ (Sool and Saanag) [on border clashes between Somaliland and Puntland], Addis 
Ababa: African Union, (2004).  
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Since they unilaterally declared the independence of their region, in 1991, the 
authorities of Somaliland have made sustained efforts to obtain international 
recognition. So far, these efforts have not yielded any result. On 13 March 
2004, I received the President of Somaliland, who briefed me on the situation 
in that region and the achievements made over the past years. He stressed 
the need for the international community to accord international recognition 
on Somaliland. In the meantime, he requested an observer status within the 
AU, to enable Somaliland to follow the developments in the Union. On my 
part, I explained that the concerns of Somaliland could be addressed within 
the federal framework agreed upon in Mbagathi, in the context of the unity of 
Somalia. I stressed the need for Somaliland to contribute to the success of 
the Reconciliation Conference and to make concrete proposals to that 
effect.451  
 
Among his concluding observations, Konare indicated that “I welcome the 
continued stability in Somaliland” and “intend to continue to engage the 
authorities of this region, with the view of looking at ways through which they 
would, in due time, contribute to the restoration of peace and security in 
Somalia, as well as the unity of the country.”452  Of course this was at the end 
of April 2004, several months before the Mbagathi process would conclude in 
the formal establishment of the TFG, by which time an emerging sentiment 
regarding the outcome of Mbagathi reflected a growing sense of caution about 
any rush to recognise a new Mogadishu regime in the light of past history. 
While Somaliland was not making much headway toward achieving 
international recognition and the AU was towing the ‘party line’ on Hargeisa 
                                                 
451 African Union Commission, (2004), p. 5, italics added.  
452 Ibid. 
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joining Mbagathi, how the AU and the international community at large would 
greet a new Somali settlement pertaining to Mogadishu became a major 
factor in the Somaliland status equation. 
 
At the beginning of 2005, another Chairperson’s report was tabled to the PSC: 
'Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Support of the African 
Union to the Transitional Institutions of Somalia'.453 This report largely focused 
on the need to enhance the security environment in Somalia as a means of 
facilitating the governing of the TFG. The preoccupation was on relocating the 
new government from Kenya and on issues of deploying an AU peacekeeping 
mission. The issue of recognition of TFG Somalia was not raised, though the 
Chairperson pointedly stressed that “I wish to call for dialogue to resolve any 
outstanding national issues” which, within the context of the Mbagathi ‘party 
line’, would include Somaliland.454 
 
With regard to Somaliland, the Chairperson made the following observation: 
 
On a related development, I received a high level delegation led by the 
‘President’ of Somaliland, in the course of October 2004, and another 
delegation led by the ‘Foreign Minister’ of Somaliland, in the course of 
November 2004. During the visits, the delegations submitted a request for the 
AU to accord Somaliland a kind of recognition, including the granting of an 
observer status within the AU. The delegation led by the Foreign Minister 
                                                 
453 See African Union Commission, ‘Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Conflict 
Situations in Africa’, Executive Council, Seventh Ordinary Session, Sirte, Libya, 
EX.CL/191(VII)), (29 June-2 July 2005), Addis Ababa: African Union (2005), with specific 
reference to ‘Somaliland’, p. 5, point 20. 
454 Ibid. 
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brought to my attention the skirmishes that took place at the end of October 
2004, between the forces of Somaliland and those of the neighbouring 
Puntland, near the town of Los Anod. The delegation then requested the AU 
to dispatch a Fact-finding Mission to Somaliland, in connection with the 
incidents that took place around Los Anod. The delegation also brought to my 
attention the gains made by Somaliland in the social, economic and security 
sectors. 
 
On my part, I encouraged the authorities to pursue the path of dialogue to 
address any differences and misunderstandings with the then authorities of 
Puntland and with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. I 
welcomed the progress made in the fields of social and economic 
development and security in Somaliland. I also undertook to dispatch a 
Mission to Somaliland as soon as possible.455  
 
On 3 May 2005, a seven-person AU delegation, headed by AU Deputy 
Chairman Patrick Mazimhaka, visited Somaliland. Its itinerary included Burco 
and Berbera, where thousands of people reportedly poured out onto the 
streets to welcome what was an unprecedented visit of the AU team. The 
delegation was also scheduled to visit the Awdal region stopover in Gabiley. 
In Hargeisa, Somaliland’s political leaders took the occasion of the AU visit to 
frankly express Somaliland’s frustration with the AU. The Deputy Speaker of 
Somaliland’s Lower House, Abdulqadir Jirde said: “The wisdom that evaded 
the international community is to allow the more successful political entities 
that emerge from the death and decay of failed states to flourish and take 
their place in the society of states. Somaliland and Eritrea qualify as prime 
                                                 
455 Ibid., p. 8. 
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examples of such successful political units.” He continued by pointing out that 
the AU’s ignoring Somaliland’s achievements was “unwittingly jeopardizing 
the stability and security of the region” and further, that “Somaliland cannot be 
wished away by any stretch of the imagination nor can it be bullied into a 
forced re-marriage with Somalia…” .456 
 
Whether or not this AU delegation’s visit will result in any benefit for 
Somaliland beyond the narrow confines of the border dispute with Puntland, 
and a TFG headed by the former anti-Somaliland leader of Puntland, is 
uncertain. Similar uncertainty pertains to the AU’s openness to a dialogue with 
Somaliland via its Chairperson, though the May 2005 AU visit augured well, 
depending on how the visit impacted on the members of the delegation and 
how the AU follows through on their findings from it. Perhaps what is 
transpiring is an interim holding action on the AU’s part, pending signs of 
credibility in the actual relocation and functioning of a government in 
Mogadishu. It could even be argued that, at some point, the AU could 
enhance its leverage over the political situation in Mogadishu by extending 
observer recognition to Somaliland.457  
 
Alternatively, the AU may wish to hold off conferring observer status on 
Hargeisa pending a build up in transitional momentum for the Somalia TFG, to 
a point where it can package Somaliland observer status with a mutual 
                                                 
456 Abdulqadir Jirde, ‘Speech delivered on behalf of the two houses’, Hargeisa, Parliament, 
Republic of Somaliland, (3 May 2005). 
http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=%205330 
457 African Union Commission, ‘Résumé. AU Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland, (30 April to 
4 May 2005)’, unpublished 4-page report, Addis Ababa: African Union, (2005). 
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commitment on the part of both Hargeisa and Mogadishu and negotiate some 
sort of regional reconciliation. Certainly, it is premature for talks between 
Hargeisa and Mogadishu at this stage, given the uncertain future of the TFG. 
Further, presumably the AU would want to position itself in such a manner so 
as to exert leverage over both, as a means of moving events in the direction it 
desired for bringing about a normalised situation along the Somali coast and 
for whatever vision it may hold for a regionally integrated Horn of Africa. Or 
perhaps this is wishful thinking that reads too much in the AU’s coyness 
toward Somaliland’s overtures. 
 
For Somaliland, such speculation is far from idle as its development potential 
in terms of attracting international assistance and foreign investment is seen 
as largely contingent on recognition. At the 2004 workshop in Hargeisa, John 
Drysdale observed that financial self-reliance was becoming more and more 
critical for Somaliland as a result of the recognition challenge, coupled with 
Saudi Arabia’s economic sanctions under the guise of a livestock ban linked 
to the ‘Rift Valley fever’ pretext.458  
 
The July 2006 AU Summit witnessed for the very first time the case of 
Somaliland being raised at the AU Executive Council Meeting. East African 
states Kenya, Rwanda and Zambia called on member states not only to focus 
on Somalia, but to recognise the peace and stability in Somaliland.459  
 
                                                 
458 ‘Conference on Peace, Security and Development in The Horn of Africa: The Somaliland 
Experience’, hosted by African Renaissance Center For Social Science Research, Media And 
Development Hargeisa, Somaliland, (1-2 August 2004).  
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Prior to the above meeting, the AU’s Chair, Professor Alpha Konare, made 
time to meet with Somaliland President Kahin at the AU’s Addis Ababa 
headquarters on 29 May 2006.460 
 
5.7 Who Will Take the First Step III: Extra-African State Actors and the 
International Community 
 
Hargeisa cannot, in Drysdale’s view,461 establish its own development bank to 
generate loans based on collateral which would allow it to convert assets into 
capital to reinforce its already self-reliant development path. Further, beyond 
the pragmatic engagement of UN agencies, there is a need for the World 
Bank’s involvement to enhance government’s ability to induce financial 
institutions and companies to enter Somaliland and look at assets in its urban 
areas. Moreover, for the UN to go beyond its current pragmatic engagement 
with Somaliland, some form of recognition would seem to be necessary and 
this is likely to commence with the AU and key member states such as 
Ethiopia and South Africa, for while the UN may by now be sufficiently gun-
shy from recognising successive failures in Mogadishu, it is not likely to alter 
its position toward Somaliland until signals emerge from Africa. By the same 
token, neither are sympathetic Western governments likely to lead the way for 
recognition.462 
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5.7.1   The West 
 
While the EU is sympathetic to Somaliland’s development in relation to 
assisting Ethiopia’s logistical access to port facilities, not all members of the 
EU have been as accommodating, and this appears to be influenced by 
colonial legacies in the Horn of Africa. For example, apart from the Arab 
League, Italy, as the former colonial power in southern Somalia, has not been 
sympathetic to Somaliland and has consistently given diplomatic backing to 
interim regimes in Mogadishu. However, to the extent that there remains 
general international caution toward rushing to recognise the TFG, this 
negative may be something of a positive for Somaliland.463  
 
Britain, by contrast, as the former colonial metropole for the northern 
Somaliland protectorate, has probably been about as sympathetic as any 
government can be under the circumstances. There has been a steady flow of 
Somaliland officials to Britain over the course of Somaliland’s existence as a 
self-declared independent state since 1991. In 2004, UK Minister for Africa, 
Chris Mullen, made an official visit to Somaliland. Britain’s goodwill is key to 
Somaliland’s recognition prospects, though it never appears imminent that 
London will be the first to recognise Hargeisa. This has not, however, ruled 
out British companies exploring economic opportunities in Somaliland. A 
cryptic report last year by the ‘Asia Intelligence Wire’ noted that  
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the Somaliland ministers of defence, water and mineral resources have 
returned to Hargeysa … after a two-week visit to the UK, following an 
invitation from British business companies. Reports released after their return 
say the ministers signed an agreement with a British company to begin oil 
exploration in Somaliland. The company contracted is the same one that 
conducted the oil exploration in Sudan”. 464 
 
Overall, however, aid from bilateral donors has not been very forthcoming.465 
As Shinn points out, many “probably shy away for fear that provision of 
assistance connotes diplomatic recognition”.466 There has been modest 
‘democracy and governance’ aid for aspects of the country’s post-
reconciliation transition and this is seen as an incentive for Somaliland to stay 
the course in implementing democratic reforms. Thus, US institutions like the 
Initiative and International Referendum Institute and International Republican 
Institute have had a presence in Somaliland during phases of this post-
reconciliation transition.467 Importantly, the National Endowment for 
Democracy funds governance programmes which are implemented by more 
than twelve local Somaliland NGOs.468 
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Somaliland Constitutional Referendum', Initiative and Referendum Institute, (27 July 2001), 
http://iandrinstitute.org/Studies.htm 
The International Republican Institute's involvement in Somaliland includes, “Specific training 
topics will include media campaigning, coalition building, forming a loyal opposition in the 
post-electoral context, continued outreach and mobilization at the grassroots level, 
maintenance of party activity, and civic education.” 
http://www.iri.org/region.asp?region=1185560545 
468 National Endowment for Democracy, see http://www.ned.org/dbtw-wpd/exec/dbtwpub.dll 
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Somaliland, it can be argued, would be an ideal model of a self-reliant 
developing African state, attractive for a conservative administration in 
Washington to support. Moreover, from an American perspective, there would 
be an interest in reinforcing the democratic development of a Muslim country 
strategically situated near the Middle Eastern theatre of the global ‘war on 
terror’.469 But there is little reason for Washington to unilaterally recognise 
Somaliland – especially given the unflattering ‘unilateralist’ reputation which, 
for obvious reasons, the George W. Bush administration has created for itself 
– when it has invested so much time, energy, and political and diplomatic 
capital in what it would consider the real prize in the North-East African 
region, i.e. bringing peace to oil-rich Sudan, where it aims to counter China’s 
influence. 
 
5.7.2  The United Nations  
 
Although the UN has long been engaged in Somaliland, principally through 
agencies like the UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF, there is unlikely to be any 
progress in the country’s relations with the UN until there is an ‘African 
solution’ to the question of its status (see map of UN Offices in Somaliland 
and Somalia). Sometimes there are ambiguously misleading reports 
concerning the UN’s posture on Somaliland that amount to very little. For 
example, a 2004 news item from the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization carried a heading on Somalia that read: 'Somaliland: UN 
                                                 
469 Two recent meetings focused on the recognition of Somaliland, ‘Roundtable on Somalia’, 
Washington, US Department of State and National Intelligence Council (13 October 2005) 
and US Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, ‘Mutual Security Conference’, Addis 
Ababa, (25-25 January 2006). The author was requested to address both fora. 
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Secretary General calls for a Long Term Solution of Somaliland Status', 
which, in fact, turned out to be nothing more than remarks that Secretary-
General Annan made regarding the need for a “long-term solution to the 
confrontation between the pro-secessionist Somali areas called ‘Somaliland’ 
and ‘Puntland’ over the control of the Sool and Saanag regions …” .470 
  
As early as 2000, the late President Egal, as cited earlier in this chapter, had 
suggested that Somaliland should be accorded an “interim status” like  
Kosovo and formerly East Timor,  to allow Somaliland to deal with donors and 
international financial institutions. While the UN is unlikely to move in this 
direction without African endorsement, it has been pragmatically engaged in 
Somaliland. But there are limits to this pragmatism. The fight against 
HIV/AIDS is indicative in this regard. In his 2002 article on Somaliland, Shinn 
noted that although Somaliland declared HIV an epidemic in 1998 and 
UNICEF had conducted a useful HIV/AIDS behavioural survey in 1999, there 
was still no UNAIDS presence in either Somalia or Somaliland. Nevertheless, 
Somaliland does possess a National HIV/AIDS Coordination Body, which held 
its first meeting in 2002. At the time, while it was generally believed that the 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS was low, the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) believed that infection rates were on the increase. Shinn was of the 
opinion that “if Somaliland, aided by international organizations, bilateral 
donors, and NGOs, were to wage a major campaign now against HIV/AIDS, it 
might actually be possible to prevent the catastrophic situations that confront 
                                                 
470 http://www.unpo.org/news_detail.php?arg=60&par=2062  
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its neighbors”.471 Shinn advised that this is “…an area where Somaliland 
should seize the initiative and request international assistance and an 
UNAIDS presence”.472  
 
As it is, UNICEF appears to operate as the UNAIDS proxy in Somalia and 
Somaliland. In 2003, it supported a two-day workshop in Hargeisa to finalise 
an action plan on the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and sexually 
transmitted infections in Somaliland. There is now a UNAIDS Representative 
for Somalia who, along with the broader Somalia Aid Coordinating Group 
(SACG), is based in Nairobi. In 2005, the UNAIDS Representative for Somalia 
visited Somaliland to confer with UNICEF on plans for HIV/AIDS prevention 
and control. Also engaged in this visit were committees established in 
Somaliland to fight HIV/AIDS as well as staff of other UN agencies based in 
the country.473 Given the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the absence 
of a UNAIDS presence in Somaliland tends to define the limits of the UN’s 
constructive engagement in the absence of Somaliland’s progress towards 
recognition. Recently, UNAIDS has corrected this sad situation and developed 
a presence in Hargeisa. 
 
This predicament kicks the question of recognition squarely back into the 
court of the AU and key states such as South Africa and Ethiopia. 
 
                                                 
471 Shinn, (2002), p. 5. 
472 Ibid. 
473 ‘SOMALIA: HIV/AIDS commission launched in Somaliland’, Irin News, (16 September 
2005). 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=49098&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa&SelectC
ountry=SOMALIA 
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5.8  Somaliland Recognition Quo Vadis: In Search of ‘An African  
       Solution’ 
 
A good point to start with in trying to decipher a ‘way forward’ for Somaliland 
in terms of the recognition conundrum might be to focus on the implications 
that Somaliland’s predicament holds for the larger picture of peace, security 
and stability along the Somali coast region of the Horn of Africa and how 
these concerns relate to AU priorities in advancing African governance and 
stability; concerns that also relate to the AU’s promotion of regional 
integration. Here, Somaliland’s former Deputy Speaker of the Lower House 
touched on what should be a major concern for the AU’s conservatism on the 
question of Somaliland; the possibility, in the words of Jirde, that the AU may 
be “unwittingly jeopardizing the stability and security of the region” by not 
thinking ‘outside-the-box’ on a situation that, in spite of concerns about setting 
a precedent that undermines the principle of territorial integrity, is actually 
unprecedented: the disintegration of what once was a sovereign state.474  
 
Somalia is not simply a ‘failed state.’ It is a disintegrated state; one that, in 
reality, no longer exists, irrespective of the fiction that African, Arab and 
international diplomacy has continued to attach to Somalia for whatever 
vested political interests this fiction serves.475 As such, in a volatile 
                                                 
474 Abdulqadir Jirde, 'Memorandum on Somaliland', speech delivered on behalf of the two 
houses of the Somaliland parliament on the occasion of the visit of the African Union to 
Hargeisa, (3 May 2005). 
 http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=5330 
475 Ulf Terlinde and Tobias Hagmann, ‘Faking a Government for Somalia. International diplomacy 
supports fictitious peace process’, Editorial and Commentary, Sub-Saharan Informer (Addis 
Ababa), (29 July 2005), p. 9.  
http://www.ulf-terlinden.de/docs/2005-07-29Terlinden_Hagmann_SSI.pdf 
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interregional environment encompassing coastal North-East Africa and the 
Arab Middle East and Persian Gulf, the stateless situation pertaining to the 
governance vacuum in the Somali region, save Somaliland, has to be 
considered an ever-present security threat. The rise of militant sectarian 
fundamentalism in this region, interacting with transnational terrorist and 
criminal transactions, not to mention inter- and intra-state political tensions, 
cannot help but complicate efforts to stabilise the Horn of Africa. The 
seriousness of the failed or collapsed state challenge within the context of 
reforming the multilateral architecture for enhancing global peace and security 
was expressed in a 2005 commentary in Asia Times Online by Bhaskar 
Dasgupta’s critique, 'Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is a Crock'.476 Pointing 
out that UN reforms should be examined “more critically and aggressively”, 
Bhaskar argued that “in particular, some sort of international consensus 
mechanisms should be drawn up, so that failed or failing states can be looked 
at much earlier and if required with much more force than currently 
applied”.477  
 
Since the failed and failing state syndrome is more acute in Africa than 
anywhere else, this should present an opportunity for the AU and its new 
architecture to assume international leadership in breaking new ground in 
addressing such questions. To reiterate, the destabilisation of the Somali 
coast, emanating from the collapse of the state in Somalia, is without 
precedent in Africa’s post-colonial history. Therefore, the conservative 
                                                                                                                                            
J. Peter Pham, ‘Dangerous Fiction: A Tale of Two Cities, Part I’, World Defense Review (13 
July 2006). http://reportingwar.com/includes/pham071306pr.html 
476 http://www.atimes.com, (3 March 2005). 
477 Ibid. 
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adherence to the ‘territorial integrity’ principle, given the fear that setting a 
precedent should not apply, especially in light of the legal case supporting 
Somaliland’s re-recognition, based on its recognised statehood prior to its 
union with former Italian Somaliland. In addition, from a pragmatically realist 
perspective, Somaliland represents the thus far enduring stabilising centre of 
gravity in the greater Somali region. Furthermore, the country’s leaders have 
not, at this stage, been clamouring for full sovereign status.  
 
Recognising the political reality of their situation and the understandable 
resistance of the AU in this regard, they have scaled down their recognition 
request to that of observer status in AU and international status comparable to 
Kosovo or East Timor (prior to its independence) as a means of overcoming 
their international isolation in Africa and globally, and in order to normalise 
their external economic relations. It would seem that the AU does not see it as 
being in Africa’s security interests for Somaliland to remain isolated in an 
unstable region. Therefore, the AU and key states like Ethiopia and South 
Africa might consider assessing Somaliland’s recognition case in terms of 
how this could either contribute to or detract from advancing the stability of the 
Somali coast and, based on such an assessment, whether or not Ethiopia and 
South Africa, together with the AU, could fashion a diplomacy of reconciling 
Somaliland and Somalia accordingly.  
 
Given the fact that South Africa has already taken a major step toward 
involving itself in the diplomatic politics of the Horn of Africa by chairing the 
AU Committee on the Post-Conflict Reconstruction of the Sudan, it would 
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therefore appear that Pretoria would be in a position to advance some 
‘outside-the-box’ thinking in this regard. This should be done in close 
consultation with Ethiopia and its fellow three-year member PSC states, 
namely Algeria and Rwanda, since the Arab League dimension of such a 
strategy will have to be factored into such a process. What follows are 
elements of how such a process might unfold. 
 
For starters, South Africa’s leadership on the post-conflict reconstruction of 
the Sudan might serve as a point of departure for the PSC to devise a more 
comprehensive North-East/Horn of Africa stabilisation strategy. Such a 
strategic vision would encompass the future transition of the Sudan toward a 
more sustainable governance framework building on the north-south interim 
(after all, this is not a permanent settlement) peace agreement and the 
pacification of Darfur parleyed into a broader Sudan accord; the management 
and eventual resolution of tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea and, above 
all, conflict prevention; and arriving at a workable accommodation in the 
greater Somali region, centred on Somaliland as well as Somalia. Thus, the 
recognition question for Somaliland should not be approached in isolation 
from such an overarching, inter-linked regional stability matrix.  It should be 
noted that the AU supports and tries to encourage a dialogue between 
Somaliland and Somalia, and the modalities pertaining to such a process do 
appear to be in place, to the extent that Somalia’s TFG remains unsettled as a 
governing entity in Mogadishu, and initiating such a dialogue is thus 
problematic. However, South Africa and Ethiopia, in conjunction with other 
members of the PSC, might prevail upon the AU to provide Somaliland with 
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the observer status that it seeks, conditioned on its opening a dialogue with 
the TFG. Since it is unclear when the TFG will actually stabilise the governing 
entity in Mogadishu – and Somaliland’s observer status should not be held 
hostage to this uncertainty – the opening of talks between Hargeisa and the 
TFG should begin as soon as feasible. It is not as if there is nothing to talk 
about except the issue of union between Hargeisa and Mogadishu.  
 
Pending the TFG more firmly establishing itself and implementing the various 
stages of transition, Somaliland-Somalia talks could, for starters, be limited to 
normalising relations between Somaliland and Puntland. The aim would, 
under the auspices of the AU Commission/PSC and IGAD, be to initiate a 
mediation of the Sool and Saanag border dispute between Puntland and 
Somaliland, culminating in a non-aggression agreement between Somaliland 
and Somalia. Negotiations between Somaliland and Somalia over the Sool 
and Saanag border region could, in the process of these talks, or following 
their conclusion, expand into an open-ended PSC/IGAD sponsored 'Somali 
Coast Governance Forum' inclusive not only of Somaliland and Somalia, but 
also Djibouti. 'Out of area' members of the PSC – South Africa, Rwanda, 
Algeria and Nigeria – could serve as a ‘contact group’ in tandem with IGAD.  
 
For additional measure, Ethiopia and Kenya, in terms of promoting a regional 
integration dimension to such a forum, might field delegations from the 
Ethiopia’s Ogaden federal region and Kenya’s Northern Frontier District within 
a context of exploring shared sovereignty arrangements with Somaliland, the 
TFG and Djibouti as a corollary to cementing a wider regional economic and 
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governing community. Nevertheless, the priority core issue to be ironed out is 
the relationship between Somaliland and Somalia within a wider regional 
integration context. Pending a mutual agreement between these two parties, 
both would enjoy observer status within the AU. However these negotiations 
might end up, in the absence of full recognition, in Somaliland’s trade relations 
with Ethiopia being parleyed into Somaliland’s wider integration in the regional 
co-operation mechanisms of East and North-East Africa via COMESA and, 
perhaps even the EAC, which is heading for a federation by 2010.   
 
As it is, academics and specialists on and from North-East Africa have 
already begun envisioning different regional economic and political integration 
scenarios that Somaliland’s leaders would eventually have to factor into the 
planning of the Somali region. AllAfrica.com, for example, carried an 
interesting ‘Analysis’ from the Addis Tribune on 'The Horn of Africa: 
Background, Scope and Regional Initiatives' by Sisay Asefa which may be 
instructive as to the type of potential for co-operation that could include 
Somaliland.478 Asefa considers COMESA, IGAD and NEPAD as “three 
regional initiatives that can serve as the basis for regional cooperation” in 
what he envisions as the Horn of Africa Free Trade Area (HAFTA) though he 
later acknowledges that “a narrowly defined Horn of Africa free trade area that 
excludes Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan will not have much inter-regional trade 
benefits and complementarity”.479 This essentially means that a HAFTA would 
have to be linked to the EAC and its prospective federation as the integrative 
                                                 
478 Sisay Asefa, ‘The Horn of Africa: Background, Scope And Regional Initiatives’, Addis 
Tribune, Addis Ababa, (30 May 2003), p. 8. 
 http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/33/025.htmlp. 8. 
479 Ibid., p. 13. 
 307
geo-political and economic centre of gravity and reference point for Horn 
countries, Somalia and Somaliland included.  
 
Depending on how the Sudan situation evolves, a prospective East African 
federation could serve as the potential re-integrative fulcrum for that country 
and/or its regions, south Sudan notably, in the event that they opt for 
independence; independence within the new AU – as opposed to the OAU – 
context essentially re-defining independence as a way-station to a larger 
regionally integrated relationship for the African nation-state. This is all the 
more reason why the AU should not remain in a timid posture with regard to 
conferring observer status on Somaliland, for its ‘unilateral independence’ will 
eventually have to accommodate this newly emerging integration reality, as 
will south Sudan.  
 
Somaliland, for its part, could embark on proactive diplomacy of seeking 
observer status, if not membership, of the EAC and/or COMESA. This could 
be with Ethiopia’s backing, linked to Addis Ababa’s interest in embedding 
itself in a larger economic community, factoring its bilateral links with 
Somaliland. These same options would also be open to Somalia. However, 
for good measure, in terms of Somaliland’s governance comparative 
advantage, another proactive move that it might make, in consultation with 
both South Africa and Ethiopia, would be for Somaliland to apply to join the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as a means of reaching out to 
NEPAD and embedding itself as firmly as possible in the NEPAD process. In 
this process, Somaliland’s membership in the APRM would reinforce its status 
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as the centre of stability in the Somali region and, perhaps, serve as an 
incentive for the south to follow suit. 
 
A Somali coast governance forum could serve as the venue for both 
Somaliland and Somalia to explore such options as well as how the two 
governments might relate to one another politically. Given the wider regional 
implications that this dialogue would carry for their neighbours, these nations 
will also have an interest in such a forum. But, in addition, these countries 
need to be encouraged to exercise greater commitment to security-enhancing 
measures in the Somali region. For that reason, the UN’s ‘Monitoring Group’ 
may need to be beefed up into a 'Transactions Monitoring Commission' to 
oversee arms embargo violations and financial transactions involving non-
Somali state actors and one or another Somali client actor. Of course this 
addresses the situation in Somalia TFG regions rather than Somaliland. But a 
continuing flow of arms into the greater Somali region cannot help but 
undermine the security of the entire region, Somaliland included.480 Moreover, 
such a Commission may be a necessary mechanism for contributing to the 
stabilisation of Mogadishu.  
 
An added role for such a Commission, as a monitoring body, could be to 
monitor violence and/or cease-fire arrangements between different Somali 
coast actors by fielding peace monitors. This could reflect joint collaboration 
between the AU’s PSC and a Transaction Monitoring Commission. Such 
UN/AU collaboration could be made integral to a ‘Somali Coast Peace Accord’ 
                                                 
480 United Nations. ‘Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council 
resolution 1630 (2005)’, Report No. 06-30515, (4 May 2006). 
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– as an extension of a successful outcome to Somaliland-Puntland/Somalia 
border mediation – that included all Somali actors. All IGAD member states 
should also buy in to such an accord which, in addition to associated 
monitoring, would complement and reinforce an AU peacekeeping presence 
in and around Mogadishu. 
 
Perhaps the kind of Somaliland-Somalia dialogue proposed here, in 
conjunction with the multi-faceted Sudan transitional dynamics, could serve as 
points of departure for elaborating a more coherent regional stabilisation 
architecture for the Horn of Africa. Thus, a Somaliland-Somalia Governance 
Forum might constitute one pillar of dialogue and stabilisation within an 
overarching Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation 
(CSSDCA) for North-East Africa; in other words, a regionalisation of the AU’s 
CSSDCA to specifically address long-term peace-building and regional 
integration in this part of the continent within a structured dialogue framework. 
Apart from whether or not any of these avenues might be explored and/or 
taken up by Somaliland, the AU and/or other vested interest parties, what are 
some of the possible scenarios that could be contemplated for Somaliland 
and the Somali coast, taking into account the unprecedented nature of the 
challenge presented by the disintegration of the Somali state and the need to 
stabilise the region? Four possibilities are presented below: 
 
1. A conservative maintenance of the status quo; 
2. mutual separation two-state solution within a Somali coast 
commonwealth; 
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3. Somaliland-Somalia confederation; and 
4. Somaliland recognition, Somalia de-recognition. 
 
5.8.1 Conservative Maintenance of the Status Quo 
 
In this scenario, which is quite likely for the foreseeable future, the AU holds 
Somaliland in abeyance on the question of observer status, while 
concentrating all its efforts on making the TFG a credible and functional 
government in Mogadishu. The AU goes no further than advising Somaliland 
to begin a dialogue with the TFG which, in the absence of any political, 
diplomatic and/or economic and security incentives, Hargeisa refuses to do. 
Meanwhile, the TFG would remain unable to establish itself as a functioning 
government in Mogadishu; or make a bid to so establish itself, for which it 
would be violently rebuffed; or, in the process of establishing itself, it would 
spark off another round of civil war that effectively takes things back to square 
one with the collapse of the TFG. Meanwhile, the regional situation along the 
Somali coast would stagnate or deteriorate amid Somaliland’s continued 
frustrating recognition quest. 
 
5.8.2 Mutual Separation/Commonwealth Option 
 
With or without incentives from the AU for Somaliland and/or the AU forcing 
the issue with the TFG, Somaliland and the Somalia TFG are encouraged by 
Ethiopia and Djibouti, possibly with South Africa’s backing and the 
support/acquiescence of IGAD to negotiate their differences, perhaps starting 
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with the Sool and Saanag border issue. These talks would result in a non-
aggression pact or agreement that would expand into a mutual agreement by 
both Hargeisa and Mogadishu to present the AU with their choice to remain 
as separate sovereign states based on mutual diplomatic recognition. The 
TFG would become the first state – African or non-African – to recognise 
Somaliland, much as Ethiopia eventually chose to do in the case of Eritrea. 
However, this mutual agreement, based on the influence of Somali business 
communities, would be linked to Hargeisa and Mogadishu committing 
themselves to the joint establishment of an economic community embracing 
both countries to Djibouti’s membership; a limited regional economic 
integration initiative that could conceivably attract Ethiopia, in the process, 
opening up the prospect for the eventual formation of a HAFTA). Called a 
Somali Coast Commonwealth, Somaliland and Somalia would request full 
diplomatic recognition by the AU and the international community, not as the 
separate sovereign states that they would be, but as the ‘commonwealth’ in 
which they would field joint delegations and establish joint diplomatic missions 
to the UN and in foreign capitals. This would provide an economical 
opportunity for both countries to manage their inter-African and global 
relations. It is however also an unrealistic prospect given the zero-sum 
outlook of the TFG regarding Somaliland, the enmity between Hargeisa and 
Mogadishu carrying over from Somaliland-Puntland tensions, and 
Somaliland’s predictable refusal to initiate talks with Mogadishu, which would 
be based on anything but a solution that starts from the recognition of two 
separate if not totally sovereign states.  
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5.8.3 Somaliland-Somalia Confederation 
 
In this scenario, Hargeisa and Mogadishu manage to go a bit further than 
mutual recognition linked by an economic commonwealth, and actually 
manage to satisfy the AU preference for the region’s territorial integrity. But 
such a settlement would be dependent on whether Hargeisa is likely to go 
short of full sovereignty: a confederation based on Somaliland and a federal 
Somalia as co-equal self-governing states; not Somaliland as a federated 
region of the TFG, as is the case with Puntland. This is possibly the only 
realistic solution out of the current impasse except that it is not likely to 
happen soon, for a variety of reasons, without a more proactive diplomacy on 
the part of the AU and key state actors on the PSC, namely South Africa and 
Ethiopia, and including pressure on the TFG in the form of disabusing it of any 
notion of full recognition unless it negotiates a settlement with Somaliland. 
Such a scenario would also, in all likelihood, include some political incentive 
for Hargeisa in the form of observer status for Somaliland in the AU. From 
there, the same regional integration possibilities would be obtained as in the 
case of the ‘commonwealth’.481 
 
5.8.4 Somaliland Recognition/Somalia De-Recognition 
 
This scenario would turn scenario one on its head, representing the most 
radical departure from the status quo. While this is not likely to happen or at 
least not soon, its logic rests on the reality of Somaliland’s stability which, if it 
                                                 
481 Matt Bryden, ‘Somalia and Somaliland. Envisioning a dialogue on the question of Somali 
unity’, African Security Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2004). 
http://www.iss.org.za/pubs/ASR/13No2/Contentpdf.html 
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continues to be sustainable, could make full diplomatic recognition 
increasingly compelling to African and non-African actors alike.482 This would 
be particularly feasible if the TFG remains stalled and/or worse, as the 
international community is unlikely to want to keep financing what, in effect, 
amounts to an abyss or a ‘black hole’ in a Mogadishu that is seemingly 
unwilling to reconstitute itself as anything remotely resembling a credible, 
functioning state. In this case, assuming that a consensus emerges about the 
need to stabilise the region, Somaliland becomes the beneficiary of diplomatic 
recognition on an understanding that it represents the core of what could 
evolve into expanding stability along the Somali coast. This could start with 
observer status, pending the continued monitoring of developments in 
Mogadishu and expanding to full recognition, if the TFG fails to become an 
effective government. Meanwhile, increased economic aid and interaction in 
support of Somaliland’s development, along with the breaking of the log-jam 
on recognition, would signal that the AU and the international community have 
decided to make it the focal point of stabilising the greater Somali region. 
Mogadishu and the various and sundry factions surrounding its dysfunction 
would have to face the reality of coming to terms with Somaliland, on 
Hargeisa’s terms, and/or Hargeisa could be made the mediating arbiter of 
reconciliation in the south – all with the backing of the AU and an international 
                                                 
482 Jeffrey Herbst, ‘In Africa, What Does It Take to Be a Country?’, Washington Post, (2 
January 2004). Herbst contends "recognizing Somaliland would be a strong signal to the rest 
of Africa that performance matters". Kurt Shillinger, ‘Recognizing Somaliland: Forward Step in 
Countering Terrorism’, RUSI Journal, London (Royal United Services Institute for Defense 
and Security Studies), (April 2005).  
http://www.rusi.org/forward.php?structureID=S40757DA765027&ref=P425663C8CF6C9&sho
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community exhausted with ‘Mogadishu fatigue’ and ready to wash their hands 
of failure after failure in the south, but nevertheless, cognisant of the need to 
fill the power vacuum in the greater Somali region. Again, while compelling, 
this scenario is unlikely unless the AU and its key member states become less 
conservative in their conflict prevention, management and resolution 
diplomacy. 
 
The likely prospects for Somaliland on the issue of recognition, given as a 
survey of these possible scenarios and any variants that may arise, is what 
used to be the ongoing refrain in southern Africa: a lutta continua. The recent 
fact-finding visits of former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and the 
doyen of African Studies, Professor Ali Mazrui, suggests an era of hope for 
Somaliland.483  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Interplay of Internal and External Forces  
as a Strategy to Acquire International 
Recognition  
 
 
Tani waa inoo xeer 
 
This will serve as a precedent between us (Somali proverb) 
 
 
While the previous chapters have separately explored the dimensions of 
reconciliation, reconstruction, religion and the quest for diplomatic recognition 
in the international relations of Somaliland’s ‘bottom-up’ state-building project, 
each aspect is intimately intertwined, and this interplay shapes a larger picture 
for understanding the emergence of Somaliland within the greater geo-
political context of the Somali peninsula, and its search for international 
recognition.  
 
The international relations of Somaliland’s state reconstruction forms an 
increasingly important dimension of the African and international politics of 
attempts to construct a new framework of democratic stability within the 
overall Somali peninsula and the greater Horn of Africa. As such, each of 
these essential and inter-related dimensions – reconciliation, reconstruction, 
religion and recognition – has provided a useful point-of-departure for making 
an assessment of the domestic politics and international relations of 
Somaliland’s state reconstruction with the recurring attempts at reconstituting 
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a Mogadishu-based Somali state. Apart from the political dynamics of the 
fraught Somaliland-Somalia relationship and how it unfolded, Somaliland and 
Somalia represent alternative modalities for approaching the local, regional 
and international politics of state reconstruction along the Somali coast and, 
more broadly, in Africa as a whole.  
 
Given the stark comparison that can be made of the relative success or failure 
of state reconstruction in Somaliland versus Somalia, the central hypothesis 
underlying this study is the importance of Somaliland’s example as a case-
study in the efficacy of the internally-driven, ‘bottom-up’ approach to post-
conflict nation-building and regional stability and the implications this 
approach holds for prioritising domestic reconciliation between indigenous 
culture and traditions, and modernity in achieving relative stability and 
international recognition in the nation-building project. For this reason, 
isolating the 'reconciliation’ dimension in the first chapter was central to 
examining all other dimensions, in as much as reconstruction, the role of 
religion and the diplomacy of recognition are all aspects of Somaliland’s 
reconciliatory approach, a significant factor in disciplining domestic forces to 
nation-building and the project of international recognition. It is an approach 
that has been grounded in a consistent role played by the country’s clan 
elders, as a traditional elite, which has emerged as the ongoing arbiter in 
mediating political conflict and accommodation among Somaliland’s political 
actors within the shared goal of international recognition. This thesis has 
emerged as a study of the interplay of internal and external forces in shaping 
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a strategy for acquiring international recognition and national self-
determination.  
 
6.1 Revisiting the Politics of Reconciliation 
 
The comparative difference in British and Italian colonial governing cultures 
and strategies appears to have been a seminal factor in the evolution of 
divergent regional paths of political development between the north-west and 
southern regions of the Somali coast. References made to John Drysdale’s 
discussion of the different fates of the “Somali hybrid insurance system”484 
can be seen as indicative of how Somali society, in the different Somali 
regions under various colonial influences, responded to the challenges of 
reconciling tradition and modernity. In Somaliland, in the north-west, a more 
workable accommodation between these tendencies took root. This, in turn, 
influenced the evolution of an intimate relationship between the traditional 
authority of clan elders as a coherent leadership class and the more modern 
nationalist political tendencies that developed from popular resistance to 
centralised authoritarian military rule from Mogadishu under Siad Barre. This 
relationship underpinned a more coherent anti-Barre resistance in and around 
Hargeisa, compared to the increasingly fragmented politics of anti-Barre 
resistance in southern Somalia; a fragmentation that has unfolded along clan 
lines of traditional authority interacting with more avowedly ‘modern’ post-
colonial nationalist actors.  
 
                                                 
484 John Drysdale’s website: http://www.somalilandsurveys.info/Article.htm   
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The emergence of the SNM in Somaliland, as the vanguard of the region’s 
resistance, cannot be adequately understood without examining the intimate 
interaction between the SNM leadership and the region’s clan elders. By not 
being marginalised by SNM nationalists, but rather by being allowed to play a 
key role in mobilising resistance, the clan elders became a crucial political 
factor in legitimising the resistance and in generating its popular base which, 
ultimately, in turn, forged a ‘national consciousness’ that propelled the SNM 
toward Somaliland’s unilateral declaration of independence. The 
independence drive was motivated by a popular determination not to become 
drawn into the endemic instability, which was already becoming an enduring 
feature of Mogadishu-based politics in southern Somalia. This, however, did 
not imply that the role of the clan elders in Somaliland automatically conferred 
stability on this sectional state-building project. As Somaliland’s brief history 
shows, the staying power of the nation-building project was far from 
guaranteed amid internal tensions and conflicts within the SNM and between 
the movement and local power brokers that erupted into recurring violence, 
conflict and civil war, before settling down into the more normalised political 
contestation of a stable polity. Furthermore, these internal conflicts which 
challenged Somaliland’s stability were accompanied by border tensions with 
an autonomous Puntland that opted to remain within a Mogadishu-based 
federal Somalia, thereby becoming a sort of ‘frontline state’ between 
Somaliland and the rest of Somalia, where political actors deemed Somaliland 
to be an integral part of Somalia. 
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Nevertheless, all along the way, the clan elders – and their increasing 
incorporation into Somaliland’s democratic political system – emerged as a 
decisive stabilising factor in reconciliatory conflict mediation, management 
and resolution; a role that endures to this day, as Somaliland has evolved 
along a relatively stable electoral path of local, presidential and parliamentary 
democratic politics.485 All in all, the traditional authority of the clan elders has 
evolved as a central factor in Somaliland’s nation-building politics of 
reconciliation. This political fact of life is testament to the extent to which 
tradition and modernity became rooted in north-west Somalia’s development, 
as Somaliland has found its own reconciliation in a workable accommodation. 
This defines a coming to terms with what Somalilanders consider to be their 
own home-grown approach to democratic governance.  
 
Somaliland, therefore, is the organic product of an historical political process; 
one reflecting a degree of ‘national integration’ between elite and mass, 
traditional authority and nationalist leadership, reflecting a merging of ‘top-
down’ and ‘bottom-up’ dynamics in arriving at the Somaliland national-state 
and social formation. This has occurred amid continuing conflict and 
fragmentation elsewhere in the Somali region despite repeated attempts at 
African and international externally driven ‘top-down’ interventions to 
                                                 
485 I.M. Lewis, ‘Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox’, Africa, Vol. 74, No. 4, 
(2004), pp. 489-515. Lewis examines how Somalis have “to contend with the intractable force 
of segmentary lineage identity, which has proved extremely difficult to adapt and 
accommodate to the requirements of modern statehood.” 
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reconstitute Somalia, including the latest embattled and besieged TFG 
initiative.486 
 
6.2 Reconstructing Polity, Society and Economy 
 
The sustainability of national reconciliation in Somaliland’s precarious 
predicament of international diplomatic isolation has hinged on post-conflict 
reconstruction which, in turn, rests on the extent to which Somaliland’s 
leaders can engage the international community as a partner in its 
development, if not in their quest for recognition. However, diplomatic 
recognition remains crucial to Somaliland’s prospects of attracting sufficient 
donor aid and investment capital to underwrite reconstruction. This, in turn, 
reinforces reconciliation.  
 
Reconciliation, however, whatever the prospects for generating international 
support for reconstruction, remains central to the country’s leaders in enabling 
them to overcome international isolation by, among other things, projecting 
Somaliland as a demonstration model of self-reliant democratic political 
stability in an otherwise chaotic region. With the recurring failures at 
reconstituting a stable state in southern Somalia, reconciliatory nation-building 
has become more and more essential to attracting international partners in 
                                                 
486 Hussein M. Adam, ‘Somalia: international versus local attempts at peacebuilding’ Durable 
peace: challenges for peacebuilding in Africa, Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, (eds.), 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, (2004), p. 253. 
Markus V. Höhne, 'Political identity, emerging state structures and conflict in northern 
Somalia’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3, (2006), pp. 1-18. Anthony Vinci, 
‘An analysis and comparison of armed groups in Somalia’, African Security Review, Vol. 15, 
No. 1, (2006). Markus V. Höhne, ‘Traditional Authorities in Northern Somalia: Transformation 
of Positions and Powers’, Working Paper No. 82, Max Planck Institute for Social 
Anthropology, Halle / Saale, (2006).  
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reconstruction. By extension, this increasingly affords Somaliland effective de 
facto, if not formal, recognition that is essential to generating reconstructive 
momentum. It would appear that Somaliland is succeeding in achieving this 
end.487 
 
From a practical standpoint, UN agencies have pragmatically seen it to be in 
their interest to nurture Somaliland’s development, as a means of having 
access to a stable outpost in the region from which to address the Somali 
region’s problems, apart from engaging the area from Nairobi in Kenya. This 
has underlined the importance of political stability as a precondition for 
advancing reconstruction and, along with that, the close relationship between 
the politics of reconciliation and the internal and external politics and 
diplomacy of reconstruction.  
 
Somaliland’s relative stability has encouraged pragmatic creativity on the part 
of the UNDP in addressing development challenges in Somalia in such a way 
as to benefit Somaliland. However, many analysts question whether UN 
agencies have played a serious development role in Somaliland.488  
                                                 
487 Stephen Ellis, ‘How to Rebuild Africa’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, (September/October 2005), p.114. 
International Crisis Group, ‘Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership’, Africa Report No.110, (23 May 2006). 
John Prendergast, ‘More than Counter-Terrorism: Rethinking US Policy toward Somalia’, Testimony before the 
House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International 
Operations, Washington, D.C., (29 June 2006). J. Peter Pham, ‘Somalia: Expanding Crisis in the Horn of Africa, 
Background, Challenges, and Opportunities of an Islamist Takeover’, Testimony before the House Committee on 
International Relations Subcommittees on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations and 
International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Washington, D.C., (29 June 2006). Saad Noor, ’Somaliland: Past, 
Present and Future’, Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittees on Africa, 
Global Human Rights, and International relations and International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Washington, D.C., 
(29 June 2006). 
488 Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
(1994). Veteran Algerian diplomat who served as UN special representative to Somalia until his controversial 
resignation six weeks before the landing of US troops in December 1992, contends that between the outbreak of civil 
war in 1988 and the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in January 1991, the United Nations missed at least three 
opportunities to prevent large-scale loss of life. Sahnoun’s view that the United Nations continues to respond with 
inept improvisation seems to hold in the case of Somaliland too. A refreshing exception is the recent visits to 
Somaliland of the UN special envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Fall, who is attempting to bring the case of Somaliland 
to the attention of the UN Security Council.  
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Reconstruction entails both political and socio-economic and economic 
dimensions. Hence, the politics of reconciliation organically merge into the 
political and economic imperatives of reconstruction. The political 
reconstruction of Somaliland’s institutions of governance, for example, are a 
natural outgrowth of the politics of reconstruction, in as much as stability has 
hinged on the importance of Somaliland developing a modern electoral 
system of democratic governance. But this had to happen simultaneously with 
the stabilisation of society through the repatriation of exiles and refugees 
interacting with a concerted disarmament-demobilisation-rehabilitation-
reconstruction programme, while integrating marginalised groups, including 
women, into the socio-economic fabric.  
 
Reconstruction has also entailed the building of an institutionalised civil 
society through the development of non-governmental research bodies like 
the SAPD, accompanied by the revival of primary, secondary and tertiary 
educational and training institutions. This is a process in which the Somaliland 
diaspora has played an active role irrespective of whether Somalilanders in 
other countries returned home or not. 
 
Several civil society organisations, along with institutions of higher learning, 
have been critical in filling a ‘development gap’ that a fledgling and woefully 
under-capacitated government has been hard-put to address. These 
organisations, in conjunction with diverse inputs from the Somaliland 
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diaspora, have expanded the spectrum of actors for donor engagement in the 
reconstruction and development process. The diaspora has also emerged as 
a critical constituency of socio-economic sustainability via the development of 
a remittance economy – and also as a political factor in the country’s 
modernisation of governance through the emergence of a constitutional 
democratic system. The extent to which Somalilanders outside Somaliland 
emerge as a major constituency in the mix of internal political actors could 
become an important factor to monitor when tracking the development of a 
normalising routine of periodic local, parliamentary and presidential elections 
that are able to take place with a minimum of state-threatening crisis. Here, 
the elders are continuing to play a major stabilising role amidst election 
outcomes that continue to be bitterly contested to a point where stability could 
be threatened without their intervention. Their incorporation into the 
constitutional governing process may prove to be an enduring stabilising 
feature of Somaliland’s political reconstruction over the long term.  
 
While constructing and reconstructing government and non-government 
institutions, Somaliland has had to undertake an audit of critically strategic 
economic sectors for development, for which donor aid and/or foreign 
investment could be mobilised. While critical sectors include livestock, the 
marine economy, education and training, and the environment and transport 
communications, Somaliland’s Berbera port, along with Berbera’s enormous 
air strip for landing heavy cargoes has proved to be a critical comparative 
advantage for Hargeisa in the Horn of Africa’s strategic calculus of 
neighbouring state actors. Ethiopia’s quest for strategic flexibility and options 
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in overcoming its land-locked status as a result of conflict and tensions with 
Eritrea has enhanced the role of Somaliland and Somaliland’s infrastructural 
reconstruction and development overall. As such, Somaliland has benefited 
from its relations with Ethiopia, with the latter nation emerging as a major 
benefactor in the country’s reconstruction and development in search of 
alternatives to being totally dependent on Djibouti as a port outlet for sea and 
ocean-going exports and imports.  
 
Somaliland, therefore, has emerged as a major factor in Addis Ababa’s 
diplomacy of balancing its interests with other neighbouring states in the sub-
region, Djibouti in particular, as the latter nation desires to be Ethiopia’s sole 
port outlet. Port Sudan and Kenya’s port at Mombasa are also other options. 
However, Ethiopia has gone ahead with its plans to increase links with 
Somaliland via Berbera, through which the Ethiopian Electric Power 
Corporation (EEPCo) has begun importing its cargo. Despite Djibouti’s 
misgivings, Addis is loath to place all its import-export eggs in one transport-
communications basket. In fact, an Ethiopia-Djibouti-Somaliland transport 
nexus could conceivably emerge as a potential nucleus for forging a regional 
economic co-operation and integration zone that could eventually contribute 
to the stabilisation of the Horn of Africa. Here, Somaliland, as a stable political 
entity that resists reintegration with the rest of Somalia, is of immense 
strategic use to Ethiopia – Addis Ababa having a vested security interest in 
the Somali region restabilising more as a community of loosely associated, if 
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not independent states, so as to forestall Somalia’s reconsolidation as an 
encircling irredentist threat.489 
 
6.3 The Role of Religion in a Turbulent Region 
 
One of the overriding threats that has emerged as challenging stability in the 
Horn of Africa, apart from the various intra-state tensions and conflicts which 
regional states are grappling with, is the threat of militant politicised Islamist 
tendencies, notably the recent rise of Islamic Courts in Mogadishu. This 
observation, made in 2005, has been reinforced by the ascendancy of the 
Islamic courts to political dominance in Mogadishu and in much of the south 
during 2006, throwing the future of the TFG into serious doubt. Thus, in the 
wake of the September 11, 2001 jihadist suicide attacks in the US, the 
religious factor in North-East African politics has come under increasing 
scrutiny both from within and outside the region, given the Horn of Africa’s 
geo-strategic positioning within what Western observers widely consider to be 
an ‘arch of crisis’ and instability encompassing the ‘Afrabian’ Red Sea as well 
as the Persian Gulf up into South-West and Central Asia. Somalia’s post-1991 
disintegration has heightened this perceived threat with regard to the role and 
                                                 
489 Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles emphasised the stability of Somaliland as a welcome 
development for Ethiopia: “The ultimate status of Somaliland, in our view, will depend on the 
Somali people and not on the will of the Ethiopian government. Until such time, as its final 
status is resolved in some fashion, Somaliland continues to be a beacon of stability in a 
troubled region. That is a very welcome development for Ethiopia and I believe for the 
international community. We will do whatever we can to promote stability throughout Somalia, 
including Somaliland. We will engage all entities and forces in Somalia that promote stability 
and peace in the region. And therefore we will continue to engage the Somaliland authorities 
in terms of trade, security and other issues of mutual interest. Nothing much has changed in 
this regard [concerning our attitude towards Somaliland] and we hope it continues to be the 
case.” 
‘Ethiopia: Meles On the Economy’, Addis Fortune, (4 July 2006). 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200607050890.html 
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prospects of Islamism within the region, with obvious implications for the 
sustainability of Somaliland’s status as an outpost of stability in an otherwise 
troubled area.  
 
While groups that closely monitor developments along the Somali peninsula, 
such as the International Crisis Group, recognise southern Somalia, in 
particular, as a refuge for members of the al-Qaeda network that bombed the 
Kenyan resort hotel in Mombasa in November 2002, it is widely observed that 
Somalis in general have shown little interest in militant political Islam. In fact, 
more concern in this region appears to centre on developments across the 
Gulf of Aden in Yemen as a potential staging ground of jihadist initiatives. On 
the Somali side of the Gulf, Islamist-oriented movements have failed to gain 
broad-based ideological popular support in spite of the anarchic environment 
that has obtained in the region since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the 
statelessness of southern Somalia has offered a convenient sanctuary for 
militant Islamists, including jihadist tendencies in an environment where 
fragmentation, factional and intra-factional tensions and conflict have become 
endemic to the point of rendering the region ungovernable.  
 
The establishment of Islamic courts in southern Somalia and their brief rise to 
dominance in Mogadishu has, however, revealed their own internal divisions 
between those favouring the establishment of an Islamist state and more 
moderate Islamist tendencies opposed to such an imposition. The balance 
has tilted against the moderate at the time of writing. However, it should be 
pointed out that such courts sprang up, in the first instance, largely in 
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response to demands for increased order and security in a stateless society. 
Still, Islamists have been a factor contributing to the ungovernability of the 
region in terms of resistance to the establishment of a Mogadishu-based TFG 
administration and to an AU and/or UN peacekeeping presence, if it is at all 
possible that such foreign troops could help facilitate its establishment while 
stabilising the region. Whether or not negotiations materialise between the 
TFG and the Islamists to alter this situation is unclear, though clearly, now, 
political Islamism emerges as an unavoidable part of the Somali region’s 
stabilisation equation and, along with it, the offsetting potential for 
destabilising rival interventions in the region’s politics by Ethiopia and 
Eritrea.490 
 
Islamists throughout the Somali region, Somaliland included, have contributed 
to an environment of insecurity in terms of murders, kidnappings, hijackings 
and assassinations of foreigners and Somalis alike. However, Somaliland has 
emerged as a comparatively vigilant actor in countering jihadist threats within 
its own neighbourhood along the Somali coast. This in turn, has enhanced its 
relations with neighbouring Ethiopia, while making it an ally with Djibouti in the 
US-led ‘war on terror’ in the Afrabian Red Sea region of intersection between 
Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, unlike the endemic fragmentation 
and in-fighting within and between clans in the south, the existence of a 
coherent clan leadership in Somaliland, which has been a mediating force for 
stability, has so far militated against Islamism gaining even a marginal 
foothold in the north-west Somali region. Thus, Islamic institutions such as 
                                                 
490 'Arms flown in for Islamic militants – Somalia', Business Day, (27 July 2006), p. 6. 
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Sharia law and Islamic schools funded by Islamic charities do not appear to 
generate the degree of concern that such institutions may generate elsewhere 
in the Muslim world, although Somali financial transaction networks such as 
the southern Somalia Al-Barakaat companies have come under pressure from 
the US as possible conduits for channeling funds to jihadists. Otherwise, the 
intimate intertwining of Islam and Somali culture and identity appears to have 
inoculated the region from the political goals of Islamism in the quest for an 
Islamic state or ‘caliphate'. This appears particularly to be the case in 
Somaliland, which exists at the very cross-roads of Islam’s historic penetration 
and dissemination throughout North-East Africa. 
 
Prior to the events of 2006 it would have appeared that the Somali peninsula 
as a region steeped in Islam rather than alienated from it, did not seem to 
make the region and Somaliland, in particular, a fertile battleground in the ‘war 
on terror.’ With regard to the south, this may be debatable with the brief rise of 
an Islamist judicial regime. Otherwise, according to most analysts on the 
region, the variety of Islamic reform movements that have sprung up along the 
Somali peninsula have been non-violent and opposed to ideological 
extremism. Islamic schools that, like madrassas elsewhere in the Muslim 
world, have come under suspicion as mechanisms for disseminating anti-
Western Wahabist extremist doctrine, are seen in Somaliland as a necessary 
complement to a still developing education system, though there is concern 
about the capacity of such institutions to adequately fill the gap in the 
education sector. It is in southern Somalia rather than in Somaliland where 
the greatest concern is focused on the potential destabilising influence of 
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militant political Islam and jihadist tendencies as derivative of the south’s lack 
of stable governance. For the time being, the refuge that the south presents to 
jihadists appears not to show signs of developing as a destabilising threat to 
the security and cohesion of the Somaliland national project, though the 
irredentist goals of some Islamists could well prove a threat to Somaliland. In 
fact, it is this latter potential threat that has motivated recent rival Ethio-
Eritrean interventions in southern Somalia’s conflict between the Islamic 
courts and the TFG; the TFG and the courts threatening to become proxies in 
a larger Horn of Africa confrontation emanating out of hostilities between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia.  
 
6.4 Recognition Quo Vadis? 
 
Developments in the Somali region have continued to reinforce the credibility 
of Somaliland as a stabilising 'good citizen' state actor that cannot be ignored 
in calculating the future of the Horn of Africa. The troubles that continue to 
plague the installation of the TFG as a reconstituted government for Somalia 
in Mogadishu, matched against the continuing political development of 
Somaliland as an on-the-ground state reality, is visibly eroding the historic 
African resistance to recognising new post-colonial states that were once part 
of already existing countries recognised by the United Nations, the OAU and 
its successor AU. Perhaps, the critical element of the timing of Somaliland’s 
emergence on the scene, interacting with the continent’s new priorities and 
those of a few major AU member states has made all the difference for 
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Somaliland’s prospects, aided by the seemingly unending problems of re-
establishing a Somali government in Mogadishu.  
 
Somaliland’s strategic importance to Ethiopia is well-established.491 While 
nurturing without diplomatically recognising the Hargeisa regime, Ethiopia has 
also been orchestrating efforts to re-establish a Somali government based in 
Mogadishu along a federalist course that would also serve its national security 
interest in forestalling the regrouping of Somali irredentism. Somaliland, 
however, has emerged as a key ally of Ethiopia in facilitating its efforts to 
overcome its land-locked predicament. However, Somaliland has also had the 
good fortune to have been able to develop an excellent rapport with post-
apartheid South Africa; South Africa’s leaders being drawn to Somaliland as 
an attractive model of a reasonably efficient, functioning example of good 
governance under the tenets that Pretoria has been promoting through 
NEPAD. As a result, Somaliland’s leaders have been able, through a tireless 
diplomacy featuring regular contacts and consultations with South Africa and 
Ethiopia, to make important headway towards its goal of becoming a 
diplomatically recognised government by the AU and the international 
community. 
 
                                                 
491 In addition to Somaliland’s strategic security value, 2006 statistics refer to brisk inter-
border trade of some 458 million Ethiopian birr exported via the Ethiopian border town of 
Jijiga. Items exported include fresh milk, khat, live animals and animal produce exported to 
Somaliland. ‘Office earns close to 458mln birr in foreign currency from export to Somaliland’, 
Walta Information Center, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, (15 July 2006). 
http://www.waltainfo.com/EnNews/2006/Jul/15Jul06/15459.htm 
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Ethiopia and South Africa, and more recently Kenya, Rwanda and Zambia 
have been instrumental in nurturing Somaliland into a position of gaining a 
serious hearing from the AU. Given Somaliland’s ongoing stabilisation under 
its home-grown reconciliatory nation-building programme, reinforced by a 
reasonably successful electoral transition, and given the continuing turmoil in 
southern Somalia, Hargeisa has been able to advance its case for recognition 
in at least two crucial respects. In the first instance, there has been progress 
in advancing the 'legal and factual bases' supporting Somaliland’s right to 
internationally-recognised sovereign status. In the second instance, 
interrelated to the first, Somaliland has been able to establish its own dialogue 
with the AU, including an AU fact-finding mission to the country that has 
further enhanced its credibility. 
 
The AU fact-finding mission to Somaliland, 30 April to 4 May 2005, led by the 
Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission, H.E. Patrick Masimhaka of 
Rwanda, in issuing its report, came to the following overall assessment: 
 
• There has been an accelerated process of state-building anchored “on 
the recognition by the Somalilanders of the inherited colonial borders at 
the time of independence from Britain in June 1960”;  
• Somaliland has a constitution “that emanated from grassroots 
consultations and was sealed in the referendum held in 2003 …”; 
• Somaliland “has territory as defined by the colonial borders inherited 
from the British colonial rule on accession to independence in 1960” 
wherein it “has only declared its own independence, after ‘reclaiming it 
 332
from the collapsed union’” which is backed up by “a standing army with 
a ‘mandate to defend the independence and territorial integrity of 
Somaliland’ …”; 
• Somaliland “has achieved peace and stability, through a home-grown 
disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration process and internally 
driven democratisation” alongside the fact that Somaliland “has a real 
economic potential, based on its surface and sub-surface resources 
and maritime resources.”492 
 
Among other findings, observations and recommendations, the mission report 
concluded that: 
 
Whilst it remains a primary responsibility of the authorities and people of 
Somaliland to deploy efforts to acquire political recognition from the 
international community, the AU should be disposed to judge the case of 
Somaliland from an objective historical viewpoint and a moral angle vis-à-vis 
the aspirations of the people (italics added). Furthermore, given the acute 
humanitarian situation prevailing in Somaliland, the AU should mobilise 
financial resources to help alleviate the plight of the affected communities, 
especially those catering for the IDPs and Returnees. 
 
Finally, given, also, the high potential for conflict between Mogadishu and 
Hargeisa, the AU should take steps to discuss critical issues in the relations 
between the two towns. That initiative should be taken the [at] earliest 
possible. 
                                                 
492 African Union Commission, ‘Resume. AU Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland, (30 April to 
4 May 2005)’, Unpublished 4-page report, Addis Ababa: African Union, (2005). 
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The findings from the AU mission were followed up by the AU conducting its 
own 'summary of the legal and factual bases for Somaliland’s right to 
international recognition as an independent state'. This unpublished document 
– 'Somaliland’s Right to International Recognition of its Sovereign Status: A 
Summary of legal and factual bases' – echoes similar terrain covered by the 
South African legal advisory on Somaliland prepared by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs. However, it goes beyond the South African advisory by stating 
that “the OAU’s historical respect for the principle of uti posseditis favours 
Somaliland’s claim to sovereignty within the boundaries of the former British 
Somaliland Protectorate” and further: “Somaliland’s international recognition 
would also be consistent with Article 4(b) of the AU Constitutive act, since it 
preserves the ‘borders existing on achievement of independence’” and 
therefore, “from this perspective, Somaliland’s admission to the African Union 
would set no precedent for secession elsewhere in Somalia or the continent; it 
would preserve a well-established AU practice of permitting former states or 
colonial entities to reclaim their sovereign status” (italics added).  
 
Somaliland, therefore, has indeed come a long way on its recognition journey 
from the point of its post-conflict reconciliatory nation-building beginnings in 
the early 1990s. How its leaders have managed to politically and 
diplomatically manoeuvre Somaliland into a position of credibility in a region 
where the OAU had built up a track-record of failure in navigating post-
colonial African self-determination claims is little more than historic in the 
context of inter-African relations: unilateral declaration of independence from 
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an OAU/AU and UN recognised African state without breaching the sanctity of 
‘territorial integrity’; a breakaway without secession; and self-determination for 
a region of an existing African state without establishing a precedent for future 
secessionist initiatives elsewhere in Africa!493 
 
Moreover, short of actual full-fledged recognition by the AU and the 
international community, the AU mission report clearly advances Somaliland’s 
case for attracting international donor aid and foreign investment on 
humanitarian grounds that should go far in helping Hargeisa overcome 
Somaliland’s international isolation. If nothing else, Somaliland’s international 
isolation has been virtually overcome. The question is, after having gone this 
far in acknowledging the reality of Somaliland and its achievement of 'peace 
and stability', how far will the AU go in acting on the mission’s and the legal 
summary’s findings and recommendations? To what extent will the realpolitik 
of the status quo reassert inertia in addressing the question of Somaliland’s 
status? Will the AU leverage its acknowledgement of Somaliland’s credibility 
as an independent state in African terms into imposing order on southern 
Somalia while at least meeting Somaliland half-way in its recognition quest?  
 
6.5 2006: Reflections 
 
2006 was a year of momentous developments encompassing the Somali 
region; developments that involved radical shifts and reversals in the fortunes 
                                                 
493 This theme is explored in Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, The Future of Africa: a new order 
in sight?, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi paper 361, (2003), pp. 
38-40. 
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of the different actors in southern Somalia with implications for Somaliland. 
Here, in fact, it is instructive to reflect on a possible scenario that was outlined 
in this manuscript at least a year ago in addressing the possibilities of an 
Islamist ascendancy in the south following the formation of the Kenya-based 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Chapter 3, on the religious 
dimension of ‘the four Rs,’ in many ways anticipated the developments that 
would unfold in 2006 though not the actual outcome that transpired on the 
ground. The challenge confronting the TFG at the time was that it was unable 
to deploy from Kenya to Mogadishu while the establishment of an AU 
peacekeeping force in southern Somalia, let alone Ethiopian troops, had 
already generated an Islamist-inspired mobilisation.  
 
In 2006, events pretty much unfolded as projected in Chapter 3, though the 
culmination of events went against the Islamists and rebounded to the benefit 
of the TFG’s final entry into Mogadishu after having been politically forced out 
of Kenya into the town of Baidoa. What unfolded was an Islamist ascendancy 
that swept away warlord ‘rule’ in Mogadishu and resulted in the establishment 
of a short-lived regime in southern Somalia under the rule of the Union of 
Islamic Courts (UIC). However, the Islamic Courts over-reached themselves 
in their militancy and began espousing irredentist sentiments that inspired 
Ethiopian military intervention to protect the TFG and, beyond that, launch 
joint operations with TFG militia supporters to roll back the UIC Islamists and 
install the Baidoa-based TFG in Mogadishu. The catalyst driving this scenario 
was the outbreak of a mini-civil war in Mogadishu between the Islamists, who 
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had consolidated themselves into the UIC, and warlords backed by U.S.-
funding in the name of fighting terrorism and alleged al-Qaeda influence. 
 
It was a popular revulsion swelling up into a mobilisation that propelled the 
UIC victory over the warlords as Somalis grabbed the opportunity of the 
Courts emergence to make a bid for imposing stability by ousting the 
warlords. The U.S. decision to back the warlords as a narrowly focused anti-
terror strategy may have been a fatal error, not only in discrediting the U.S. in 
the eyes of Somalis on the ground, but in tipping the political balance within 
the UIC toward the most militant, extremist, pro-jihadist elements. Beyond 
sweeping the boards of the warlords, the UIC began to eye the TFG itself 
which, in large measure, reflected an accommodation with warlord elements 
in its very unstable structuring. Moreover the TFG’s vulnerability before the 
advance of the Courts in town after town motivated an Ethiopian troop 
deployment in Baidoa as protection of the TFG; a move which, in turn, 
inspired stepped up Eritrean military support for the Courts as a counter to 
Ethiopia’s intervention – hence adding a new potentially regionally 
destabilising dimension in the transformation of conflict in southern Somalia 
into a proxy war. 
 
Eritrea’s backing of the UIC would dovetail with its support for Oromo and 
Ogaden insurgents within Ethiopia’s vast eastern borderlands in direct 
proximity to Somalia. The problem this caused however was that increasing 
expansionist rhetoric by the UIC regarding intentions of re-uniting all Somali-
speaking territories into a ‘United Somalia’ fed Ethiopia’s threat perception of 
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a return to the very Somali irredentism of the Barre regime. This sentiment 
had propelled the Siad Barre regime into the Ogaden in the late 70s, 
triggering the Ethio-Somali war that resulted in Somalia’s defeat, internal 
destabilisation and ouster of Barre. It was widely expected that a confluence 
of Islamism and irredentism would be just the cocktail combination to justify, 
for the Ethiopians, a military initiative against the Courts aimed at rolling back 
their political advances in the south and installing their TFG clients into power 
in Mogadishu. 
 
The proxy dimension to the TFG-UIC confrontation extended into a broader 
alignment on both sides of the conflict. Beyond Eritrea there was a broader 
alliance. Egypt, Sudan and the Arab bloc generally, including Saudi Arabia 
and even Iran were lined up behind the Courts while the AU, including the 
member states of IGAD, were seen as committed to the TFG and, at least 
politically, in favour of the deployment of a peacekeeping force which the UIC 
and its allies rejected.  Until the UIC over-reached itself, it was seen as 
generally having the politico-diplomatic upper hand as its backer sought to 
have the Courts negotiate their way into a power-sharing arrangement with 
the TFG which would ultimately favour the Islamist given their on-the-ground 
military dominance over the TFG. While negotiations gave the UIC and its 
backers the ‘moral high ground,’ talks arranged in Khartoum went no where, 
ultimately leading to the dead-end that resulted in the UIC’s ouster by Ethiopia 
and the TFG.    
 
 338
Although the Ethiopian intervention had the blessing of the U.S. and was 
generally depicted as a collusion between the two, in terms of Washington’s 
‘war on terror’ and long-standing alliance with Addis, Ethiopia had its own 
intrinsic security interests which are widely understood. It’s land-locked 
vulnerability to ‘Islamic encirclement’ and threat to its territorial integrity 
combined with its tug-of-war with Egypt over regional influence centring on the 
Nile ensure that Somalia will always occupy a priority interest in Addis’ 
security calculations. Thus, in spite of the enmity between Ethiopia and 
Somalia, the AU initially sanctioned Addis’ intervention as a ‘right to self-
defence’ although it quickly followed up by signalling the need for a relatively 
speedy troop withdrawal.494 Ethiopia, indeed, at the time of writing, is 
implementing a phased troop withdrawal from Somalia irrespective of how 
rapidly it takes for an AU peacekeeping force to be deployed. The bottom-line 
is that whether Somalia is with or without a functioning government, Addis 
cannot afford to have a hostile Somali regime in Mogadishu. This is where 
consideration of the status of Somaliland comes into the picture given the 
good relations that exist between Addis and the unrecognised regime in 
Hargeisa. 
 
The outbreak of hostilities in the south between the Islamic Courts and an 
Ethiopia-backed TFG was not seen as boding well for Somaliland’s future 
given the politico-diplomatic isolation of the TFG and Ethiopia prior to Addis’ 
military move against the Courts. The confrontation forced Ethiopia to tilt more 
                                                 
494 ‘Joint Communiqué – African Union, League of Arab States and the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development, On the current situation in Somalia’, Addis Ababa, (27 December 
2006). 
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in favour of the TFG and Puntland as the first lines of defence against the UIC 
Islamist advance while seemingly pushing Somaliland to the sidelines. 
Somaliland’s marginalisation was coupled by the threat of a steady 
encroachment of the UIC into Somaliland based on links between pro-
Islamists linked to the Courts in Mogadishu. This prospect was being 
spearheaded by protest in and outside Somaliland over the arrest and 
detention of dissident Sheik Mohammed Ismail. A war of words ensued 
between the UIC and Hargeisa until the UIC changed tack in November when 
officials began emphasising an intent to apologise to the people of Somaliland 
for the atrocities of the Barre regime and to compensate them in the interest 
of an eventual re-uniting of north and south. This dialogue tack signalled an 
attempt to defuse a potential confrontation between the UIC and Somaliland, 
which would only have compounded the UIC’s main preoccupation with the 
TFG. Similarly, the ultimately victorious Ethiopian-backed TFG has also had 
to backtrack on statements that could be interpreted as implying an eventual 
confrontation between Somaliland and southern Somalia over re-unification. 
 
From a strategic perspective of stabilising the Somali Coast, the travails of 
southern Somalia would seem to re-emphasise the importance of African and 
international diplomatic recognition of Somaliland as a stable, democratic 
‘zone of peace’ in the region. Somaliland could become the focal point of an 
alternative bid to consolidate regional stability. On the other hand, given the 
new lease on life provided the TFG by Ethiopia’s intervention, some foresaw a 
possibility of Somaliland once again being marginalised in its unrecognised 
isolation as African and international attention sifted back toward shoring up a 
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TFG now finally seated in Mogadishu. This could very well prove to be the 
case were it not for the sustained interest that the AU Commission has taken 
in Somaliland, which has taken the form of an ongoing dialogue interacting 
with AU fact-finding missions. This has resulted in what could very well be a 
bid by the AU during 2007 to unblock the unrecognised status of Somaliland 
as an acknowledgement that it is indeed a special case of restoring 
independence rather than an outright secession. Thus, Somaliland’s 
achievement of some form of interim recognition and/or AU observer status 
may be one of the outcomes of the UIC-TFG confrontation in southern 
Somalia and the intervention of Ethiopia; an outcome compelled by Africa’s 
felt need to stabilise the Horn region and check any prospect of an Islamist 
ascendancy in eastern Africa. Should the AU take such a comparatively bold 
step, this would ensure that Somaliland would not be back onto the back-
burner by renewed international attention on a Mogadishu regime. Somaliland 
would emerge as an equalising factor in the stabilisation equation in the 
Somali coastal region. At this stage, the ball is in the AU’s court.   
 
6.6 Somaliland: Implications for Further Inquiry 
 
Thus, the progress that Somaliland has made along the road to still unfulfilled 
recognition raises more questions than answers. But these are very crucial 
and fundamental questions that beg further research into the politics and 
diplomacy of post-colonial African efforts at state reconstruction and the 
reconfiguring of regional inter-state relations and the role that extra-African 
actors and the international community can or may play in this process. 
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Further inquiry, inspired by the Somaliland ‘bottom-up’ nation-building 
experience challenged by Hargeisa’s quest for international recognition with 
its internal interplay and balance of forces, might focus on some of the 
following areas of interest: 
 
• A more in-depth examination of how differing, regionally-based colonial 
experiences in the Somali region, interacting with the different nationalist 
responses to colonialism and post-colonial independence that have 
emerged, have contributed to the Somali region’s current predicament of 
a fractured Somali identity and the implications that the different 
trajectories of political development in north-west Somalia-cum-
Somaliland versus the rest of the Somali coast holds for regional stability 
or endemic instability in the Somali-speaking lands and for the Greater 
Horn of Africa. To what extent can Somaliland and the rest of Somalia – 
based on their differing political histories – become reconciled in a new 
political relationship that might include other Somali-speaking 
communities in Djibouti, the Ethiopian Ogaden and the Kenyan Northern 
Frontier District within the framework of a Greater Horn of Africa regional 
integration project within the framework of the AU?495 To what extent are 
these prospects complicated by the rise of political Islam in southern 
Somalia? 
• Somaliland’s quest for international recognition as a sovereign, 
independent state, while compelling, nevertheless, challenges the pan-
African regional integration paradigm evolving within the framework of the 
                                                 
495 Leenco Lata, The Horn of Africa as Common Homeland. The State and Self-Determination 
in the Era of Heightened Globalisation, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, (2004). 
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AU. At a time when Africa needs to overcome its colonially-inherited 
fragmentation which strikes at the very heart of the continent’s endemic 
weakness and instability, how can an internationally-recognised 
independent Somaliland contribute toward enhancing regional integration 
in the Greater Horn of Africa? This begs a more basic fundamental 
question for AU/NEPAD Africa: How can continuing post-colonial African 
aspirations for self-determination be reconciled with the imperatives of 
greater sub-regional and continental integration in an era of globalisation 
which Africa finds hard to cope with? Can such aspirations be satisfied 
short of sovereign independence within larger unions of federated or 
confederated states?496 
• Somaliland’s emergence is a product of state collapse and disintegration. 
To what extent can the Somaliland experience contribute to the gaining of 
new insights on how to overcome and/or recover from state collapse 
and/or disintegration within a larger unstable region, while at the same 
time factoring in a broader regional integration and governance agenda 
that political elites in a successor state must address in how they relate 
bilaterally to neighbouring countries and multilaterally within sub-regional 
organisations as well as at the continental level of the AU? 
• Somaliland’s ‘bottom-up’ nation-building experience holds out important 
lessons for how other African states might approach the need for 
reconciling ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ in arriving at workable nation-
building and governance strategies. This experience needs to be explored 
in more depth, perhaps within the theoretical framework offered by 
                                                 
496 The July 2006 AU Summit in Banjul, Gambia, grappled with the integration challenge and 
made little progress. 
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Mahmood Mamdani’s ‘bifurcated state’ thesis on how the colonial state 
inheritance, post-independence, institutionalises an inherently unstable 
divide between urban democratic modernity and rural-based authoritarian 
traditionalism challenging national cohesion and democratic 
consolidation.497 
 
The foregoing barely scratches the surface of possible directions that future 
inquiry inspired by the Somaliland experience might take in developing a 
research agenda on governance, post-conflict state reconstruction and 
reconstitution interacting with pressing issues of regional co-operation and 
integration. The areas outlined above are purely illustrative of where the 
Somaliland experience might lead.  
 
‘Somaliland: Post War Nation-Building and International Relations, 1991-
2006’, is intended to serve as a modest beginning by contributing to 
developing a new sub-field of International Relations dealing with the 
‘internationalisation of domestic transformation’. This thesis explores how the 
shared goal of international recognition has been a significant factor in 
disciplining domestic factions, helping to entrench reconciliation, respect for 
human rights and democratic reconstruction of institutions because – 
whatever their domestic value – these were seen as key to gaining sovereign 
recognition within the Somali coast and the Greater Horn of Africa in the 
unfolding Age of the AU and NEPAD. 
 
                                                 
497 Mamdani, Mahmood, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1996). 
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Appendix A 
Interviews 
 
 
 
Abdi, Idris Ibrahim, Somaliland Minister of Livestock 
 
Abdi, Suad, Chairperson of Nagaad Women’s Organisation, Hargeisa 
 
Abdullah, Haji Ibrahim, Head, Organization for Promoting Good and Forbidding Evil, 
Hargeisa (hayat al-amari bi-l mahruf wa nahyi an al-munkar) 
 
Abdulla, Jabril, Co-Director, Centre for Research and Dialogue, Mogadishu 
 
Abdur Rahman, Shaykh Mohamed Quraysh, Somaliland elder 
 
Abokor, Adan, Director, International Cooperation for Development, Hargeisa 
 
Abraham, Kinfe, Director, Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and 
Development, Addis Ababa 
 
Adam, Fawzia, Director, RAAD, London 
 
Adam, Jawahir Y., Humanitarian advisor, Geneva 
 
Adam, Hussein, Professor of Political Science, College of the Holy Cross 
 
Adami, Ahmed Ali, Chairperson, National Electoral Commission of Somaliland 
 
Adan, Zamzam Abdi, Committee of Concerned Somalis, Hargeisa 
 
Ahmed, Ahmed Abdi, CEO Hargeisa Spring Water 
 
Ahmed, Eid Ali, Chairperson, Somaliland Societies in Europe, London 
 
Al-Amin, Khalid, Professor of Development Studies, Khartoum University 
 
Ali, Amraan, Administrator of Hargeisa University 
 
Alemu, Tekede, Ethiopian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
 
Barkad, A. Askar, Somaliland Liaison officer, Addis Ababa 
 
Basu, Sangu, South African Ambassador to Addis Ababa 
 
Berhanu, Kassahun, Head of International Relations, University of Addis Ababa 
 
Bryden, Matt, Director, Horn of Africa, International Crisis Group, Nairobi 
 
Bujra, Abdalla, Executive Director, Development Policy Management Forum Addis 
Ababa 
 345
 
Bulhan, Hussein, Director, Centre for Creative Solutions, Hargeisa 
 
Cowburn, Rachel, Head of International Affairs, UK Labour Party 
 
Crook, Paul, Liaison officer, European Union Office, Hargeisa 
 
Dia, Mamadou, Political analyst, African Union Commission 
 
Dimbil, Hassan Dahir, Deputy Head of Mission, Somaliland Liaison Office, Addis 
Ababa 
 
Drake, Daniel, Second secretary, British Embassy, Addis Ababa  
 
Dribissa, Abdetta, Head, Ethiopian Government Trade Office, Hargeisa 
 
Drysdale, John, Somali studies specialist, Gabiley, Somaliland 
 
Duale, Abdullahi, Somaliland Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
Duale, Abduarrahman, Governor of Somaliland Reserve Bank 
 
Egal, Mohammed Haji Ebrahim, Late former President of Somaliland  
 
Egal, Khulthuum, Head of the Egal Foundation, Hargeisa 
 
Esa, Ahmed, Director, Institute of Practical Research and Training, Hargeisa 
 
Eid, Abdilkarim, CEO, Telesom, Hargeisa 
 
Fakade, Mohamed Salah Nur, Senior Somaliland politician 
 
Farah, Marwo Lulu, Chairwoman of Somaliland International Recognition Action 
Group, London 
 
Farah, Abby, Veteran Somaliland diplomat 
 
Faqi, Joseph, Editor, Sub-Saharan Informer, Addis Ababa 
 
Frazer, Jendayi, US Ambassador to South Africa 
 
Gaal, Suleiman Adam, Chairperson, Somaliland House of Elders 
 
Gaas, Mohamed, Editor, Horn Tribune, Hargeisa 
 
Galindo, David, Political Counsellor US Embassy, Addis Ababa 
 
Garey, Nole, Somalia desk officer, US State Department, Washington 
 
Gabobe, Yusuf, Editor, Somaliland Times 
 
Gebere-Egziabhert, Kisut, Editor of Ethiopian Herald 
 
Gees, Mohamed Said,  Director, Academy for Peace and Development, Hargeisa 
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Gerathu, Tesfamichael, Eritrean Ambassador to South Africa 
 
Goth, Bashir, Editor, Awdalnews.com, Dubai 
 
Gulaid, Sulaiman Ahmed, President, Amoud University, Borama, Somaliland 
 
Guleid, Abdul Karim Ahmed, Ethiopian Member of Federal Parliament and 
Chairperson, Hope for the Horn 
 
Ibrahim, Fatima, Human Rights officer, UNDP, Hargeisa 
 
Ismail, Edna Adan, Head of Edna Maternity Hospital and former Somaliland Foreign 
Minister 
 
Ismail, Mustafa Osman, Former Sudanese Foreign Minister 
 
Jama, Mohamed, Kulmiye party official, Hargeisa 
 
Jibril, Adam, Veteran Somali politician 
 
Johanneson, Wesley, Counsellor, South African Embassy, Addis Ababa 
 
Kahin, Dahir Rayale, President of Somaliland 
 
Kambudzi, Admore Mupoki, Political analyst, African Union Commission 
 
Kiir, Silva, Vice-President of Sudan and President of the Sudan Peoples Liberation 
Movement 
 
Kioko, Ben, Director of Legal Affairs, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa 
 
Lewis, Ioan M., Emeritus Professor of Anthropology, London School of Economics 
 
Lortan, Fiona, Political analyst, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa 
 
Machar, Riek, Vice-president of Government of Southern Sudan 
 
Mahdi, Maryam, Senior member, Umma Party, Khartoum 
 
Mahdi, Sadiq, President, Umma Party, Sudan 
 
Mamabolo, Kingsly, Deputy Director-General Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Pretoria 
 
Mariano, Robleh Michael, Advocate, Guardians of Civil Society, Hargeisa 
 
Mazimhaka, Patrick, Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Addis 
Ababa 
 
Mazrui, Ali, Director, Institute for Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton State 
University, New York 
 
Medhane, Assefa, Professor of International Relations, University of Addis Ababa 
 
Mohammed, Abdul, Director of Inter-Africa Group, Addis Ababa 
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Mullen, Chris, Former UK Minister for Africa 
 
Nhlapo, Welile, Director, Africa 1, United Nations, New York 
 
Neja, Sebhat, Veteran Ethiopian politician, Addis Ababa 
 
Omaar, Rakiya, Director, African Watch, Hargeisa 
 
Pahad, Aziz, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria 
 
Pahad, Essop, Minister in the Presidency, Pretoria 
 
Prunier,Gerard, Director, Ethiopian Institute of French Studies, Addis Ababa 
 
Rashid, Hassan Mohamed, Correspondent, Jamhuriyya newspaper, Hargeisa 
 
Richards, Owen, Second secretary, British Embassy, Addis Ababa 
 
Ross, Carne, Director, Independent Diplomat, London 
 
Samatar, Saeed, President, Somaliland Policy and Reconstruction Institute, Los 
Angeles 
 
Schermerhorn, Lange, International consultant and former US Ambassador to 
Djibouti 
 
Schwartz, Stephen, Political Counsellor US Embassy, Pretoria 
 
Sheikh, Abdullahi Ali Abdi, Principal, Furqaan Schools, Hargeisa (madaaris al-
Furqaan) 
 
Sheikh, Mohamed Rashid,  Senior Somaliland journalist, Hargeisa 
 
Shinn, David, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, George Washington  
University, Washington 
 
Shire, Saad, Managing Director, Dahabshiil, London and Founder of Burao 
University, Somaliland 
 
Silanyo, Ahmed, President of Somaliland Kulmiye Party, Hargeisa 
 
Simon, Bereket, Ethiopian advisor of public relations to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi 
and spokesman of the ruling EPRDF party 
 
Sufi, Mahmoud, Somaliland Minister of Awqaaf and Islamic Affairs 
 
Tadesse, Medhane, Centre for Dialogue and Research, Addis Ababa 
 
Triesman, David, UK Minister for Africa 
 
Toga, Dawit, Research analyst, Conflict Management Division, African Union 
Commission 
 
Turabi, Hassan, President, Popular Congress Party, Sudan 
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Yamamoto, Donald, US Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 
 
Young, John, Sudanese and Ethiopian studies specialist, Khartoum 
 
Warabe, Faisal, President Ucid Party, Hargeisa 
 
Worthington, Tony, Former UK Member of Parliament 
 
Zenawi, Meles, Ethiopian Prime Minister 
 
 
Additional Notes on Interviews   
During the course of my research, I discovered the need to develop a 
compelling rationale and hypothesis for this study on both theoretical and 
foreign policy grounds. This proved challenging combining an understanding 
of nation-building and the policy dilemmas of Somaliland’s international 
relations. A few notes are appropriate here in explaining how the large 
amount of interviews were used in my analysis and some of the related 
problems. 
 
This thesis is the first scholarly manuscript on Somaliland. Most studies on 
Somaliland deal with narrow aspects. In this respect, I noted that none of the 
studies were able to come up with a reasonably coherent answer to explain 
the nuances of Somaliland’s reasonable nation-building success and the 
rigidities of the international system. The range of interviews I embarked 
upon, provided rich empirical sources of information which led me to develop 
this hypothesis around the four themes of reconciliation, reconstruction, 
religion and recognition. It is particularly this analytical framework, culled from 
the numerous interviews, though not referenced individually, allowed me to 
compile quantitative data, dates, events, and weave them into a scholarly and 
meaningfully coherent narrative. I am convinced without the critical 
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information from the interviews, the development of an original hypothesis 
would have been impossible.    
 
It was this knowledgeable list of personalities that I interviewed, from heads of 
research institutes, traditional elders, policy makers, diplomats, heads of 
state, foreign affairs officials that provided answers to burning questions which 
remained un-answered in the available literature. I have made reference to 
some of the interviews and notably those who were comfortable with the idea 
of being quoted.  
 
Most persons I interviewed opted to remain anonymous. In this regard, 
referencing the names of interviewees and the anonymous forms of 
referencing protocol known to scholars, have been omitted in the footnotes, 
for confidentiality and security reasons in view of the ongoing lawlessness in 
southern Somalia and the ideological distrust evident amongst various groups 
and clans in the Horn of Africa. The concerns of confidentiality breaches, the 
promise of absolute confidentiality to those I interviewed could not be taken 
blithely, nor the privilege of scholarship. Although I was first reluctant to use 
this latter method, I concluded it was best, in the interests of the obligations of 
confidentiality, ethical rigor, the safety of interviewees, their careers and, the 
interests of many who spoke to me on the basis of strict confidence. I plan to 
undertake further research in the Horn of Africa and believe although this 
method of academic referencing is unorthodox, it will be more effective for the 
future of scholarly analysis on Somaliland and the region’s geo-political 
dynamics.    
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